The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  Despite the range of issues and variables studied in persuasion research, the essential paradigm is somewhat constrained in its portrayal of natural persuasion settings. A one-way, source-to-recipient model of persuasion reflects only some of the contexts in which social influence occurs. Although it might afford an accurate picture of persuasion through exposure to public media such as television, newspaper, and the Internet, it is unlikely to capture the dynamic aspects of persuasion that occur in the kinds of interpersonal interaction that characterize negotiations.

  In contrast to the one-shot, one-way message transmissions used in the persuasion paradigm, conflict and conflict resolution involve dynamic, repeated interactions between sources and recipients who together engage in bidirectional, mutual attempts at persuasion. In addition, attempts at influence may be directed not only at one’s opponent, but also at the groups represented by each party and at any mediators who might be present (and the mediator may meanwhile attempt to influence the negotiators). Moreover, the messages exchanged during negotiations often address multiple, related issues and the relations among them (such as order of priority) rather than single, independent ones. Finally, in negotiations, the parties are interdependent rather than autonomous: their outcomes depend on one another’s actions (Neale and Bazerman, 1991). These differences between the typical negotiation setting and the typical persuasion paradigm are important to bear in mind as we review the persuasion literature.

  Persuasion researchers can and do study persuasion as it relates to complex social settings; they traditionally do so by adding layers of complexity to the basic paradigm described earlier. This involves introducing new variables that capture the essential features of particular settings. For example, researchers have examined the effects of direct interpersonal influence by leading study participants to expect an interaction with the message source. (See Bohner and Dickel, 2011; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.)

  The prototypical persuasion paradigm has therefore been treated as a skeletal framework onto which variables are often added to understand more fully the complex processes of persuasion. It is clear that the framework represents a simplification of social influence in real-life contexts. Nevertheless, we believe that the study of persuasion, using variations of its basic paradigm, can inform us about how attitude change occurs in a wide range of conflict resolution settings. The basic paradigm and its modifications permit us to address a host of issues manageably and to draw causal conclusions about the effects of particular variables. The leap from there to real-world conflict resolution settings is sizable but feasible, given good theory about both conflict and persuasion.

  The Heuristic-Systematic Model

  Theories of persuasion that explain how attitude change occurs as a result of two qualitatively different modes of processing are called dual-process theories. Dual-process theories have been influential in numerous domains of social psychology, including prejudice, stereotyping, and decision making (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008), and have also been applied in the negotiation domain (see de Dreu, 2004).

  Our theoretical perspective, called the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Chaiken and Ledgerwood, 2012), is one of several dual-process models proven to be important in social psychology. We treat this model simply as a perspective, borrowing terms and insights from other dual-process models as well. Our goal is to acquaint readers with dual-process models in general and exploit the general perspective these models offer for understanding conflict and negotiation.

  Modes of Information Processing.

  Like other dual-process theories, the heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of information processing. Systematic processing involves attempts to thoroughly understand any information encountered through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning about relevant stimuli (such as arguments, sources, and the causes of sources’ behavior) and to integrate this information as a basis for subsequent attitudes and behaviors. A systematic approach to processing information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might entail reading as many newspaper reports as possible to learn about the conflict and develop an opinion about the “best” course of action. Not surprisingly, such systematic thinking entails a great deal of mental effort, requiring both deliberate attention and allocation of mental resources. Thus, systematic processing is unlikely to occur unless a person is both able and motivated to do it.

  Relative to systematic processing, heuristic processing is much less demanding in terms of the mental work required and much less dependent on adequate levels of personal or situational capacity (such as knowledge and time). In fact, heuristic processing has often been characterized as relatively automatic, in that it requires little cognitive effort and capacity (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues, such as a source’s credentials, the group membership of those endorsing an opinion, or the number of arguments presented. These cues activate well-learned decision rules known as heuristics. Examples are “experts know best,” “in-group but not out-group sources can be trusted,” and “argument length implies argument strength.” These simple associative rules allow judgments to be formed quickly and efficiently, with little additional cognitive processing. A heuristic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might involve simply adopting the opinion of a noted political expert. Put simply, heuristics are the ifs in an if-then rule structure, and judgments are the thens (“If expert, then agree”).

  Cognitive Consequences of Processing Modes.

  Although heuristic processing is more superficial and systematic processing involves greater depth of detail, neither mode is necessarily more or less rational, and both can produce nonoptimal, poor, or biased judgments. In the case of heuristic processing, many of the mental rules of thumb that people use to make judgments have proven useful and reliable in the past and should presumably remain so in the present. Moreover, in a world that offers abundant information but too little time or opportunity to think in a detailed, systematic way about every decision, heuristic processing can be highly functional.

  However, heuristic processing is obviously fallible. Experts can sometimes be wrong, one’s own group is not always right, and numerous reasons are not always good reasons. Thus, although heuristic processing can and often does produce reasonable judgments that people hold with relatively high confidence, it can sometimes produce judgments that are different—and subjectively poorer—from those that people would reach if they processed information more systematically. This is because systematic processing of persuasive appeals can increase both the breadth and depth of a person’s issue-relevant knowledge in ways that heuristic processing cannot.

  Systematic processing involves sustained attention and information search. This can increase the depth of understanding about a particular issue or at least about a particular point of view. Moreover, when driven by a need for accuracy, systematic processing can involve more objective and even-handed thinking than heuristic processing, which tends to be biased in favor of prior judgments and habitual responses. Open-minded and accuracy-driven systematic thought can increase the breadth of knowledge about a given issue and, more important, about alternative perspectives from which it can be understood.

  For example, systematic processing driven by accuracy motivation can lead to complex thought patterns that involve examining issues from multiple viewpoints and weighing the pros and cons of opposing perspectives. Research on cognitive complexity has established that a number of advantages are associated with this kind of reasoning, including diminished susceptibility to overconfidence and superior performance in group problem solving (Curşeu, Schruijer, and Boroş, 2011; Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993). Of special relevance to conflict settings, cognitive complexity has been associated with increasing tolerance for alternative viewpoints, facilitating compromise, and identifying integrative solutions to conflict (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Winter, 2007). Ind
ividuals who process information in cognitively complex ways are thus often more effective in conflict and decision-making settings.

  Importantly, systematic processing is more likely than heuristic processing to lead to deep, pervasive cognitive restructuring. This means that the cognitive changes that occur as a consequence of systematic processing are likely to persist, and thus affect future judgments and behavior, relative to the changes that accompany heuristic processing. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.) Hence, in the long run, open-minded systematic processing may well produce more optimal judgments than heuristic processing.

  Sources of Bias.

  Although systematic processing is enduring, it is far from foolproof. This is because the cognitive effort associated with systematic processing does not necessarily mean that all possible information will be sought out and weighed in an open-minded, even-handed manner. In fact, sometimes systematic processing simply strengthens prior convictions. Systematic processing can be biased by both “cool” cognitive factors (such as a recipient’s existing attitudes) and, as discussed later, “hotter” motivational factors (such as a recipient’s goals or ideological commitments).

  People’s current attitudes can exert a biasing effect at virtually all stages of information processing. Existing attitudes bias our attention to information in the environment (we tend to selectively seek and attend to information that confirms our existing attitudes), our interpretation of this information, and our memory for attitude-relevant information (see Albarracín, Johnson, and Zanna, 2005). The way our minds organize information often makes it easier for us to process information that is congenial to our own attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, 1998). Thus, through the cool, cognitive process of critically thinking about a source’s arguments, perceivers may find themselves genuinely swayed by arguments that fit their preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

  Importantly, even if perceivers engage in modest to high amounts of systematic processing, heuristics can provide another source of cognitive bias. For example, based on the heuristic that in-group sources tend to be correct, we often expect that politicians from our own political party will have more compelling and valid positions than politicians from an opposing political party. This heuristic-based expectation may guide systematic processing in a way that ends up confirming our initial expectation. As we attend to our own party’s arguments, we may perceive them to be compelling, and we may elaborate them in ways that make them even more convincing. In contrast, if we instead hear exactly the same arguments put forth by the opposing political party, we may think of various reasons that the arguments are flawed or unconvincing.

  Motives for Processing

  Researchers have identified three types of motives that influence how individuals process information. An accuracy motive is geared toward discovering what is correct. But thinking is not always accuracy driven and objective. Two other, “directional” motives are geared toward validating a particular judgment or stance: defense motivation is self-focused and egoistic, whereas impression motivation is other focused and relational (see Chaiken et al., 1996; Kunda, 1990).

  The motivation to attain accurate judgments is pervasive in everyday life because we need to accurately understand the world around us in order to behave effectively. When accuracy motivation is present but not particularly high, people tend to look for heuristic cues that signal accuracy, such as source credibility. Indeed, communicators often seek to enhance others’ perceptions of them as trustworthy, expert, and likable because this provides heuristic information suggesting that the advocated position is accurate. However, if accuracy motivation increases, heuristic processing may be accompanied by systematic processing: if we want to be very confident that a judgment is correct, we are often uncomfortable making a snap decision based on a simple heuristic.

