Malcolm X

by Clayborne Carson

  Unsurprisingly, therefore, Malcolm’s conversion to the Islamic teachings of Elijah Muhammad involved a rejection of his past that would have been inconceivable for King. While in prison for robbery, Malcolm repudiated his earlier life and symbolized his rebirth in the Nation of Islam by abandoning his surname. He joined an organization that had not been part of his environment as a youth and acquired a new past through the racial mythology of the Nation. Malcolm’s acceptance of the idea that he was a member of the Lost-Found Nation of Islam in North America made his previous life—and indeed all the postenslavement experiences of African-Americans—only a negative reference point for his new identity. For Malcolm, black adherence to Christianity simply reflected the fact that African-Americans had been brainwashed and separated from their true history. During his adult life, Malcolm would increase his knowledge of the African-American historical literature, but he also popularized the historical myths of Elijah Muhammad, which replaced the complexities of African-American history with tales of the “Asian Black Nation” and “the tribe of Shabazz.”10 Unlike the main African-American Christian churches, the Nation of Islam did not have deep historical roots in the African-American experience, and its development was largely isolated from that of other black religious institutions. Malcolm learned from Elijah Muhammad that African-American history was not a long struggle toward freedom but simply the final stage of the decline of the “Black Man,” who had once ruled the earth. The Nation’s version of the past was not based on historical research, but it appealed to blacks such as Malcolm who did not identify with the black Christian churches that were more rooted in African-American history.

  In contrast to Malcolm’s negation of his past, King placed great importance on his family’s deep roots in the Baptist church and the Atlanta black community. King’s great-grandfather, grandfather, and father had been Baptist ministers. He saw African-American history and the history of his own family as a successful climb from enslavement to freedom and from poverty to affluence. King’s adult life as a religious leader was built upon the foundation of his childhood experiences and his ties to the African-American Baptist church and to black leadership networks. While Malcolm became a critical outsider urging blacks to reject mainstream institutions, King became a critical insider seeking to transform those institutions.

  Malcolm’s and King’s strengths and limitations as leaders were related to their ability to mobilize African-American institutions on behalf of the racial goals they sought. Malcolm’s political evolution demonstrates the extent to which black nationalism had become marginalized since its nineteenth-century heyday. While nineteenth-century nationalists Martin Delany and Alexander Crummell were products of mainstream black institutions, Marcus Garvey and Elijah Muhammad were outsiders—the former an alien who came to the United States only as an adult, the latter a Muslim in a Christian-dominated culture. Garvey was able to gain a massive following and build an institutional base in the United States despite the opposition of mainstream leaders, but he could never supplant them or their institutions. Elijah Muhammad similarly attacked the “so-called Negro” leaders and attracted a sizable following; yet he could never effectively challenge the dominance of the national civil rights groups.

  Only toward the end of his life did Malcolm begin to move beyond his role as a representative of Elijah Muhammad. As he became restive under Muhammad’s cautious leadership, he strengthened his ties with black activists who were affiliated with the major black churches and civil rights groups. He continued to criticize the national civil rights leaders, but he recognized that the civil rights movement contained militant factions with which he could work. Malcolm continued to call himself a black nationalist, but the term was no longer sufficient to describe his ideology. Advocacy of the goal of establishing a black-controlled nation no longer detracted from the achievement of goals that were more attainable in the short term. After his break with the Nation of Islam in 1964, Malcolm denned black nationalism as black control of the political and economic life of black communities, as racial pride and self-reliance. Malcolm also insisted that he was “giving a new interpretation to the civil-rights struggle, an interpretation that will enable [black nationalists] to come into it, take part in it.”11

  Malcolm’s new interpretation was consistent with the evolving ideas of many of the militant activists who had participated in the civil rights struggle, because it suggested a strategy that was in accord with their own experiences. Just as nationalism was an insufficient term to describe ideas that are only tenuously connected with the long-term goal of establishing a black nation, so too was integrationism inadequate to describe the increasingly far-reaching objectives of the activists who spearheaded the civil rights protests of the 1960s. By the time of Malcolm’s break with Elijah Muhammad, many of these activists saw themselves as participants in a freedom struggle seeking rights that extended beyond civil rights legislation or even the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Such activists also recognized that future black progress would require the transformation of the African-American institutions that had made possible previous gains. Rather than simply a movement toward the assimilation of white cultural values, the struggle was becoming by 1964 a movement toward the political, economic, and cultural transformation of white and black America.

  Many black leaders of the mid-1960s continued to insist that black nationalism and integrationism represented mutual exclusive, antagonistic ideologies, but Malcolm and King were among those who began to recognize the limitations of their perspectives. Malcolm, even more than King, was willing to modify his views in order to bridge the nationalist-integrationist ideological conflict. As he did so, his black nationalism became less strident but also more potent. The FBI closely observed the shift in his ideological orientation and increasingly saw him an important element in an upsurge of racial militancy.

