The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

  One potential problem after group violence is unequal justice. After the genocide about 1.5 million Hutus streamed out of Rwanda into Zaire, now the Congo (DRC), including many of the perpetrators. These genocidaires then conducted raids into Rwanda, killing more Tutsis. Just as at the time of the genocide, the international community did nothing. The new Rwandan army invaded the Congo twice to fight these genocidaires, but it also killed a very large number of Hutu civilians. The justice processes in Rwanda have addressed only crimes of Hutus during the genocide, and not these crimes of the Tutsi-led army.

  Countries that forgo justice processes tend to return to them after some period of time. In Argentina, perpetrators of the disappearances in the late 1970s received blanket pardons. This led to persistent distress and protests in segments of the population. As a result, amnesty laws have been overturned and the prosecution of harm doers began more than twenty years after their deeds (Burchianti, 2004). In Cambodia after the genocide in the late 1970s, a tribunal began its work only in 2009, with the first sentence of a perpetrator in 2010.

  Economic justice is also very important. Tutsi survivor women in Kigali said at a hearing in 1999 as the Unity and Reconciliation Commission began its work: “We lost everything, cannot feed our children, cannot pay for their schooling, and need economic compensation.” One aspect of economic justice is to help those devastated by violence. This often happens only minimally. In South Africa, victims received much less compensation than initially promised by the TRC (Byrne, 2004). In Rwanda, a poor country, they also have not received sufficient help.

  Another aspect of economic justice is addressing inequalities, often a primary source of conflict and violence (Fein, 1993). This requires psychological change in attitudes by the more powerful toward the less powerful and an accompanying change in legitimizing ideologies that justify group differences in access and privilege (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Only then is it likely that institutions will be created that provide equal access for all groups to society’s resources. Equal access may also require practices that address the consequences of a past history, whether differentness or discrimination, such as helping immigrant groups like Muslims in European countries to acculturate (Staub, 2007, 2011),

  MOVING TOWARD FORGIVENESS

  Forgiveness means letting go of anger and the desire for revenge and moving toward an increasingly positive view of and acceptance of the party that harmed oneself or the people one cares about (McCullough, Finchman, and Tasang, 2003; Worthington, 2005; Staub, 2011). Forgiveness is an aspect of reconciliation, central to which is mutual acceptance. But forgiveness is one-sided: it comes from the party that is harmed, victimized, injured. Forgiveness by victims after intense victimization is extremely difficult. However, it is much more likely if harm doers, or the group they come from, acknowledge their actions, the harm they have caused, express regret, apologize, and show empathy with their victims or the survivors of their violence. The joining of acknowledgment and progressive forgiveness is then a mutual process, which is the essence of reconciliation.

  Private forgiveness, with its element of letting go of pain, can bring relief to people who suffered. But one-sided public forgiveness can be dangerous. Violence creates an imbalance in the relationship between harm doers and victims. While publicly forgiving people who have not acknowledged and showed regret for their actions can sometimes make further harmful action by them less likely, this is more probable if there has been no intense hostility between the parties (Wallace, Exline, and Baumeister, 2008), or if their power to harm has diminished. Otherwise, it can instead increase the imbalance in the relationship and embolden perpetrators, leading to more violence (Staub, 2005a, 2011). The conditions under which unconditional or one-sided forgiveness by those who were harmed moves groups toward peaceful relations, rather than new violence, requires further research.

  Usually it is a combination of processes that effectively promotes reconciliation. For example, forgiveness is more likely after some degree of healing and in the context of or after appropriate justice processes (Deutsch, 2008). In our research, soon after the genocide, without yet a justice process, we thought it unreasonable to expect that people would forgive. It is for that reason that we measured “conditional forgiveness” (Staub et al., 2005). As I noted, with many reconciliation processes, there can be reversals, as there was in the Israeli public’s view of the “new history” in the course of the second intifada. Immacule Ilibigaza (Ilibagiza and Erwin, 2006) described in her memoir forgiving the Hutu killers while still in hiding from them. But when she went back to her village where all except one other member of her family was killed, it took her time and effort to recapture the feeling of forgiveness.

  Acknowledgment, Apology, Regret

  Acknowledgment of suffering—by perpetrators, bystanders, the rest of the world—is likely to contribute to healing. But perpetrators tend to deny what they did or justify their actions as necessary self-defense or in other ways. The devaluation of victims, or opponents in a violent conflict, that is normally present from the start and intensifies in the course of the evolution of increasing violence does not disappear when the violence stops. Members of groups that have engaged in violence often continue to blame victims or opponents and hold on to a destructive ideology that made the other the enemy. These tendencies may be enhanced by guilt and shame that is unacknowledged (Staub, 2011).

