Africa

by Guy Arnold

  TANZANIA

  In the last hours before Tanganyika became independent on 9 December 1961, Nyerere revealed that his greatest anxiety was the people’s expectation that independence would bring rapid changes, and that the government would be unable to fulfil their hopes. Nyerere was to puzzle his admirers as much as his opponents and not least when in January 1962, less than two months after independence, he stepped down as Prime Minister to work with the party. Few were certain as to what he intended. The British expected that an independent Tanganyika would accept a close relationship of dependence and so were shocked when he resigned to strengthen the party (TANU). They began to understand that he had embarked upon a policy of self-reliance. It was also believed that the decision had been a TANU rather than a government one, adding strength to the view that like other African states Tanganyika was moving towards a one-party structure. ‘Those who had type-cast the TANU leader as a “moderate” were alarmed at the change as a sign that the country was taking a leap to the left. They refused to accept the genuine declaration of the new Prime Minister, Rashid Kawawa, that Nyerere remained the “father of the nation”… Cynics looked behind the straightforward explanation for sinister causes, but were unable to find any of substance.’25 The Times opined: ‘What may happen to Tanganyika if Mr Nyerere does not keep control can only occasion the gravest misgivings. African talent is desperately thin on the ground; few African countries can less afford to bully or frighten expatriates and capital away. Extremism in foreign policy, furthermore, besides injuring a very weak economy, would worsen an already difficult outlook for East Africa as a whole.’ This considered appraisal of the possible consequences of Nyerere’s decision, like many similar Western appraisals of Africa at that time, is apparently only concerned with what is good for Tanganyika; in fact it betrays the interests uppermost in Western thinking: the position of expatriates in Africa and the future of Western investment. There was a more radical view of the event: ‘Sir Ernest Vasey’s translation from Finance Minister to financial adviser, on the excuse that he was not eligible for citizenship, followed criticism of him by the left wing of TANU for his adherence to Western capitalist techniques and attitudes and for the involvement with the West which his policies were producing.’26 In July 1962, just halfway through the year in which Nyerere was reorganizing TANU and preparing to launch the country upon a radical socialist path, with ill-judged timing the Arthur D. Little Report, the result of a three-man mission for the Agency for International Development (IDA), was presented to the government with its recommendations for the future industrialization of Tanganyika. The country could not become a manufacturing centre processing imported materials for re-export, the report argued. The country’s industrial future should be based on the partial or complete processing for export of domestic raw materials, or manufacture for the local market. The report also suggested that investment uncertainty could be reduced if the government entered a guarantee programme concerning repatriation of earnings and capital for foreign investors. External advice then and later would inhibit African attempts to industrialize and keep them as sources of raw materials while at the same time ensuring the best possible conditions – maximum repatriation of profits – for external investors.

  On 8 December 1962, the eve of his installation as President of Tanganyika which would become a republic on that day, Nyerere said in his speech that he intended to change the country quickly and raise the standard of living and that ‘he might have to push people around’. Indications that TANU was not prepared to tolerate opposition were not slow to appear. There had been incidents during the Presidential election when TANU ‘strongmen’ had disrupted African National Congress (ANC) meetings and subsequent ANC meetings had been banned rather than the ‘strongmen’ being disciplined. Later, Nyerere was to warn that opposition should be constructive and not merely annoying. Freedom of speech, he said, ought not to be misused. It was not in order that some people might be able to abuse others that such freedom was granted. As always in a one-party state – at this stage Tanganyika was a de facto rather than de jure one-party state – the old question recurred: who controls the controllers?

  Unlike Kenya, Tanganyika did not have large white or Asian minorities to accommodate after independence and Nyerere rejected any attempt to give whites or Asians special political rights, although he was determined that they should not be discriminated against. In fact race relations were sufficiently equable that African elected members, anxious to ensure the protection of minorities, proposed reserved seats for them under the independence constitution while the Europeans and Asians objected to this, expressing themselves satisfied that such a measure was unnecessary and that politics could be conducted in a non-racial atmosphere. This harmonious beginning was marred in January 1962 when, following some racial incidents, a number of whites were expelled for racial discrimination. Nyerere defended the expulsions: ‘Our people have expected much from independence which it is impossible to give them. But I am determined that they will get one thing and that is personal respect.’

