The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  Cooperative interdependence in conflict leads to power with. When conflicts occur in situations that have cooperative task, reward, or outcome interdependence structures, or between disputants sharing a cooperative psychological orientation, there is more cooperative power. In other words, in these situations, conflict is often framed as a mutual problem to be solved by both parties, which leads to an increased tendency to minimize power differences between the disputants and to mutually enhance each other’s power in order to work together effectively to achieve their shared goals. Thus, if the parents can recognize that their daughter’s social needs and their own needs to have a close family life are positively linked, then they may be more likely to involve her in the problem-solving and decision-making processes, thereby enhancing her power and their ability to find mutually satisfying solutions to the conflict.

  The overwhelming evidence seems to indicate that the powerful tend to like power, use it, justify having it, and attempt to keep it. The powerful tend to be more satisfied and less personally discontent than those not enjoying high power; they have a longer time perspective and more freedom to act and therefore can plan further into the future. These higher levels of satisfaction lead to vested interests in the status quo and development of rationales for maintaining power, such as the power holders’ belief in their own superior competence and superior moral value (Deutsch, 1973). Kipnis (1976) argued that much of this may be the result of the corrupting nature of power itself. He proposed that having power and exercising it successfully over time lead to an acquired “taste for power,” inflated sense of self, devaluing of those of lesser power, and temptation to use power illegally to enhance one’s position. Fiske (1993) has demonstrated that powerful people tend to pay less attention to those in low power since they view them as not affecting their outcomes, they are often too busy to pay attention, and they are often motivated by their own high need to dominate others. Inattention to the powerless makes powerful people more vulnerable to use of stereotypes and implicit theories when interacting with the powerless. Mindell (1995) explained the state of unawareness that having privilege often fosters in this way: “Rank is a drug. The more you have, the less aware you are of how it affects others negatively” (p. 56).

  Thus, in conflict situations high-power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often neglect to analyze—as well as underestimate—the power of low-power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs; Salacuse, 2001). In addition, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, use pressure tactics, offer few concessions, have high aspirations, and use contentious tactics. HPGs therefore make it difficult to arrive at negotiated agreements that are satisfactory to all parties.

  When members of HPGs face a substantial challenge to their power from LPGs, their common responses fall into the categories of repression or ambivalent tolerance (Duckitt, 1992). If the validity of the concerns of the LPG is not recognized, HPGs are likely to use force to quell the challenge of the LPG. But if the challenges are acknowledged as legitimate, HPGs may respond with tolerant attitudes and expressions of concern—though ultimately with resistance to implementing any real change in their power relations (Duckitt, 1992). This has been termed the attitude-implementation gap.

  In light of their unreflective tendency to dominate, it becomes critical for members of HPGs to be aware of the likelihood that they will elicit resistance and alienation (from members of LPGs with whom they are in conflict) through using illegitimate techniques, inappropriate sanctions, or influence that is considered excessive for the situation (Deutsch, 1973). The cost to the HPG is not only ill will but also the need to be continuously vigilant and mobilized to prevent retaliation by the LPG.

  The tendencies for members of LPGs are opposite to those of members of HPGs, with one important exception: LPG members tend to be dependent on others, have short time perspectives, are unable to plan far ahead, and are generally discontent. Often the LPG members attempt to rid themselves of the negative feelings associated with their experiences of powerlessness and dependence (such as rage and fear) by projecting blame onto even less powerful groups or onto relatively safe in-group targets. The latter can result in a breakdown of LPG in-group solidarity (Kanter, 1977), and impair their capacities for group mobilization in conflict. Intense negative feelings may also limit the LPG members’ capacity to respond constructively in conflict with HPGs and impel such destructive impulses as violent destruction of property (Deutsch, 1973). Several tactics can enhance the power of LPGs. The first is for the group to amass more power for assertion—either by increasing their own resources, organization, cohesion, and motivation for change or by decreasing the resources of (or increasing the costs for) the HPGs (see chapter 2 in this Handbook). The latter can be accomplished through acts of civil disobedience, militancy, or what Alinsky (1971) described as “jujitsu tactics”: using the imbalance of power in the relationship against the more powerful. Another approach available to LPG members is to attempt to appeal to the better side of the members of the HPG by trying to induce them (through such tactics as ingratiation, guilt, and helplessness) to use their power more benevolently or by trying to raise HPG awareness of any injustice that they may be party to. LPGs would also do well to develop a broad menu of tactics and skills in implementing the strategies of autonomy, dependence, and community.

