IBM and the Holocaust

by Edwin Black

  Together the continuous reports, summaries, cables, and telephone calls offered minute-to-minute operational details of IBM’s activities in France, Italy, and Sweden; the serial number and location of equipment; and precisely which machines were destined to be shipped to Dehomag or the German army. Devices and spare parts going into the Reich or elsewhere in Nazi-conquered Europe were tracked by New York—from the most complex collator to the simplest sorting brush. Despite the turmoil of Dehomag’s revolt, throughout 1940 and 1941 the fluid decision to build new factories to supply Nazi Germany, the stocking of those factories, and the year-to-year ordering of expensive machine tools, these decisions were made by IBM NY based on the most current market information. Paper factory output and anticipated shortages throughout Europe were monitored to anticipate problems before they occurred.124

  Millions of punch cards were routinely shipped from IBM in America directly to Nazi-controlled sources in Poland, France, Bulgaria, and Belgium, or routed circuitously through Sweden or colonies in Africa. When IBM’s American presses did not fill orders, subsidiaries themselves would ship cards across frontiers from one IBM location to another.125

  All money was accounted for and audited down to the franc and lira. All expenses were deferentially proposed to New York and carefully approved or rejected. Watson was even told that the French subsidiary had charged an extra 1.5 francs for wine with lunch in the company canteen.126

  But in December 1940, things were different. The plan for an MB cartel was still very much alive in the Nazi game plan. Moreover, the constantly evolving special plans for Hitler’s Holleriths were beginning to take shape. Periodically, when Chauncey inadvertently raised an issue that came close to the cartel question, the managers at Dehomag would mysteriously comment, “there were concentration camps,” and then become completely silent. On December 13, 1940, Chauncey wrote to Watson, “I mentioned to Hummel that now might be a good opportunity to acquire our rights from Bull, he vaguely hinted that perhaps the Bull Company in France has already been acquired by others. When I pressed him for an explanation, he would say nothing more. When I reach a point with these fellows, they begin to talk of concentration camps, etc.”127

  A few days later, on December 17, Chauncey was discussing the issue of Heidinger defecting to a competitive company and destroying the subsidiary. Hummel first swore Chauncey to secrecy and then revealed, “Heidinger would never fight Dehomag.” Chauncey then reported to IBM NY that he “went along with him [Hummel] in the hopes that he would not retire within a shell, or completely shut up with the explanation that ‘there were concentration camps’!”128

  About that time, Otto Kiep surprised Chauncey by mysteriously stating it was better for directors to decline any stock in Dehomag—even token stock. On December 13, Chauncey wrote to Watson without elaborating, “it is Mr. Kiep’s opinion that no shares should be issued to the directors, because of something he has learned.” Like the other messages, Chauncey channeled the message through the Embassy.129

  Chauncey made clear to Watson in his various writings that Germany’s use of machines throughout conquered Europe would be profoundly lucrative, and IBM could not give up the profits. Albert described an enticing Axis-wide punch card monopoly that would rule in “Germany’s possible future economic space comprising not only the increased [Reich] territory [itself], but the sphere of… Central Europe to the Balkans, the African possessions, and the Near East.”130

  But to remain a viable member of the Nazi juggernaut, Albert explained, Watson would have to adopt a decision not to just do business with and extract profit from Nazi Germany, but to ensure that Dehomag become an organic facet of the Third Reich itself. In a twenty-one-page recommendation to Watson, Albert circumlocutiously described the cooperation Veesenmayer expected. “The structure of the German economic system,” Albert wrote, “requires that every German undertaking is completely, loyally and without any reservation a member of that system, as formed by National Socialist leadership. What matters is… the spirit of German economic leadership—and not who is the owner of the shares…. the business policy of the German company… [must be] in complete harmony with the German national interests, and it is the business of the men at the head of the German undertaking to see to that. Of course, if the company’s interests are not so defended, either because the parties concerned grow weary under the weight of those difficulties,… [or] perhaps because at heart they themselves share the adversarial point of view… the company will suffer.”131

  Watson was willing to cooperate—as he had done since the first days of the Third Reich. But why was it necessary to give up majority ownership? Majority ownership was something a man like Watson could not bear to relinquish. But everything seemed to rest on that very fulcrum: IBM becoming a minority owner of its own enterprise.

