Battered Bastards of Bastogne

by George Koskimaki

  We had 20 rounds per gun of hollow charge anti-tank ammo that were never used or counted in ammo reports except to be used for direct fire.

  The preparation for the tank attacks we received on Christmas Day had been planned and set up for several days. Snow had covered the gun positions. All we had to do was move our gun sections and start shooting.

  Sgt. Joseph F. Rogan, Jr. was serving as forward observer on an outpost with “A” Company of the 401st Glider Infantry Battalion. He was the first to alert the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion that an attack was headed in their direction. The S-2 Report for the 463rd states:124

  During the early morning, a strong enemy attack developed along a line from Champs to Flamizoulle. The battalion forward observer, Sergeant Joseph F. Rogan, Jr., adjusting indirect fire in support of the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, notified the Battalion S-3 by radio, that he and his supporting company had been over-run by tanks and that the tanks were moving in the direction of the firing battery positions.

  Major Victor E. Garrett was the S-3 (Operations) officer for the 463rd. He describes how the actions involving the 463rd evolved during the night and early morning of Christmas Day:

  On Christmas Eve night the Germans broke through our front lines. I had many intelligence reports all night about the situation.

  About daylight, Captain Ardelle E. Cole advised me by radio that there were four tanks lined up on a ridge above us. I asked, ‘Do they have muzzle brakes?’ His reply was, ‘Yes.’

  The 463rd had knocked out several tanks in the earlier fighting in Sicily and had participated many times after that in Italy and southern France against armored vehicles with much success. Now it was early Christmas morning. Colonel John T. Cooper describes the developing situation:

  I was awakened by my S-3, Victor Earl Garrett from the Operations Room across the hall in the house we were using as our CP.

  He told me that eleven tanks had moved in on Sgt. ‘Booger’ Childress’s ‘B’ Battery. Some four tanks had stopped so close to him that he might be discovered if the soldiers moved around very much. He could hear the other tankers and they had gotten out of the tanks and were waiting around. He had to whisper. Snow was about a foot deep all over the place.

  The Germans got out of their tanks and made coffee and sat around waiting for daylight. They did not know that while this was going on, they were being observed through the tube of a 75mm pack howitzer, which would soon be loaded with hollow-charge ammo, probably the only such ammo in the (European) theater and they had parked in front of the only guns that had the ammo.

  I told the S-3 to alert all the batteries and for them to stay in their sacks, except for the C.O.’s and executive officer and gun crews. Movement in batteries are to be kept at a minimum. No lights. No one was to fire a round until we gave the order: ‘Let the shit hit the fan!’

  As it was still dark and as the word got out, our gunners had occupied their gun pits and other outposts were able to see the tanks, we had a good view of what we had to do.

  You will remember how I was greeted for several days by ‘How many tanks did you knock out today?’125

  I was now determined to be able to give Elkins and Carmichael a damn good answer. I was also sure that Patton’s tanks were in the vicinity and I was damn sure we were going to shoot German tanks. I told the S-3 that we would not shoot until he could see the muzzle brakes on the guns or the Swastika painted on the tanks.

  As the Germans began to make a move, we could see the muzzle brake on the guns. The S-3 gave the order: ‘Let the shit hit the fan!’

  Having refreshed his memory by rereading a letter he sent home in late 1944, PFC. Walter J. Peplowski, a member of the #3 pack howitzer for “B” Battery, has a vivid description of the Christmas morning action:

  The number 3 pack howitzer with Wolfenbarger, Silvas and Peplowski as a full gun crew was used. If it wasn’t for powerful George Silvas, I don’t know if we could have made it up hill through the soft snow to the gun pit.

  Now the howitzer is in the pit—all ammo is taken out of the cases. The bare shells are lined up in perfect order: HE, WP, HE, WP, etc. The barrel is traversed to the tanks on the extreme left. We wait, knowing to fire now would invite disaster, powder snow, smoke, a real give-away.

  The enemy infantry action to the right indicates that a tank swing to the left is inevitable to make a fire team.