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  Despite many decades of fine research, our field still lacks a basic unifying framework that integrates our understanding of the many theories and principles of power and conflict dynamics. Thus, the findings from this research are often piecemeal, decontextualized, contradictory, or focused solely on negative outcomes. I next describe a new model of power and conflict that aims to bring a sense of coherence and parsimony to the study of power and conflict.

  A SITUATED MODEL OF POWER AND CONFLICT

  Our model builds on Deutsch’s theory of social relations and psychological orientations (Deutsch 1982, 1985, 2007, 2011) to offer a situated model of power and conflict (Coleman, Kugler, Mitchinson, Chung, and Musallam, 2010; Coleman, Vallacher, and Nowak, 2012; Coleman, Mitchinson, and Kugler, 2009; see figure 6.1). It suggests that when people are faced with a conflict, they have three primary considerations:

  Figure 6.1 The Situated Model of Power and Conflict

  Is the other party with me or against me or some combination of both?

  What is my power relative to the other party’s (high, equal or low)?

  To what extent are my goals linked to the other party’s goals, and how important is this conflict and relationship to me?

  The model specifies the three basic dimensions of conflict situations:

  The mixture of goal interdependence: The type and mix of goal interdependence in the relationship, with pure positive forms of goal interdependence (all goals between parties in conflict are positively linked) at the extreme left of the x-axis, pure negative interdependence (all goals are negatively linked) at the extreme right of the x-axis, and mixed-motive types (combinations of both positively and negatively linked goals) along the middle of the x-axis.

  The relative distribution of power: The relative degree to which each party can affect the other party’s goals and outcomes (Depret and Fiske, 1993; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). It constitutes the y-axis of the model, with pure types of unequal distribution of power (A over B) at the top of the y-axis, the opposite types of unequal distribution of power (B over A) at the bottom of the axis, and various types of relatively equal distribution of power along the middle of the y-axis.

  The degree of total goal interdependence–relational importance: The degree of importance of the relationship and linkage of goals (total goal interdependence) in conflict. This constitutes the z-axis of the model, with high degrees of goal interdependence between the parties in conflict located at the front of the z-axis (strong goal linkages and/or high proportions of linked goals), low degrees of interdependence located at the rear of the z-axis (no, few, or weak goal linkages), and mod
erate degrees of goal interdependence located along the middle of the z-axis.

  These three dimensions constitute the core of the situated model. They provide a sense of the basic social context in which people experience conflict. Thus, conflicts that appear to be similar by virtue of representing the same perception of incompatible activities (you and I are competing for the same job) may be experienced in fundamentally different ways depending on the settings of the three parameters in the model (our mix of cooperative or competitive goals; my high, equal, or low relative power; and the high or low importance of our relationship).

  The situated model suggests that when conflicts are perceived, the three basic features of social conflict—mix of interdependence, relative distribution of power, and degree of total interdependence—interact to situate parties psychologically in different regions of a conflict stimulus field (Kelley 1997): a perceiver’s representation of his or her external world or environment. These different regions tend to afford distinct conflict orientations, which are syndromes of disputants’ perceptions, emotions, values, and behaviors in the conflict (see figure 6.2). In other words, the different regions of the stimulus field tend to influence how conflicts are perceived (as mutual problems or win-lose challenges), how it feels to be in the situation (relatively comfortable versus anxiety provoking), what is likely to be valued in the situation (solving problems and sharing benefits with other parties versus conquering them), and how to best go about responding to the conflict and obtaining these values and goals (through respectful dialogue and problem solving versus forceful domination or submission to power). The different regions do not rigidly determine specific thoughts, feelings, and actions in conflict but rather tend to orient disputants like improvisational scripts; they provide the general frame and contours for responses to conflict, and mostly determine which behaviors are not appropriate to a particular situation.

  Figure 6.2 Psychological Orientations in the Basic Conflict Stimulus Field

  The findings from research conducted through focus groups, critical incidents, and correlational and experimental studies have found that when participants were presented with the same conflict in terms of incompatible goals and issues, they described markedly different experiences—perceptions, emotions, values, and behavioral intentions—across the five regional conditions (Coleman et al. 2010; Coleman, Kugler, Mitchinson, and Foster, 2013). When faced with a region 1 scenario (relative high-power, cooperative, high-interdependence relations), participants described a more benevolent orientation to conflict than most other regions. Participants said they valued taking responsibility for the problem and listening to the other, and they expressed genuine concern for their low-power counterpart. In contrast, region 2 scenarios (relative high power, competitive, high interdependence) were found to induce an angrier, more threatening, and confrontational approach to the other party, with heightened concerns for their own authority and goals (dominance). Region 3 scenarios (low power, cooperative, high interdependence) afforded more of an orientation of appreciative support than the other regions, where people respectfully sought clarification of roles and responsibilities, worked harder, and felt anxious and confused about the conflict situations. This was in contrast to the reactions observed to region 4 scenarios (low power, competitive, high interdependence), which induced higher levels of stress and anger, a strong need to tolerate the situation, and a desire to look for possibilities to sabotage the supervisor if the opportunity presented itself (appeasement). Region 5 scenarios (low interdependence), in contrast to the others, afforded a less intense experience of the conflict, where people preferred to simply move on or exit the conflict (autonomy).