  2. Malcolm and the FBI

  Malcolm X’s affiliation with Elijah Muhammad attracted the attention of the FBI, but during the 1950s and early 1960s, the federal government did not view the Nation of Islam or black nationalists in general as major threats to national security. Instead, during the Cold War era, leftist internal subversion was the nation’s major concern. Malcolm’s advocacy of racial separatism and his anti-white public statements alarmed many white Americans who became aware of them, but, until the late 1950s, most government officials who knew of him considered him a minor cult figure. Even during the early 1960s, Malcolm’s black nationalist rhetoric did not cause much concern among whites, because it was not seen as an major element within African-American politics. As late as 1966, a Newsweek opinion survey indicated that most blacks supported the civil rights organizations and their leaders, and only five percent of the respondents indicated approval of black nationalism. A similarly small proportion of blacks expressed positive opinions about the “Black Muslims” and Elijah Muhammad. The large proportion of “not sure” responses regarding the Nation of Islam reflected wide-spread uncertainty among blacks regarding its policies.12 After a decade of civil rights protests, black militancy was still commonly defined as approval for confrontational tactics rather than separatists strategies. In 1967, when the FBI officially extended its Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) beyond leftist organizations to include “Black Nationalist-Hate Groups,” the Nation of Islam was targeted but so too were King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.13 The FBI’s increasing concern about black nationalist agitation was clearly a result of the increasing militancy, during the first half of the 1960s, of blacks who were not black nationalists. Malcolm’s significance as a subversive threat reflected his gradual movement from the margins of African-American politics toward active support for militant grass roots activism.

  Nevertheless, under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI had exhibited intense hostility to all forms of African-American militancy, including the politically inert black nationalism of the 1950s. Indeed, David Garrow, in his study o
f the FBI’s vendetta against King, has argued that the Bureau’s essential “social role has been not to attack critics, Communists, blacks, or leftists per se, but to repress all perceived threats to the dominant, status-quo-oriented political culture.”14 Hoover’s intense racism, however, insured that he would use his power with special vigor against black militancy. Hoover’s career in the Justice Department began during the era of “New Negro” militancy after World War I, and, as an official of the General Intelligence Division and the Bureau of Investigation, he soon became involved in counterintelligence efforts aimed at Marcus Garvey and A. Philip Randolph.15 As head of the FBI, he intensified the Bureau’s program of domestic surveillance during the 1930s and 1940s. During this period, the United States government became far more concerned about communist subversion than about waning black nationalist activism and the FBI’s continuing interest in the minuscule Nation of Islam was largely a result of the group’s opposition to military service. This surveillance did not result from a belief among most government officials that the Nation was subversive but from the determination of Hoover to maintain surveillance of a large number of suspect groups, even without explicit authority from his nominal superiors in the Justice Department.

  During the early years of Malcolm’s ministry the federal government’s policies toward the Nation of Islam were inconsistent. While Hoover and other Bureau officials saw the group as one of many which advocated black militancy, other officials of the Justice Department were not convinced that the Muslims posed a serious threat. The 1975 Church Committee hearings on intelligence activities revealed extended discussions between the FBI and Justice Department officials regarding the Nation of Islam. According to testimony before the committee, the Bureau suggested in 1952 that the Muslims be added to the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations. The Department of Justice concluded the following year that the Nation of Islam would not be prosecuted under the anticommunist Smith Act but decided that “the group would under certain circumstances represent a serious threat to our national security.” In 1954, government officials decided against prosecuting the Nation for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act. Afterwards, the Justice Department approved continuing wiretap surveillance of Elijah Muhammad while also responding inconclusively to the FBI’s requests for advice on whether Muslim activists should remain on the Security Index. In 1959, Hoover’s nominal superiors refused to support his request to prosecute the NOI or place it on the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations. The following year, the Justice Department advised Hoover that Black Muslims could not be automatically barred from government employment but gave the FBI authority to continue its investigation of the Nation of Islam. During the 1960s, Justice Department officials continued to questioned whether Elijah Muhammad’s prophesies actually constituted national security threats even while refraining from ordering the FBI to discontinue its investigation. Without explicit instructions from Justice Department officials, the FBI continued to compile information on the Muslims until after the death of Elijah Muhammad.16

  During his public life Malcolm gradually shifted his nationalist perspective from Elijah Muhammad’s politically inert racial separatism towards a Pan-African perspective that brought him closer to the increasingly militant African-American political mainstream. While a loyal spokesperson for Elijah Muhammad, he had advocated a form of nationalism that aroused the emotions of blacks and the fears of whites. The FBI reports of his early speeches mentioned his apocalyptic predictions of race wars and divine retribution, but Justice Department officials were more perplexed than worried by Malcolm’s vague metaphors and religious prophecies that communicated anti-white sentiments without explicitly calling for racial confrontations. An FBI report of Malcolm’s speeches at New York’s Temple No. 7 offers an example of the kind of apocalyptic prophecies that excited black audiences while not provoking white authorities:

