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The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

Page 57

by Peter T Coleman


  These findings are of interest because of growing evidence that emotions are gender typed. Plant, Hyde, Keltner, and Devine (2000) report that in general, women are expected to express more emotions than men. The exception is anger, which is perceived as appropriate to men but not women. Consistent with this general observation, research shows that women who express anger are accorded lower status and perceived as less competent than men who express anger (Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008; Schaubroeck and Shao, 2012). It is then unsurprising that in relationship conflict, women suppress anger whereas men express anger (Fischer and Evers, 2011). Conversely, in a study of sexual attractiveness, Tracy and Beall (2011) found that happiness was highly attractive when expressed by women but highly unattractive when expressed by men. These findings suggest that women should not display either genuine or strategic anger in their negotiations. Doing so is unlikely to yield the benefits associated with anger and highly likely to incur social costs. There may be merit in expressing more gender-appropriate emotions such as disappointment in order to improve individual outcomes. However, it seems that Babcock and Laschever’s (2007) recommendation that women display unrelenting niceness may present a better strategic route in negotiations. What is clear is that expressing the same emotions may have different consequences for female and male negotiators. Research is needed to clarify how a negotiator’s gender, and that of her or his opponent, affects the impact of emotional expression in negotiation.

  In investigating gender effects, research has focused almost exclusively on two-party negotiations. How gender might affect outcomes in multiparty negotiations is an unknown. Evidence from small group research, however, hints at the likelihood that what women do, and how it is perceived, will differ depending on a team’s gender composition. In ultimatum bargaining games, all-male groups make more generous allocations to an opposing team than all-female or mixed-gender groups (Hannagan and Larimer, 2010). In negotiations, men perceived their team’s performance to be increasingly poorer as the number of women on their team increased (Karakowsky, McBey, and Chuang, 2004). And in their investigation of loan payment default in microcredit groups, Anthony and Horne (2003) found that as the number of women in a group increased, repayment defaults decreased. Research also suggests that the impact of team composition is more subtle than a simple majority-versus-minority effect. For example, Loyd, White, and Kern (2011) showed that independent of group size, women are perceived as warmer, more competent, and better leaders when they are the only female team member or when there are three women on a team. Research also suggests that gender diversity affects group performance only when a gender faultine is activated (Pearsall, Ellis, and Evans, 2008) and that gender dissimilarity has its strongest effect on perceptions of relationship conflict within teams when team members have a strong gender social identity (Randel and Jaussi, 2008).

  This collection of findings does not yet give us coherent insight into how the gender composition of groups affects perceptions of group performance, individual group members, and perceptions of group members. However, it does suggest that whether women are perceived to have violated stereotypes, whether a group is perceived to have high relationship conflict, how and when alliances form, and the resource allocation decisions made by groups are affected by their gender composition. These findings have implications for multiparty negotiations. They suggest that women will be most influential in such negotiations when they are in a clear minority (the only woman) or a clear majority (more than two women), but that they may lose influence when there are two women in a multiparty negotiation. They also suggest that how women form alliances may be critical to the perceived success of a negotiation: same-gender alliances may increase the salience of gender fault lines, which may increase a sense of relational conflict and discord. The same issues arise when we consider negotiating teams: the extent to which women can influence their teams and the extent to which those teams may focus on relational conflict is tied to a team’s gender composition. Finally, in interteam negotiations, the gender composition of teams may inadvertently shape resource allocation, which appears to be more egalitarian when teams are mixed gender or all female (Hannagan and Larimer, 2010). Although these implications are intriguing, research has yet to systematically explore how multiparty and team negotiations are affected by the proportion of women and men participating in negotiations.

  IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

  I started this chapter with the question of whether women are natural-born peacemakers. The conflict styles research that I reviewed suggests that the answer is yes. This research shows that women tend to favor gender-normative behaviors when resolving conflicts, either directly or as third parties. The answer in relation to negotiation is more complex, however. To the extent that women avoid negotiation, they behave in a gender-congruent way by averting interpersonal tension. And in planning negotiations, they appear to be guided by more egalitarian principles. However, once in a negotiation, they are as likely as men to implement a competitive strategy.

  Both compliance and noncompliance with gendered expectations carry costs for women. When women comply and accommodate their negotiation partners, they undercut their ability to claim resources for themselves. If they accommodate when they are negotiating on behalf of others, they are perceived as incompetent leaders (Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013). As third parties, their trustworthiness hinges on their ability to implement gender-incongruent techniques (Stuhlmacher and Poitras, 2010). Women are thus caught in a double-bind, not clearly benefiting from either complying with or violating gender stereotypes. A potential cost of this double-bind is that it places women in a self-perpetuating negative spiral (Ely, Ibarra, and Kolb, 2011): women, initially reluctant to negotiate, incur either economic or social costs when they initiate negotiations, thus reinforcing their inclination to avoid negotiating. In the following sections, I describe three pillars that underpin a broad strategy designed to support women who negotiate for improved outcomes.

