Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  42. Mason, Nazism, 113.

  43. The argument, advanced – in sophisticated fashion – by Mason in his various works, for economic determinants (within the regime’s ideological framework) shaping a social crisis and leaving Hitler with no alternative other than to risk war before Germany was ready for it, has encountered widespread criticism. See, particularly, Jost Dülffer, ‘Der Beginn des Krieges 1939: Hitler, die innere Krise und das Mächtesystem’, GG, 2 (1976), 443–70; Ludolf Herbst, ‘Die Krise des nationalsozialistischen Regimes am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges und die forcierte Aufrüstung. Eine Kritik’, VfZ, 26 (1978), 347–92; and Richard Overy, ‘Germany, “Domestic Crisis”, and War in 1939’, Past and Present, 116 (1987), 138–68. Mason, Nazism, ch.9, contains the author’s response.

  44. Below, 138.

  45. TBJG, I/6, 158 (24 October 1938).

  46. Below, 138.

  47. DGFP, D, IV, 99–100, N0.81; Keitel, 195–6.

  48. See Weinberg II, 468–9.

  49. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939).

  50. IMG, xii.580: ‘Der Kerl hat mir meinen Einzug nach Prag versiebt.’

  51. Watt, How War Came, 142; Weinberg II, 469.

  52. See, for example, the entry in TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).

  53. Courcy, 94–5.

  54. See Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Großdeutschland. Außenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes, Munich, 1987, 166–7; Watt, How War Came, 195.

  55. Gedye, 371.

  56. Courcy, 94–7. The economic motive was probably not in itself sufficient. But Weinberg II, 469, n.16, seems in danger of underestimating its importance.

  57. Wendt, Großdeutschland, 166; Watt, How War Came, 195.

  58. Weinberg II, 479.

  59. Courcy, 92–3.

  60. Below, 138.

  61. Courcy, 85—9.

  62. Irving, Goring, 240–42; Watt, How War Came, 142–3.

  63. See Watt, How War Came, 143–7, for Slovakia.

  64. Weinberg II, 485.

  65. DGFP, D, V, 361–6, N0.272.

  66. Weizsäcker-Papiere, 150. And see Jutta Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg. Die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Zweiten Weltkrieg, Opladen, 1976, 187.

  67. Watt, How War Came, 146.

  68. ADAP, D, V, 127–32, Nr.119; Weinberg II, 497–8.

  69. Weinberg II, 498. According to Below, it was following the failure of his visit to Warsaw that Ribbentrop began to contemplate a link with Russia to prevent Poland looking for support to Britain (Below, 146).

  70. Weinberg II, 498–9 and n.140.

  71. Watt, How War Came, 143; hinted at also in Weinberg II, 497–8.

  72. BA, NS 11/28, Fols.55–62: quotations, Fol.58 (‘dass unser Deutschland, unser Deutsches Reich einmal die dominierende Macht Europas sein wird’); Fol.61 (‘den Geist unserer jetzigen Zeit, den Geist der Weltanschauung, die heute Deutschland beherrscht… ein zutiefst soldatischer Geist…); Fol.60 (‘Es ist mein unerschütterliche Wille, dass die deutsche Wehrmacht die stärkste Wehrmacht der ganzen Welt wird’).

  73. Below, 144; Irving, Führer, 164; Irving, War Path, 1 73ff.

  74. IfZ, F19/10, ‘Hitlers Rede vor dem Offiziersjahrgang 1938 am 25.1.1939 in der Reichskanzlei (geheim)’: ‘Und wenn dieser Aufbau – sagen wir – in 100 Jahren endgültig in sich gefestigt sein wird, und eine neue tragende Gesellschaftsschichte abgegeben haben wird, dann wird das Volk – das ist meine Überzeugung – das als erstes diesen Weg beschritt, die Anwartschaft besitzen, auf die Herrschaft Europas…’ (Fol.25, and see also esp. Fols.8–9, 15–16, 19, 24). A different copy of the text is in BA, NS 11/28, Fols. 63–85, quotations Fols. 68 (‘Prinzipien der demokratischen, parlamentarischen, pazifistischen, defätistischen Mentalititäf), 75 (‘Brutalität, d.h. das Schwert, wenn alle anderen Mittel versagen’), 84 (as above). See also Irving, Führer, 165.

