The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed)

by Peter T Coleman

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  CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE

  SOME RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN THE STUDY OF CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION

  Dean G. Pruitt

  Katharina G. Kugler

  It would be idle to assume that a single chapter like this one can be a comprehensive guide to the gaps in the field of conflict studies. The preceding chapters summarize the knowledge in this field, and the gaps undoubtedly greatly exceed that knowledge. Furthermore, future research is likely to follow unforeseen theoretical directions, leaving a chapter like this one in the dust. Nevertheless, we hope that it will provide some guidance to those new to the field and some stimulation to seasoned scholars.

  The chapter may seem quite one-sided to those who follow traditions other than those we will describe. But there is no way around this. What we find most exciting and can think about most clearly are research issues that fit into our way of looking at the field.

  We have divided the chapter into six sections: origins and impact of conflict, strategic choice, escalation and intractability, readiness for conflict resolution, negotiation, and mediation. Besides identifying recent trends in conflict research, we pose questions that need attention and present some possible directions for answering these questions with some testable hypotheses. We also discuss some of the research methods that are needed to move ahead.

  ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONFLICT

  Conflict originates in clashing opinions, interests, or values or in annoyance with another party. Its roots can be as superficial as attitudes and money or as profound as basic human needs such as food, shelter, security, identity, dignity, and control over one’s life (Burton, 1990). Conflict is inherent in all social life; hence, scholars in many fields have contributed to its literature. In this section, we focus on three areas that address the diverse approaches to research on this phenomenon.

  Positive Consequences of Conflict

  Conflict has a bad reputation, but it can be quite beneficial if it remains within bounds. For example, many studies have shown that dissent, and hence within-group conflict, can increase understanding of complex issues and thus enhance work group performance, creativity, and innovation (see Brodbeck et al., 2011; de Dreu, 2002; de Dreu, De Vries et al., 2000; de Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; de Dreu and West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth and Kwan, 1987). However, recent meta-analytic reviews (de Dreu and Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, and Jehn, 2012) do not find this positive effect across all groups, which implies that conflict is productive in some circumstances and counterproductive in others. This suggests the need to sort out those circumstances—to identify when dissent should be encouraged versus discouraged (de Dreu, 2008; Tjosvold, 2008). That problem would seem to call for experimentation in group laboratory settings, where theoretically derived variables can be systematically manipulated. Subsequent field studies, for example, in organizational settings, will be necessary to ensure the generalizability of the laboratory findings.

  Relative Deprivation

  Relative deprivation occurs when achievement falls short of a “reasonable” standard, such as what was achieved in the past, what comparison figures are achieving, what law or custom says one deserves, or what one expects to achieve. Sociologists and social psychologists know a lot about relative deprivation but not much about its impact on behavior, including conflict behavior. For example, we know from laboratory experiments that people tend to compare themselves with others who are proximate or salient or are similar to themselves (Major, 1994). But there is little, if any, research about the effect of social comparison on social conflict.

  The social psychological laboratory is a possible site for studies of these effects. Such studies could build on prior research about the impact of relative deprivation on cognition. The beauty of laboratory experiments is that they allow creation of novel conditions, precise operationalization of variables, and unambiguous assessment of cause and effect (Pruitt, 2005b). The design of such studies might compare three conditions: no deprivation, deprivation in the absence of a standard, and deprivation in the presence of a standard. The dependent variables could be such conflict behaviors as demands for changed behavior, threats, and retaliation.

  In addition to determining whether and how much conflict behavior is produced under each condition, such studies should explore the mechanisms underlying these effects, such as whether relative deprivation has its effect by encouraging a sense of injustice and anger. The impact of various moderating variables should also be examined, guided by what is already known about the conditions encouraging relative deprivation.

  Group Mobilization

  By group, we mean any set of people with a common identity who have some ability to communicate and take organized action. Groups, in this meaning, run all the way from small face-to-face friendship groups and work groups to departments, organizations, and even nations. How do the origins of intergroup conflict differ from those of interpersonal conflict? For one thing, relative deprivation must be understood in somewhat different terms. Questionnaire studies have found that readiness to participate in social protest is more closely related to collective deprivation, a sense that one’s group is not doing as well as other groups, than to personal deprivation (Dion, 1986; Dubé and Guimond, 1986). In addition, group mobilization is usually a forerunner of intergroup conflict.

