The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

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  CHAPTER THIRTEEN

  SELF-REGULATION IN THE SERVICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

  Walter Mischel

  Aaron L. DeSmet

  Ethan Kross

  Some of the most frustrating conflicts are those that people fight within their own heads, as they struggle with the dilemmas and temptations they encounter and create, as has been chronicled ever since Adam was tempted by Eve and Paradise was lost forever. In everyday life, we experience these internal wars when, after resolving to skip the dessert, we are faced with the pastry tray, or when the tobacco addict, choking with emphysema, battles with himself not to light the next cigarette. Such conflicts are omnipresent as people try to pursue a difficult achievement goal, follow through on a health regimen (adhering to diets, exercise schedules, medications), or maintain a close relationship—efforts that require more than habit and routine to stay on course as conflict becomes inevitable and the difficulty and frustration of the effort escalate.

  In this chapter, we consider some of the main findings from psychology that address these internal battles. We do so on the assumption that understanding what makes intrapsychic conflict easier to negotiate constructively is also relevant to the diverse types of conflict that characterize the human condition at every level, from the interpersonal to the international. Our primary goal is to capture what psychological research and theory tell us about willpower and to examine the potential implications for conflict resolution.

  UNDERSTANDING “WILLPOWER”

  The facet of willpower that is of particular concern here is the ability to inhibit impulsive, automatic, “hot” emotional responses that conflict with and threaten to undo the more valued but distant future goals one is trying to pursue (trying to bypass the pastry, or continue studying for an exam rather than turn on the TV, or forgo alcohol, or save for retirement rather than buy the sports car, or settle a long-standing border dispute with one’s neighbor).

  A Prototypic Conflict within the Self: The Marshmallow Dilemma

  The “delay of gratification” paradigm (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989) is more widely known as the “marshmallow test” in media versions and best-selling advice volumes. Popularization notwithstanding (Goleman, 1995), in psychological research, this method has been a prototype for the study of willpower in pursuit of difficult goals and a cornerstone for the concept of emotional intelligence (EQ). It has been researched extensively, both in experiments and in longitudinal studies that follow the same individuals for many years. (For reviews, see Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004; and Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989).

  In this method, a young child is presented with some consumable that she desires, for example, a food treat. A dilemma is then posed: wait until the experimenter returns and get two of the desired treats, or ring a bell and the experimenter returns immediately, but the child gets only one treat. The child clearly prefers the larger outcome and commits herself to wait for it. Soon, though, the delay becomes very difficult as waiting for the chosen goal drags on in the face of conflict, frustration, and temptation to ring the bell and take the immediately available treat. Though simple in its structure, this method has been shown to tap the type of skills and self-regulatory strategies that are fundamental for impulse control and for sustaining willpower in the face of temptation and frustration.

  A choice conflict between either waiting for two marshmallows or settling for one now may seem artificial and far from the choices adults confront in their worlds. But for the young child, this type of problem, when carefully structured in age-appropriate ways, creates a genuine conflict as involving to her as many dilemmas of life are to adults. It provides a route to study the processes underlying willpower systematically. Early studies of the delay situation revealed large individual differences in children’s willingness and ability to delay. Years later, the time spent waiting for two marshmallows later versus one now proved to be remarkably indicative of important outcomes in later life (Ayduk and others, 2000; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriquez, 1989). As examples, the number of seconds a preschooler is willing to wait for the bigger treats, rather than settling for the lesser one available immediately, significantly predicts diverse adaptive cognitive and social outcomes decades later, notably SAT scores (Mischel, 1996) and cognitive control ability (Eigsti and others, 2006).

  Given that behavior in this situation is not of trivial interest, it becomes important to understand what is happening psychologically that makes some children ring quickly and others wait for what seems like forever. This problem has driven an extensive research program (Mischel, 1996; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004), addressing the question if humans initially are driven by impulses, pressing for immediate release, ruled by a pleasure principle, and largely indifferent to reason—as has long been assumed—how do they become able to control their actions and feelings, overcoming the power of stimuli to elicit automatic reactions and exerting the self-control strategies or willpower essential for executing their difficult-to-achieve intentions?

  It is tempting to interpret the marshmallow-test results to support the view that how people manage to persist and exert self-control reflects basic character traits such as ego control or conscientiousness, traits that may already be visible quite early in life. Such constructs can be useful in characterizing broad individual differences in the predisposition to self-control and ability to negotiate difficult conflicts without losing the long-term goal that one seeks, but at best they offer incomplete explanations. They overlook, for example, the finding that the same preschooler who was unable to wait even a minute under some conditions was able to wait twenty minutes when the situation was represented or framed in other terms or when the conditions changed in even seemingly minor ways. So we need to understand what
people can do when they try to persist in goal pursuit, to deal effectively with conflict without succumbing impulsively to the immediate temptations and impulses to quit.

  Essential Preliminaries for Self-Regulation

  Beginning in the early years of life, ineffective self-regulation predicts many adverse outcomes: subsequent school failures, poor academic and social competence, conduct disorders, and various forms of addictive and antisocial behavior. (For review, see Mischel and Ayduk, 2004.) Conversely, individuals who can effectively self-regulate and cope with conflict in pursuing their goals can at least partially shape their lives and futures in constructive directions. It is therefore important to understand the processes that enable self-regulation and willpower in the service of constructive conflict resolution.

  Over the course of the past four decades, research has gone beyond folk wisdom and speculation to demystify the concept of willpower. The findings speak to why at least some people under some circumstances are able to turn their good intentions into effective behavior as they cope with the conflicts most important to them. Much of this research focuses on the psychological processes involved in self-regulation that make it extremely difficult—or relatively easy—for people to deal effectively with seemingly mundane but potentially life-threatening conflicts

  Effective self-regulation or its failure depends on a sequence of closely connected and interacting cognitive and emotional processes. These include (1) how the individual encodes or construes the situation in which self-regulation is attempted, (2) the expectancies and beliefs that become activated, (3) the feelings and emotions triggered and experienced, and (4) the goals and values engaged. Although these are essential preliminaries for even attempting to exert effortful control, sustaining effort depends on the self-control skills and strategic competencies that are employed in trying to pursue them.

  Encodings.

  The motivation to self-regulate tends to increase to the extent that the activity or situation is encoded as personally meaningful and self-relevant. New mothers, for example, cope better with the often exhausting and conflict-provoking chores and routines of parenting an infant if they view those tasks as fulfilling important self-obligations rather than as taking time away from other modes of self-fulfillment, such as a career. Even if events and situations are perceived as highly self-relevant, however, the person does not necessarily consciously attempt to self-regulate. On the contrary, such situations often easily and automatically trigger the enduring behavior patterns that characterize an individual’s personality and function to undermine self-regulation. One example of such an automatic reaction is the anger and abusiveness readily triggered in rejection-sensitive men who are quick to perceive rejection from a romantic partner even if it has not occurred. Their maladaptive reaction pattern of uncontrolled hostility may be essentially reflexive, bypassing conscious control and preventing purposeful self-intervention effort. In such a case, the person encodes the situation as personally relevant even if it is not and maintains this representation regardless of contradictory evidence. The ironic and often tragic result is that the outcome the man most fears and expects—rejection by the romantic partner—is precipitated by his own behavior in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, and Khouri, 1998).

  Expectancies.

  Expectancy and belief that one is able to exert control and successfully execute necessary action is also an essential prerequisite for self-regulation. It supports one’s efforts and guides whether, where, when, and how one attempts to self-regulate (Mischel, Cantor, and Feldman, 1996). To even try purposeful self-regulation requires a representation of the self as a causal agent capable of executing an intended action. Perceived self-efficacy—the belief that “I can do it”—is a foundation for successfully pursuing a difficult goal or for changing and improving one’s situation or oneself (Bandura, 1986). Its psychological opposite, perceived helplessness, is the route to giving up, apathy, and depression (Dweck, 1986; Seligman, 1975). Even when the self-regulatory task is something aversive that has to be endured and cannot be controlled—say, a painful dental procedure or hostile interaction—the belief that one can predict or control the stress is an important ingredient for coping. Generally, most people tend to become less upset if they think they can predict and control stressful or painful events, even if the perception is illusory (Averill, 1973; Miller, 1979; Rodin, 1987; Taylor, Lichtman, and Wood, 1984; Thompson, 1981).

  Affect.