  LITTLE told this group that there was a space ship 40 miles up which was built by the wise men of the East and in this space ship there are a number of smaller space ships and each one is loaded with bombs. LITTLE stated that when ELIJAH [MUHAMMAD] of Chicago, Illinois, gives the word these ships will descend on the United States, bomb it and destroy all the “white devils.” According to LITTLE these bombs will destroy all the “devils” in the United States and that all the Muslims in good standing will be spared.17

  When FBI agents interviewed Malcolm a few months after this speech, they described him as “uncooperative” but nevertheless willing to reassure them that “Muslims are peaceful and they do not have guns and ammunition and they do not even carry knives.” Malcolm insisted that he had “never been a member of the Communist Party” and that the NOI did not “teach hatred.” When questioned about the War of Armageddon, Malcolm reportedly “remarked that the Bible states this will be when God destroys the devil.”18

  Malcolm sought to separate himself from leftist subversion and civil rights agitation, which were more immediate government concerns than was black nationalism. Malcolm’s initial hostility toward the expanding civil rights protest movement at times extended beyond verbal attacks to include opportunistic overtures to the white opponents of civil rights. As had Marcus Garvey during the 1920s, Malcolm represented the Nation of Islam in a meeting with the Ku Klux Klan representatives, seeking to arrange an accommodation based on mutual support for racial segregation. According to the FBI’s report of the meeting, which occurred in Georgia on January 28, 1961, Malcolm solicited the Klan’s help with Muslim plans to separate from the United States. After his break with Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm expressed his shame over participating in the meeting, revealing that it resulted in a tacit agreement between the NOI and the Klan. “From that day onward the Klan never interfered with the Black Muslim movement in the South.”19

  During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Malcolm X’s speeches often suggested that the federal government was worried about the threat posed by the Nation of Islam, but such comments overstated the government’s concern. When compared to the extensive FBI investigation of King, the file on Malcolm contains few indications that the FBI ever devoted much effort to combating his influence until after his break with Elijah Muhammad. Even then, the FBI did not understand the nature of the threat posed by either Malcolm X or Elijah Muhammad, nor did it develop a coherent program to combat black nationalist agitation until after Malcolm’s death. Instead, during the first half of the 1960s, the FBI was primarily concerned with the possibility that communists, rather than black nationalists, might gain control over the African-American freedom movement.

  While investigating Malcolm and the Nation of Islam, the FBI rarely made them the targets of its aggressive and often illegal counterintelligence activities. When Hoover officially established the COINTELPRO in 1956, its initial goal was to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party, USA, which had long been the target of aggressive FBI tactics, including extensive recruitment of informers and efforts to exacerbate factionalism. COINTELPRO was later expanded to include such targets as the Socialist Workers Party, the Puerto Rican independence movement, and even the Ku Klux Klan. Although isolated COINTELPRO activities were undoubtedly directed against Malcolm and the Nation of Islam, only in 1967, two years after Malcolm’s death, did Hoover include the Nation of Islam as a COINTELPRO target. Elijah Muhammad was mentioned among “extremists” who warranted special attention. An August 25 memorandum to field offices announced:

  The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters. . . .20

  3. Politicization of Nationalism

  As Malcolm became increasingly successful as a minister of the Nation of Islam, he also began to recognize the political limitations of his religious message. During the first decade of his ministry, his political perspective had been shaped by
the apolitical, religious orientation of the Nation of Islam. He was always careful to acknowledge that he was speaking on behalf of Elijah Muhammad and sought to distance himself from black radicalism. This was not only a reflection of his subordinate status in the Nation but also of his belief that religious conversion to Muhammad’s form of Islam offered a better route to racial advancement than the strategies of social reform within the American political system. Malcolm’s account of his formative experiences mentioned few contacts with political ideas, whether conventional or radical. He had only a passing awareness of the extensive leftist activities that took place while he was in New York during the 1940s. Although Malcolm’s autobiography mentions in passing rent-raising parties where activists sold the Communist newspaper Daily Worker, and proclaimed the Communist Party as “the only political party that ever ran a black man for the Vice Presidency of the United States,” Malcolm describes himself as unaffected by left activism: “to my sterile mind in those early days, it didn’t mean much.”21 Even Malcolm’s 1950 statement that he had “always been a Communist” should be seen primarily as an outgrowth of Malcolm’s effort during World War II to convince selective service officials that he was unfit for the military. The 1952 visit Malcolm reportedly received in prison from a member of the Crispus Attucks Club of the American Youth for Democracy may suggest a latent openness to radicalism, but he was undoubtedly sincere, if not totally accurate, when he told FBI interviewers in 1955 that he had “never been a member of the Communist Party or the American Youth for Democracy” and claimed not “to have known anyone who was associated with it.”22