Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane History)

by Ian Kershaw

  152. Domarus, 1446: ‘Grundsätzlicher Befehl’, 11 January 1940; Laqueur, 18–19. The number of persons with indirect or partial knowledge was of course far wider.

  153. This was given as a reason, in autumn 1942, why Gauleiter Greiser should not proceed with his aim to exterminate 30,000 Poles suffering from incurable tuberculosis (Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, 72).

  154. See Steinert, 252–7, including (257) reference to Bormann’s secret circular to Gauleiter, informing them on Hitler’s behalf, that ‘in public treatment of the Jewish question all discussion of a future complete solution (Gesamtlösung) must cease. It can however be mentioned that the Jews are conscripted en blsoc for appropriate deployment of labour.’

  155. IMG, xxvii.270–73, here 270, Doc. 1517-PS, Alfred Rosenberg: ‘Vermerk über Unterredung beim Führer am 14.12.41’.

  156. Steinert, 252–3.

  157. IMG, xxix. 145, 1919-PS; Anatomie, i.329; ii.446–7.

  158. See Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europäischen Juden’, 161.

  159. See note 144 above: BDC, SS-HO, 933: RFSS to Berger, 28 July 1942: ‘Verbot einer Verordnung über den Begriff “Jude”’.

  160. See TBJG, II/4, 402 (30 May 1942) for the ‘psychological pressure’ during the winter on account of ‘the unsuccessful Napoleonic adventure’.

  161. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 365, 368–9.

  162. See TBJG, II/4, 482, 489 (10 June 1942).

  163. S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, London, 1954, 1956, 1960, i.599ff., 614, ii.467ff., 475, iii.364ff. See also Overy, Why the Allies Won, 47 (with different figures), 49, 52.

  164. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 183; Weinberg III, 350 (who gives the number of British troops captured as 28,000); DRZW, vi.623–33; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.IV, The Hinge of Fate, London etc., 1951, 371–8.

  165. Weinberg III, 350–51.

  166. Below, 312; Irving, HW, 399; Weinberg III, 350–51.

  167. TBJG, II/4, 416 (31 May 1942). Hitler repeated that the attacks would be on ‘cultural centres’, since those on military and economic targets had hardly been worthwhile. The appointment of Air Marshal Arthur Harris as Commander-in-Chief of the RAF’s Bomber Command on 23 February had sharply intensified the British strategy of ‘area bombing’, aimed at demoralization of the population living in the centres of German cities (Overy, Why the Allies Won, 112–13).

  168. TBJG, II/4, 422 (1 June 1942); 431 (2 June 1942).

  169. Below, 311–12.

  170. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Bd.II: i.Jan-uar 1942–31. Dezember 1942, ed. Andreas Hillgruber, Frankfurt am Main, 1963 (=KTB OKW, ii.), ii/i, 395–6 (1 June 1942); Bock, 490 (1 June 1942); Picker, 381 (1 June 1942).

  171. Picker, 381 (2 June 1942).

  172. TBJG, II/4, 489 (10 June 1942).

  173. A military alliance, rather than a formal pact, had been arrived at in spring 1941. The Finns had initially put out a declaration of neutrality on the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, though Hitler’s own proclamation the same day had pointed out that German soldiers at the northern point of the front were fighting alongside Finnish divisions. Immediate Soviet attacks on Finland led to a Finnish declaration of war on 25 June 1941. (See DRZW, iv.Ch.VI, pts.1–4, especially 39off., 400–404.)

  174. Bernd Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland. Das geheime Tonprotokoll seiner Unterredung mit Mannerheim am 4. Juni 1942’, VfZ, 41 (1993), 122 n.23; Domarus, 1889.

  175. Wegner ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 122–3, 127.

  176. Wegner ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 124, 128; Domarus, 1889.

  177. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 126 and (for the text) 130–37.

  178. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 127.

  179. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 125–6 and n.40, 134 n.74. For the ‘preventive war’ legend, and the way it was exploited by Nazi propaganda, see above, Ch.9, notes 4, 39.

  180. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 128.

  181. TBJG, II/4, 489 (10 June 1942).

  182. Wegner, ‘Hitlers Besuch in Finnland’, 129.

  183. TBJG, II/4, 450 (5 June 1942). Daluege rang Goebbels at 10a.m. to say that Heydrich had died a half an hour earlier. Presumably, he had first rung FHQ. But Hitler, as Goebbels pointed out, could not make any decision about the state funeral since he was in Finland and not expected back until the evening. So he must already have left FHQ when the news arrived. He landed in Finland at 11.15a.m. (Domarus, 1889). Whether Hitler was informed during his six-hour visit to Finland, or learnt of Heydrich’s death only on return (Domarus, 1890) is uncertain.