  More ominous for the future was the growth of an authoritarian attitude in the ranks of TANU. This, perhaps, was hardly surprising once the emphasis had been put upon the role of the single party, first in bringing about independence and then as the national instrument for development. Thus, in 1962, several small political parties were harassed out of existence by TANU. Moreover, when Nyerere first suggested competitive elections within the one-party system, he found little support for the idea within the ranks of TANU. Authoritarianism came early to most newly independent African countries under a variety of guises. On 27 September 1962 the National Assembly passed, without dissent, the Preventive Detention Bill: persons threatening the stability and security of the State could be detained and no detention order could be questioned in any court. Detainees were to be told within 15 days of the grounds for their detention and could make written representations to the Minister of Home Affairs. The Prime Minister, Rashid Kawawa, said the Bill was desired by the people: ‘We do not want democracy to be lost, and therefore democracy must defend itself. Tanganyika was prepared to be condemned by the whole world in order to defend democracy.’

  Mr Wilbert A. Klerrun, the Publicity Secretary of the TANU Parliamentary Party, felt the need to justify this measure in a letter published in the Guardian:

  We have a very strong government – strong in the sense that it is so popular as to be virtually irremovable through the ballot box. We are convinced, however, that there are people both within the country and outside it who would like to circumvent the ballot box. Persons to whom the will of the people is an obstacle and who, therefore, are prepared to resort to any other means to reach their objective. And while we agree that, politically, it would be better for the government to wait until this danger became obvious both inside and outside Tanganyika, our government rightly believes that it would be the height of irresponsibility to take such a risk without security. We prefer present criticism for possible authoritarianism to future pangs of conscience for certain irresponsible negligence.28

  Since, as the writer claimed, the government was so strong such measures were surely unnecessary but authoritarianism is the natural companion of strength. The measure received immediate support from the country’s neighbour Kenya. The Kenya Weekly News editorialized to the effect that the measure came as no surprise. The signs that the government of Tanganyika needed the bill were apparent: defections from TANU, the creation of opposition parties, demonstrations by University students against one-party rule, the burning of TANU party cards, apathy of voters registering for the Presidential elections. ‘In this matter one had to weigh the arguments of justice and morality against the hard facts of political life in Tanganyika today. TANU had a frighteningly massive task to undertake, the transformation of a backward poor country into a dynamic nation.’29 The article concluded by asking whether outside observers could point to an alternative to TANU. The answer, at that time, was no and sin
ce that was the case why was the measure necessary at all?

  DISILLUSION WITH THE WEST

  Over the years 1961–65 most aid for Tanzania came from the West but the country’s pro-Western stance was to be shattered by four issues: ‘The four issues which caused this “loss of innocence” in foreign affairs were the continuing support given by the Western powers to the racist regimes in Southern Africa, American and Belgian intervention in the Congo, the direct intrusion of cold-war politics following the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the British failure to intervene in Rhodesia when its white-dominated regime unilaterally declared independence.’30

  The West’s continuing support for the white racist regimes in Southern Africa, and most especially for South Africa and its apartheid system, led Nyerere to give his full support to the various liberation movements. These were obliged to turn to the Communist countries for arms as the only available source and this allowed the white South and the West to claim that the liberation movements were Communist and therefore that the white minority regimes were fighting Communism. The Zanzibar revolution of January 1964 opened the door to the Eastern powers, which to that date had found few opportunities of influencing East Africa. They moved into Zanzibar with a vengeance, however, to raise fears in the West that were only partially allayed when Nyerere brought about the union of the two countries in April 1964 as the United Republic of Tanzania. Even so, this led to a break with West Germany, which refused to continue its aid programme since there was East German diplomatic representation in Zanzibar, even though Nyerere reduced this to consulate status. The crisis brought out clearly the readiness of the West to use its aid as an instrument of political blackmail. Thirdly, Nyerere referred to American duplicity towards Kenyatta over the US/Belgian intervention in the Congo in November 1964 as ‘an action reminiscent of Pearl Harbour’.