  However, feeling affirmed can lead people to acknowledge the harm their group has done. When Israelis, and Serbs in Bosnia, were led to focus on experiences that affirmed them, they were more likely to both acknowledge their group’s responsibility for harmful actions and support reparations for them (Čehajić;-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Lieberman, and Ross, 2011; see also Nadler and Schnabel, 2008). And after their group was affirmed, participants in several studies were more willing to accept shame and guilt for harmful actions by their group—e.g., Canadians for their treatment of Aboriginals (Gunn and Wilson, 2011). Healing also strengthens the self and presumably makes acknowledgment more possible (Staub, in press).

  THE MULTIPLE PROCESSES IN RECONCILIATION

  Practices of reconciliation usually involve a combination and intermingling of elements. As an example, consider a project in Sierra Leone of Fambul Tok, “Family Talk,” a community organization that has designed ways of engaging people with each other:

  Under a tree, or in other settings, organizers, ex-combatants, and victims/community members sit around a bonfire. Religious leaders start the meeting, saying, “If you have done something wrong, come forward, tell about it, apologize to the family of the people harmed, and the whole community.” Confess to a person who never knew who killed his or her son that you did it. The spirit of these meetings is that the truth is cleansing and can be the beginning of reconciliation. This is followed by engaging people, killers and survivors, in varied activities. Some are recreational, such as a soccer match, followed by dialogue. In others people work together, for example, to replenish stock. Others are community forums that people initiate. In still others, sitting under a tree, they talk through how to engage in acts that contribute to reconciliation—such as having worn a blue shirt while killing someone’s parents, and not wearing blue when visiting that person. (Staub, 2011, p. 485)

  In Sierra Leone, violent groups not only killed but also maimed many people, cutting off arms or other body parts. One of the activities of Fambul Tok has been to bring perpetrators together with survivors whose family members they killed and the communities in which they killed people. This also is a multifaceted process, more so than it looks on the surface. The public aspect of it is to bring a perpetrator to a community and face-to-face with a survivor who seemingly miraculously forgives him in front of the community (Fambul Tok, 2012) . But there is a great deal of both preparation, working with the perpetrator, the community, and the individual who publicly forgives, as well as follow-up. Over time the symbolic act of forgiveness turns into real reconciliation. In this process, some
perpetrators become agents of reconciliation.

  Progressively Increasing Acceptance of the Past

  Letting go of the past, not dwelling in pain, is an important contributor to reconciliation. This view comes from my experience in the field. Acceptance of the past does not mean forgetting. It requires healing and is furthered by understanding, but it may precede forgiving. Accepting is a psychological state or attitude that says: “This is what happened to us, this has been our life, this is who we are. But our past does not dictate our future. We can use what we learned from the past wisely, not be a slave or victim of it.” It is one of the things that Palestinians and Israelis seem to have difficulty with (Staub, 2011). At least some Palestinians cannot accept the state of Israel, a well-established entity, and the loss of the homes of their grandparents or parents and their suffering as refugees and having lived under occupation. At least some Israelis cannot move beyond all the Jewish victimization in the past, the terrorist attacks on them, and Arab hostility toward them over the years. Although Israelis are in a dominant position relative to Palestinians, they cannot live enough in the present and future to trust reconciliation with Palestinians and engage in actions that can lead to it. Both groups also hold on to destructive ideologies that interfere with peace.

  Destructive Ideology versus Constructive Ideologies

  Ideologies are visions of social arrangements and of relationships between groups and individuals. In the face of difficult social conditions, new ideologies tend to emerge, visions of the future to be created, that provide hope for their group. These visions, and joining together in an ideological movement, help fulfill needs for effectiveness, community, identity, and an understanding of reality. However, they are often destructive, as they identify enemies who stand in the way of the fulfillment of the ideology—the creation of the better future. These ideologies are powerful motivators of violence against the identified enemy.

  Among some Palestinians, in particular Hamas, a continuing vision is the elimination of Israel (and perhaps of Jewish Israelis) and the creation of a Palestinian state in its place. Among some Israelis, the destructive ideology is the recreation of historical Greater Israel, which includes the West Bank, with the Palestinians who live there, standing in the way. Reconciliation requires moving from destructive to constructive ideologies in which the vision of the hopeful future includes all groups. This makes it possible for all groups to join in working for the ideology’s fulfillment. Such a shared vision for Palestinians and Israelis can include, minimally, two states in an economic community living in peace, thus benefiting the region and making terrorism less likely (Staub, 2011).

  Political Conditions and Reconciliation: Pluralistic, Fair, and Democratic Institutions

  What are the institutionalized practices and institutions that promote reconciliation, or interfere with it and with one of its primary aims, a peaceful society? As I discuss them, I will provide examples for some of them from Rwanda.

  Pluralism, the free flow of ideas, and the access of all groups to the public space, all groups having a voice, are essential for reconciliation and lasting peace. Sometimes reconciliation processes and the sociopolitical context are at odds with each other. For example, in Rwanda, the government advocates reconciliation and promotes certain reconciliation processes. At the same time it holds an “ideology of unity,” that there are only Rwandans, not Hutus and Tutsis. In the name of unity, it discourages references to Hutus and Tutsis. There are laws that can lead to jail sentences for vaguely defined “divisionism” and advocating genocidal ideologies, also vaguely defined. This limits the free expression of ideas and the discussion of issues between Tutsis and Hutus (Prunier, 2009; Staub, 2011).