  Only if IBM reduced its ownership to less than 50 percent would the contemplated competition be suppressed and Watson’s profits be protected. Yet the guarantees, all oral, seemed too vague for IBM to trust. Chauncey wrote Watson, “Dr. Veesenmayer… stated that he was not in a position to give me any written statement,” and added that “the transaction must be approved by the [German] government and that would be all the guarantee we needed.” Chauncey also reported his conversation with a director of the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Kimlich, who concurred with Veesenmayer. “Dr. Kimlich stated that his organization [Deutsche Bank] would take care of any competition,… [a] statement he would not amplify, but only repeated.”132

  Reducing ownership to a minority bothered Chauncey’s sense of profit as well. “IBM will have reduced its interest in the German company to less than 50 percent,” he complained to New York, “and its share of the future profits proportionately.”133 IBM wanted both—to remain a commercial part of the Nazi domination in Europe and keep all the profits.

  Only Watson could decide. Chauncey confirmed to Watson and the other senior executives in New York that he had promised Veesenmayer that he would fly back to America and brief company officials. Then he would immediately fly back to Berlin and personally deliver to Veesenmayer IBM’s answer.134

  Veesenmayer would now play a special role both with IBM and the Third Reich’s war against the Jews. As statistics and human sorting continued in the drama of Jewish destruction, the two would intertwine. Chauncey’s chaotic consultations with Veesenmayer and others about the future of IBM in Europe would keep the young attorney in Berlin and Geneva until late March 1941.135

  Just days after Chauncey finally departed for New York, Veesenmayer would travel to Yugoslavia to oversee the Reich’s affairs with the Ustashi. By early April, Veesenmayer was arranging with Croat leaders and the Ustashi “an exact plan for the assumption of power.”136

  But Veesenmayer ultimately emerged as much more than just Hitler’s envoy to communal destruction. He would soon become a technical scheduler of actual genocide.

  One of the earliest episodes occurred in fall 1941. Germany’s Minister to Yugoslavia, Fritz Benzler, asked for an expert to handle difficulties with the Jewish situation. The Foreign Office sent Veesenmayer. On September 8, Veesenmayer and Benzler proposed that 8,000 Jews in Serbia be deported down the Danube on barges into Romania for further action. Berlin did not answer quickly enough, so forty-eight hours later Veesenmayer and his colleague sent a follow-up dispatch: “Quick and draconian settlement of the Serbian Jewish question is most urgent…. Request authorization from the Foreign Minister to place maximum pressure on the Serbian military commander. No opposition is to be expected from the Serb government.”137

  Soon, the question was routed to Adolf Eichmann, the Reich’s expert for Jewish affairs. The reply: “Eichmann proposes shooting.” By September 28, the German general commander in the area wanted all 8,000 rounded up for “immediate elimination.” In early October 1941, German army commanders in conjunction with Serb mayors and police began picking up Jews from cities and towns in a lightning Aktion, or Action. Victims were driven and then marched to an open pit in
a remote location, and there ordered to kneel over the trench. German soldiers at ten paces would fire rifles at their head and chest. Line by line, thousands of murdered Jews slumped into the earth.138

  Days later, the Foreign Office rebuked Benzler and Veesenmayer for becoming too involved in the technical and military aspects. They were reminded to confine themselves to such matters as simply arranging transportation.139

  Later, in July 1943, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop wanted President Tiso of Slovakia to accelerate the “cleanup” of the Jewish question there. The Slovakians were reluctant because the war was not going well for Germany and Slovakian leaders could no longer plead ignorance of the genocide. In December 1943, Veesenmayer was again sent to Bratislava. In one meeting with Eichmann’s expert Dieter Wisliceny, Veesenmayer angrily reviewed Eichmann’s detailed statistical reports of Slovakian Jews both by ancestry and religious belief. Veesenmayer was impatient for action. He vowed to talk “bluntly” with President Tiso. After their talks, Tiso agreed to transport the remaining 16,000 to 18,000 unconverted Jews to concentration camps—no exceptions permitted. Shortly thereafter, 10,000 baptized Jews were added to the rolls.140