  The snow is melting as we kneel this Christmas morning. My knees are wet. We talk about the range and decide that a lead of 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 tank lengths would be just right; also, to drop rounds, aim lower so there would be no overs.

  The leading tank swerves, others follow just like in the book. We joke a little—the tension is broken. We know soon firing will commence and will move like hell. Wolfenbarger is gunner, a cool, calm, efficient and accurate one.

  The action comes fast—last tank first, every shell a hit—one—two—three tanks on fire, one in the woods. This is for certain.

  PFC. Joseph F. Callahan was the cannoneer on Sgt. Derwood Parker’s gun in the same battery on Christmas morning. This is his recollection:

  When word was received about the German tanks, I don’t think we used the eye scope but just fired. And we saw the first tank, but we shot and hit the second one. We went to the tank that afternoon and there were two bodies inside it and one body lying outside.

  Cpl. Nicholas Bellezza was on a .50 caliber machine gun with PFC. Al Fredericks and a raw recruit in the “B” Battery sector. They were covering the right flank. Bellezza related:

  Snow kept filling our gun pit at which we stood guard 24 hours every day. On Christmas Day, at daybreak, I noticed through the haze, approximately 350 yards, the outlines of tanks which were located directly in front of my position. I immediately called the switchboard for a verification to find out if they were our tanks. The response was negative.

  Noticing movement around the tanks, I opened fire. German fire was returned (white tracers) at my position. The recruit said, ‘Don’t fire—they may see us!’ He was so scared that he left the gun position leaving Fredericks and me to keep firing. The barrel got so hot we had to stop and change it. Fredericks, in his haste, grabbed the barrel without using asbestos gloves. However, his burns were minor.

  By the time we were to refire, the tanks had moved. I remember that one of the battery’s guns was moved to give direct fire at the tanks.

  PFC. Gus Hazzard was one of the men on forward outpost duty as part of T/4 Corsen “Booger” Childress’ team. He provided his recollection of the early action:

  In the pre-dawn hours of 25 December 1944, T/4 ‘Booger’ Childress, Joe Pimlott and myself were assigned as supporting infantry. We were lying in an open, snow-covered field waiting for the dawn as directly to our front tanks were moving about. When dawn broke, all hell broke loose. After the small arms quieted down and the smoke cleared, we advanced forward to an idling tank. There was one German still alive sitting with his back to a tree. The prisoner, along with others, and the tank were driven back to our lines by Childress, Pimlott and myself.

  The S-2 Report for the 463rd sent by PFC. Ken Hesler, continues with its description of the early hours of the attack and lists the make-up of the stalking party:

  During the fire fight in the battalion’s northern sector, at approximately 0730 hours, the western tank defenses engaged four medium enemy tanks—destroying two and damaging one to such an extent that it withdrew to a hull down position where it was captured by Battalion Tank Stalking Party consisting of Tec 4 Corsen H. Childress, Pvt. August F. Hazzard, Pvt. William L. Justice, Pvt. John T. Paris, Pvt. Stanley M. Levandosky, Pvt. Gordon L. Ballenger and Pvt. Joseph W. Pimlott under the command of 1Lt. Ross W. Scott.126

  The S-2 report sheds further light into the actions of this tank stalking party and another small patrol:

  This same party also captured two officers and twelve enlisted men on this same patrol. Sgt. Thomas J. Spivey, with PFC. Charles Johnson, Pvt. Gunther F. Wint
er and Pvt. Gloden E. Oglesby, engaged a German machine gun with small arms fire killing one and capturing eight enlisted men who were turned over to the 502nd Parachute Infantry.