  Group mobilization theory (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1996) identifies a series of stages on the way to group action. First, individuals must become strongly identified with their group—the group must be an important part of their self-definition. Then they must develop a sense of collective deprivation—a perception that the group as a whole has been victimized,
that their own suffering and that of their fellow group members is part of a larger pattern. For this perception to lead to actual conflict behavior, group members must also be willing and able to pool their actions in a joint endeavor. This requires some level of group mobilization, which usually involves the emergence of an activist subgroup with militant leaders who are willing to carry the group’s grievances to the adversary. These three stages—group identity, perceived collective deprivation, and group mobilization—tend to recycle. For example, militant leaders, once they emerge, often encourage increased group identity and greater perceived collective deprivation.

  Group mobilization theory is powerful, but it is not yet well developed in the sense of understanding the processes that occur at each stage and the conditions that produce them. We need more case studies to understand these processes and some large-sample studies to test hypotheses about these conditions. Among the hypotheses that could be tested are Dahrendorf’s (1959) proposal that mobilization occurs under three conditions: (1) ease of communication within the group, (2) the availability of leaders to organize for group action, and (3) the absence of outside suppression of such leadership efforts.

  We hesitate to propose that such hypotheses be tested with laboratory groups because of the complexity of the phenomena under study and the corresponding difficulty of developing an adequate laboratory simulation. Yet laboratory studies require clear operationalization of concepts, making them a good place to sharpen hazy ideas, such as those now found in the theory of group mobilization. Laboratory settings also make it easy to observe stages in the development of groups because they occur right before the eyes of the investigator.

  Studies should also be done on group humiliation, which has been suggested as a motive for the current spate of terrorist attacks. Research is needed to determine whether humiliation is indeed a powerful group motivator (for an exemplary study at the level of the individual, see Coleman, Goldman, and Kugler, 2009) and what conditions produce it in its apparently virulent form.

  STRATEGIC CHOICE

  A popular version of strategic choice theory holds that parties in conflict must choose among four strategies: contending, problem solving, yielding, and inaction (de Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Thomas, 1976). The first two strategies have drawn the most attention in research. Contending, which involves such tactics as threats and coalition building, is aimed at defeating the other party. Because contending tends to elicit a comparable response from the other party, it often makes conflict hard to solve. Furthermore, contending may produce a conflict spiral, leading to escalation that hurts both parties’ interests—what Deutsch (1973) calls a “destructive process.” Problem solving, which is aimed at finding a solution that satisfies both parties’ needs, is in sharp contrast to contending. It encourages lasting settlements and improved future relations between the parties.

  There are many research findings on the antecedents of contending and problem solving (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). However, some of the field’s most important assumptions about this matter are based on theoretical reasoning or inferences from research on related phenomena. For example, Pruitt and Kim (2004) hypothesize that problem solving is fostered by positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) thinking, momentum from prior agreement with the other party, and a belief that both parties (rather than just the adversary) are to blame for the conflict. Hypotheses such as these need to be tested. Social psychological research suggests opposing hypotheses with respect to the impact of positive mood on strategic choice. The finding that positive mood encourages helping behavior (Isen and Levin, 1972) implies that it should also encourage problem solving, but the finding that positive mood encourages blame of the adversary (Forgas, 1994) implies just the opposite. This contradiction needs to be sorted out empirically.

  Many conflict theorists believe that heavy contentious behavior, such as violence, is encouraged by moral exclusion of the other party, that is, viewing the other as “outside the community in which norms apply, and therefore as expendable [and] undeserving” (Opotow, 2000, p. 417). Moral exclusion removes some of the main inhibitions against aggressive behavior. This body of theory is challenging but quite underresearched. Data need to be gathered on the psychological nature of moral exclusion, its precise impact on behavior, the conditions that foster it, and the conditions that encourage expansion of a moral community to include one’s adversaries.

  Strategic choice theory has been criticized as an oversimplification in that sequences and combinations of the four basic strategies are often found (Van de Vliert, 1997; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert et al., 1999). For example, combinations of problem solving and contending are particularly common and are often quite beneficial. That is because problem solving requires that one be firm about one’s basic needs (while flexible about the means for achieving them), and contentious tactics are sometimes required to underline this firmness (Druckman, 2003). Furthermore, a vigorous defense of one’s position on certain issues provides information about one’s priorities and hence may help the other party locate an acceptable exchange of concessions.