  The final disillusionment came when Britain failed to intervene following Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in Rhodesia. An OAU resolution called upon all members to break diplomatic relations with Britain by 15 December 1965 unless adequate action had been taken to reverse UDI: in the event only 11 countries did break relations with London, and Tanzania was one of them. Britain retaliated by freezing a newly negotiated loan of £7.5 million. These events constituted a most important learning process for Nyerere and other African leaders as well: that the West was far more committed to the racist white minorities on the African continent than it was amenable to majority African opinion. At the same time, African states were obliged to swallow their pride because they were still in desperate need of Western aid. And this gave the Communist countries their chance. ‘By 1968 Nyerere accepted that Tanzania had become an ally of the Communist powers in regard to the liberation of Southern Africa. On that issue the policies of the Western powers had left Tanzania with no other option to this alliance save a humiliating acceptance of the permanence of racial oppression in Southern Africa.’31 As it turned out Tanzania was to have a good experience with Communist China (rather than with the USSR or Eastern Europe) culminating in Chinese aid for the TANZAM railway.

  Over the first years of the 1960s Nyerere saw his vision of an egalitarian and democratic society being eroded by over-dependence upon foreign aid, a growing elitism among the TANU leadership and increasing divisions between the urban and rural areas. It was in reaction to these developments that TANU produced the Arusha Declaration. The interesting aspect of Nyerere and Tanzania at this time is that though he was admired personally for his determination to produce an incorruptible, utopian society few others really wanted anything of the kind. Although not making direct condemnations of the elite generation, the Arusha Declaration set forth a stringent leadership code: Every TANU or government leader must be a peasant or worker and not associated with capitalism or feudalism; no leader should hold shares in any company; no leader should hold directorships; no leader should receive two or more salaries; and no leader should own houses he rented out to others. ‘The leadership code caused immediate and widespread concern within the party, the trade union movement, and the government bureaucracy. Leaders were allowed to convert their assets into trust funds for their children and to retain and employ hired labour on their farms. In spite of these concessions and the party’s formal approval of the Declaration as a whole, the leadership code was neither widely supported nor vigorously implemented in the first few years.’32 Following the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration the government embarked upon the task of gaining control over the economic ‘commanding heights’ by nationalizing the banks and the major agricultural processing companies, insurance and export trading companies. Later, the sisal estates and primary industries were also taken over by the state. However, the new search for national self-reliance that Nyerere launched was heavily circumscribed because Tanzania remained dependent upon the workings of an international system that was economically and politically weighted against small countries. National interests might be determined in Dar es Salaam but the attainment of these national goals was inhibited by decisions taken outside Africa. Nationalization, self-reliance, austerity and anti-corruption measures and the determination to take total control of the country’s economy were never enunciated better anywhere else in Africa. The successful achievement of these aims was another matter.

  Was Nyerere being impossibly utopian? His experiment in socialism during the 1960s and 1970s acted as a magnet for Western intellectuals, many of whom went to teach in the University at Dar es Salaam, and for many more Nyerere became the ‘guru’ of how Africa’s problems ought to be tackled. All the new states of Africa faced the task of achieving rapid economic development while they also attempted to create their own political values to replace those left behind by the departing imperialists. Many of the new leaders opted for a one-party authoritarian system that gave them immense power though all too often they ended up employing all their talents to maintain the system that kept them in place. Nyerere set forth the kind of society he wanted to create as one based upon ujamaa, which did not draw its inspiration from either East or West. As he argued, ujamaa was opposed to both capitalism and doctrinaire socialism because the latter sought to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man while the former sought to build a happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man.33 This was all very well but Nyerere never really discusses how his socialism could be attained in practice and given all the anti-socialist developments in Tanzania prior to the Arusha Declaration this represents a major failing. He sets out a stringent leadership code, but then undermines it by concessions that allow his TANU leaders to hold onto their capitalist wealth. He enunciates a creed of self-reliance and demonstrates how aid will create a dependence mentality but continues to seek aid on a scale that is far greater than the ‘catalyst’ function he assigns to it. In each case Nyerere was bowing to political realities that were far more powerful than his socialist creed. But even if it failed in the end, Nyerere’s socialist creed was like a breath of fresh air in a continent where too many of the new leaders allowed themselves to be corrupted by the allure of power.

  UGANDA

  Uganda, which came to independence in 1962, faced a very different set of problems to those of its two East African neighbours. The Ganda peoples of the Kingdom of Buganda constituted 28 per cent of Uganda’s population and controlled the richest lands producing 90 per cent of the country’s high-quality coffee crop, the principal export. The first loyalty of the Ganda was to their traditional ruler, the Kabaka, rather than to the British-created state of Uganda and when in 1953 the British Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton hinted at the formation of an East African Federation they reacted with deep hostility, assuming that as with the Central African Federation farther south this would give control to the white settlers of Kenya. The Kabaka demanded that Buganda should be transferred to the Foreign Office, that is, be detached from Uganda and granted independence separately. He refused to co-operate with th
e British government over developing Uganda as a unitary state and would not nominate Buganda Ministers to the Legislative Council. The British response was to exile the Kabaka to London on 30 October 1953. This was the beginning of a fight against a unitary state that would only be resolved by force in 1966. When Uganda became independent in 1962 nothing had been satisfactorily resolved: not only was Buganda a state within a state but it had uneasy relations with the other smaller kingdoms, the most important of which, Bunyoro, claimed the ‘lost counties’ that had formerly been part of Buganda and were then part of Uganda.

  As a consequence of this background the first years of Uganda’s independence were taken up with a struggle between the kings who demanded a federal system under which they would retain substantial local power and the political radicals who wanted a centralized, unified state. Under the terms of the 1955 Constitution the Kabaka of Buganda, King Frederick Mutesa II, had been made a constitutional monarch but by 1962 he had consolidated his position and exercised not merely political influence but real power within his kingdom. In the run-up to independence a complicated pattern of political alliances resulted in a coalition between the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) led by Milton Obote and the Kabaka Yekka (KY or King Alone) party of Buganda forming the government that came into being at independence in October. A year later when Uganda became a republic the Kabaka was elected President while Obote remained Prime Minister. A power struggle ensued between Buganda, which had abandoned none of its separatist ambitions, and Obote’s government, which was determined to create a modern centralized state. Uganda’s post-independence constitutional crisis arose out of the fact that four kingdoms with substantial regional powers were not prepared to give them up without a struggle while Obote was equally determined to destroy their independent authority and create a unitary state. The UPC-KY alliance broke down in 1964 over the issue of the lost counties – Buyaga and Buyangazi – which the Kabaka insisted should be returned to Buganda. In a referendum the counties voted to return to Bunyoro and not Buganda, a result that emphasized the differences between the conservative Kabaka faction and the modern centralists. Finally, the issue of dual power came to a head in February 1966 when Obote first carried out a putsch against right-wing members of the UPC (he had five ministers arrested) and then forced through an interim constitution which ended most of Buganda’s federal privileges, while also withdrawing autonomy from the three smaller kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro. Under the new constitution the President (Obote) was given full executive powers and then, when the Lukiko (parliament) of Buganda demanded that the central government quit Buganda, Obote sent in troops under Col. Idi Amin Dada to storm the royal palace. The Kabaka fled to England. In September 1967 a new unitary constitution was enacted. Obote’s problems, however, were far from over. In order to consolidate its power the UPC was also obliged to tackle the left-wing Youth League as well as the trade unions; this was successfully accomplished. But Obote had no real power base. He developed close relations with the 73,000-strong Asian Community, many of whom were prominent in government service and largely controlled the manufacturing sector. Obote’s government came increasingly to rely upon armed oppression and detention as a normal response to opposition, with the General Service Unit (GSU) under Akena Adoko as a principal means of maintaining control.