  The First Pillar

  Much of the discussion about how to improve women’s outcomes has centered on “fixing women” (Ely et al., 2011). Such an approach focuses on how women can better manage their negotiations to offset the negative consequences of asking. Recently Kulik and Olekalns (2012) identified two sets of strategies that might mitigate the costs incurred by women who negotiate. The first set of strategies focuses on offsetting the negative violations that women incur when they initiate negotiations. These negative violations, the result of behaving in a gender-incongruent way, trigger backlash and resistance on the part of an opponent. One reason for this backlash is that in the absence of other information, opponents are likely to make a person-based attribution (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012). This tendency may reflect a broader attributional bias in which not only are women’s and men’s actions evaluated against different standards, but women’s actions are more likely to elicit person-based attributions, whereas men’s actions are more likely to elicit situation-based attributions (Ragins and Winkel, 2011). Women can benefit by adding information that redirects the attribution for their ask from a person-based one to a situation-based one. Perceived demandingness decreases and perceived likability increases when women provide normative information by referring to their skills or to “industry standards,” or create external attributions for requests by saying they were encouraged to ask by their mentor. These strategies increase the perceived legitimacy of their ask and enhance the other person’s willingness to work with them in the future (Bowles and Babcock, 2008; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, and Amanatullah, 2009).

  The second set of strategies amplifies positive violations, that is, heightens gender-congruent characteristics. These strategies reflect Kray and Thompson’s (2005) suggestion that women will gain the most benefit in negotiations if they harness and work with gender stereotypes. Reflecting this advice, Kray and Locke (2008) showed that women can boost their negotiations by flirting with their opponents. Flirting points to the role of gender-congruen
t influence in negotiation. Guadagno and Cialdini (2007) showed that influence strategies are gender marked and that women gain influence by using gender-congruent strategies such as flattery, supplication, and an appeal for sympathy (Bolino and Turnley, 2003; Gordon, 1996). A second route for harnessing gender stereotypes is to use gender-congruent language. The use of linguistic devices such as tag questions and qualifiers, while signaling powerlessness (Mulac and Bradac, 1995), reduces social distance and improves outcomes in interdependent settings such as negotiation (Fragale, 2006). Inclusive language (using we and us) similarly reduces social distance and leads to improved outcomes (Donnellon, 1994; Simons, 1993). Because these linguistic strategies reduce social distance, they are congruent with the expectation that women strive for social harmony.

  The Second Pillar

  The responsibility for improving outcomes does not reside solely with women. The second pillar is thus built on the organizational policies and practices that create a more equitable environment: one that legitimizes the act of “asking” and reduces ambiguity about what is a legitimate “ask” (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012).

  Promote a Collaborative Culture.

  Kray et al.’s (Kray et al., 2001, 2002, 2004) research showed that women perform poorly when their negotiation success is linked to male-stereotyped behaviors such as being assertive and rational and pursuing personal interests. However, when the behaviors associated with negotiation success are linked to female-stereotyped behaviors such as communicating clearly, showing good listening skills, and having insight into the other negotiator’s feelings, women outperformed men (Kray et al., 2002). This finding suggests that in the same way that women’s negotiation success increases when they negotiate about gender-congruent topics, their success increases when they believe gender-congruent skills lead to negotiation success. Organizations can embrace this finding and consider whether their culture encourages a purely agentic, male-stereotyped approach to negotiations or if it also supports a communal, female-stereotyped approach to negotiations. Promoting a more collaborative culture that links negotiation success to problem solving should improve outcomes for women. Because those skills reflect a principled problem-solving approach to negotiation, they should also benefit the organization as a whole.

  Reframe Negotiation.

  How organizations frame requests also affects women’s outcomes. Women are more likely to negotiate, and to negotiate to the same level as men, when they are told they can “ask for more” but not when they are told “payment is negotiable” (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman, 2007). This finding suggests that very small changes in how organizations talk about making requests (asking versus negotiating) may give women the confidence to improve their outcomes.

  Reduce Ambiguity.

  Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated that women’s negotiation performance worsens as ambiguity about a negotiation increases. At least two factors contribute to this ambiguity. The first factor is the degree to which negotiating for improved outcomes is seen as a legitimate organization activity: women are more successful in their negotiations when institutional policies legitimize negotiating (Niederle and Versterlund, 2008). This legitimization is important because women are reluctant to initiate negotiations; understanding when negotiating is appropriate within an organization creates clearly defined opportunities for women to ask. This means that women are invited to negotiate for the resources that they need. It is also important because it shifts attributions about the underlying reasons for negotiating from the women to the situation. When women initiate negotiations in clearly defined and organizationally normative contexts, they should be more protected from backlash. Organizations that establish transparent policies for when it is appropriate to negotiate will assist women in becoming more effective negotiators.