  Pruitt and Kim (2004) have put forward some testable advice about how to employ contentious tactics without courting escalation:

  Combine promises with threats, employing both the carrot and the stick.

  Use legitimate threats, such as those from a legal authority.

  Employ deterrent rather than compellent threats. “Deterrent threats request that Other not take a particular action, while compellent threats request that Other take a particular action” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 75).

  If one must employ compellent threats, give the other party a choice of possible actions so as to minimize the appearance of pushing the other around.

  Other researchers have proposed that the capacity for flexible and adaptive use of different conflict strategies is beneficial (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Mannix, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Rackman and Carlisle, 1978; Raiffa, 1982; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert, 1997). This proposal inspired Coleman and Kugler (2011) to design a measure of adaptive conflict management in organizations, the Managerial Conflict Adaptivity Assessment. The approach is based on a situated model of conflict in social relations described by Coleman et al. (2010, 2012, 2013b). Their studies show that adaptive and flexible conflict management in the workplace (i.e., changing one’s strategy as the situation demands) is predictive of satisfaction with conflicts and relationships and a sense of well-being at work. This promising beginning suggests the need for a systematic research agenda on conflict adaptivity. This and similar approaches assume that conflicts are usually complex and dynamic and hence require adaptive and flexible behavior.

  ESCALATION AND INTRACTABILITY

  Most conflicts are quickly settled in a more-or-less positive way. However, a few conflicts escalate, becoming increasingly destructive and intractable, in the sense of resisting all efforts at resolution. These conflicts, though infrequent, tend to be important because escalation and intractability can have severe consequences.

  In its most basic sense, escalation means movement from less extreme to more extreme contentious tactics by one or both parties. Such movement often goes through a series of intermediate stages, which can be called an escalation sequence. There are two types of escalation sequences, unilateral and bilateral (Pruitt 2005a). In unilateral sequences, only one party escalates; in bilateral sequences, the parties escalate in tandem.

  Unilateral Escalation Sequences

  A laboratory experiment on unilateral escalation suggests questions for future research. Mikolic, Parker, and Pruitt (1997) studied reactions to persistent annoyance by having confederates of the experimenter withhold needed supplies from the participants. The data were based on a content analysis of telephone messages to the confederates. Most participants tried to get the supplies by means of the following orderly progression of tactics: requests, demands, angry
statements, threats, harassment, and abuse. They stopped escalating at different points along this progression. Some made only requests; others requests and then demands; still others, requests, then demands, then angry statements, and so on. Groups on the whole escalated further than individuals—following the same orderly progression.

  This study raises several questions that require further research. The most basic of these is: Why does persistent annoyance so often produce escalation? There are at least three possible answers, which need empirical test: people may reason that if a less extreme tactic fails to deter the other party, a more extreme tactic may do so; or they may become angrier and more aroused over time, which should make them more aggressive; or their moral exclusion may grow because they see the other party as increasingly guilty of a transgression. A second question concerns how to account for the orderly sequence of tactics seen in this study. A third question concerns the level at which parties stop escalating. Why did groups escalate further than individuals in our study, and why did some individuals escalate further than others?

  Bilateral Escalation Sequences

  Bilateral escalation sequences usually develop through conflict spirals, entailing repeated retaliation and counterretaliation or defense and counterdefense. Thus an employee might criticize a management policy, provoking disciplinary action such as denying the employee a raise. Annoyed by this treatment, he or she might then talk to the press, provoking dismissal.

  It is possible for conflict spirals to go around and around without advancing in level of escalation. I yell at you, you yell at me, I yell at you, you yell at me. Heavy contentious tactics are being used, but they are not getting heavier. This raises an important theoretical question: Under what conditions and through what processes do conflict spirals produce bilateral escalation rather than simply going around and around? One possible answer is that in bilateral escalation, each party sees the other as responsible for every new round of the conflict spiral, a phenomenon called biased punctuation. Biased punctuation has often been discussed by conflict theorists (e.g., Kramer, 2004), but research on this topic appears to be nonexistent. If this is indeed a source of bilateral escalation, we need to understand the conditions that produce it and the processes by which it develops.