  75. BA, NS 11/28, Fols.86–119; quotations: Fols.114–15 (‘Verstehen Sie eines, meine Herren, die grossen Erfolge der letzten Zeit sind uns nur deswegen geworden, weil ich die Gelegenheiten wahrgenommen habe…’ ‘Ich habe mir vorgenommen, die deutsche Frage zu lösen, d.h. das deutsche Kaumproblem zu lösen. Nehmen Sie es zur Kenntnis, dass, solange ich lebe, dass dieser Gedanke mein ganzes Dasein beherrschen wird. Seien Sie weiter der Überzeugung, dass, sowie ich glaube, in irgendeinem Augenblick einen Schritt hiervorwärts zu kommen, dass ich dann augenblicklich immer handeln werde, dass ich dabei auch vor dem Äussersten nie zurückschrecken werde…’); Fol.119 (‘Seien Sie daher nicht überrascht, wenn auch in den kommenden Jahren bei jeder Gelegenheit irgendein deutsches Ziel zu erreichen versucht wird, und stellen Sie sich dann, bitte sehr, im gläubigsten Vertrauen hinter mich…’). See also, for summary notes of the speech, IfZ, ED 57, Irving-Sammlung, ‘Wiedergabe von Notizen einer Ansprache Hitlers an Offiziere der Wehrmacht am 10.2.1939’; brief extracts from the text are printed in Jost Dülffer, ‘Der Einfluß des Auslandes auf die nationalsozialistische Politik’, in Erhard Forndran, Frank Golczewski, and Dieter Riesenberger (eds.), Innen- und Außenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung, Opladen, 1977, 295–313, here 304; Wolfgang Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich. Dokumente zur Innen- und Außenpolitik, Bd.1, Munich, 1985,267–8; and Irving, Führer, 165–6. See also Below, 145. In a fourth speech, to newly qualified officers, held on 11 March 1939 in Berlin, Hitler repeated themes of his speeches in January and February, including the need for ‘living space’, the heroism and racial value of the German people, the failure of its leadership in 1918, the qualities of the new state he had led since 1933, and the historical precedents for a master-race dominating an inferior people (BA, NS 11/28, Fols. 120–46).

  76. TBJG, I/6, 247 (3 February 1939).

  77. TBJG, I/6, 246 (1 February 1939).

  78. Watt, How War Came, 147–9.

  79. TBJG, I/6, 280 (11 March 1939); see also Irving, Goebbels, 288—9.

  80. Below, 151; Irving, Göring, 244.

  81. Keitel, 200.

  82. TBJG, I/6, 283 (13 March 1939).

  83. Below, 151; Irving, Goebbels, 290; Watt, How War Came, 152.

  84. TBJG, I/6, 283–4 (13 March 1939).

  85. TBJG, I/6, 285 (14 March 1939); DGFP, D, IV, 243–5, Doc.202.

  86. Watt, How War Came, 150.

  87. TBJG, I/6, 285–6 (14 March 1939, 15 March 1939).

  88. Schmidt, 435; Watt, How War Came, 144, 152; Toland, 515.

  89. TBJG, I/6,287 (15 March 1939); Keitel, 200. According to Keitel, Hácha’s arrival was announced to Hitler around 10.00p.m. He had only been expected in late evening (Below, 151), though photographs of the Czech President inspecting a guard of honour outside the station in Berlin in daylight suggest that he had actually arrived in the city no later than about 7.00p.m. (Domarus, 1093 n.263).

  90. Keitel, 200. For Hitler’s relaxed attitude during the evening, see Below, 152.

  91. Schmidt, 435–6.

  92. DGFP, D, IV, 263–9, Doc. 228; Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler. Der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von 1918 bis 1945, wie ich ihn erlebte, Hamburg, 1950, 476; Keitel, 201; Schmidt, 437; Below, 150–53.

  93. Keitel, 201.

  94. Keitel (200–201) claimed Hácha had no knowledge. But, according to Schmidt, Hácha had been told by Mastny on arrival in Berlin that troops had crossed near Ostrau (Schmidt, 437); and Goebbels pointed out that the purpose of sending some troops into Czech territory was to exert further pressure on Hácha (TBJG, 286 (15 March 1939)).

  95. Keitel, 201.

  96. Irving, Göring, 245.

  97. Schmidt, 438–9.

  98. Schmidt, 439; DGFP, D, IV, 263–9, N0.228.

  99. Schroeder, 88.

  100. Below, 153; Keitel, 202; Domarus, 1097.

  101. Schroeder, 88; Below, 153–4; Schneider, Nr.47, 21 November 1952, 8; TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939), where Goebbels noted that Hitler thought the people of Prague had ‘behaved quite neutrally’, and that more could not have been expected of the
m.