  Though he was not a member of a gun crew, Pvt. Merle W. McMorrow had this report of the action:

  I was not in a gun section but we got a message by phone that Germans had broken through the defenses of the 327th Infantry. I ran across the road to where one of the howitzers was partially dug in on a small knoll. It must have been somewhere between 0700 and 0730 a.m. and the rumbling of the approaching tanks could be heard in the semidarkness. I recall there was more excitement than fear in the group. We usually never had an opportunity to see the enemy we were firing at. Three or four tanks were in our immediate front at about 300 yards distance. There were scattered patches of woods located within the field. German infantry was following beside and behind the tanks. It involved direct fire and the gun had to be moved down the slope slightly to get the tube depressed sufficiently to get the tanks in the gun sight. A .30 caliber usually stopped them (infantry) before they got into the cover of the wooded area. The other tanks continued to be fired on and it soon became obvious they were no longer advancing toward our position. I remember a number of fellows ran out to the tanks—whether they were guessing that it had just been abandoned or found that out after they got there, I don’t know. I do know they drove it back with a great deal of pride.

  Battalion commander John T. Cooper was justly proud of his men and hoped by calling higher headquarters he could prove once and for all to the “doubting Thomases” that tanks could indeed be knocked out with direct fire from pack howitzers. He wrote:

  I picked up my telephone to Division and reported the attack on the 463rd. ‘We would like some help but would stay in contact and not give ground. Our HQ was being attacked.’

  ‘Cooper, are you making this up?’ someone asked at Division.

  ‘Hell no—look out your window and you will see five smoke columns each of a burning tank. No—make that six, there goes another one!’

  ‘We will get Task Force Cherry down as soon as possible, out!’

  This German Tiger tank was knocked out near Bastogne. A grenade was exploded in the barrel of its 88 by Germans to keep it from being used against them. (Photo by Mike Musura, courtesy of John Gibson.)

  In the first 15 minutes we had disabled 8 tanks, hit ten tanks, the one close to Childress on the turret, killed two inside and one getting out. Childress called and said he had dragged the man off the track and got the two dead men out. I told him to sit tight, but put a white undershirt on the tube and wait for me.

  By this time, about 45 minutes had passed. Walter Scherl, my driver, and I drove out and led the tank, driven by ‘Booger’ down a draw into our HQ area and parked it outside my CP. I called Headquarters to tell them I had a present for them.

  In a letter Colonel Thomas P. Sherburne had written to George Koskimaki while the latter was serving as executive secretary of the 101st Airborne Division Association in 1980, Sherburne responded to an item which appeared in the newsletter about his old friend, Colonel John T. Cooper. He wrote:

  I remember when, on Christmas Day at Bastogne, he (Col. Cooper) called up and announced he had a Christmas present for me, but I had to come and pick it up. It was a German tank no less; this his doughty battalion had shot up (but still ran) when we rushed them out to use direct Fire at the tank breakthrough. No Boche foot soldiers got through them.

  In a letter Cpl. James L. Evans had written to Col. John Cooper in recent years he described having accompanied Col. Tom Sherburne on the inspection trip to the 463rd sector shortly after the battle ended. Evans had been on duty at the Division Artillery switchboard when he got the assignment to accompany the artillery commander. Evans wrote:

  Soon after I arrived at my switchboard, Colonel Sherburne appeared to pick me up to ride as security for him. (This he did several times during the war, always having me use proper procedure in getting permission from my captain, R. Wilson Neff.)

  We proceeded to your location at the scene of the battle which had just ended. You and Colonel Sherburne talked and I kept my distance (as a corporal should).

  Colonel Sherburne and I then proceeded to examine the tanks. You followed us at a close interval as you could hear Colonel Sherburne if there were any question or remarks made. I am the one who asked, ‘What gun hit this tank?’ I knew it showed my ignorance when I said it.

  I then went around the first tank, which had burned. There was a German tanker burned to a crisp hanging upside down on the right side of the tank. His foot was caught in or near the opening on the top of the tank. There was a brown leather suitcase strapped on the right front of the tank that had not burned.

  The other tank that I remembered made a mad dash into a thick patch of pines to escape. The trees were 6 to 8 inches in diameter. The tank plowed into the woods 75 to 100 yards, making a swath about ten feet wide until it hit a bank about 4 feel high at a 45 degree angle. I understood that your men captured the tank crew.

