IBM and the Holocaust

by Edwin Black

  Part of Wimmer’s problem was that the Nazis simply could not take a Jewish census in Holland. A traditional census or population count required an army of enumerators visiting every citizen’s home, diligently filling out forms. German administrators could not find reliable census takers to serve among the outraged masses. A registration, on the other hand, depended upon Jewish subjects voluntarily walking into the Census Office to fill out forms. That process was impeded by the general day-to-day reluctance that gripped Dutch Jewry, overcome only incrementally by each Jewish family. Moreover, a storm of venomous attacks in the popular underground media of Amsterdam made even the staffers of local Census Offices queasy.60

  Two weeks later, on April 9, Lentz was still offering the Germans excuses for the slow progress, explaining that many local burgomasters had not yet read the government gazette, which came out in February.61

  Of 1,050 municipalities outside Amsterdam, he reported, 1,019 had already completed their registration. As an example of local difficulties, he cited the town of Apeldoorn’s “difficulty registering the inmates of the local Jewish insane asylum.” The poor inmates could not provide cogent responses. But by May 5, most burgomasters had completed their registration. For many, the task was easy; some 483 localities had not a single Jew to report.62

  By mid-May, Wimmer’s office was beginning to understand that the constellation of overlapping local registrations in Holland fell short of what the Nazi program of destruction needed. Lentz’ numerous Census Offices lacked the coordinated ability to identify, cross-index, and organize Jewish names nationally. Only a centralized Hollerith operation could do that. Moreover, Wimmer wanted the Jews alphabetized. Without alphabetizing, an organized step-by-step round-up and deportation to camps could not occur.

  On May 19, 1941, Wimmer decided “that besides the registers that have been constructed so far, a special alphabetical register should be made, that [lists] all Jews and Jews of mixed blood, who are and have been reported after decree 6/41.” This extra dimension would have tasked Lentz’ overworked operation. To date, Lentz’ bureaus had not even turned in reports on the first 78,119 questionnaires filed. While the Germans wanted to press Lentz to the maximum, they didn’t want to pressure him too much.63

  So some days later, Lentz was notified, quite carefully, by Hans Calmeyer, Wimmer’s chief expert on Jewish affairs. “Dr. Wimmer would like to see constructed a register like the Hollerith punch card system,” wrote Calmeyer. “The register must [contain] age, profession, and gender… [and] the category (Jew, Mixed I, Mixed II) to which the registered belongs. I don’t deny that the compilation of such a register would form a serious burden for the Population Registries. However, without such an alphabetic register alongside the register on identity cards, and besides the already existing registers on municipalities, the [Jewish] registration just won’t be sufficient.64

  “You will soon have to be prepared for many… requests about information on individuals,” Calmeyer continued. “These requests won’t be able to name the last residence of the requested person in every case. Such requests will form an extraordinary workload for your office if the aforementioned alphabetical register is not compiled, because thus far, the requests can only be answered after searching through all municipal registers. Of course, the municipal registers should not be neglected…. Pray, also let me know what kind of punch card system you think most efficient and most easily introduced.” Calmeyer ended his note asking how long Lentz would need to complete the alphabetical register.65

  Lentz was ahead of Wimmer and Calmeyer. With barely suppressed braggadocio, Lentz replied the next day, “With much interest I have taken notice of your letter of 26th of May 1941, in which you informed me of the wishes of Sir Secretary of State Dr. Wimmer concerning the making of [another] punch card system. I am glad to inform you that the Inspectorate has already been creating such a system according to the Hollerith method for several weeks.”66

  Two months earlier, Lentz had requested permission from the Interior Ministry to rent an extra Hollerith from the local IBM subsidiary. His expense request was approved on April 23 and he was waiting for the equipment. But as soon as the approval was granted, he began to advance work. “I immediately commenced the execution of the plan,” Lentz informed Calmeyer. “We have already made much progress with the so-called ‘coding’ of the data and the punching is almost ready too, thanks to the co-operation of another government department. I add a model of the punch card for your information. The machinery has not arrived yet, but measures have been taken, so that this will soon become available.”67

  There was a major problem, though, confessed Lentz. His entire program was based on numerical identification of individuals, not alphabetical. He emphasized to Calmeyer, “the [new] Hollerith punch card system is not suited for functioning as an alphabetical register since the cards are not punched by name, but by number. Punching alphabetically is possible, but there are so many technical difficulties connected with it.” As a result, Lentz declared he would regretfully bypass all other projects and concentrate on the alphabetizing. “I will now have an alphabetical register made that will contain the names of all Jews and Mischlinge [people of mixed blood] who have reported for registering.”68

  To further reduce delays, Lentz declared he would split the task into two: those Jews in Amsterdam and those outside the city. Since the areas outside Amsterdam were already complete, Lentz promised that list first. “This part will be ready about mid-June.” If on the other hand, Wimmer and Calmeyer preferred Amsterdam first, Lentz could deliver that list just slightly later. “If you would like to have the names of the registered people in Amsterdam put into the alphabetical register as well,” he stated, “then I would be able to have that completed by the end of June or in the beginning of July.”69

  On May 30, 1941, a German civil occupation official summarized the on-going overlapping Hollerith projects to Wimmer and the many technical obstacles. “Besides the already constructed and to be constructed registers,” the report described “a special alphabetical register, possibly with the Hollerith punch card-system, for all people who have to report.” But the punch cards for the new alphabetical file could not be printed without a careful design of data. So, the official added, his office would first have to determine exactly which punch card columns needed to be allocated to yield the desired data.70 This was a question only Hollerith engineers could answer. Only IBM could print the cards.

  “The Central Register has already requested the material and the machines for the construction of the Hollerith system,” the official continued. Repeating Lentz’ warning, he told Wimmer, “The Central Register, however, points out that the [existing] Hollerith punch card system, which currently assigns a number to every processed form and registered person, is not appropriate for the compilation of an alphabetic register. The alphabetic punching is connected to so many technical difficulties that a [quick] change of the system towards alphabetic processing seems just not possible in practice.”71

  “I don’t deny,” the report continued, “that this [additional] processing of persons who are obligated to report from Amsterdam (over 85,000 persons), will greatly increase the workload of the Central Office, and it will also delay the completion of the special registers.”72

  But for Wimmer, no time could be wasted. He ordered all alphabetizing projects to go forward at full speed, regardless of the difficulty. That was the priority. Lentz’ devoted efforts prevailed. By June 14, 1941, Wimmer’s office had received ten copies of a completed preliminary survey “of all persons of Jewish blood.” The alphabetical index would be ready shortly. “Very soon,” the report to Wimmer promised, “we shall be able to start categorizing certain groups through the Hollerith method.” Now that the Jews were almost entirely alphabetized, demographic segments could be cross-indexed, sorted, and then called up by age, gender, and profession, all in alphabetical order.73

  The system was soon ready. In early June 1941, anti-Nazi Dut
ch resistance groups detonated two bombs in Amsterdam. In reprisal, the Germans took action against 300 Dutch Jews, as well as a number of German refugees between the ages of 18 and 30. The Nazis relied upon Jewish organizational lists to round up Jewish youth workers. British intelligence reports asserted that when the number of Jews the Germans wanted fell short, additional hostages were taken. A British intelligence officer, citing a Dutch Jewish refugee, reported the additional action this way: “The Gestapo came with lists, from Standesamt [the Registry Office], carrying out searches in houses and looking for Jews in certain alphabetical groups. On one occasion, they took all the Jews whose names came within the alphabetical register S to V.” The British report added that all seized Jews seized were eventually shipped to Mauthausen concentration camp, “and most of them also died” within several weeks.”74

  By June 16, 1941, Lentz reported that his office had almost completed the total registration of Jewish persons commanded by decree V06/41, except for a few “stragglers.” He added that his Inspectorate “will now begin the registration of different groups via Hollerith method.” Lentz wondered whether the Germans wanted any specific Jewish population segments sorted first. “I can process and pass on information,” he wrote, “in case police services or German services urgently are looking for special groups, for example, artists or dentists.”75

  A few weeks later, on July 26, 1941, Lentz notified Calmeyer that the Inspectorate had established his own priorities. Processing by age was already underway. Next, he would tackle those of Jewish blood who had served in the Dutch military. “It is my intention,” assured Lentz, “after these duties, to start with the control on the punching of Hollerith cards to improve the coding of professions.” He would need a few weeks to finish these tasks if approved in that order. “I hope to hear from your side soon if you accept this proposal.”76

  Within a month, virtually all “stragglers” had been found out or had come forward. By September 5, Wimmer was about to review summaries that identified the exact number of Jews, broken down by specific categories.

  Lentz had registered, sorted, and tabulated 118,455 Dutch Jews; 14,495 German Jews; and 7,295 others, as well as 19,561 mixed breed Mischlinge, for a total of 159,806. This included 700 so-called racial Jews who were practicing Roman Catholicism; 1,245 belonging to Protestant churches; and 12,643 with no religious affiliation.77

  Lentz reflected on his mammoth accomplishment while jotting notes in his personal handwritten journal, entitled Memoires I, Registration of Jews (Source and Development): “I rented a Hollerith installation,” he penned, “with which the professional statistical survey has been composed, which satisfied the Germans very much, and gave them the convictions that my opinions had been correct.”78

  He also thanked his Nazi overseers for their recognition for all his technical achievements. “I would like to express appreciation,” Lentz wrote to Wimmer’s office, “of the confidence you repose in myself and my staff. Thanks to this and to your cooperation, the Census Office was able to contrive ways and means of carrying out its often-difficult task. May I express the hope that we shall continue to enjoy your confidence.” He also wrote, “This encourages us to strive with utter devotion to do justice to our slogan, ‘to record is to serve.’”79

  IBM’s hastily established subsidiary in Holland, Watson Bedrijfsmachine Maatschappij, at 34 Frederiksplein in Amsterdam, listed impressive numbers for the first eight months of 1940.80

  Cash: $180,088.81

  Accounts receivable: $495,692.82

  Plant, office equipment, rental machines, and parts investment: $965,803.00. 83

  The subsidiary reported a gross profit of $116,651.90 for its eight months of operation in 1940.84

  Ironically, by the time the subsidiary’s profits were merged into charges added on the New York books, including $522,709.03 described only as “Other,” as well as Eliminations and Adjustments, IBM reported a net loss for its Dutch subsidiary of $122,668.70.85

  During 1941, IBM sent Holland 132 million punch cards from America; the subsidiary was by that time operating near its capacity of 150 million cards annually. Those cards were sold for $106,920.86

  Ten days after the census ordered by decree VO6/41 was fully compiled, punched, and sorted, Nazi authorities demanded all Jews wear the Jewish star. Again a number of Dutch people reacted with outrage and protest. British diplomats reported that in one town, when the burgomaster ordered Jews to affix the star, many non-Jews wore one as well.87

  But it was not the outward visage of six gold points worn on the chest for all to see on the street, it was the 80 columns punched and sorted in a Hollerith facility that marked the Jews of Holland for deportation to concentration camps. The Germans understood this all too well. On October 2, 1941, H. Bohmcker, a key Nazi official in Amsterdam, gleefully wrote to Arthur Seyss-Inquart, German Kommissar for Holland: “Thanks to decree 6/41, all Dutch Jews are now in the bag.”88

  * * *

  FRANCE EXCELLED at many things. Punch card automation was not one of them. Although IBM had been able to install several hundred Hollerith devices, mainly for high-volume military, railway, and banking users, Reich forces had in large part confiscated those machines. The rest of France simply did not possess the punch card orientation of many other European countries, such as Holland and Germany. IBM learned early that its brand of technologic change came slowly to some markets. France was a prime example.

  Holland’s census and registration projects were masterminded by a fanatical population registrar commanding hundreds of advanced machines still intact in a well-entrenched Hollerith infrastructure supplied with decamillions of punch cards flowing from IBM NY and other European subsidiaries. Decades of Dutch registration that had innocently recorded religion and personal details could, under Lentz, be centralized into a clenching social dragnet.89

  But France lacked a tradition of census taking that identified religion. Henri Bunle, chief of the General Statistics Office of France, explained to Vichy collaborators on March 4, 1941: “The General Statistics Office of France is not in a position to rectify published numbers as the last religious census in our country was undertaken in 1872. Since that date, the individual questionnaires used for counting have never touched upon questions of the religion of those counted.” Later, on April 12, 1941, he informed the newly established General Commission for Jewish Questions (GCJQ): “France is actually the only country in Europe, or almost, where the number of Jews in its population is unknown, not to mention their age statistics, nationalities, professional affiliations, etc.”90 It was common to proclaim that no one really knew how many Jews lived in either France or even Paris.91

  Inexorably complicating identification was a confusing patchwork of geopolitical social realities. Since the rise of Hitler in 1933, masses of refugees had been streaming in and out of France. In some cases, some members of refugee families remained while others in the group relocated. Most estimated that there were hundreds of thousands of undocumented refugees and other foreign-born Jews in France when Germany invaded in 1940. After France was bifurcated into an Occupied Zone in the north, including Paris, and the Unoccupied Zone in the south, which became the Vichy collaborationist regime, thousands of Jewish families in the north flocked to Vichy for safety. In some cases, German forces in the north actually expelled Jews to Vichy as a preliminary measure, much as Jews were expelled to Poland before the Reich invaded. During spring and summer 1940, when things settled down in the north, thousands of families cautiously ventured back to look after their businesses, possessions, or family members left behind. Jews routinely returned to Paris as late as November 1940. During May 1941, special trains transported 8,000 Jews from Vichy back to the north. Undeniably, Jews were constantly on the move between the two French zones. Addresses changed constantly. No one knew how many of the migrating Jews were foreign or native born.92

  In either French territory, many of the Jews, whether stationary or migrating, did not identify with Ju
daism, or hid their religious background. Many genuinely doubted their lineage would qualify under the Reich’s rule about Jewish grandparents. Who could even trace or identify one’s ancestry, especially if earlier generations hailed from outside France? Ambiguities about the dimensions of Jewish existence in France persisted even as many Jews reacted to looming anti-Jewish measures by openly attending synagogues. There was no way to quantify the number of Jews in France or generalize about their character.93

  The problems of ancestral tracking, shifting addresses, and other population uncertainties were only multiplied by the twin French jurisdictions. Sometimes anti-Jewish measures were executed in one zone and not the other. Sometimes such measures were enacted months apart, or with vastly differing tenets. Aryanization of Jewish business, for example, was decreed on October 24, 1940, in Occupied France; the similar decree in Vichy France was not issued until ten months later, August 27, 1941. Adding in Jewish commercial and social existence in French colonies such as Morocco and Algeria, and making special provisions for the uniqueness of Paris itself, only further muddied the ability to promulgate and enforce actions.94

  Berlin could overcome much of the geographical and ethnic confusion in France if it had enjoyed the regimented cooperation of its collaborators, whether reluctant or eager. However, for many leaders in Vichy France, willful collaboration with the Reich was strained through a French rightist mindset, which in many ways mimicked the early days of the Hitler movement. In the beginning phases of Nazism, foreign Jews in Germany, so-called Eastern Jews, were targeted first and foremost. In Nazi Germany, German Jews who fought for the Reich in WWI were initially afforded special status. So too, the French right wing conceptualized foreign Jews, especially refugees, as France’s scourge. By this ultra-patriotic French thinking, the Jews chiefly deserving of brutal persecution were not the established Jews of France, and especially not those who had distinguished themselves with great national service. War veterans and even those contributing to France’s cultural and scientific realms were worthy of special consideration. To do otherwise could be seen by French rightists as an encroachment on certain French prerogatives.95