  How much processing occurs, and thus whether heuristic or systematic processing dominates judgment, depends primarily on (1) the extent to which judgment-relevant heuristics are accessible (e.g., the “in-group sources can be trusted” heuristic may be particularly salient in conflict situations; see Chen and Chaiken, 1999; Ledgerwood and Chaiken, 2007); (2) the extent to which people have the time and mental resources necessary for systematic processing (in negotiations, anxiety or time constraints could decrease the capacity for systematic processing); and (3) the level of judgmental confidence that a perceiver desires. Assuming the first two factors are in place, our theoretical perspective predicts that people will process as little as possible but as much as necessary: in general, people want to satisfy their goals as efficiently as possible, without expending unnecessary effort. As the desired level of confidence increases, the minimal amount of processing necessary to reach this “sufficiency threshold” increases as well.

  Thus, when accuracy motivation is modest (or when capacity is inadequate), heuristic cues such as source expertise and consensus opinion can exert a powerful influence on judgment—regardless of persuasive arguments or other information that might otherwise temper or reverse the heuristic-based judgment (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly, 1996; Petty and Wegener, 1998). Ample systematic processing occurs only if accuracy motivation is higher—for example, if the issue is of great personal importance or the perceiver is accountable to others (and even then, accuracy-motivated systematic processing can still be biased by initial heuristics).

  Although people usually assume that they are motivated to reach accurate judgments, they can also be motivated (usually without realizing it) by defense and impression concerns (Chaiken and Ledgerwood, 2012). Defense motivation compels people to process information in ways that protect and validate their own beliefs and interests. These beliefs could be about a person’s own valued qualities (“I’m intelligent”), ideological values (“Government should be as limited as possible”), or identity in valued groups (“Being Jewish is important to who I am”). These self-interests or self-definitional beliefs are defended because the perceiver feels, at least unconsciously, that overall personal integrity and well-being would be threatened if they were challenged.

  When defense motivation is present but moderate, desired confidence, and therefore the amount of processing, is also moderate. Thus, heuristic processing dominates judgment—but defensively or selectively. In other words, since the goal of processing is to arrive at judgments that protect the self, heuristics are selected to the extent that they serve this goal. For example, if an expert source presented a short argument in favor of deporting illegal immigrants, you might invoke the heuristic “experts know best” if that position is congruent with your ideological values, whereas you might instead rely on the heuristic “argument length implies argument strength” if the short message contradicts your values and you want a reason to discount it.

  When defense motivation is strong, additional systematic processing occurs until a person is sufficiently confident in her self-protective judgment. Like defense-motivated heuristic processing, defense-motivated systematic processing is also biased by a person’s favored position. For example, people tend to counterargue information that threatens their preferred position (Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, and Chaiken, 2001; Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, and Pohl, 2011).

  The third broad motivational concern addressed by our perspective is impression motivation, which involves considering the interpersonal consequences of expressing a particular judgment in a given social context (such as in an interaction between two negotiators). Here, the target’s goal is to express positions that are socially acceptable to other people in their environment. As with defense motivation, impression-motivated processing is not necessarily self-conscious and is marked by a selective bias.

  Impression-motivated heuristic processing entails selective application of heuristics that ensure a smooth interaction with specific others. On the one hand, when interacting with a person or group whose views on an issue are unknown or vague, a perceiver might invoke the heuristic “moderate judgment minimizes disagreement.” On the other han
d, when others’ views are known, a “go along to get along” heuristic might better serve the same goal.

  With sufficient cognitive capacity and higher levels of impression motivation, people may also process systematically but still selectively. Thus, a negotiating politician who is motivated to be well liked and respected by his constituents might think more favorably about an agreement that is likely to be popular among his constituents, and more critically about an agreement that is likely to be unpopular. Importantly, parties in conflict resolution are often concerned with the impressions they make on multiple audiences, and the content of the desired impressions may differ depending on the audience. For example, a negotiator seeking to resolve an international conflict may be motivated to look collaborative to the other party, tough and competent to his constituency, and dignified to the world at large. Which of these audiences is most salient at a given moment may influence which desired impression motivates the negotiator’s information processing.

  Illustrating the importance of impression-motivated processing, Chen and Chaiken (1999) reported a study in which participants anticipated a discussion about a social issue with a partner who allegedly held either a favorable or an unfavorable opinion on the issue. Before this discussion, participants read “imagination scenarios” subtly designed to activate either the accuracy goal of determining a valid opinion or the impression goal of getting along with another person. After this task, participants familiarized themselves with the discussion issue by reading an evaluatively balanced essay concerning the issue (in this case, whether election returns should be broadcast while polls are still open). Participants then listed the thoughts that had occurred to them as they read the essay and indicated their own issue attitudes. Finally, they learned that there would be no actual discussion and were excused.