  Limits on press freedom and on the expression of varied views limit political processes. It is a free and active press that enables people to make their own judgment about events and advocate for political views and parties. The government limits political opposition in other ways as well. This may be in part because Tutsis, about 15 percent of the population, still fear Hutus, about 84 percent of the population, and in part because once in power, governments in countries that have not developed democratic institutions resist yielding power.

  Democratic political institutions mean a free press, civic institutions that involve people in the political process, and free elections. These create trust that through proper representation of the different groups in the population, conflicts can be peacefully resolved. In societies with subgroups of very different sizes, with each holding on to its identity, constitutions are needed that provide for representing the interests of each group. External bystanders working together with internal groups can be helpful in this. In Macedonia, external nongovernmental organizations developed ideas that were used in creating a new constitution that helped address some of the issues between ethnic groups (Burg, 1997). The US Department of Justice provided such help in Rwanda. Other important institutions are the police and the justice system. To create a peaceful society, there needs to be equal justice regardless of group differences in wealth and power and accountability for violent and criminal conduct. Even better is the prevention of such conduct. For example, the Rwandan government carefully monitors the behavior of its leaders to prevent corruption.

  I have already discussed the importance of economic justice. In Rwanda, new laws attempt to create equality of opportunity in access to education and jobs. The fast economic development of Rwanda (Kinzer, 2008) has increased differences in wealth between segments of the population, as usually happens in cases of speedy economic development in poor countries. But equal access to opportunity, especially if it becomes increasingly de facto, can create trust in the system.

  Psychological changes and the development of institutions are intertwined. Members of each group, especially powerful groups, increasingly need to see the humanity of other groups in order to be motivated to establish institutions that treat people equally. Such institutions in turn further change attitudes and values. Just as violence and the institutions that serve it evolve progressively, so do the processes and institutions that serve reconciliation and peace.

  The presence of the psychological conditions I described and their social manifestations (e.g., positive attitudes toward other groups, some degree of healing, constructive ideology) and constructive institutions can be used together to assess the level of reconciliation in a society and the prospects for peace. In summary, these institutions include a free press, civic institutions that promote political participation by all groups, free elections, a law-abiding and fair police, a justice system that addresses both present and past crimes, the absence of corruption, lack of discrimination in access to education and jobs, and a culture and social system that makes equal opportunity real.

  Public Education about Conflict and Conflict Resolution

  Even if the processes of prevention and reconciliation are effective, conflicts between subgroups of societies can emerge, especially in plural societies. In addition, even after healing processes and more positive attitudes by groups toward each other, great past violence leaves in its wake psychological vulnerabilities. These can emerge and have strong effects under newly developing difficult life conditions or group conflict. Understanding this can serve to some degree as inoculation against its happening. Creating fair and democratic institutions, and knowledge and skills to prevent and or address conflict can build confidence, lessening the impact of challenging conditions as well as enabling groups to peacefully deal with them.

  Lederach (1997) has written about downward influence (the influence of leaders on the population), upward influence (the influence of the population on leaders), and groups in the middle (such as the media and church leaders), who can exert both upward and downward influence. One avenue for the transformation of each of these groups, so that it becomes an agent of positive change, is public education through radio and television, depending on what is appropriate for a particular setting, as well as trainings and worksh
ops.

  Our trainings in Rwanda and its use with leaders is one example (Staub, 2011; Staub and Pearlman, 2006). However, because of insufficient human and material resources, these trainings were not continued as we moved on to educational radio programs. For lasting change, especially by leaders guided by ideology and part of a highly hierarchical system, extended trainings are needed (Staub, 2013). Another example is the trainings that Howard Wolpe and his associates (Wolpe et al., 2004) conducted in Burundi. In Burundi also, Hutus and Tutsis are the two primary groups, and they have engaged in a great deal of violence against each other. Wolpe and his associates brought leaders of various kinds together—military, different civilian groups, and so on—to develop skills in dialogue and negotiation, as well as comfort with each other, before addressing issues to be resolved. Such trainings can develop the capacity of parties to listen to each other, hear the essential concerns of the other group and express their own effectively, compromise, use mediators as appropriate, to be able to identify escalation and use de-escalation processes, and in general gain knowledge and skills in conflict management and resolution (Coleman, 2012; Kelman and Fisher, 2003). One relevant institution to create would be mediation centers that both provide training and offer mediation services.

  After violent conflict or mass violence—one-sided or mutual harm doing—as the parties come together, it is difficult for them not to start with expressing all their pain, anger, and hostility. In our workshops in Rwanda, people interacted around ideas and gained experiential understanding that apparently lessened the negative view of the other party and modulated feelings of hurt and anger (Staub et al., 2005; Staub and Pearlman, 2006). Starting with such a process may help parties to engage effectively with each other.