  In spring 1944, after a stint at der Fuhrer’s headquarters, Veesenmayer would be sent East again, this time as Minister to Hungary. His instructions were to form a new puppet government in Budapest and organize the Hungarian railroads.141

  Veesenmayer was for the first time completely in charge of German operations in a puppet nation. In Budapest, he formed a close alliance with Eichmann and together they orchestrated the systematic destruction of Hungarian Jewry. According to Veesenmayer’s 1941 census statistics, 724,307 Jews lived in Hungary. Another 62,000 were considered Jewish by blood. But Hungarian leaders, although rabidly anti-Semitic, were reluctant to continue their on-again off-again persecution of the Jews. The Allies had already announced that there would be war crime tribunals for genocide. Warnings conveyed by neutral leaders and the Vatican were coming in continuously. Russian troops were steadily advancing from the East. The Hungarians were openly worried.142

  But Veesenmayer, with Eichmann at his side, hammered out a domestic power-sharing agreement with those Hungarian leaders that would ignore the Allies and cooperate with Hitler’s mandate. To ensure close supervision, he installed his own expert in the Hungarian Office of Jewish Affairs to monitor a torrent of anti-Semitic decrees. Veesenmayer described the progress as one of “unusual rapidity under local conditions.”143

  A few weeks later, with confiscation and ghettoization nearly complete, the deportations began. Veesenmayer divided Hungary into five zones, plus Budapest. But Zone 1, the Carpathians, required a full seven weeks to empty because not enough trains were available. On April 20, 1944, Veesenmayer complained to the Foreign Office that he was unable to locate enough freight cars for his task. But by the end of April, two trains were arranged. Each carried 4,000 Jews from the Kistarcsa internment camp. Destination: Auschwitz.144

  Veesenmayer would learn to locate freight cars and schedule them in and out of Hungary like clockwork. As efficiency increased, only ten days would be needed per zone. After the zones were emptied in late June, 437,402 Jews were gone. But then a struggle ensued as to whether Budapest’s Jews would be deported to their death as well. Hungarian leaders hated Jews but feared war crimes trials more. Veesenmayer did not care how close the Russians were. A stalemate developed with Hungarian Chief of State Admiral Miklos Horthy. Eichmann sent one train filled with Budapest Jews to a death camp only to have Horthy order it stopped at the border and sent back.145

  Horthy eventually dismissed the puppet leaders Veesenmayer had installed and ordered their arrest. Veesenmayer protested bitterly and complained to Berlin. Von Ribbentrop telegraphed a warning: “The Fuhrer expects that the measures against the Budapest Jews will now be taken without any further delay by the Hungarian government… no delay of any kind in the execution of the general measures against Jews [will be permitted].”146

  Veesenmayer then warned Horthy that two additional Wehrmacht armored units would soon be sent to Hungary. Horthy still refused to cooperate. Eventually, Veesenmayer ordered Horthy’s son kidnapped. Bundled into a blanket, the son was driven to an airfield and flown to Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria. Veesenmayer threatened to have the younger Horthy shot if Hungary did not comply.147

  Compromises, broken and amended, were made with Hungarian leaders. Eventually, Hungary agreed to deport 50,000 Jews to Austria and, the remainder of Budapest Jewry were sent to concentration camps. Beginning on October 20, 1944, thousands of terrified, weeping Jews were pulled from their apartments and homes in all-day operations. There weren’t enough freight cars. So within days, the 27,000 assembled Jews were sent on a death march to the Austrian border. Lines of marching Jews stretched out from Budapest, miles and miles long, girded by a parallel of corpses heaped along the road. Veesenmayer reported that 2,000 to 4,000 were being added daily. Many thousands died en route from the exhaustion, exposure, and starvation. They were in fact marched to death.148

