The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  Escalation Dynamics

  All of the individual and group factors described so far have one thing in common: they tend to influence conflict interactions in the direction of escalation, that is, the process by which conflicts become more intense and more hostile. Escalation involves the increasing use of heavier methods of influence, especially coercive or punishing tactics, by each group to reach its goals in opposition to those of the other group. Escalation also typically results in the proliferation of issues, not simply basic ones that the conflict is perceived to be about (wages or benefits in union-management conflict), but also process or relationship issues that arise from how the two parties treat each other (the use of deception in negotiations). Finally, the motivations that drive the conflict change from wanting to do well in achieving one’s goals, to winning over the other, and then to hurting or destroying the other (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Escalation feeds largely on fear and defensiveness, in which threats by one party to gain its objectives are met by counterthreats from the other, and these reciprocal interactions move to a higher level of costs each time around in a climate of increasing mistrust. The self-fulfilling prophecy, first identified by Robert Merton (1952), comes into play in a specific manner, in that defensiveness and mistrust motivate cautious or controlling moves, which elicit a defensive and hostile counteraction that is then perceived as justifying the initial action. This type of interaction, for example, led Ralph White (1984) to characterize the Cold War as partly due to “defensively motivated aggression.”

  Our understanding of escalatory processes has been enhanced by the work of Morton Deutsch (see chapter 1 in this Handbook) on the differences between cooperative and competitive interactions. The modal approach that parties take in terms of perceptions, attitudes, communication, and task orientation tends to show a consistency that is very powerful in determining the nature of their interaction over time. Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations captures a great deal of the reality of intergroup conflict—the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship. As Deutsch points out, cooperative processes of problem solving are similar to constructive processes of conflict resolution, while competitive processes are similar to destructive ones in addressing conflict. Deutsch (1983) also captured the competitive-destructive dynamic in his elucidation of the “malignant social process,” which describes the increasingly dangerous and costly interaction of high-intensity intergroup conflict. Through a combination of cognitive rigidities and biases, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments to prior beliefs and actions, parties are drawn into escalating spirals wherein past investments justify increasing risks and unacceptable losses foreclose a way out. Thus, it is understandable how groups get locked into destructive conflict and appear unable to de-escalate or resolve the situation by themselves.

  Resistances to Resolution and Intractability

  The downside of escalation is found not only in the pains and costs that the parties endure but in the resistances to deescalation and resolution that the negative interactions create. The late Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and their colleagues have been at the forefront of studying and theorizing about how parties get locked into their conflicts. At the individual level, they see psychological changes, including hostile attitudes and perceptions, which first encourage escalation (through the biases noted) but then support the persistence of escalatory interactions (through similar biases). To these they add the processes of deindividuation (by which out-group members are not seen as individuals but as members of a category who carry no inhibitions against maltreatment) and dehumanization (wherein out-group members are perceived as less than human and thus appropriate for inhumane treatment) (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

  Structural changes at the group level also result from escalation. Hostile perceptions of the out-group and destructive motives toward them become cemented in group norms, and pressures are brought to bear for members to accept these as right. As already noted, increased cohesiveness and militant leadership tend to support more contentious tactics and aggressive objectives. In addition, militant subgroups, which benefit from the conflict in terms of status, power, or wealth, develop strong vested interests in its continuation. At the level of the larger social system—the organization, community, or global society—intense conflict induces polarization, by which other players, who are initially outside the conflict, get drawn into coalitions that ultimately fracture the system into two opposing camps. This not only increases the intensity of the conflict but eliminates neutrals who could serve a useful third-party role in resolution.

  The final contributor to deescalation resistance is the phenomena of overcommitment and entrapment. Psychological and group changes tend to strengthen commitments made to contentious behaviors, such that they become self-reinforcing, partly through the act of rationalization. Whatever was done in the past is seen as necessary, and the barrier to conflict termination is the other party’s intransigence. Commitment to destructive and costly courses of action is increased further by the phenomenon of entrapment, in which costs already incurred are justified by continuing expenditures in pursuit of victory. Although this is irrational by outside judgment, each party pursues its goals, believing that the ultimate reward is just around the corner and that only its attainment will justify what has already been expended. The longer that mutual intransigence persists, the more the parties feel compelled to justify their positions through continued intransigence.