  102. Schroeder, 88–9.

  103. Reichsgesetzblatt (=RGBl) 1939,I, 485–8, quotation 485; Below, 154.

  104. Below, 154.

  105. TBJG, I/6, 293 (20 March 1939); Below, 155; Domarus, 1103.

  106. See Below, 154, 156.

  107. StA München, NSDAP 126, report of the Kreisleiter of Aichach, Upper Bavaria, 31 March 1939: ‘Die Menschen freuten sich über die großen Taten des Führers und blicken vertrauensvoll zu ihm auf. Die Nöte und Sorgen des Alltags sind aber so groß, daß bald wieder die Stimmung getrübt wird.’

  108. Below, 156. Speer, 162, remarked on the depressed mood in Germany and the worries about the future. See also, for reactions to the latest coup, Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 139–40.

  109. DBS, vi.279. Analysts at Sopade headquarters, by now moved from Prague to Paris, concluded that, in the light of Hitler’s broken promises and so many occasions in which to recognize the true essence of the Nazi regime, ‘If the world… allows itself to be deceived, then it alone is to blame… For this system, there is no right other than that of the stronger’ (DBS, vi.372–3).

  110. Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin, 32.

  111. Eva Sternheim-Peters, Die Zeit der großen Täuschungen. Mädchenleben im Faschismus, Bielefeld, 1987, 361–2.

  112. DBS, vi.278.

  113. Chamberlain, Struggle, 413–20, quotation 418.

  114. Courcy, 98.

  115. Cit. Weinberg II, 542–3.

  116. Weinberg II, 545–6.

  117. DGFP, D, IV, 99–100, N0.81.

  118. Domarus, 510–11, 1029, n.49a, 1109; Benz, Graml, and Weiß, Enzyklopädie, 582; Watt, How War Came, 156.

  119. See Weinberg II, 536.

  120. Domarus, 1109, How War Came, 156–7.

  121. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939).

  122. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939); Domarus, 1109–10.

  123. Domarus, 1110–14. There appears to be no evidence for the assertion by Watt, How War Came, 157, that Hitler came on land sea-sick from his stay on the Deutschland.

  124. TBJG, I/6, 297 (23 March 1939).

  125. TBJG, I/6, 296 (23 March 1939). Hitler had been taking it for granted for a few months that the former colonies would be returned to Germany (Weinberg II, 512–13). The issue was at best, however, of secondary importance to him, and his somewhat vague presumption was that the colonial question would be solved perhaps in the later 1940s when Germany was the master of the European continent and when the battle-fleet was ready (Klaus Hildebrand, Deutsche Außenpolitik 1933–1945. Kalkül oder Dogma?, Stuttgart etc., 1971, 78–9).

  126. DGFP, D, VI, 70–72, No. 61.

  127. DBFP, Ser. 3, IV, 463–4, No. 485.

  128. Watt, How War Came, 158–9.

  129. Below, 157; DGFP, D, VI, 117–19 (quotation, 117), No. 99. Hitler’s stance is not compatible with the post-war claim – on the basis of dubious evidence – that he had already decided upon the military occupation of Poland as early as 8 March, when he spoke to leaders of business, the Party, and the military (Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann (eds.), Anatomie des Krieges. Neue Dokumente über die Rolle des deutschen Monopolkapitals bei der Vorbereitung und Durchführung des zweiten Weltkrieges, East Berlin, 1969, 204–5, Dok.88 (based on reports sent to President Roosevelt on 19 September 1939 by William Christian Bullitt, the United States Ambassador in Paris)).

  130. TBJG, I/6, 300 (25 March 1939).

  131. Domarus, 1115–16; Watt, How War Came, 160–61.

  132. As in Domarus, 1116. Hitler was, however, displeased with Ribbentrop’s clumsy alienation of the Poles, which threatened to do just what he wanted to avoid and drive them into the arms of the British (Bloch, 220).

  133. TBJG, I/6, 302 (28 March 1939).

  134. Watt, How War Came, 160–61.

  135. Weinberg II, 554–5.

  136. DBFP, Ser.3, IV, 553, No.582. For the background, and the shifts in the British stance towards Germany in spring 1939, though inclined to interpret them as a continuation by other means of existing policy (as Chamberlain himself saw it), aimed at preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe and maintaining Britain’s status as a world power, rather than a change of direction, see Simon Newman, March 1939: the British Guarantee to Poland. A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy, Oxford, 1976, stressing the role of Halifax in urging the Guarantee on Chamberlain. For greater emphasis upon the Guarantee as a decisive turning-point, if not intended as such, in British policy, see A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, (1961), Penguin edn, Harmondsworth, 1964, 253. It is tempting to agree with P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe, London, 1986, 252–5, that the simplest explanation for the Guarantee is probably the best: Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia had sharply altered opinion in Britain, including Chamberlain’s own. There had to be a significant shift in policy. Chamberlain now fully realized the extent to which he had been duped; how the Munich Agreement, which he regarded as his own achievement, had been no more than a major deception. A balanced assessment of Chamberlain’s attempts to appease then deter Hitler in 1938–9 can be found in R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement. British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, London, 1993, here especially 204ff.

  137. Domarus, 1128–9. The communiqué of the meeting between Chamberlain and Beck on 5 April 1939 is in DBFP, Ser.3, V, 35, No. 10 (and see 50, No. 17 n.2, referring to the text of the speech in Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, House of Commons, vol.345, Cols.2996–9). For the firm resolution and false optimism in Warsaw that followed the announcement, see Shirer, 131. British guarantees for Romania, Greece, and Turkey and the beginning of serious negotiations with the Soviets followed (Watt, How War Came, 193; see also Weinberg II, 556).

  138. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 1946, vol.2, 127: ‘Denen werde ich einen Teufelstrank brauen.’ Gisevius was reporting what he had been told by Admiral Canaris, present when Hitler made the remark.

  139. Goebbels anticipated Hitler’s response: ‘So Beck has fallen after all into the Lords’ trap. Poland will perhaps some day have to pay a high price for that.’ – TBJG, I/6, 313 (10 April 1939).

  140. See Dirks/Janßen, 83–4.

  141. Domarus, 1119–27, especially 1120, 1125. The speech was not allowed to be transmitted live, presumably to allow the text to be edited if need be (which it was not). The orders, allegedly from Hitler himself, preventing a live broadcast were issued at such short notice that they came through to William Shirer only after Hitler had already begun to speak. The abrupt end to the broadcast of the speech, and its replacement by music, led to immediate queries from New York about whether Hitler had been assassinated (Shirer, 130).

  142. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45, (1962), Presidio paperback edn, Novato, n.d. (1964), 19–20. For the text: Walther Hubatsch (ed.), Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, (1962), Munich, 1965, 19–22 (=Weisungen); and see Müller, Heer, 390–92.

  143. Domarus, 1130; Below, 159.

  144. DGFP, D, VI, 223–8, Doc.185; Domarus, 1131–3. Weisungen, 22; IMG, xxxiv. 388–91, Doc.120-C (‘Fall-Weiß’), 429–42, Doc.126-C.

  145. Weisungen, 22.

  146. Hoffmann, 122.

  147. Though Poland was aiming to modernize its armed forces, its defence budget in the years 1935–9 amounted to no more than 10 per cent of that of the Luftwaffe alone for the single year of 1939. Andrzej Suchcitz, ‘Poland’s Defence Preparations in 1939’, in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), Poland between the Wars, 1918–1939, London, 1998, 109–36, here 110.)

  148. Christian Hartmann and Sergej Slutsch, ‘Franz Halder und die Kriegsvorbereitungen im Frühjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres’, VfZ, 45 (1997), 467–95, quotations 480, 482–3, 488–90, 495; for the dating to the second half of April, 469–70.

  CHAPTER 5: GOING FOR BROKE

  1. Speer, 163–4; Domarus, 1144; TBJG, I/6, 322 (20 April 1939); Below, 160; Schr
oeder, 92–4. And see Kurt Pätzold, ‘Hitlers fünfzigster Geburtstag am 20. April 1939’, in Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Pätzold (eds.), Der Weg in den Krieg. Studien zur Geschichte der Vorkriegsjahre (1935/36 bis 1939), East Berlin, 1989, 309–43.

  2. Domarus, 1146. Henderson, 214, for his recall (and 220 for his return on 25 April).

  3. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939); Domarus, 1145–6; Below, 161; Schroeder, 94.

  4. Fritz Terveen, ‘Der Filmbericht über Hitlers 50. Geburtstag. Ein Beispiel nationalsozialistischer Selbstdarstellung und Propaganda’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 75–84, here 82.

  5. TBJG, I/6, 323 (21 April 1939).

  6. DBS, vi.435–54.

  7. Ilse McKee, Tomorrow the World, London, 1960, 27.

  8. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 106, 148–9, 222, for examples.

  9. Domarus, 1178; see also Sebastian Haffner, Anmerkungen zu Hitler, Munich, 1978, 43–5.

  10. MadR, ii.160–61.

  11. MadR, ii.293.

  12. GStA, Reichsstatthalter 563, ‘Die Lage der bayerischen Landwirtschaft im Frühjahr 1939’, Fol. 13; see Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 61.

  13. MadR, ii.159, 161, 292, 295.

  14. MadR, ii.157.

  15. BA/MA, RW19/68, ‘Zusammenfassender Überblick’, 31 January 1939, Fol.119.

  16. BA/MA, RW19/56, Wehrwirtschaftsinspektion VI, June 1939.