  During the war years, IBM supplied elaborate Hollerith systems to nearly all the railways of Nazi-dominated Europe.149 Knowing how many freight cars and locomotives to schedule on any given day in any given location, anywhere across the map of Europe, required the computational capabilities of Hollerith.150 Punch card systems identified the exact location of each freight car, how much cargo it could accept, and what schedule it could adhere to for maximum efficiency.151 In fact, the main method of tracking freight cars was a network of Hollerith systems installed at railroad junctions across Europe.152 Using IBM equipment, freight car locations were updated every forty-eight hours. Without it, the location of rolling stock would generally be more than two weeks out of date and useless in a wartime setting.153 In 1938 alone, more than 200 million punch cards were printed for European railroads.154 In Nazi Poland, the railroads, which constituted some 95 percent of the IBM subsidiary’s business, were accustomed to using more than 21 million cards annually.155 In Nazi-allied Romania, the railroads used a large installation of machines in the Ministry of Communications.156

  In Yugoslavia, where Veesenmayer worked with the Ustashi, the railroads used Ministry of Commerce machines in Belgrade.157 In Hungary, where Veesenmayer and Eichmann coordinated continuously with the railroads, the machines were Holleriths.158 Standardized forms on daily reports registered every detail of train operation from passenger load per car and fuel consumed per train, to locomotive efficiency and which government department would be billed for the freight.159 Hollerith made the trains run on time in Nazi Europe. These were the trains Veesenmayer and his cohorts relied upon.

  During all the genocide years, 1942-1945, the Dehomag that Watson fought to protect did remain intact. Ultimately, it was governed by a special Reich advisory committee representing the highest echelons of the Nazi hierarchy. The Dehomag advisory committee replaced the traditional corporate board of directors. As with any board, the committee’s duty was to advise senior management, approve and veto special projects, and mandate priorities. The day-to-day decisions were left to managers to execute. When needed, it coordinated with IBM Geneva or its representatives in other subsidiaries. Four men sat on the advisory board. One was a trustee. Second was Passow, chief of the Maschinelles Berichtwesen. Third was Heidinger. Fourth was Adolf Hitler’s personal representative.160

  Hitler’s representative on Dehomag’s advisory committee was Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer.161

  PART THREE

  X. THE STRUGGLE TO STAY IN THE AXIS

  DURING THE WINTER OF 1940-1941, AS CHAUNCEY NEGOTIATED with Nazis in Germany, war enveloped Europe. While Watson and IBM executives were fighting daily to retain their commercial primacy in the Axis conquest machine, millions of Jews were fighting to stay alive in a continent overrun with highly organized, intensely automated Nazi forces and their surrogates. Newspaper articles, dramatic photos, and newsreels continued to tell the tragic, even if by now familiar, story of Je
wish destruction.

  November 9, 1940, New York Times, “Reich Jews Sent to South France; 10,000 Reported Put Into Camps.” At Camp de Gurs, the refugees, it was said, were forced to live in small wooden barracks without enough water and practically no food supply.1

  November 26, 1940, New York Times, “Walls Will Enclose Warsaw Jews Today; 500,000 Begin ‘New Life’ in Nazi-Built Ghetto.” By German decree, all Jews in Warsaw have been required to take up residence in the ghetto… with as many as seven persons living in one room in some buildings. The wall—unusual in modern times, surrounds 100 or more city blocks and closes off 200 streets and even street car lines.2

  December 5, 1940, New York Times, “Rumania Emerges From ‘Revolution’; Death Toll Nearly 400, Wounded Exceed 300—Terror Reign Lasted for Eight Days.” Moldavian Iron Guard “Purists” launched a pogrom of large proportions. Jews were kidnapped, beaten and killed at Galati and Turnu Severinu, Giurgiu and Craieva…. In daytime raids, Iron Guards confiscated Jewish shops in Brasov, Timisoara and Ploesti.3

  December 5, 1940, New York Times, “Cholera Killing Men in Concentration Camps in France.” Refugees transferred from one camp to another… were locked into cattle cars without food, water or sanitary equipment for as long as four days at a time… nearly all of the 15,000 inmates were stricken with cholera and approximately 500 died. “There were no shovels to dig graves with and no coffins to bury the bodies in,” [an imprisoned doctor said]. “We dug shallow graves with our hands and cremated those we could.”4

  December 17, 1940, New York Times, “Property of Jews in Alsace Is Confiscated.” The property of Jews is confiscated and will be distributed either gratis or at low prices…. The finer furnishings… have been sent to Germany by the trainload.5