The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  Be Prepared for the Negotiation to Take More Time and Effort.

  Integrative negotiations are time and effort intensive and require a greater exchange of information on interests and priorities. It takes longer to discuss options and weigh each of them along a set of mutually agreed-on criteria. The process of ensuring an agreement that fully satisfies each party’s interests cannot be rushed. In the end, however, it not only produces an agreement that generates higher mutual satisfaction and commitment but also builds a stronger relationship between negotiators (which is important for future negotiations).

  Stage 2: Building a Relationship with the Other Party

  Our natural tendency in conflicts is to view the other party as part of the problem (Fisher et al., 1991). We usually see the other’s goals as necessarily in opposition to our own and their actions as impediments to our desires (Hocker and Wilmot, 1985). Integrative negotiation requires a different mind-set, where the other party is seen as a partner in solving a joint problem rather than an enemy who must be defeated (Fisher et al., 1991).

  Whenever there is an important or ongoing relationship with the other party, integrative negotiation is especially appropriate. This is because the collaborative (instead of competitive) approach in integrative negotiation emphasizes and preserves the quality of the relationship between negotiators. As we will discuss in the next section, integrative negotiation relies on exchanging information that parties are otherwise disposed to keep hidden. This exchange of information will not occur if the parties do not trust each other. Distrust of the other party entails suspicion of their motives and fear of exploitation, and it leads to heightened scrutiny and lower information exchange. This incites competitive behaviors (motivated by a perceived need to defend oneself) rather than collaborative behaviors (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale, 1980). Thus, it is vital to take steps to communicate and demonstrate trustworthiness so the other party will not fear exploitation. When the parties trust each other, they are more willing to openly and truthfully share information such as interests and relevant situational details (Butler, 1999; Tenbrunsel, 1999). If the prior relationship history of the negotiators has been strained and tense, it will be even more important to take steps to repair this relationship (for a fuller discussion, see chapter 5 in this Handbook).

  Stage 3: Exchanging Information

  Because integrative negotiation is a joint problem-solving endeavor, both parties need to openly share information with each other to discover areas of commonality and difference. They should begin with a negotiation over how they will negotiate. Specifically, the negotiation should begin with a statement that joint (rather than individual) gain is being sought, information on interests should be fully discussed first, and all viable options should be explored to maximize the likelihood of a win-win solution. That is, any agreement on a particular issue should be completely tentative until the very end, so trade-offs among issues can be used to maximize joint gain. In addition, the negotiators can set ground rules such as sticking to a preset agenda, committing to respectful dialogue, dealing with less contentious issues first, and agreeing to take breaks when discussions become tense.

  As the negotiation proceeds, it is imperative to focus the discussion on each negotiator’s interests. Negotiators should directly ask the other party to state his or her interests (and priorities among these interests), as this is much more likely to lead to integrative agreements (Thompson, 1991). While this advice may seem obvious, very few negotiators actually do this (Thompson, 1991). Simply asking why a negotiator has taken a particular stance on an issue can provide the key to resolving the conflict in a mutually beneficial way (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007).

  When the negotiation over the issues begins, the parties can start by stating their opening offers on each issue. These offers should be the most a party can plausibly justify, and that rationale should be explained. This rationale should highlight the interests to be served. While “asking for the moon” may seem incompatible with integrative negotiation, this is important because one party’s ultimate settlement on an issue might not be a problem for the other party to grant (either because he views it as a trivial issue or that settlement point on the issue also has high value to him). It is unlikely to get the highest possible settlement point on an issue without asking for it, and you just might get it! Furthermore, making a subsequent concession to a lower-valued settlement point on that issue is more likely to be accepted than if you were to make the same offer without the more extreme offer preceding it. Finally, this avoids the so-called myth of the fixed pie, where a negotiator assumes (without testing) that the goals of both parties are mutually exclusive; this is not necessarily the case.

  To maximize the chances of the other party sharing information with you, you must be willing to share information with her. When you indicate willingness to openly exchange information (as we have suggested) if your partner does as well and you proceed to share information, you increase the likelihood that your partner will reciprocate (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007). In addition, making multiple offers of equivalent value to you can provide you with information about the relative priorities of the other party (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007).

  Stage 4: Inventing and Exploring Options

  With the opening offers (and underlying interests) now on the table, the parties can quickly see where they agree and where they do not. There may be some compatible issues where both parties prefer a particular settlement point, so these can be quickly settled.