  The second factor is the degree to which organizations clearly define what is negotiable. Women may be reluctant to negotiate because they are unclear about what is negotiable. In the absence of clear information, both women and men need to predict what is negotiable in terms of both the range of negotiable issues and the upper bounds of what is possible. This ambiguity advantages men, who see more of the world as negotiable than women do (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). It also advantages men because men predict the upper limit on what is attainable to be higher than women do (Babcock and Laschever. 2003). Organizations that provide transparent information about salary ranges and appropriate standards encourage women to ask (Bowles et al., 2005) and to set their asks at appropriate levels.

  Analyze Network Access.

  Differences in women’s and men’s network access may heighten differences in what women and men believe is negotiable. When deciding when and what to negotiate, individuals are likely to draw on their networks to disambiguate what is normative. However, because women and men differ in how they build networks, this strategy is likely to perpetuate gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes. Men’s networks include mainly men and few women, are multipurpose, and are composed of many shallow ties. Women’s networks are typically composed of fewer deep ties. Their networks include both men and women, but the two groups serve different functions: women turn to men in their network for resources and to other women for friendship and social support (Ibarra, 1992; Ragins and Kram, 2007).

  Because men build trust on in-group membership whereas women build trust on personal relationships (Maddux and Brewer, 2005), women are likely to be at a disadvantage in their ties to men: the relationships between women and men are likely to be characterized by lower trust because women are out-group members for men. As a result, men may restrict the information that flows to women about when and what to negotiate. Because the other female ties in a network all share this gender disadvantage, they cannot correct this information bias. Women consequently enter negotiations with a distinct informational disadvantage. Organizations might then consider how to better develop women’s networks. Formal mentorship schemes and other activities that develop and strengthen women’s ties to men provide one mechanism for overcoming this informational disadvantage.

  The Third Pillar

  The final pillar focuses on women’s development programs. What kinds of training should organizations deliver to improve women’s negotiation effectiveness? (Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist, 1993; Sturm, 2009). Ely et al. (2011) outline three skill sets that are especially important for women who engage in negotiations: recognizing what is negotiable, managing the process, and planning. They focus less on prescriptive advice about how to negotiate a good deal and more on managing the specific challenges that women encounter.

  The Domain of Negotiation.

  Two factors come into play in determining the domain of negotiation. First, women see less of the world as negotiable than men do (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). Consequently, they operate in a narrow domain of what can be negotiated (the most traditional items, such as salary, bonuses, job roles) and fail to recognize opportunities to negotiate items outside of this narrow range. Second, women appear more comfortable negotiating on gender-congruent issues (Bear, 2011; Bear and Babcock, 2012). As a result, they may further constrain the domain of negotiable items because gender-congruent issues such as work flexibility are more available than gender-incongruent issues. Using a program to explore what is negotiable, or inviting human resource managers into the program to talk about what is negotiable, helps women to broaden the domain of negotiable issues.

  Managing the Process.

  Women are not only reluctant to negotiate; they are also reluctant to push through adversity. Unlike men, who continue to negotiate through difficult moments, women end negotiations at that point (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). Although ending negotiations clearly fits with the desire to preserve relationships, it means women are disinclined to push through for better outcomes. Many of these moments of adversity can be described as moves—deliberate tactics that negotiators use to assert power and signal resistance to a woman’s proposal (Kolb, 2004).

  Caug
ht in the moment, it can be difficult to respond constructively to such tactics. Women may therefore benefit from their perspective-taking ability: by placing themselves in the other party’s shoes prior to negotiating, they may better anticipate and prepare for an opponent’s moves. At the same time, women need to learn how to respond effectively to such moves by turning the negotiation, that is by redirecting the negotiation from a power dynamic to a problem-solving dynamic. Kolb (2004) identified five broad turns that help women level the playing field (restorative turns) and redirect the negotiation to a more collaborative style (participative turns). Women may reestablish the power balance by providing an alternative account for their behavior (“I am looking for what’s fair” rather than “I am being greedy”), or by explicitly identifying the power tactics used by an opponent. They may invite the other negotiator to join them in a problem-solving approach by refocusing on the problem to be resolved, by using questions to solicit further information from an opponent, or by creating the opportunity to reconsider the negotiation process by briefly pausing the negotiation. Training programs can coach women in recognizing moves and to develop their skill in using turns.

  Planning to Negotiate.

 

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