  184. Picker, 386 (4 June 1942). Hitler referred here, as on an earlier occasion, on 3 May 1942 (Picker, 306–8), to attempts on his own life. Hitler repeated, when in Berlin for Heydrich’s funeral, that he had warned him only to travel in an armour-plated car (TBJG, II/4, 486 (10 June 1942)).

  185. TBJG, II/4, 486 (10 June 1942).

  186. TBJG, II/4, 492 (10 June 1942).

  187. See DRZW, vi.868ff. for the unfolding of the campaign.

  188. Halder KTB, iii.462 (21 June 1942).

  189. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 66.

  190. Halder KTB, iii.467 (28 June 1942).

  191. Halder KTB, iii.469 (1 July 1942); Domarus, 1895–6.

  192. Bock, 512–14 (3 July 1942).

  193. Halder Diary, 632–9 (3–13 July 1942); Bock, 525–6 (13 July 1942); Below, 312. In his talk with Bock on 3 July, Hitler had made fun of the English for sacking generals when something went wrong and thereby undermining the freedom of decision in the army (Bock, 513 (3 July 1942)).

  194. See Domarus, 1897, n.312.

  195. Domarus, 1897; Hauner, Hitler, 179, for the return to Rastenburg on 1 November.

  196. Schroeder, 135–41; Halder KTB, iii.483 (16 July 1942); Below, 313. Picker found the Ukraine an attractive area (Picker, 465 (22 July 1942)). Below, who had mentioned that Hitler disliked the heat and the flies in the summer of 1942, referred to the Vinnitsa headquarters during the second sojourn there in late February and early March 1943 as ‘pleasant’ (Below, 331). Goebbels, however, visiting FHQ in that period, found the location ‘desolate (trostlos)’ TBJG, II/7, 501 (9 March 1943)).

  197. Below, 313; Picker, 461 (19 July 1942).

  198. Picker, 457–77 (18–26 July 1942).

  199. Below, 313.

  200. Halder KTB, iii.492 (28 July 1942), 493–4 (30 July 1942), 494–5 n.1; KTB OKW, ii/2, 1285; Irving, HW, 405–6.

  201. Hartmann, 325.

  202. Below, 313.

  203. See Bernd Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum. Deutschlands Kriegführung zwischen Moskau und Stalingrad’, in Jürgen Förster (ed.), Stalingrad. Ereignis-Wirkung-Symbol, Munich/Zürich, 1992, 17–37, here 19.

  204. Cit. Hartmann, 326 n.90. Ninety per cent of the Soviet Union’s oil came from Baku and the north Caucasian oil-fields (Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 19).

  205. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 21, for the scepticism, but the lack of a convincing alternative on the part of the generals.

  206. Wegner, ‘Hitler zweiter Feldzug’, 660; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 29.

  207. Weisungen, 227. Marshal Semyon Timoshenko was the Red Army’s senior general, commonly regarded at this point as the Soviet Union’s most competent military commander. He had, however, presided over the loss of a quarter of a million men, together with their tanks and artillery, in the battle for Kharkov in spring, and was recalled to Moscow on 23 July, returning to a field-command, this time on the north-west front, only in October (Oxford Companion, 1108–9).

  208. Hartmann, 325.

  209. Weisungen, 227–9; see Hartmann, 326.

  210. Hartmann, 328–9; DRZW, vi-953ff.

  211. Halder KTB, iii.489 (23 July 1942), trans. Halder Diary, 646; Hartmann, 328.

  212. Cit. Hartmann, 328.

  213. Overy, Why the Allies Won,
67.

  214. Halder KTB, iii.503–7 (12–19 August 1942); Hartmann, 329.

  215. Halder KTB, iii.501 (9 August 1942); Speer, 252; DRZW, vi.942–3; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 30; Irving, HW, 414.

  216. TBJG, ii/5, 353–4 (20 August 1942).

  217. This is what Speer later claimed (Speer, 252).

  218. Halder KTB, iii.508 (22 August 1942); Below, 313; Domarus, 1905.

  219. Speer, 253.

  220. DRZW, vi.965; Hartmann, 329.

  221. Halder KTB, iii.509 (23 August 1942).

  222. See Hartmann, 329.

  223. Halder KTB, iii.511 (26 August 1942).

  224. Warlimont, 251 (dating the meeting to 8 August); Halder KTB, iii.501 (7 August 1942); DRZW, vi.908; Irving, HW, 415.