  Colonel Sherburne and I then left. We went through the village and we inspected the tank you had captured. We then went out of the village toward Bastogne about 150 to 200 yards where we met General McAuliffe in his jeep. The jeeps stopped side by side while the General and the Colonel talked it over. It was decided that we would turn around and go back to the battlefield and show the General what we had seen.

  Before we could turn, a flat trajectory shell came directly over the jeeps from the direction of the knocked-out tanks, crossed the road at 90 degrees and hit or missed one of the village houses about 200 yards away. We all hit the ditches. Then another shell came over. General McAuliffe had Sgt. Brown turn his jeep around and the General, Colonel Sherburne, Sgt. Brown, Colonel’s driver and I went back to Bastogne. (The jeeps were driven by two Browns.)

  A special commendation letter was sent by Colonel Thomas Sherburne, acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division Artillery to LTC. John T. Cooper, Jr. and his men which the 463rd Artillery commander was to show to the “doubting Thomases” of the other division artillery units who had derided the statements of Cooper and his officers concerning destruction of German tanks with a 75mm pack howitzer. The letter reads in part:

  … During this action, your battalion can be officially credited with having: (1) Destroyed with AP and WP two medium enemy tanks, proved by line of hits and ricochet marks in the snow direct from your positions. (2) Captured in running condition one medium tank, crew having given up when a round from one of your pieces struck the vehicle and injured the commander. (3) Killed with HE and MG fire two enemy tank crew members who left the tanks. (4) Captured fourteen assorted enemy infantry and tank crew members … 127

  Destroying Secret Equipment

  The unit history of the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion states the following:

  In the 463rd Command Post, all classified documents as well as the M-209 crytographic machine were destroyed. By about 0830 hours, enemy infantrymen had approached within 200 yards of the CP and were taking it under rifle and machine gun fire.

  Out in the “Dog” Battery area, its commander, Captain Victor J. Tofany was prepared to destroy personal belongings. He related:

  It all started with an all-out German attack designed to wipe out the ‘doughnut’. Everyone was prepared for the worst. The barracks bags with our belongings were piled ready to be burned and the cannoneers were oiling their rifles and carbines in case we were overrun by the enemy. General McAuliffe had told them Nuts and they were going to finish us off. In the ensuing battle, many of the 463rd men fought as infantry and helped to halt the German advance.

  A Play by Play Report

  1Lt. Everett Fuchs served as executive officer for “A” Battery of the 377th Parachute Artillery Battalion. His group was positioned in the small hamlet of Savy, a short distance from the 463rd batteries at Hemroulle. On Christmas Day he was able to give a “play by play” description of the tank attack
which he witnessed from his position. He wrote:

  On Christmas Day, our battery position was at Savy on a hill west of the road to Longchamps. We had a good view of the whole area east, northeast and north. In the early morning of the 25th, we heard heavy activity over in the 502nd area. We were called for some missions and were on the alert. As day broke, I was scanning this whole area with glasses when I picked up tanks all over the area. Some were heading in my direction. Most looked like they were in the 463rd area. I called my Battalion Fire Direction Center and reported this and I warned them of the approaching tanks and said I was going to position my guns to take on the tanks if they got through the 327th and 463rd. Battalion was unaware of these tanks and questioned me. I was talking with Captain Aldrich and told him to open his back door—he would see the tanks. Just at that time, two tank destroyers which had pulled up and took position near Battalion started firing. Both scored direct hits on the tanks. At the same time, the 463rd had taken tanks under fire. In that area there seemed to be about eight tanks. None of the tanks got through—destroyed by the 463rd and 327th so I was not able to get into the fight. I assumed the 463rd took care of most of the tanks because near their area I saw many smoldering remains of tanks. All this time I was describing the whole series of events to our battalion fire control center. A short time later all tanks being destroyed, crews killed or captured, everything quieted down about 0900 to 0930.

  Summary of 463rd Actions

  As the day wound down in the 463rd area, Pvt. Merle W. McMorrow had this observation about the prisoners captured by his unit: