Africa

by Guy Arnold

  3 Formulation of concrete proposals for exchange of visiting missions both government and non-government, which may lead to first-hand knowledge of one country by another and to mutual appreciation of their respective cultures.

  4 Consideration of the problem of international peace in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the re-affirmation of the principles of the Bandung Conference.

  5 The Conference to consider setting up permanent machinery after the Conference.

  Egypt pressed the conference to include the question of Israel; this was not accepted at the time though the issue of Israel would recur repeatedly in the years to come. Most speakers, though not Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia or President Tubman of Liberia, condemned France for its Algerian policy.

  At the closing session, the declaration that gained the most applause was that of Dr Nkrumah who said the conference had killed the old notion that Africa was irrevocably divided into ‘Arab’ and ‘Black’ Africa, into ‘Mediterranean’ and ‘tropical’ Africa, into ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’. Emperor Haile Selassie said ‘Africans are beginning to discover Africa’. ‘The real significance of the conference is that states so diverse, which have long been separated or have never known each other, have met for discussions, have learned each other’s ways and felt that African countries can on certain matters present a united and influential voice.’2 The principal subjects discussed on this occasion would recur at all the subsequent conferences, though the number of newly independent countries would rapidly increase, and while some problems would go off the agenda others – such as the Congo – would replace them to take up a great deal of debate. This conference set the tone for much subsequent debate and despite inevitable flights of rhetoric most of the discussions were sober appraisals of the tasks Africa had to face and revealed an acute awareness of what Africa ought to do and what lay within the scope of its power, a power that was strictly limited even when unanimity of approach could be attained.

  The next conference of significance was the first All-African Peoples’ Conference, which opened on 5 December 1958 in Accra. The conference was non-governmental and had some 500 delegates from all over Africa including many from nationalist organizations. There were also observers from Europe and America. It was set to discuss colonialism, racialism and tribalism in contemporary Africa. An important recent development that influenced the conference was the successful drafting of a charter on 23 November 1958 to create an African Union of States, beginning with Ghana and Guinea. Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, the sponsors of the charter, hoped it would be the beginning of a wider union; President Olympio of Togo had expressed an interest in joining. The conference gave dramatic emphasis to the possibilities of the Ghana–Guinea Union even though only a few of the important leaders of French or British West Africa expected to be present. A number of delegates spoke of union in general terms and all those from French-speaking West Africa were in favour of working together. On the other hand, President Tubman of Liberia had declared, in a speech the previous November, his opposition to the idea of federation, which he described as ‘utopian’ while drawing attention to important differences in foreign policy between West African leaders. However, he did emphasize the need for treaties of friendship and other forms of association among West African states. As West Africa commented:

  Political interest in West Africa now swings away from relations with European powers to those between West African territories and the new relationships will prove a more serious test of African statesmanship than the old. Earlier this year we point out that independence reopened the frontier problem throughout the area, and it is clear that between territories there are innumerable possible grounds for dispute. If the Ghana-Guinea union offers a pattern for peaceful settlement of disputes, and a framework for free trade and movement, it will give a lead which others are certain to follow. But there is no single solution to West African unity, and rigid arrangements may perpetuate dis-unity, by making the admission of new states unlikely or impossible.3

  President Nkrumah opened the conference: he declared this to be the decade of African independence and urged the delegates to achieve first ‘the political kingdom: all else will follow’ and he warned them to recognize imperialism which might arise ‘not necessarily from Europe’. Tom Mboya from Kenya was elected chairman of the conference. Fraternal delegates included six Soviet writers; both Khruschev and Chou En-lai sent greetings to the conference. Western reporting of the conference tended to highlight Western Cold War paranoia: what was the significance of the Soviet writers attending and what did Tom Mboya mean in his speech when he emphasized Africa’s indifference to great power quarrels and said that Africans would not tolerate interference from any country ‘and I mean any’? As West Africa commented:

  The Conference is best seen as a demonstration of strength and intention. Even if east and central African visitors have heard from Ghana’s United Party spokesman that he thinks treatment of Africans by Africans can be as bad as that of Africans by Europeans, from Liberia’s True Whig Party that there is no need for an ideology for all Africa, and from the powerful Action Group delegation that no slogan can fit all the diverse conditions now obtaining in Africa, the visitors go away with a vision of United Africa which, even if little is done towards accomplishing it, can be a powerful stimulant. Any mention of the Ghana-Guinea union – which at present can be described as a close alliance – aroused the Conference’s enthusiasm.4

  The final resolutions were similar in tone and style to those of the previous conference. As West Africa summed up: ‘Many outside Africa will resent or regret the wording of the Conference resolutions, many will wonder just how concrete its achievements will be. But the Conference’s success or failure will owe nothing to outsiders in spite of the crowd of fraternal delegates and observers from Europe and the United States. This may be a strident voice; but it is African.’5

  In January 1960 President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia opened the second All-African People’s Conference in Tunis; there were delegates from 30 countries and observers from Britain, the US, Russia, China, India, Greece, West Germany and Yugoslavia. In his welcoming speech President Bourguiba said that under-developed countries must co-operate with the industrialized powers if their standard of living was to be raised. On African unity and freedom he said: ‘This is the moment of African independence. All the paths towards independence are valuable – whether they are through political stages or by armed conflict. Personally, I favour the pacific ways but I cannot refrain from helping Algeria in its war for liberty.’ The conference lasted for four days. Significantly, the largest delegation to the conference came from Ghana whose policy remained the most determinedly pro-African unity.

  In June 1960 the second Conference of Independent African States was held in Addis Ababa just over two years after the first one in Accra. The number of independent states attending had increased to 11 while delegations from a number of states approaching independence also participated. In his welcoming speech Emperor Haile Selassie emphasized that the conference was meeting at a moment of crisis in the relations of the Great Powers and that the breakdown of the Summit between Eisenhower and Khruschev was a matter of concern to Africans, as well as to the rest of humanity. Peace was essential to Africa’s prosperity and progress. Reverting to a familiar African refrain of the time, the Emperor said that ‘While co-operating with all states and international organisations, African states must not accept formulae that perpetuate colonial regimes or sow seeds of divisions among our countries’. He urged the establishment of an African Development Bank, and concluded that the fate of the African continent was passing into African hands. The leader of Africa’s oldest independent state called delegates to rise to new responsibilities. Many of the delegates claimed that though the ranks of the independent African states were growing rapidly, relatively little had been done to meet some of their more important problems such as African unity, South Africa and South West Afric
a, the Algerian war and the French use of African soil for nuclear experiments.

  On the question of African unity the Ghana delegation took the lead and Ako Adjei, the foreign minister, urged ‘a complete change in our traditional attitudes and a drastic reorganization of our thinking habits’. He proposed the establishment of a Community of Independent African States that would not conflict with the national identity or constitution, or interfere with their policies, relations or obligations. However, Malam Maitama Sule, for Nigeria, said that rapid advance towards African unity seemed improbable. He said they had to be realistic and that though pan-Africanism was ‘the only solution to our problems in Africa’ a union of African states was ‘premature’. Nigeria proposed no more than an Organization of African States with a permanent secretariat. Many delegates emphasized the need for economic co-operation. Support for independence movements throughout Africa was a constant theme. As Ahmed Taibi Benhima, the Moroccan delegate, declared: ‘We must not rest until there is no longer mention in our African continent of British Kenya, of British Cameroons, or Portuguese Angola, of Spanish Sahara, of French Algeria or French Somaliland.’ Algeria and South Africa remained at the top of the agenda. At the end of the conference the chief resolutions were agreed unanimously. All African states were called upon to apply a total boycott on South Africa and all the colonial powers were to be invited to set a timetable for independence for their colonies. The question of African unity was deferred.

  What became known as the Brazzaville Group was formed in December 1960 when 12 Francophone countries met in Congo (Brazzaville). The 12 were Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, Dahomey (Benin), Chad, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Cameroon and Madagascar. The Brazzaville Declaration called for peace in Algeria, favoured mediation in the Congo and upheld Mauritania’s independence. It opposed a political union that would require integrated institutions but accepted a permanent Inter-State Economic Secretariat. The importance of the Brazzaville Group lay in the fact that it introduced two new elements into African politics at that time: it was the first occasion when invitations were extended to a restricted list of independent states; and a deliberate attempt was made to create a bloc of African states as opposed to regional groupings.6

  In January 1961 leaders of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya, Egypt and the Algerian Provisional Government met in Casablanca where they adopted what came to be known as the Casablanca Charter. Their object was the creation of a joint military command and an African Common Market. The group, which advocated a socialist path of development for the continent and a strong central authority, came to be seen by the rest of Africa as radical.

  The movement received expressions of support from the newly formed Pan-African Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). The first problem facing the Casablanca Group was the fact that although its decisions probably reflected much African opinion outside the countries taking part in the meeting, it did not include Nigeria, independent the previous October, which opposed the idea of an African High Command. Thus, the Casablanca Conference emphasized the growing divisions in Africa rather than unity. Other countries that had been invited to attend the conference but had not done so were Tunisia, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Togo, Somalia, India and Indonesia, the countries from outside Africa then having troops in the Congo under UN Command. Another group of countries, notably the French Community states, which had just participated in the Brazzaville meeting the previous month and were supporters of Kasavubu, had not been invited. The Congo, in effect, was acting as a divisive factor in Africa.

  Casablanca was very much a working conference with little time for receptions or public occasions. King Mohammed of Morocco had convened the conference and acted as chairman and the Crown Prince led the Moroccan delegation. Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Egypt were led by their heads of state, the Algerian Provincial Government by Ferhat Abbas, Libya by its Foreign Minister and Ceylon by its ambassador in Cairo.

  The main theme that dominated the conference was the deteriorating situation in the Congo. Nkrumah persuaded the other countries at Casablanca who wished to withdraw support from the UN in the Congo to give the UN Command another chance. He argued that there was no real alternative and that outside support for rival Congolese ‘governments’ would create the very conditions that the pan-Africanists sought to avoid – the unleashing of a full-scale Cold War confrontation in Africa. At the same time, Nkrumah was persuaded by his West African partners that the way to change the UN was to present it with an ultimatum. At that time Lumumba was still alive though he would be murdered a few days after the conference had come to an end. President Nasser succeeded, for the first time, in persuading the African states to condemn Israel ‘as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neocolonialism not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia’. All the participants agreed on the potential value of the UN and on its Congo failure although they differed as to just what had to be done. The result was a compromise: the threat by every state, including Ghana, to withdraw troops from the Congo unless the UN Command acted immediately to support the ‘Central Government’. They laid down a detailed programme, which included disarming Mobutu’s army, expelling all Belgians and others not under UN Command, and reconvening the Congo Parliament. The conference resolution also reserved the right to take appropriate action ‘if the purposes and principles which justified the presence of the UN Operational Command in the Congo are not realised, and respected’. The radical nature of the conference was most obviously apparent in its attitude towards the Congo crisis and the role of the UN.

  The African Charter of Casablanca included provisions for the creation of an African Consultative Assembly, which would have under it four committees: a political committee, an economic committee, a cultural committee, and a joint African High Command. Resolutions covered the questions of Israel, Mauritania (which Morocco claimed), Ruanda-Urundi (the demand for an immediate Belgian withdrawal), apartheid and racial discrimination, French nuclear tests in the Sahara, Algeria (opposing any unilateral French solution to the war) and a communiqué on the situation in the Congo. The decisions arrived at by the Casablanca Conference were among the most forthright to emerge from Africa up to that date and set out or reinforced the objections of the more radical African states to the continuing interference in the continent’s affairs (neo-colonialism) of the great powers.

  The third All Africa People’s Conference met at Cairo in March 1961. As with all these conferences, concern about neo-colonialism came top of the agenda – neo-colonialism was defined ‘as the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means’ – and the conference warned independent African states to beware of neo-colonialism which was associated with Britain, the United States, France, West Germany, Israel, Belgium, the Netherlands and South Africa. President Kennedy’s new ‘Peace Corps’ was to be ‘mercilessly opposed’ since its aim was to ‘re-conquer and economically dominate Africa’. There were rowdy demonstrations by Somali students against Ethiopia. The forceful resolutions against neo-colonial activities demonstrated the deep awareness of the all-pervasive influence of the major powers in Africa alongside a sense of frustration that most African states simply did not have the ability to resist many of these pressures. Thus, the conference denounced the following manifestations of neo-colonialism: puppet governments represented by fabricated elections and based on some chiefs, reactionary elements, anti-popular politicians, big bourgeois compradors or corrupted civil or military functionaries; regrouping of states before or after independence by an imperial power in federation or communities linked to that imperial power; Balkanization as a deliberate fragmentation of states; economic entrenchment of the colonial power; direct monetary dependence; military bases. It added that the agents of neo-colonial
ism were colonial embassies and missions serving as nerve centres of espionage and pressure; so-called foreign aid and UN technical assistance which ill-advises and sabotages natural development; military personnel (foreign) who serve above all colonial interests; and the malicious propaganda controlled by imperial and colonial countries. These conference strictures on neo-colonialism may have appeared excessive yet by March 1961 the neo-colonialist activities of the major powers in the Congo had become a principal topic for discussion throughout Africa. At the end, conference resolutions included a call to the ‘anti-imperialist’ bloc to assist in the development of African economies by granting long-term loans at low interest rates to be repaid in national currencies; the expulsion of South Africa from the UN; the dismissal of Dag Hammarskjold; the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta; the immediate independence of the Rhodesias and the dissolution of the Central African Federation.

  Opposition to the Casablanca Group (its Charter had been published in January) was not slow to appear. President Tubman of Liberia called a meeting in Monrovia for 8–12 May 1961, which was attended by 19 other independent African states. These were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). When the same group of countries met again in Lagos in January 1962 they had become known as the Monrovia Group. The Group adopted a draft charter for an Organisation of Inter-African and Malagasy States. Opening the conference Monrovia President Tubman outlined seven points for consideration. These were: