Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  83. Dallin, ch.3, especially 56ff.

  84. Dallin, 84, 123–4. Civilian rule was established in the occupied territories in August and September 1941 (Dallin, 85).

  85. Koeppen, Fols.12–13 (18 September 1941).

  86. Dallin, 185ff.

  87. Dallin, 203ff.

  88. Halder KTB, iii.10 (24 June 1941).

  89. Halder KTB, iii.15 (25 June 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 424.

  90. Halder KTB, iii.20 (27 June 1941), 25 (29 June 1941), 29 (30 June 1941), 34–5 (2 July 1941), 39 (3 July 1941).

  91. Halder KTB, iii.39 (3 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 448.

  92. DRZW, iv.212–13; Leach, 53, 99; Dirks/Janßen, 137ff.

  93. DRZW, iv.219–42; Leach, 99–118,250–69. See above, Chapter 7, n.157, for Loßberg’s post-war claim to have begun work on the strategic study already in early July 1940, and without any formal request to do so. In his post-war memoirs, Bernhard von Loßberg, Im Wehrmachtführungsstab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers, Hamburg, 1950, 104–8, Loßberg makes no mention of this.

  94. See Halder KTB, ii.463–9, ‘Aufmarschanweisung OKH vom 31.1.1941 “Barbarossa”’ (Leach, 263–9 (OKH Deployment Directive, ‘Barbarossa’, 31 January 1941). The Directive was discussed by Halder and Brauchitsch with the three Army Group Commanders on 31 January 1941, then issued on 19 February 1941 (Halder KTB, ii.264 n.1, 266 (31 January 1941, 2 February 1941). Mention of Moscow was confined to a single sentence: ‘In the event of a sudden unexpected collapse of enemy resistance in northern Russia, the abandonment of the turning movement and an immediate thrust towards Moscow could be considered’ (Halder KTB, ii.465; trans. Leach, 264).

  95. Weisungen, 98–9 (No.21, 18 December 1940). Hitler’s significant amendment to the original plan of attack had been conveyed to Jodl on 17 December 1940, the day before the issuing of Directive No.21 for ‘Barbarossa’ (KTB OKW, i.233).

  96. Halder KTB, iii.24–5 (29 June 1941).

  97. KTB OKW, i.1020; DRZW, iv.486–7; and see Warlimont, 182.

  98. DRZW, iv.487.

  99. Leach, 197.

  100. DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 216.

  101. KTB OKW, 1.1030 (during Hitler’s visit to Leeb in Army Group North on 21 July). See also Warlimont, 186; DRZW, iv.495.

  102. Weisungen, 166 (23 July 1941); DRZW, iv.490; Leach, 198.

  103. KTB OKW, i.1030; Halder KTB, iii.103–7 (23 July 1941), especially 104 and n.1, 106 (quotation); DRZW, iv.491.

  104. Weisungen, 165; DRZW, iv.689–93; Leach, 204. Hitler’s Directive No.33 of 19 July 1941, ‘Continuation of the War in the East’, had, however, indicated that air-raids supporting the army on the south-eastern front, not on Moscow, were the first priority (Weisungen, 164–5). Göring later described the raids on Moscow as ‘prestige attacks’, prompted by sarcastic remarks by Hitler casting doubt on whether the Luftwaffe had a single squadron with the courage to raid Moscow (DRZW, iv.693).

  105. Leach, 205.

  106. Halder KTB, iii.151 (4 August 1941). Under ‘Losses (Verluste)’ Halder noted 46,470 officers and men dead, 11,758 missing, and 155,073 injured.

  107. Leach, 205–7, 210.

  108. Leach, 207.

  109. KTB OKW, 1.1033.

  110. DRZW, iv.493.

  111. 111. KTB OKW, i.1037, 1040.

  112. Warlimont, 185; Leach, 208.

  113. KTB OKW, i.1040; DRZW, iv.495–6; Leach, 209.

  114. Halder KTB, iii. 134 (30 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 490.

  115. Weisungen, 168–9; DRZW, iv.495; Leach, 209.

  116. DRZW, iv.495–6.

  117. DRZW, iv. 499–500.

  118. Halder KTB, iii.170 (11 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 506.

  119. Weisungen, 173; and see DRZW, iv.503; Warlimont, 187.

  120. DRZW, iv.504.

  121. TBJG, II/1, 258 (19 August 1941). Hitler’s own – exaggerated – view was that he had not been ill since he was sixteen years old (Monologe, 190 (9–10 January 1942)).

  122. Irving, Doctor, 87–8; Irving, HW, 293–5.

  123. TBJG, II/i, 260–3 (19 August 1941).

  124. Laurence Rees, War of the Century. When Hitler Fought Stalin, London, 1999, 52–6; Volko-gonov, 412–13.

  125. TBJG, II/1, 266 (19 August 1941).

  126. KTB OKW, 11.1055–9; DRZW, iv.505.

  127. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit. Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923–1945, Tübingen/Stuttgart, 1950, 132–5; Warlimont, 189 (whose translation has been used).

  128. KTB OKW, i.1061–3 (Halder’s memorandum, and Hitler’s order); Halder KTB, iii.192 (22 August 1941), trans. Halder Diary, 514; Warlimont, 190.

  129. KTB OKW, i.1065; Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); DRZW, iv.506; Warlimont, 190–91.

  130. KTB OKW, ii.1063–8 (Hitler’s ‘Study’); DRZW, iv.505–6.

  131. Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 515; and see Bock, 290–91 (23 August 1941), and Hartmann, 283.

  132. Above from Guderian, 198–202.

  133. Hartmann, 283–4; Halder’s reaction to Guderian’s change of mind in Halder KTB, iii.194–5 (24 August 1941).

  134. Bock, 291 (24 August 1941); Hartmann, 284 n.57.

  135. A point made by Warlimont, 191.

  136. DRZW, iv.514, 516, 516 n.252; Leach, 222 (slightly different figures).

  137. Leach, 222.

  138. DRZW, iv.516; Warlimont, 193, on agreement now on the necessity of reaching Moscow before the winter.

  139. In fact, once the German blockade set in, around 2.5 million civilians would be practically trapped – apart from a path over the iced Lake Ladoga – in the city over an exceptionally icy winter and beyond. (The siege would finally be raised only at the end of January 1944.) With supply routes cut off, famine conditions quickly took hold. Horses and stray dogs were rapidly consumed. Bread and gruel were in exceedingly short supply. Most people had to resort to root vegetables and, when they dried up, an unholy concoction made from peat and paper. An estimated 850–950,000 are estimated to have succumbed to starvation, cold, and illness. (Osobyi Arkhiv (Sonderarchiv), Moscow, 500–1–25, ‘Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr.191’, 10 April 1942, Fols.264–70; Oxford Companion, 683–6; Richard Overy, Russia’s War, London, 1997, 105–11.)

  140. TBJG, II/1, 481–3 (24 September 1941).

  141. TBJG, II.1, 486 (24 September 1941).

  142. TBJG, II/1, 482 (24 September 1941). In fact, Hitler was hoping to be able to withdraw a good number of divisions after attaining the next military goals. Halder had decided as early as 8 July to make winter arrangements for an occupying rather than a combat force in the Soviet Union (Halder KTB, iii.53 (8 July 1941); Dallin, 62).

  143. An attached cover-note by Keitel of 1 September states that Hitler had approved the Memorandum. Its circulation was restricted on Hitler’s orders to the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop). Chief of Staff Halder presumably saw it only several days after its initial distribution, since he noted extracts in his diary entry for 13 September. (ADAP, D, XIII, 345–53, quotation 352, No. 265; DGFP, D, 13, 422–33, quotation 431, No.265; Halder KTB, iii.226–9; DRZW, iv.507; Warlimont, 192–3.)

  144. Halder KTB, iii.205 (29 August 1941).

  145. DRZW, IV. 571.

  146. See Leach, 220, 222.

  147. Bonwetsch, 203ff. (though the change was only gradual, and from 1942 onwards). For an emphasis, diluting the blame attached exclusively to Stalin, on the structural weaknesses in the Red Army in 1941, but rapid remedial action taken, see Jacques Sapir, ‘The Economics of War in the Soviet Union during World War II’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 208–36, here 216–19. See also David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army stopped Hitler, Kansas, 1995, 65ff.

  148. Leach, 234–7 (and see also pp.118–23) for above.

  149. Leach, 212, 223–4. Whether Soviet determination to stand and defend Moscow, backed by utterly ruthless butchery of those attempting
to flee, would have been sustainable had Stalin fled from the capital might, however, be doubted. And such an eventuality was close in mid-October, when a special train was waiting under steam at one of Moscow’s stations ready to carry the Soviet dictator out of the city. Stalin seems to have pondered the likely consequences for morale, however, and decided to stay. (Volkogonov, 434–5; Edvard Radzinsky, Stalin, New York, 1996, 482–3; Rees, War of the Century, 71–4; Bonwetsch, 189; Glantz and House, 81; Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler’s War. German Military Strategy, 1940–1945, London, 1998, 117–18. For a guide through the labyrinth of interpretations, see Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, Hitler’s War in the East 1941–1945. A Critical Assessment, Providence/Oxford, 1997, 85–104, especially 99ff.)

  150. See Leach, 238–41.

  151. Hauner, Hitler, 151–2.

  152. Hauner, Hitler, 166–8. For Udet, whose death was attributed by the regime to an accident while testing a new aeroplane, see Wistrich, 280.

  153. Rebentisch, 374.

  154. Lang, Der Sekretär, 464.

  155. Rebentisch, 374.

  156. Steinert, 206–8.

  157. Boelcke, Wollt Ihr, 236.

  158. Steinert, 209–13; Boelcke, Wollt Ihr, 234–44; Seydewitz, 70–72.

  159. Heinrich Breloer (ed.), Mein Tagebuch. Geschichten vom Überleben 1939–1947, Cologne, 1984, 63.

  160. Breloer, 63.

  161. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18475, report of the Landrat of Ebermannstadt, 1 July 1941: ‘Nicht das geringste Verständnis besteht für die Verwirklichung von Weltherrschaftsplänen… Die überarbeiteten und abgewirtschafteten Männer und Frauen sehen nicht ein, warum der Krieg noch weiter nach Asien und Afrika hineingetragen werden muß.’

  162. StA Bamberg, K8/III, 18475, report of the Landrat of Ebermannstadt, 30 August 1941; printed in Martin Broszat, Elke Fröhlich, and Falk Wiesemann (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit. Soziale Lage und politisches Verhalten der Bevölkerung im Spiegel vertraulicher Berichte, Munich/Vienna, 1977, 152.

  163. Steinert, 213–14.

  164. StA Munich, LRA 61618, report of Gendarmerie-Posten Mittenwald, 24 May 1941 (‘schlecht und kriegsmüde’); report of Gendarmerie-Kreisführer Mittenwald, 28 November 1941 (‘… die sich stetig steigernden großen und kleinen Alltagssorgen…’).

  165. Conway, 259–60, 383–6.

  166. For Bormann’s increasing intervention in Church matters during the war, see Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 25off.

  167. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 332–4; E. D. R. Harrison, ‘The Nazi Dissolution of the Monasteries: a Case Study’, English Historical Review, 109 (1994), 323–55, here 336–41.

  168. GStA Munich, Epp-Akten 157, Reichsstatthalter Epp to Lammers, 23 December 1941: ‘Staats-minister Wagner wollte mit seinem Kruzifixerlaß auf seine Weise der von Reichsleiter Bormann herausgegebenen Lehre, daß Nationalsozialismus und Christentum unvereinbare Gegensätze seien, sichtbare Auswirkung verschaffen…’

  169. Landratsamt Traunstein, IV-7–177, anonymous letter to the Landrat of the Landkreis Traunstein, 20 September 1941: ‘Die Söhne unserer Stadt stehen im Osten im Kampf gegen den Bolshewismus. Viele aus ihnen geben dafür ihr Leben. Wir können nicht verstehen, dass man uns gerade in dieser schweren Zeit das Kreuz aus den Schulen nehmen will.’

  170. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 340–57; Heinrich Huber (ed.), Dokumente einer christlichen Widerstandsbewegung. Gegen die Entfernung der Kruzifixe aus den Schulen 1941, Munich, 1948.

  171. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 178.

  172. Landratsamt Parsberg 939, report of the Landrat of Parsberg, 19 September 1941: ‘Durch-führung des Kreuzerlasses in Parsberg’: ‘… das will der Führer nicht und er weiss bestimmt nichts von dieser Kreuzentfernung’.

  173. StA Munich, LRA 31933, anonymous letter (undated but received on 2 October 1941) to the Bürgermeister of Ramsau, Landkreis Berchtesgaden: ‘Braune Hemden trägt Ihr von Oben, Innen raus seid Bolschewisten u. Juden sonst könnt Ihr nicht handeln des Führers Rücken...’ (grammar and punctuation as in the original).

  174. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 340; Lutz Lemhöfer, ‘Gegen den gottlosen Bolschewismus. Zur Stellung der Kirchen zum Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion’, in Ueberschär and Wette, 131–9, here 135–6.

  175. This was the implication of the interpretation by Peter Hüttenberger, ‘Vorüberlegungen zum “Widerstandsbegriff”’, in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Theorien in der Praxis des Historikers, Göttingen, 1977, 117–34.

  176. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 290.

  177. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 324–5.

  178. 178. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 206ff., 289–91.

  179. Honolka, 84–90; Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 286–7.

  180. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 334.

  181. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 334, 486–7 n.127.

  182. Heinz Boberach (ed.), Berichte des SD und der Gestapo über Kirchen und Kirchenvolk, Mainz, 1971, 570–71.

  183. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 349–50.

  184. Cit. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 350; Peter Löffler (ed.), Bischof Clemens August Graf von Galen. Akten, Briefe und Predigten, vol.2, 1939–1946, Mainz, 1988, 864–6.

  185. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 352; see also Löffler, 874–83; and Ludwig Volk, ‘Episkopat und Kirchenkampf’, in Dieter Albrecht (ed.),Katholische Kirche und Nationalsozialismus. Ausgewählte Aufsätze von Ludwig Volk, Mainz, 1987, 94.

  186. Klee, Dokumente, 193–8; trans. N & P, iii.1036–9.

  187. Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 352; Lewy, 253.

  188. Papen, 481–2.

  189. See Harrison, ‘Dissolution’, 325–6.

  190. Picker, 260 (7 April 1942).

  191. Bernhard Stasiewski, ‘Die Kirchenpolitik der Nationalsozialisten im Warthegau 1939–1945’, VfZ, 7 (1959), 46–74, here 65.

  192. Papen, 481–2.

  193. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 335.

  194. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 335.

  195. TBJG, II/2, 33 (1 October 1941).

  196. TBJG, II/1, 239 (15 August 1941). Goebbels referred to the possibility of linking the ‘debate’ to the film justifying ‘euthanasia’, Ich klage an (I Accuse), which he had commissioned and was now almost ready for release. See Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1 21ff. for the content of the film, first shown in Berlin on 29 August 1941.

  197. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 339; Eugen Kogon et al. (eds.), Nationalsozialistische Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Eine Dokumentation, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 62.

  198. Aly, 314–15.

  199. The above based on Aly, 313, 316.

  200. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.

  201. TBJG, I/9, 119 (31 January 1941).

  202. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.

  203. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 345ff., 417ff.

  204. TBJG, II/1, 484 (24 September 1941).

  205. The aim was to destroy the Soviet Army Group of Marshal Timoschenko before the onset of winter and, only once that was achieved, to advance on Moscow. (Weisungen, 174–8. For the military developments, see DRZW, iv.568ff.)

  206. TBJG, II/2, 44 (3 October 1941).

  207. Domarus, 1756.

  208. Domarus, 1757.

  209. TBJG, II/2, 50 (4 October 1941).

  210. TBJG, II/2, 50–1 (4 October 1941).

  211. TBJG, II/2, 51 (4 October 1941).

  212. TBJG, II/2, 52 (4 October 1941). During the coming fortnight, Stalin would come close to fleeing from Moscow and, according to one piece of anecdotal evidence, did contemplate – if this is accurate, for a second time, following such considerations in July – putting feelers out to Germany for peace-terms (Rees, War of the Century, 55–6).

  213. TBJG, II/2, 54 (4 October 1941).

  214. Hewel’s diary entry notes for the afternoon of 3 October: ‘… With the Führer to the Sportpalast. Great speech – impromptu. Tremendously rapt. Directly afterwards to the train and back to Headquarters.’ (‘… mit dem F[ührer] zum Sportpalast. Ganz große Rede – aus dem Stehgreif. Unerhört andachtsvoll. Direkt anschließ
end zum Zug und zurück ins Hauptquartier.’ (IfZ, ED 100. And see Irving, HW, 319.)

  215. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).

  216. Domarus, 1759.

  217. Domarus, 1763.

  218. TBJG, II/2, 55–6 (4 October 1941).

  219. Koeppen, Fol.36 (Midday, 4 October 1941); TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).

  220. TBJG, II/2, 53, 56 (4 October 1941).

  221. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).

  222. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).

  223. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).

  224. See Irving, HW, 318.

  225. Halder KTB, iii.266 (4 October 1941), 268 (5 October 1941).

  226. DRZW, iv.574, where it is pointed out that the fighting-power, with many of the units scarcely rested and having suffered serious losses, was not up to that of the force of 22 June. See also Koeppen, 32 (2 October 1941).

  227. DRZW, iv.765; see also 575ff.; Below, 292, has over 660,000 prisoners.

  228. IfZ, ED 100 (Hewel diary), entry for 7 October 1941: ‘Viaz’ma taken. Ring round Timoschenko army closed. Jodl: Most decisive day of the Russian war. Comparison with Königgrätz’. (‘Wiasma genommen. Ring um Timoschenko-Armee geschlossen. Jodl: Entscheidenster Tag des Russenkrieges. Vergleich mit Königgrätz’.) For the confidence of Army Group Centre and of Halder, see DRZW, iv.576.

  229. Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister, 204.

  230. Koeppen, Fols.45–6 (8–9 October 1941).

  231. Monologe, 77 (10–11 October 1941). By early December, Hitler was admitting that the Wehrmacht had no satisfactory defence against the heavy Soviet tanks (TBJG, II.2, 467 (10 December 1941); Below, 297.)

  232. Koeppen, Fol. 48 (16 October 1941).

  233. Koeppen, Fol. 37 (4 October 1941).

  234. Koeppen, Fol. 40 (5 October 1941).

  235. Monologe, 78 (13 October 1941).

  236. Koeppen, Fols. 51–2 (17 October 1941).

  237. Bock, 337 (21 October 1941).

  238. Koeppen, Fol. 57 (19 October 1941).

  239. See Koeppen, Fols. 53, 57, 62 (18 October 1941, 19 October 1941, 23 October 1941). Goebbels comments several times on the bad weather: e.g. TBJG, II/2, 96 (11 October 1941); 152 (21 October 1941); 204 (30 October 1941), where he remarks that ‘the weather situation has made almost our entire operations in the east impossible’. See also DRZW, iv.578–82 for deterioration in the weather and the growing transport and supplies crisis; and for the suggestion that the bad weather was not unseasonally early, Domarus, 1770, n.439.