  The high degree of resistance to resolution exhibited by certain intergroup conflicts has led to increasing interest in the concept of intractable conflict, seen as those that persist over long periods of time at an intense yet fluctuating level and that are extremely difficult to resolve (see chapter 30). Intractable conflicts may be initiated by or linked to objective incompatibilities over land or other resources, but they are generally seen as maintained by subjective factors, such as hostile attitudes, polarized and exclusive identities, extreme emotionality, and destructive relationships. It is also generally acknowledged that intractable intergroup conflicts are immune to the traditional methods of conflict management, such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, In fact, it is posited that the premature application of such methods may render the conflict more resistant to resolution (Rothman, 1997).

  IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE

  The complexity and intractability of destructive, escalated intergroup conflict boggle the mind and depress the spirit of those who would deign to do anything about it, whether members of the conflicting groups or outsiders. This is true whether the conflict involves factions in an organization that have crossed each other off, interest groups in a community that only yell at each other about the issues that divide them, or ethnic groups that believe total eradication of the enemy is the only viable solution. Nonetheless, this horrendous social problem is a phenomenon that can be understood and can be rendered amenable over time to actions and interventions that transform seemingly intractable incompatibilities into workable relationships. The task is not easy, and civilization is a far way from having the knowledge and expertise required. However, based on what we now know, some implications for addressing intergroup conflict can be discerned.

  A number of implications are in the form of broad orientations to approaching the resolution of intergroup conflict, which need to be further operationalized as more specific strategies and tactics. First among these is the premise that intense intergroup conflict is both an objective and subjective phenomenon and that attempts to address only one set of factors or the other are doomed to failure, either immediate or long term. Thus, methods are required that settle substantive interests and address psychological, social, and cultural aspects—the stuff of identity conflicts. Given this complexity and its attendant intransigence, it is typically the case that members of the parties themselves are unable to engage in the analysis
and interaction required. Thus, it is implied that the involvement of third parties outside the conflict, who are perceived as impartial, competent, and trustworthy, is usually required to de-escalate and resolve the situation. In doing so, third parties must realize that de-escalation is not the simple reverse of escalation because of the residues and resistances that have been built up through a history of antagonistic interaction.

  A further implication of the objective-subjective mix is that different methods of intervention may be required at different stages of escalation in order to de-escalate the conflict to a level where subsequent interventions will now work. For example, interventions that focus on perceptual, attitudinal, and relationship issues may be required before third-party efforts at mediating agreements on substantive matters can be successful. This form of contingency modeling has been put forward by Loraleigh Keashly and me, as well as other scholar-practitioners in the field, including Dean Pruitt and Paul Olzack.

  A related implication is that intervention in intergroup conflict needs to start with a thorough analysis of the situation, including a cultural analysis where appropriate, before interventions are designed and implemented. Such analysis should involve not only the third party, but also the members or representatives of the groups themselves, because each phase of deescalation and resolution depends on earlier ones. For example, analysis, understanding, and dialogue are necessary for reconciliation to occur, and the development of alternative solutions must be based on a diagnosis of each party’s motivations, aspirations, and constraints.

  Finally, the objective and subjective mix of conflict also implies that changes are required in both the process or relationship qualities and in the substantive or structural aspects for intergroup conflict to be resolved in an enduring manner. That is, the clearing up of misattributions and the rebuilding of trust, for example, need to go hand in hand with the development of decision-making procedures and resource allocation systems that address the basic incompatibilities. Thus, conflict resolution is prescribed not simply as a mechanism for dealing with difficult differences within existing social systems, but also as an approach that can facilitate constructive social change toward more responsive and equitable systems.

  Elsewhere, I have delineated a set of generic principles for resolving intergroup conflict, which embody implications that flow from these ideas (Fisher, 1994). I summarize these principles here in a manner that specifies further implications that they incorporate or are based on. The principles are organized into three major phases of addressing intergroup conflict: analysis, confrontation, and resolution.

  Analyzing the Conflict

  Conflict analysis should be the lead activity in moving into a field of incompatibilities and destructive interactions. Unlike the analysis that parties usually engage in (which identifies political, economic, legal, or military strategies and resources they can use to prevail), conflict analysis carried out by third parties in a facilitative role focuses on the sources and dynamics of the conflict that have brought it to its current state of expression. This involves identifying the parties and factions and the issues that they maintain the conflict is about. However, it also goes beneath the surface issues to identify the underlying interests, values, and needs that relate to the positions the parties take, that is, their demands and offers. A cultural analysis of parties who differ from each other or from the intervenor should also be carried out to illuminate their culture of conflict, that is, how they conceptualize conflict and believe it should be addressed in terms of accepted norms, practices, and institutions (Ross, 1993). In addition, this initial phase must entail a process analysis that surfaces and discusses the perceptions, thoughts, goals, fears, and needs of each party and a trust-building process that allows the parties to exchange clarifications, acknowledgments, assurances, and possible contributions to rebuilding their relationship.

