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More Guns Less Crime

Page 5

by John R. Lott Jr


  Even the narrower categories are somewhat broad for our purposes. For example, robbery includes not only street robberies, which seem the most likely to be affected by concealed-handgun laws, but also bank rob-

  Table 2.1 The most common crimes and the variation in their prevalence across counties (1992)

  Note: Dispersion provides a measure of variation for each crime category; it is a measure of the average difference between the overall average and each county's number of crimes. The total of the percents for specific crimes in the violent-crime category does not equal 100 percent because not all counties report consistent measures of rape. Other differences are due to rounding errors.

  beries, for which, because of the presence of armed guards, the additional return to permitting citizens to be armed would appear to be small. 16 Likewise, larceny involves crimes of "stealth," which includes those committed by pickpockets, purse snatchers, shoplifters, and bike thieves, and crimes like theft from buildings, coin machines, and motor vehicles. However, while most of these fit the categories in which concealed-handgun laws are likely to do little to discourage criminals, pickpockets do come into direct contact with their victims.

  This aggregation of crime categories makes it difficult to isolate crimes that might be deterred by increased handgun ownership and crimes that might be increasing as a result of a substitution effect. Generally, the crimes most likely to be deterred by concealed-handgun laws are those involving direct contact between the victim and the criminal, especially when they occur in places where victims otherwise would not be allowed to carry firearms. Aggravated assault, murder, robbery, and rape are both confrontational and likely to occur where guns were not previously allowed.

  In contrast, crimes like auto theft of unattended cars seem unlikely to be deterred by gun ownership. While larceny is more debatable, in general—to the extent that these crimes actually involve "stealth"—the probability that victims will notice the crime being committed seems low, and thus the opportunities to use a gun are relatively rare. The effect on burglary is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint. It is true that if nondiscretionary laws cause more people to own a guns, burglars will face greater risks when breaking into houses, and this should reduce the number of burglaries. However, if some of those who already own guns now obtain right-to-carry permits, the relative cost of crimes like armed street robbery and certain other types of robberies (where an armed patron may be present) should rise relative to that for burglary or residential robbery. This may cause some criminals to engage in burglaries instead of armed street robbery. Indeed, a recent Texas poll suggests that such substitution may be substantial: 97 percent of first-time applicants for concealed-handgun permits already owned a handgun. 17

  Previous concealed-handgun studies that rely on state-level data suffer from an important potential problem: they ignore the heterogeneity within states. 18 From my telephone conversations with many law-enforcement officials, it has become very clear that there was a large variation across counties within a state in terms of how freely gun permits were granted to residents prior to the adoption of nondiscretionary right-to-carry laws. 19 All those I talked to strongly indicated that the most populous counties had previously adopted by far the most restrictive practices in issuing permits. The implication for existing studies is that simply

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  using state-level data rather than county data will bias the results against finding any impact from passing right-to-carry provisions. Those counties that were unaffected by the law must be separated from those counties where the change could be quite dramatic. Even cross-sectional city data will not solve this problem, because without time-series data it is impossible to determine the impact of a change in the law for a particular city. 20

  There are two ways of handling this problem. First, for the national sample, one can see whether the passage of nondiscretionary right-to-carry laws produces systematically different effects in the high- and low-population counties. Second, for three states—Arizona, Oregon, and Pennsylvania—I acquired time-series data on the number of right-to-carry permits for each county. The normal difficulty with using data on the number of permits involves the question of causality: Do more permits make crimes more costly, or do higher crime rates lead to more permits? The change in the number of permits before and after the change in the state laws allows us to rank the counties on the basis of how restrictive they had actually been in issuing permits prior to the change in the law. Of course there is still the question of why the state concealed-handgun law changed, but since we are dealing with county-level rather than state-level data, we benefit from the fact that those counties with the most restrictive policies regarding permits were also the most likely to have the new laws imposed upon them by the state.

  Using county-level data also has another important advantage in that both crime and arrest rates vary widely within states. In fact, as indicated in table 2.2, the variation in both crime rates and arrest rates across states is almost always smaller than the average within-state variation across counties. With the exception of the rates for robbery, the variation in crime rates across states is from 61 to 83 percent of their average variation within states. (The difference in violent-crime rates arises because robberies make up such a large fraction of the total crimes in this category.) For arrest rates, the numbers are much more dramatic; the variation across states is as small as 15 percent of the average of the variation within states.

  These results imply that it is no more accurate to view all the counties in the typical state as a homogenous unit than it is to view all the states in the United States as a homogenous unit. For example, when a state's arrest rate rises, it may make a big difference whether that increase is taking place in the most or least crime-prone counties. Widely differing estimates of the deterrent effect of increasing a state's average arrest rate may be made, depending on which types of counties are experiencing the changes in arrest rates and depending on how sensitive the crime rates are to arrest-rate changes in those particular counties. Aggregating these

  Toble 2.2 Comparing the variation in crime rates across states and across counties within states from 1977 to 1992

  Note: The percents are computed as the standard deviation of state means divided by the average within-state standard deviations across counties.