  225. Below, 314; DRZW, vi.898–906; Irving, HW, 416–18.

  226. Hartmann, 330.

  227. Heusinger, 200–201; trans. amended from Warlimont, 251–2.

  228. Engel, 125 (4 September 1942); see also Warlimont, 251–2, 618 n.21; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, (1955), London, 1982, 261–2. Though his diary entry is misdated, and is a post-war reconstruction, there seems no obvious reason to doubt the authenticity of Engel’s record. Heusinger’s account (Heusinger, 201, also misdated) of Hitler’s further response is less insulting than what was actually said. Heusinger accepted after the war that he had deliberately avoided publishing Hitler’s worst insult. (See Hartmann, 331–2 and nn.14, 17.)

  229. Engel, 125 (4 September 1942). Halder, recognizing that he could no longer cope with Hitler’s operational leadership, appears, in fact, consciously to have been working towards the second half of July at provoking his own dismissal, aware that a conventional resignation would not be acceptable (DRZW, vi.954).

  230. Engel, 126 n.395.

  231. Engel, 124 (27 August 1942). This and a further entry for the same date are misdated by Engel (see 124 n.389) and repeated almost verbatim (126) under the date 7 September 1942.

  232. Engel, 124 (27 August 1942).

  233. Engel, 126 (8 September 1942). According to her later testimony, Jodl told his second wife, Luise, that ‘he had never witnessed such an outbreak of fury’ in Hitler. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, II/T1/S2/3 (interview, in English, with John Toland, 7 November 1970).)

  234. Below, 315.

  235. Warlimont, 256; Halder KTB, iii.518–19 (8 September 1942).

  236. Engel, 125 (27 August 1942).

  237. Irving, HW, 422.

  238. Engel, 125 (27 August 1942). See his similar comments, 128 (18 September 1942).

  239. Engel, 127 (8 September 1942).

  240. Warlimont, 256; Below, 315.

  241. Engel, 127 (18 September 1942). For Hitler’s lack of trust in his generals, see Engel 127–9 (14–30 September 1942).

  242. Warlimont, 257–8.

  243. Warlimont, 258.

  244. Below, 316.

  245. Warlimont, 259; Below, 315. Zeitzler was a close friend of Schmundt (Warlimont, 259). See Hartmann, 337–9, for a description of Zeitzler and his belief in Hitler. Hitler had pointed out to Goebbels some weeks earlier how impressed he had been by Zeitzler’s work in the west (TBJG, II/5,353 (20 August 1942)).

  246. Warlimont, 260.

  247. Hartmann, 339.

  248. Halder KTB, iii.528 (24 September 1942). Halder was far from pessimistic about overall developments in the war. (See Weizsäcker-Papiere, 303 (30 September 1942).)

  249. Hartmann, 339.

  250. KTB OKW, ii/I, 669 (2 September 1942).

  251. Halder KTB, iii.514 (31 August 1942).

  252. Halder KTB, iii.521 (11 September 1942); DRZW, vi.982; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32.

  253. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 32–3.

  254. Below, 318; Domarus, 1924–5.

  255. DRZW, vi.684–7; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 30–31; Irving, HW, 419; Domarus, 1924.

  256. See Weinberg III, 351, 355–6, 361–2.

  257. Below, 317.

  258. TBJG, II/5, 594 (29 September 1942). For a repeat of these remarks and criticism of the behaviour of the Munich population during the raid, TBJG, II/5, 604 (30 September 1942).

  259. TBJG, II/5, 358 (20 August 1942).

  260. Steinert, 316; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 185.

  261. Below, 317; Irving, HW, 427.

  262. TBJG, II/5, 370 (20 August 1942). The date appears to have been fixed only late in September (TBJG, II/5, 584 (28 September 1942).

  263. TBJG, II/5, 594–5 (29 September 1942). See also 596 for Goebbels’s scepticism; and Domarus, 1912, for the DNB summary of the speech.

  264. Below, 318.

  265. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, Bd. 1942 (Sept.-Okt.), from NA T78/317/1567ff., Führerrede zum Ausbau des Atlantikwalles am 29.Sept. 1942. See Irving, HW, 428–9.