  It is implied in these activities and outcomes that the parties will be engaging in intense, face-to-face interaction that involves genuine communication and the development of realistic empathy for each other. It is further implied that this form of analysis needs to be carried out by a skilled, impartial, and trusted third party who carries knowledge of conflict processes and skills in group dynamics and intergroup relations. It is conceivable that members of the parties can form a balanced team to undertake this consulting role, but it is doubly difficult for them due to their group identifications. Given that the third party also requires knowledge of the system and culture in which the conflict is embedded, be it organizational, community, societal, or international, it is also implied that the intervenor will be a multiskilled team of diverse individuals.

  The stage of conflict analysis may reveal that objective interests predominate and that the parties are motivated to settle their differences and either ignore subjective elements or defer their consideration to a future time. In this case, the parties may shift to a negotiation mode and move toward a mutually satisfactory agreement; more likely, they will need to engage the services of a mediator who will assist them in crafting a settlement. It is also possible that the parties will agree to engage and accept a binding third-party judgment by a superior authority—a higher manager or body in the organization, an arbitrator appointed for the purpose, or a legal adjudicator who is available to them. Unfortunately, in intense intergroup conflict, these options are either not engaged (because each group fears losing and believes they can still win) or are not successful in the long run (because the settlements do not deal with the underlying sources and subjective aspects that drove the conflict to high levels of escalation and intractability). In these cases, continuing involvement by a third party in a consultative role is often required, although it is not readily available in many settings.

  Confronting the Conflict

  When third-party-assisted interaction is possible, the stage of productive confrontation follows analysis, in which the parties directly engage each other on the issues that divide them and work toward mutually acceptable solutions through joint problem solving. It is essential that this process be carried out under norms of mutual respect, shared exploration, and commitment to the problem-solving process rather than a fixation on positions. It is implied that the facilitative conditions of intergroup contact (articulated by social scientists starting with Gordon Allport) are in place for these interactions, including equal status participants from each group, positive institutional supports for the process, a cooperative reward and task structure, a good potential for participants to get to know each other as persons, and the involvement of respected, competent, and well-adjusted individuals. Thus, it is further implied that intergroup engagements need to be well designed, with appropriate selection of individual participants and identification of both formal and informal activities and goals. This again is a role best left to knowledgeable, skilled, and trusted third-party consultants.

  Equally challenging is the facilitation of the engagement sessions themselves, which need to incorporate qualities such as open and accurate representation of group perceptions, recognition of intergroup diversity including gender and cultural differences, and the persistence to attain mutually acceptable outcomes. A strong implication is that the parties must be encouraged to follow a strategy of collaboration rather than competition. That is, they need to engage in a combination of assertive behavior (stressing one’s own needs) and cooperation (showing concern for the other party’s needs). This two-dimensional approach or dual-concern model is well represented in the conflict resolution field, building on the early work of Robert Blake and Jane Mouton with elaborations by Kenneth Thomas, Afzalur Rahim, and others. The parties must also engage in a joint problem-solving process that will get them to shared solutions. Knowledge of group problem solving is a starting point, but it was the pioneering efforts of Robert Blake, Jane Mouton, and their colleagues that led to the development of a social technology of intergroup problem solving. They have articulated how this technology can be applied by consul
tants or by members of the groups themselves, at least in organizational settings.

  Resolving the Conflict

  Conflict resolution refers to both the collaborative process by which differences are handled and the outcomes that are jointly agreed to by the parties. As distinct from conflict management, mitigation, or amelioration, conflict resolution involves a transformation of the relationship and the structural situation such that solutions developed by the parties are sustainable and self-correcting in the long term. It also requires that an adequate degree of reconciliation occurs between the parties, in that harmony has been restored through processes such as acknowledgment of transgressions, forgiveness by the victims, and assurances of future peace. Future incompatibilities will of course occur, and further problem solving toward social change will be required, but the manner of approaching differences and the quality of the outcomes will be different. Thus, one implication of this approach is that conflicts and the relationships in which they are embedded need to be transformed in an enduring fashion as opposed to simply settling disputes or, worse, suppressing differences. In order to accomplish this, the resolution process and outcomes must address the basic human needs for development and satisfaction to some acceptable degree. Needs for security, identity, recognition, participation, distributive justice, and so on must be identified in the analysis, and mechanisms to address them (“satisfiers”) must be built into the outcomes. Relations between identity groups can then be built around each group having a satisfactory degree of recognition and autonomy (power), so that they can freely enter into an interdependent relationship that is mutually beneficial.