  When parties perceive themselves to be located in a particular region of the stimulus field for extended periods of time (e.g., stuck in low power in a competitive conflict with their boss), they will tend to foster the development of a stronger orientation for that region, which can become chronic. Once an individual has developed a strong propensity for a particular conflict orientation (e.g., dominance), it can become very difficult to change one’s orientation, even when it fails to satisfy one’s goals, the intensity of the conflict dissipates, or social conditions change (see Coleman et al., 2010). More chronic orientations will often operate with automaticity and may begin to be employed even when they are inconsistent (ill fitting) with particular situations (Barge, 1996). For example, case study research on state-level international negotiations also provides strong support for the view that high-power parties often become very comfortable with dominance orientations and find it difficult to employ other strategies when power shifts and conditions change, and that low-power parties too can become very skilled and accustomed to their role (Zartman and Rubin, 2002).

  Generally, more adaptive orientations to conflict—those that allow the use of different orientations and behaviors in order to satisfy goals in a manner not incongruent with the demands of the situations encountered—will lead to greater general satisfaction with conflict processes and outcomes over time. It is important to stress that each of the different orientations outlined in our model has its particular utilities, benefits, costs, and consequences depending on the psychological makeup of people, the orientation of other parties, and the nature of the situations. Ultimately what is particularly useful in evolving situations of conflict is the capacity to adapt: to move freely between various orientations and employ their related strategies and tactics in a manner that helps to achieve one’s short- and long-term goals.

  Case-based research on interstate negotiations found that parties tended to be more effective in negotiations to the extent that they were able to adjust their orientations and behavior to the relative (and relevant) power of the other side (Zartman and Rubin, 2002). In a correlational study (Coleman et al., 2009), investigators found that more adaptive individuals (those who saw utility in employing all five orientations when necessary) had greater levels of satisfaction with conflicts in general than did less adaptive individuals. This study also found that more adaptive individuals learned more from conflicts and had more global perspectives on conflict, focusing more on both long-term and short-term goals than less-adaptive individuals did. Another study found that people who were able to employ orientations and behaviors that were not incongruent with the situation (ill fitting) expressed significantly more satisfaction with the processes, outcomes, relationships, and their own behavior in those conflicts (Coleman and Kugler, 2011).

  The situated model of power and conflict builds on the essential features of social conflict that have been identified by prior research and theorizes how different configurations of these factors together influence constructive and destructive dynamics in conflict. By integrating the three dimensions, the model helps to synthesize many disparate and even contradictory findings from decades of prior research and therefore contribute to our understanding of how power, interdependence, and relational importance affect conflict dynamics. Instead of emphasizing how a set of predispositions or conditions invokes positive conflict processes, the model stresses the necessity of adapting flexibly to new situations in a manner that helps to achieve important goals. Conflicts can be constructively managed when the disputants are able to move between different orientations, strategies, and tactics as the evolving situation requires.

  IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

  The situated model of power and conflict presented here highlights the importance of adaptivity in constructive conflict resolution. This is what Harvard professor Joseph Nye (1990) has called smart power—a capacity to combine the use of hard power (military, economic) and soft power (moral, cultural) as circumstances dictate. Research has found that although many negotiators and leaders tend to get stuck in one approach to negotiating conflict (often domination), more effective leaders and negotiators are more nimble (Hooijberg and Quinn, 1992; Lawrence, Lenk, and Quinn, 2009; Zartman and Rubin, 2002). They read situations more carefully, consider their short- and long
er-term objectives, and then employ a variety of strategies in order to increase the probabilities that their agenda will succeed (Dörner, 1996).

  Thus, according to our model, conflict resolvers of all stripes should develop their capacities and skills for these traits:

  Domination through command and control—employing power, information, and authority to demand, incentivize, threaten, coerce, expose and, publicly shame opponents when absolutely necessary

  Taking the high road through benevolence—modeling exemplary, collaborative, win-win leadership by listening carefully to the needs and concerns of opponents, finding common ground on the priority objectives, and uniting parties around a common vision and purpose