  266. Domarus, 1913–24.

  267. Domarus, 1915; MadR, xi.4259 (1 October 1942).

  268. Domarus, 1920.

  269. Domarus, 1914, 1916.

  270. TBJG, II/6, 42 (2 October 1942).

  271. TBJG, II/5, 357 (20 August 1942).

  272. TBJG, II/6, 46–7 (2 October 1942); and see also TBJG, II/5, 354 (20 August 1942).

  273. TBJG, II/6, 48–9 (2 October 1942).

  274. Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33; and see Engel, 129–30 (2–3, 10 October 1942).

  275. TBJG, II/5, 356 (20 August 1942).

  276. DRZW, vi.987–8; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 33.

  277. DRZW, vi.988–93; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.

  278. Engel, 129 (10 February 1942).

  279. DRZW, vi.993–4; Wegner, ‘Vom Lebensraum zum Todesraum’, 34.

  280. Domarus, 1916.

  281. Below, 319; Manfred Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee im Kessel von Stalingrad’, in Förster, Stalingrad, 76–110, here 76–9.

  282. Domarus, 1931.

  283. Below, 320–21; 1929–30; Irving, HW, 439–42 (who draws the comparison with the fate of Generals Hoepner and Sponeck the previous January).

  284. On 1 November Hitler had transferred his headquarters from Vinnitsa back to the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, where his entourage were pleased to find that bright and spacious wooden barracks had been added to the gloomy bunkers to which they had all been earlier confined. He had left his headquarters for Berlin, then Munich, on 6 November (Below, 321).

  285. German views on the eastward-bound convoy from Gibraltar varied between seeing it as carrying provisions for Malta or heading for Tripolitania to attack Rommel from the rear. The Italian General Staff more realistically presumed that the objective was the occupation of French bases in North Africa. Mussolini and Ciano expected no resistance from the French (CD, 520 (7 November 1942)).

  286. The first American fighting units to be engaged in the north African theatre of war were bombing crews relocated from India to the Egyptian front in the wake of the Tobruk disaster (Weinberg III, 356).

  287. Below, 321–2; Engel, 134 (8 November 1942).

  288. Below, 321–2.

  289. Domarus, 1937.

  290. TBJG, II/6, 254 (9 November 1942).

  291. TBJG, II/6, 257–9 (9 November 1942).

  292. TBJG, II/6, 259 (9 November 1942).

  293. Domarus, 1935.

  294. Domarus, 1938.

  295. Domarus, 1937; Jäckel, ‘Hitler und der Mord an den europäischen Juden’, 161.

  296. Steinert, 318–19; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 186–9.

  297. Engel reported that Hitler’s speech had been the subject of much discussion at Führer Headquarters. He and others, he said, had been ‘disgusted’ that Hitler had spoken so optimistically ‘with his audience in mind (berechnet auf Zuhörerkreis)’ (Engel, 134 (10 November 1942)).

  298. TBJG, II/6, 259–60 (9 November 1942).

  299. TBJG, II/6, 261, 263 (9 November 1942).

  300. TBJG, II/6, 258–9, 261–2 (9 Nov
ember 1942).

  301. CD, 521 (9 November 1942); 522 (10 November 1942).

  302. CD, 522 (9 November 1942).

  303. CD, 522 (10 November 1942); Schmidt, 576.

  304. Domarus, 1945–9.

  305. Weisungen, 220–21 (Directive No.42, 29 May 1942).

  306. Below, 322–3.

  307. Below, 323; DRZW, vi.997; Irving, HW, 455.

  308. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 191; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 80–81; DRZW, vi.997–1009, 1018–21; and, fundamental especially for the Soviet side, Erickson, ch.10. There were also more than 30,000 soldiers of other nationalities, 10,000 of them Romanians, encircled (Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 90).

  309. Below, 323–4.

  310. Manfred Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, Stuttgart, 1974, 163; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 82; DRZW, vi.1024.

  311. KTB OKW, ii/I, 84, ii/II, 1006 (22 November 1942); Kehrig, Stalingrad. Analyse und Dokumentation, 183; Kehrig, ‘Die 6.Armee’, 85; DRZW, vi.1025.

  312. Below, 324. Both those close to Hitler and those who later castigated his direction of the war concurred many years after the events that he accepted Göring’s assurances that the troops at Stalingrad could be sustained from the air. (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Toland Tapes, T1-S1, interview of Adolf Heusinger by John Toland, 30 March 1970; 68–1, interview of Otto Günsche by John Toland, 26 March 1971.) For the dreadful weather conditions in Stalingrad in November, at times dipping to as low as minus eighteen degrees Celsius, see Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, London, 1998, 214, 230, 232.