  Having exchanged information on interests allows the parties to proceed to discuss options, which are different possible settlements on the issues. When there are multiple issues, there are many potential ways of arriving at an agreement. The parties should now brainstorm potential options that would likely satisfy both of them. This means withholding any criticism in order to generate a long list of potential agreements. These are not proposals or offers. They are simply options to be explored and evaluated to see which one most fully creates value for both parties and allows them to satisfy their respective interests. In this process, the parties should demonstrate “firm flexibility” (Fisher et al., 1991)—an uncompromising stance on resolving the interests that motivated the negotiation, yet openness to any viable solution that might be useful in serving those interests.

  Toward that end, options can be created in a variety of ways. What initially appears as a single issue might be more fruitfully considered as two or more separate issues, which might create the potential for a logrolling solution (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1981, 1983). When problems are large and present multiple issues, breaking the problem into smaller, more solvable parts can often create a breakthrough toward reaching agreement. There are other types of options as well—for example:

  Expanding the pie—finding a creative way to add more resources to a fixed-pie issue, allowing both negotiators to receive enough to be sated

  Nonspecific compensation—paying off the other party in a completely different currency in exchange for getting what we want

  Cutting the cost of compliance—by reducing the burden one negotiator endures by agreeing to the desires of the other

  Finding a bridging solution that creates new alternative possibilities that neither side had earlier envisioned

  Particularly when parties have to negotiate a long-term contract and there are considerable differences about whether conditions in the future will improve or decline, parties can create contingent contracts, which capitalize on unresolved differences between negotiators on how the future will unfold by specifying different contract terms for different future scenarios (Pruitt, 1981; Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999; Lax and Sebenius, 2002; Lewicki et al., in press). All of these processes require both creating options and then trading off on those options so as to maximally satisfy the needs of both parties. Negotiators may also offer multiple offers of equivalent value simultaneously to each other, suggesting several packages of offers that have equi
valent value to the person making the offer but may have differential value to the receiver (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).

  Stage 5: Reaching Settlement

  After generating a wide variety of potential options, the parties must negotiate over how to settle. This is done by agreeing on objective criteria for the optimal solution. Market rates, industry practice, past precedent, and other similar metrics form objective criteria along which each option can be evaluated. The importance of objective criteria cannot be overstated, as it is important that the final solution not be seen as unfairly biased toward one party at the other’s expense. These criteria may also serve as benchmarks to gauge the degree to which interests are met. They can also be set before options are invented, although these may artificially limit the number of options invented. Essentially, integrative negotiation is a rational decision-making technique that seeks to optimize joint gain. More specifically, the objective is to reach the Pareto-efficient frontier, where “there is no agreement that would make any party better off without decreasing the outcomes to any other party” (Neale and Bazerman, 1991, p. 23). This ensures that value is created to the furthest extent possible.

  Once agreement is reached on the criteria, the parties may proceed to apply them to each option. The option scoring the highest along the chosen criteria is selected as the optimal solution. The parties may also choose to leave the door open for the possibility of postsettlement settlements (Bazerman, Ross, and Yakura, 1987). In this process, the current agreement becomes the parties’ new BATNA, while they continue to explore additional options that might improve on the existing deal. This process can be pursued very soon after the deal is reached or may be initiated weeks or months after the deal was arrived at, as the context has changed, new contingencies have arisen, or new opportunities have become available.

  HOW TO DO INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION WELL IN DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS

  Clearly the process of integrative negotiation we have described works optimally when both parties mutually agree to pursue it. Under those conditions, the process can flow almost seamlessly. More likely, however, at least one party is not as committed to the integrative bargaining process as the other is, or the size, complexity, and other characteristics of the issues themselves make it difficult to find an integrative agreement. In this section, we first address the question of how an integrative negotiator can deal with a difficult opponent and then address the problem of negotiation impasse—that is, characteristics of the issues themselves and the context in which they occur.

  Characteristics of the Parties

  There may be characteristics of the parties themselves that make integrative negotiation more difficult to achieve.

  Definition of One’s Own Identity.

  It is not uncommon for parties to define themselves—to define their identity—in ways that make working together with others more difficult. Members of certain groups—political, religious, geographic, racial—link themselves to issues in ways that make negotiation over the issues inextricably tied to definitions of self (Shapiro, 2006). For example, a research study examining the characteristics of intractable environmental disputes showed that the identities assumed by some of the disputing parties (“environmentalists” or “preservationists”) contributed to the parties’ taking negotiation positions they defined as nonnegotiable (Gray, 2003; Brumans et al., 2008).

  Characterization of the Other’s Identity.