  *Because of multiple arrests for a crime and because of the lags between the time when a crime occurs and the time an arrest takes place, the arrest rate for counties and states can be greater than one. This is much more likely to occur for counties than for states.

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  data may thus make it more difficult to discern the true relationship between deterrence and crime.

  Another way of illustrating the differences between state and county data is simply to compare the counties with the highest and lowest crime rates to the states with the highest and lowest rates. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 list the ten safest and ten most dangerous states by murder and rape rates, along with those same crime rates for the safest and most dangerous counties in each state. (When rates were zero in more than one county, the number of counties is given.) Two conclusions are clear from these tables. First, even the states with the highest murder and rape rates have counties with no murders or rapes, and these counties in the most dangerous states are much safer than the safest states, according to the average state crime rates for the safest states. Second, while the counties with the highest murder rates tend to be well-known places like Orleans (New Orleans, Louisiana), Kings (Brooklyn, N.Y.), Los Angeles, and Baltimore, there are a few relatively small, rural counties that, for very short periods

  Table 2.3 Murder rates: state and county variation in the states with the ten highest and ten lowest murder rates (1992)

  Table 2.4 Rape rates: state and county variation in the states with the ten highest and ten lowest rape rates (1992)

  of time, garner the top spots in a sta
te. The reverse is not true, however: counties with the lowest murder rates are always small, rural ones.

  The two exceptions to this general situation are the two states with the highest rape rates: Alaska and Delaware. Alaska, possibly because of the imbalance of men and women in the population, has high rape rates over the entire state. 21 Even Matanuska-Susitina, which is the Alaskan borough with the lowest rape rate, has a higher rape rate than either Iowa or Vermont. Delaware, which has a very narrow range between the highest and lowest county rape rates, is another exception. However, at least part of the reason for a nonzero rape rate in New Castle county (although this doesn't explain the overall high rape rate in the state) is that Delaware has only three counties, each with a relatively large population, which virtually guarantees that some rapes will take place.

  Perhaps the relatively small across-state variation as compared to within-state variations is not so surprising, given that states tend to average out differences as they encompass both rural and urban areas. Yet

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  when coupled with the preceding discussion on the differing effects of concealed-handgun provisions on different counties in the same state, these numbers strongly imply that it is risky to assume that states are homogenous units with respect either to how crimes are punished or how the laws that affect gun usage are changed. Unfortunately, this emphasis on state-level data pervades the entire crime literature, which focuses on state- or city-level data and fails to recognize the differences between rural and urban counties.

  However, using county-level data has some drawbacks. Because of the low crime rates in many low-population counties, it is quite common to find huge variations in the arrest and conviction rates from year to year. These variations arise both because the year in which the offense occurs frequently differs from the year in which the arrests and/or convictions occur, and because an offense may involve more than one offender. Unfortunately, the FBI data set allows us neither to link the years in which offenses and arrests occurred nor to link offenders with a particular crime. In counties where only a couple of murders occur annually, arrests or convictions can be many times higher than the number of offenses in a year. This data problem appears especially noticeable for counties with few people and for crimes that are relatively infrequent, like murder and rape.

  One partial solution is to limit the sample to counties with large populations. Counties with a large number of crimes have a significantly smoother flow of arrests and convictions relative to offenses. An alternative solution is to take a moving average of the arrest or conviction rates over several years, though this reduces the length of the usable sample period, depending on how many years are used to compute this average. Furthermore, the moving-average solution does nothing to alleviate the effect of multiple suspects being arrested for a single crime.

  Another concern is that otherwise law-abiding citizens may have carried concealed handguns even before it was legal to do so. 22 If nondiscre-tionary laws do not alter the total number of concealed handguns carried by otherwise law-abiding citizens, but merely legalize their previous actions, passing these laws seems unlikely to affect crime rates. The only real effect from making concealed handguns legal could arise from people being more willing to use them to defend themselves, though this might also imply that they would be more likely to make mistakes in using them.

  It is also possible that concealed-firearm laws both make individuals safer and increase crime rates at the same time. As Sam Peltzman has pointed out in the context of automobile safety regulations, increasing safety may lead drivers to offset these gains by taking more risks as they

  34/CHAPTER TWO

  drive. 23 Indeed, recent studies indicate that drivers in cars equipped with air bags drive more recklessly and get into accidents at sufficiently higher rates to offset the life-saving effect of air bags for the driver and actually increase the total risk of death for others. 24 The same thing is possible with regard to crime. For example, allowing citizens to carry concealed firearms may encourage them to risk entering more dangerous neighborhoods or to begin traveling during times they previously avoided:

  Martha Hayden, a Dallas saleswoman, said the right-to-carry law introduced in Texas this year has turned her life around.

  She was pistol-whipped by a thief outside her home in 1993, suffering 300 stitches to the head, and said she was "terrified" of even taking out the garbage after the attack.

  But now she packs a .357 Smith and Wesson. "It gives me a sense of security; it allows you to get on with your life," she said. 25

  Staying inside her house may have reduced Ms. Hayden's probability of being assaulted again, but since her decision to engage in these riskier activities is a voluntary one, she at least believes that this is an acceptable risk. Likewise, society as a whole might be better off even if crime rates were to rise as a result of concealed-handgun laws.

  Finally, we must also address the issues of why certain states adopted concealed-handgun laws and whether higher offense rates result in lower arrest rates. To the extent that states adopted the laws because crime was rising, econometric estimates that fail to account for this relationship will underpredict the drop in crime and perhaps improperly blame some of the higher crime rates on the new police who were hired to help solve the problem. To explain this problem differently, crime rates may have risen even though concealed-handgun laws were passed, but the rates might have risen even higher if the laws had not been passed. Likewise, if the laws were adopted when crime rates were falling, the bias would be in the opposite direction. None of the previous gun-control studies deal with this type of potential bias. 26

  The basic problem is one of causation. Does the change in the laws alter the crime rate, or does the change in the crime rate alter the law? Do higher crime rates lower the arrest rate or the reverse? Does the arrest rate really drive the changes in crime rates, or are any errors in measuring crime rates driving the relationship between crime and arrest rates? Fortunately, we can deal with these potential biases by using well-known techniques that let us see what relationships, if any still exist after we try to explain the arrest rates and the adoption of these laws. For example, in examining arrest rates, we can see how they change due to such things as changes in crime rates and then see to what extent the unexplained

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  portion of the arrest rates helps to explain the crime rate. We will find that accounting for these concerns actually strengthens the general findings that I will show initially. My general approach, however, is to examine first how concealed-handgun laws and crime rates, as well as arrest rates and crime rates, tend to move in comparison to one another before we try to deal with more complicated relationships.

  Three. Gun Ownership, Gun Laws,

  and the Data on Crime

  Who Owns Guns?

  Before studying what determines the crime rate, I would like to take a look at what types of people own guns and how this has been changing over time. Information on gun-ownership rates is difficult to obtain, and the only way to overcome this problem is to rely on surveys. The largest, most extensive polls are the exit polls conducted during the general elections every two years. Recent presidential election polls for 1988 and 1996 contained a question on whether a person owned a gun, as well as information on the person's age, sex, race, income, place of residence, and political views. The available 1992 survey data did not include a question on gun ownership. Using the individual respondent data in the 1988 CBS News General Election Exit Poll and the 1996 Voter News Service National General Election Exit Poll, we can construct a very detailed description of the types of people who own guns. The Voter News Service poll collected data for a consortium of national news bureaus (CNN, CBS, ABC, NBC, Fox, and AP).

  What stands out immediately when these polls are compared is the large increase in the number of people who identify themselves as gun owners (see figure 3.1). In 1988, 27
.4 percent of voters owned guns. 1 By 1996, the number of voters owning guns had risen to 37 percent. In general, the percentages of voters and the general population who appear to own guns are extremely similar; among the general population, gun ownership rose from 26 to 39 percent, 2 which represented 76 million adults in 1996. Perhaps in retrospect, given all the news media discussions about high crime rates in the last couple of decades, this increase is not very surprising. Just as spending on private security has grown dramatically—reaching $82 billion in 1996, more than twice the amount spent in 1980 (even after taking into account inflation)—more people have been obtaining guns. 3 The large rise in gun sales that took place immediately before the Brady law went into effect in 1994 accounts for some of the increase. 4

  Three points must be made about these numbers. First, the form of

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  Voters Voters General General

  1988 1996 population population

  1988 1996

  Gun ownership among voters and the general population

  Figure 3.1. Percent of women and men who owned guns in 1988 and 1996: examining both voters and the general population

  the question changed somewhat between these two years. In 1988 people were asked, "Are you any of the following? (Check as many as apply)," and the list included "Gun Owner." In 1996 respondents were asked to record yes or no to the question, "Are you a gun owner?" This difference may have accounted for part, though not all, of the change. 5 Second, Tom Smith, director of the General Social Survey, told me he guessed that voters might own guns "by up to 5 percent more" than nonvoters, though this was difficult to know for sure because in polls of the general population, over 60 percent of respondents claim to have voted, but we know that only around 50 percent did vote. 6 Given the size of the error in the General Social Survey regarding the percentage of those surveyed who were actual voters, it is nevertheless possible that nonvoters own guns by a few percentage points more than voters. 7

 

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