  Whereas expectations of efficacy and control enhance the potential for self-control and goal pursuit, anxious feelings and self-preoccupying thoughts undermine such efforts. The thought, “I’m no good at this; I’ll never be able to do it” in the test-anxious person competes and interferes with task-relevant thoughts (for example, “Now I have to recheck my answers”). Interference from self-preoccupying thoughts tends to be greatest when the task to be done is complex and requires many competing responses, as is always the case when the problem and conflict to be solved are complex and difficult. As the motivation to do well increases (as when success on the task is especially important), anxiety and the tendency to catastrophize become particularly maladaptive, interfering with attention to the task and concentration on how to master it effectively.

  Motivation and Persistence in Goal Pursuit.

  Encodings, affect, and expectancies notwithstanding, equally important for facilitating adaptive self-regulation is that the individual be motivated to self-regulate. If the person presented with a delicious-looking piece of chocolate cake does not care about losing weight, then it is unlikely that the person will refrain from taking a bite. Assuming that the individual is in fact motivated to self-regulate, their persistence in goal pursuit will be bolstered or undermined by their outcome expectancies about the likelihood that the effort, cost, and time spent on the task will or will not actually result in the desired outcome. People base outcome expectations on both information in the current situation and expectations generalized from previous similar situations. In short, expectancy has a substantial impact on self-regulatory choices and motivation: people are likely to choose to perform an action that requires effort if they believe that they can perform the action (they have high self-efficacy expectancy) and expect it to lead to favorable consequences.

  Hot Reactions and the Emotional Brain

  The situations in which people most need and want to self-regulate and control their impulses as they struggle to resolve conflict tend to be those in which it is most difficult for them to do so. These are the situations that elicit hot emotional reactions such as intense fear and anxiety or strong appetites or craving. In such situations, the person may be subject to what is called stimulus control—namely, situations in which the stimulus triggers a virtually uncontrollable automatic response. The central challenge for the individual is to overcome such reflexive, automatic stimulus control with reflective self-control.

  Consider, for example, the dilemma of the addict who is trying to quit but is tempted with heroin, or the starving dieter faced with the ultimate chocolate cake, or the test-anxious student facing an important examination. This kind of hot situation tends to automatically trigger a hot reaction, rapidly generating the associated feelings of fear or desire and the urge to respond impulsively, bypassing self-regulatory controls just when it is most important to have them. Such hot, reflexive reactions may be part of the overall arousal state that helps initiate quick adaptive action, as in an emergency response to a fire alarm or sudden danger that mobilizes the body’s resources. However, the arousal state makes thoughtful self-regulation and planful action and reflection most difficult (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).

  Crucially important in emotional reactions, particularly fear, is a small almond-shaped region in the brain called the amygdala (“almond” in Latin). This brain structure reacts almost instantly to stimuli that individuals perceive as threatening (Adolphs and others, 1999; LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Phelps and others, 2001; Winston, Strange, O’Dohe
rty, and Dolan, 2002), immediately cueing behavioral, physiological (autonomic), and endocrine responses. It mobilizes the body for action, readying it to fight or flight in response to a perceived threat. This reflexive emergency reaction is useful for adaptation: there is evolutionary survival value in reacting automatically to a snake in the grass without taking time to reflect on it or to fight an opponent who is ready to strike when flight is not possible. But these automatic reactions are only a quick fix and can become destructive if they persist (Ledoux, 1996, 2000). When activated indiscriminately, in response to stimuli that are not threatening, they can lead to negative consequences for the self.

  Unlike lower animals in the evolutionary ladder, human beings have the capacity to eventually take control with high-level brain centers (the prefrontal cortex) and start thinking and planning their way through perceived threats that the amygdala responds to automatically. In this vein, findings on the neural basis of emotion regulation indicate that the amygdala does not operate in isolation in response to perceived threats. Instead, it projects to and interacts with a number of prefrontal brain regions (among other areas) that support high-level executive functions that are believed to play a critical role in the cognitive control of emotion. (For review, see Ochsner and Gross, 2005.) For example, studies of people’s ability to down-regulate negative emotional responses have shown that instructing people to cognitively reappraise the meaning of threat-arousing stimuli to perceive them as less aversive (e.g., imagine that the blood on a corpse is ketchup) leads to concomitant decreases in autonomic responses, amygdala activation, and self-report negative affect (Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, and Davidson, 2000; Levesque and others, 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and Grabrieli, 2002; Ochsner and others, 2004). Thus, the trick in achieving effective self-regulation is to move from the automatic, hot, emotional response that can quickly become maladaptive to a cooler, more reasoned, and reflective action that makes use of the vast cognitive resources that give humans their advantage (Mischel and others, 1989).