  Just as negotiating parties may define themselves in ways that self-limit their willingness to negotiate, parties may define the other party in stereotypical ways that generate the same result. As parties define themselves as unique and distinctive, they often define the other in ways that preclude productive negotiation or even meaningful communication. For example, in the ongoing debate over abortion, if one defines one’s position as “100 percent pro-life” and the other as “100 percent pro-choice,” this definition of self and characterization of the other may preclude any further productive dialogue between them. Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein (1996) have shown how the self-definition and other-definition process leads parties to make positive attributions to themselves about their self-definitions and their positions on issues, and comparably negative attributions to their opponents and their positions on issues (Ross, 1997), and that these dynamics systematically lead to negotiation impasses.

  Use of Competitive, Distributive Tactics.

  A third problem is that the opposing negotiator tends to resort to competitive, distributive tactics as part of the process—for example, good cop–bad cop, nibbling (requesting an unlimited number of small concessions), or deception (Lewicki et al., in press). There are several strategies an integrative negotiator can use to confront the other party’s use of these tactics, particularly if the parties have agreed to approach negotiation in an integrative manner:

  Ignoring the tactic and persisting in the effort to sustain the integrative negotiation process

  Notifying the other party that one is aware of the tactic being used, raising that tactic to the level of open discussion, and indicating that the tactic is likely to be unproductive in an integrative negotiation and unlikely to yield positive outcomes to the opponent

  Making an offer to the opponent to change the negotiation approach to a more productive course of action by explaining how the integrative negotiation process can yield superior outcomes for both sides and offering to guide the other through that process in a productive manner (Lewicki et al., in press)

  Dealing with Power Differences.

  Power differences between the parties can inhibit effective integrative negotiation. Parties with more power, particularly some form of coercive power, may believe that they can use that power to force an agreement on the other, and hence have less of an incentive to negotiate constructively (Donohue and Kolt, 1992; Brams and Doherty, 1993; de Dreu, 1995). Similarly, if the low-power party believes that the high-power party has the capacity and willingness to exert such power, the low-power party may fail to adequately protect himself or herself from abuse. Finally, the introduction of power into the relationship may create emotions of fear and anger or a desire to seek revenge—to save face and not look weak, redress past injustices, or attempt to prevent future abuses of power (Kim and Smith, 1993).

  Several strategies may be used to counteract the use of this power:

  Protect oneself by understanding one’s bottom line or minimally acceptable settlement, while constantly attempting to bring the conversation back to the discussion of mutual interests.

  Cultivate one’s BATNA so that the negotiator believes that he always has some viable alternative to pursue as a way to satisfy his interests and that the other (high-power) negotiator is aware that we have viable alternatives and can walk away from the deal being discussed at the table. It may also be useful to specify in advance indicators that a negotiator should be aware of that may indicate that abuse of power is likely to occur and that the BATNA should be actively considered.

  Enable the negotiators to agree to discuss the power imbalance and redistribute power in order to enhance the integrative conversation. Specific tactics might include sharing resources, sharing control over key processes (e.g., setting and shaping the agenda, parties at the table), and discovering common interests that can focus the conversation and override the power differences that exist (Donohue and Kolt, 1992).

  Agree to employ a third party (e.g., mediator, facilitator) who can referee and broker the negotiation process. This refers to empowering this third party to keep the negotiators on track and follow the agenda, orchestrate them through the steps of integrative negotiation we examined, identify tactics that the parties may be using that may be disruptive to the flow of integrative negotiation and intervening so as to curtail the use of those tactics, and regulate emotional outbursts so that they do not derail productive, problem-solving conversations (Lewicki et al., in press; Ury, 2000).

  Dealing with Negotiation Impasses

  While inte
grative negotiators may wish to believe that every problem can be solved by following the process we have spelled out here, in fact, many disputes are inherently more difficult to resolve. In addition to difficulties with the other party, two major characteristics of disputes make some negotiations more difficult to resolve: the types of issues under discussion and characteristics of the negotiation environment (the basic objectives of the parties and how they have evolved) and the setting (e.g., where and when the negotiation occurs, cultural and relationship differences between the parties). We also mention several key ways that negotiators can engage in productive actions in an effort to resolve impasses.

  Characteristics of the Negotiation Issues.

  Some issues are simply more difficult to resolve than others. Several authors (Putnam and Wondolleck, 2003; chapter 30 in this Handbook) have indicated that impasses often result because the issues become intractable—that is, difficult to resolve because of the complexity of the conflict, intensity of the emotions associated with the conflict, pervasiveness of the conflict in people’s personal lives, and persistence of the problem over a long period of time. Three major characteristics of issues can contribute to the likelihood of impasse:

  The differences between the parties originate in fundamental differences in personal and social values. Many of the most difficult issues to resolve in our society—gay marriage, abortion, global warming, gun control, government-supported health care—can be traced to fundamental differences in the personal and social values of the conflicting parties (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002).