Africa

by Guy Arnold

  THE PERIPHERY OF THE WHITE SOUTH

  The 1970s began well for Zambia: copper prices were high, an apparently successful diversification of the economy was taking place and the tenth anniversary of independence was celebrated in 1974 with a real sense of national achievement. But the price of copper then collapsed and the country became increasingly indebted on the mistaken assumption that copper prices would soon recover – which they failed to do. At the same time Zambia undertook an ever more forward role as a front-line state in the confrontation between independent Black Africa and the White South. At the end of 1972 Zambia became a one-party state and in June 1973 Harry Nkumbula, leader of the Zambian ANC, issued the Choma Declaration accepting the one-party state and joining the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). By 1978, a consequence of its deepening economic crisis, Zambia was obliged to reopen rail links through Rhodesia although it continued to support the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU in the final phase of the struggle in Rhodesia. Rhodesia and South Africa retaliated by launching periodic air raids on Zambia.

  By contrast, Zambia’s neighbour Malawi had become entrenched as black Africa’s ‘odd man out’ because of Banda’s continuing and often flaunted relations with South Africa. Banda became progressively more authoritarian through the decade; he would brook no opposition and not permit any person to emerge as a possible successor to himself so that the main opposition came from dissident groups outside Malawi.

  Once it was clear that he was losing Lesotho’s January 1970 elections, Leabua Jonathan carried out a coup, raising the familiar Communist bogey in relation to his opponents as a means of gaining South African support for his actions. King Moshoeshoe was again put under house arrest and then allowed to go into exile in the Netherlands. The leader of the Basuto Congress Party (BCP), Ntsu Mokhehle, was first imprisoned, then placed under house arrest. Then Jonathan decreed a five-year ‘holiday’ from politics. During the rest of the year Jonathan carried out a countrywide campaign of repression against his opponents: about 1,000 men took to arms and 500 were killed. In December 1970 the King was allowed to return to Lesotho after he had agreed to a proclamation forbidding his participation in politics. In 1973 Jonathan tried to achieve a compromise with the opposition and created an interim assembly. At first Mokhehle agreed to take part but then changed his mind and fled to South Africa taking his hard-line supporters with him. Other members of the BCP were persuaded to cooperate with the government. There was renewed violence in 1974. The Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), formed by the exiled BCP, launched attacks on police sub-stations and hundreds of people were killed in the subsequent fighting in the mountains, 200 were detained of whom 35 were later put on trial and 14 found guilty of treason. At the end of the year Jonathan introduced a new constitution, which made Lesotho a constitutional monarchy and gave greater powers to local government authorities. There was further violence in 1978, which continued into 1979, and from South Africa Mokhehle, taking a leaf from Jonathan’s book, said he would only take part in elections if the representatives of the Communist bloc (the USSR, Cuba and East Europe) were expelled from Lesotho. At the end of the decade the outlook appeared bleak. The country had been subjected to a decade of violence because of Jonathan’s greed for power but in any case Lesotho had almost no economic base except labour to export to South Africa and its hydro potential.

  Swaziland emerged to independence in 1968 in the ‘deep white south’ with apartheid South Africa on three sides and Portuguese-controlled Mozambique on the fourth. A deeply conservative country, Swaziland chose to pursue a low-profile policy in relation to South Africa. In 1973 the old king, Sobhuza II, first proclaimed a state of emergency, then abrogated the constitution and abolished all political parties. From that time onwards legislation was by royal decree. The economy was doing reasonably well and there was a large influx of South African capital that would soon dominate development prospects. An order in council of 1978 established an indirect electoral system; the country was divided into 40 tinkhundla (local councils) and these selected members who then chose other members to sit on an electoral college. The system, in fact, ensured the absolute power of the king.

  AFRICA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

  Only in 1956 under the loi cadre was political activity permitted in Madagascar following the uprising of 1947. In 1957 the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) was formed under the leadership of Philibert Tsiranana who had formerly served as a deputy in France. He was very popular among the Côtiers, the latecomers to the island of African origin, as opposed to the Merinas, who were of Indonesian origin and first settled Madagascar. Tsiranana’s PSD ruled with little difficulty through the 1960s although by the end of the decade the government faced two broad problems: a deteriorating economy, largely the result of external events such as the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal, the 1968 troubles in France which led to the 1969 devaluation of the French franc; and splits within the ranks of the PSD which were made worse by Tsiranana’s long illness when he was unable to mediate between the factions.

  Madagascar had remained largely isolated and had taken little part in African affairs up to 1970. The PSD won the September 1970 legislative elections without difficulty since the opposition was divided and ineffective. In April 1971 there was an uprising of peasants in the Toliara region; it was led by the Mouvement National pour l’Indépendence de Madagascar (MONIMA) under Monja Jaona. The people were rebelling against repressive local officials. The uprising was put down, further repression followed and this led to a number of deaths. As a result MONIMA attracted more support and became a national rather than just a local movement. In January 1972 Tsiranana won a third presidential term with 99.9 per cent of the votes cast. On 13 May, however, riots that included students, teachers, workers and the unemployed erupted in the capital Antananarivo and the rioters formed the basis for a new political movement – the Federation of the 13 May Movement (KIM). After three days of violence Tsiranana handed full power to Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa to restore order. The following October Ramanantsoa held a referendum in which he obtained an 80 per cent vote for reform. Tsiranana was then removed from the presidency. Though personally popular Ramanantsoa faced a deteriorating economy, disunity in the armed forces and growing divisions between the country’s two main ethnic groups, the Merinas and the Côtiers. At a meeting of the mobile police on 31 December 1974 Ramanantsoa was persuaded to hand over power to another soldier, and he did so on 5 February 1975 to Col. Richard Ratsimandrava who, however, lasted only six days before being assassinated. A period of uncertainty followed before Lt-Cmdr Didier Ratsiraka (a former foreign minister) became head of state and government on 15 June. He established the Supreme Revolutionary Council and inaugurated a socialist revolution: banks were nationalized, as were insurance and shipping companies, mineral resources and the petroleum refinery. The US satellite tracking station was closed down and the major French company Société Marseillaise de Madagascar was taken over by the state. Ratsiraka had his policies published as a ‘Little Red Book’. In December he won a referendum endorsing his policies by 94.66 of 90 per cent of the votes cast. Ratsiraka’s foreign policy included closer relations with the Communist and Arab worlds and providing support for Third World liberation movements. In 1976 he created a new political party, Avant garde pour la Rénovation de Madagascar (AREMA) (Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution), and joined forces with the existing Front National pour la Défense de la Révolution (FNDR) (National Front for Defence of the Revolution) although AREMA became the dominant political force in the country. At the beginning of the 1980s Ratsiraka defused growing opposition by releasing Monja Jaona, the leader of MONIMA, whom he persuaded to join the FNDR, which provided an umbrella for all radical movements.

  Mauritius became independent in 1968 when the Independence Party (IP) led by Seewoosagur Ramgoolam formed the first post-independence government. Ramgoolam wanted to preserve the communal nature of Mauritian society and believed this could best be achieved by means of coalition g
overnments. He also wanted to diversify the economy away from its then overwhelming dependence upon sugar. In 1970 Mauritius joined the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). Ramgoolam invited the opposition Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate (PMSD) to join the government. However, a new more radical party emerged; this was the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM) led by a Franco-Mauricien, Paul Berenger whose main support came from the trade unions. By the end of 1971 the MMM controlled a number of unions including three in the sugar industry, bus drivers and teachers. In August 1971 the dockers, who were mainly MMM supporters, came out on a strike which got out of hand leading Ramgoolam to declare a state of emergency. The government broke the strike and Berenger and other MMM leaders were imprisoned for 20 days. In March 1972 120 leading members of the MMM were imprisoned. These tough measures split the MMM into a pro-government faction and the Mouvement Militant Mauricien Social Progressiste which was Marxist oriented. The MMM fought the 1976 election on a platform of making Mauritius a republic, greater centralization and a tougher anti-South African policy. It also demanded the return to Mauritius from the US of the island of Diego Garcia, which had been turned into a US military base. The MMM won 34 seats, Ramgoolam’s IP won 27 but he was able to create a coalition with the minority parties and remained in power until 1982. The last years of the decade witnessed growing industrial unrest and strikes, rising unemployment, inflation and devaluation.

  France had colonized the Comoros islands in the 1840s. On 6 July 1975 the Comoran Chamber of Deputies made a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and the following day elected Ahmed Abdallah as President of the new state. France did not attempt to reverse this UDI but retained control of the island of Mayotte. Opposition to Abdallah was not slow to appear, for he was too dictatorial, and on 3 August he was overthrown in a coup. The leader of the Front National Uni (FNU), Prince Said Mohammed Jaffar, became the head of a new national executive council and Ali Soilih, who had organized the coup, became defence and interior minister. Meanwhile, in Mayotte the Mouvement Populaire Mahorais (MPM) expelled from the island all those who were thought to favour independence. On 12 November 1975 Comoros was admitted to the United Nations as a unified state even as France prepared to hold a referendum in Mayotte. In reaction to this French move the Comoros national executive council nationalized all French administrative property in the islands and repatriated French officials. On 31 December 1975 France recognized Comoros but did not establish diplomatic relations with its former colony. On 2 January 1976 Ali Soilih was elected head of state. On 8 February the Mayotte referendum returned a 99 per cent vote in favour of retaining links with France. The islands were divided into economic and administrative units of about 6,000 people each, consisting of three or four villages. Land distribution was carried out and the voting age was lowered to 14 years; the Revolutionary Youth Movement became Soilih’s most ardent supporters. Soilih made the mistake of trying to modernize what was essentially a conservative society too fast, leaping from colonial and feudal subjugation to a form of progressive socialism. As a result he was overthrown in May 1978 in a coup mounted by 50 European mercenaries who came from South Africa, led by the Frenchman Bob Denard; they brought the country’s first president, Ahmed Abdallah, back to power. Soilih was killed. The OAU expelled Comoros from its ministerial council because it had become a mercenary-backed government. In September 1978 the mercenaries were asked to leave. Comoros then received aid from France, Arab countries and the EC. In February 1979 it was readmitted to the OAU. Following a referendum of October 1978 Comoros became a Federal Islamic Republic, allowing a degree of autonomy to each island. France, meanwhile, created the special status of a collectivité territoriale for Mayotte, which allowed it one representative in the French Senate and one in the Assembly. Following the 1978 mercenary coup in Comoros Mayotte reaffirmed its rejection of association and maintained its link with France. Comoros continued to claim Mayotte as part of its territory and the UN General Assembly accepted several resolutions that reaffirmed Comoros’ claim to the island, a view that was endorsed by the OAU.

  The Seychelles became independent of Britain in 1976 with James Mancham of the Seychelles Democratic Party (SDP) as President and Albert René of the Seychelles People’s United Party (SPUP) as Prime Minister, an arrangement that only lasted for a year. When Mancham went to London for the 1977 Commonwealth Summit, 60 armed members of the SPUP who had been trained in Tanzania seized power in Seychelles. René denied any prior knowledge of their intentions but did not refuse to be sworn in as President. Mancham’s extravagant lifestyle and capitalist policies had made him many enemies. Under a new constitution of 1979 Seychelles became a one-party state while the SPUP had already transformed itself into the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front (SPPF).

  Although the events in many of these countries appear superficially to be much the same – coups, the formation of one-party states, the insistent intervention in politics of the military – in fact there are wide variations on these themes. Newly independent governments first wished to repudiate colonialism and the colonial power and the easiest, most readily available alternative was to adopt some form of socialism or Marxism, especially as to do so represented not just a break but also a positive denial of everything the metropolitan power stood for. But Marxism, however appealing in theory, did not produce the increased wealth needed to meet national expectations. The result, as we have seen in a number of cases, was that governments were forced to return to the Western fold they had abandoned. And the West then imposed stringent, often punitive, terms as the price of new aid and investment. Benin, Congo, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Togo of Francophone countries were each obliged to turn again to France. The radical movements that criticized over-dependence upon the former colonial powers almost invariably found, if they subsequently became the government, that they had little choice in the matter. It was a question of economics and virtually all the levers of power lay with the West. Few of the new states of Africa were either determined enough or strong enough to defy the pressures that were exerted upon them and follow their own chosen political and economic development paths.

  CHAPTER FIFTEEN

  Four Different Development Paths

  Four countries – Algeria, Nigeria, Tanzania and Botswana – achieved remarkable if very different economic and political development during the 1970s. Two of them, Algeria and Tanzania, pursued austere socialist paths that demanded a great deal of their people with most of the promise of better times to come set firmly in the future. On the other hand, there was nothing socialist about the bonanza years enjoyed by Nigeria as a result of the oil boom, which followed the Yom Kippur War and fourfold increase in oil prices. Lagos attracted entrepreneurs from all over the world, each hoping for quick returns on investments in what was seen as Africa’s largest and most attractive market. Botswana’s case was different again. Surrounded by South Africa, Rhodesia and South African-controlled Namibia, Botswana refused to bow to pressures from its racist neighbours and pursued instead a defiant multiracial policy while its huge mineral discoveries transformed the country’s long-term prospects.

  ALGERIA

  At the beginning of the 1970s President Boumedienne embarked upon an ambitious programme of development designed to turn Algeria into an industrial-based economy. At the same time he defined his country’s position as non-aligned, socialist and determined to withstand outside interference. Since the overthrow in 1965 of Ben Bella, who was accused of orchestrating a verbal revolution rather than anything else, Boumedienne had already made considerable progress in creating an industrial sector. What he had not succeeded in doing was securing for himself any broad political acceptance; his leadership was always to be from the top downwards rather than based upon grassroots support. His austere dedication to socialist principles was admirable; his understanding of how ordinary people operated less obvious and unlike his contemporary, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, he was not a teacher. Statistics over these years register encou
raging advances on many fronts. Thus, there were 1.7 million children in primary schools in 1969–70, a figure that was raised to 1.9 million with the addition of 6,000 new classrooms by 1970–71. On the other hand, there was a desperate shortage of skills of all kinds so that there were still 48,000 foreigners teaching in primary schools and a further 11,000 in secondary schools.

  The government was moving inexorably towards the creation of a socialist society by encouraging workers’ participation in management, the distribution of land among landless peasants and further nationalization measures. Petroleum was the key to Algeria’s revolution. Oil production of 26 million tons in 1965 had risen to 50 million tons by 1970 while natural gas output over the same period had increased from 1,800 million cubic metres to 2,500 million cubic metres. A confrontation with France, the former metropolitan power, was a prerequisite for Algerian control of the economy and relations with France reached a low point at the beginning of the decade over the question of export taxes on Algeria’s oil. The tax reference price for oil had been set in 1965 at US$2.08 a barrel; in July 1969 Algeria revised this upwards to US$2.85 a barrel in a move to control fully its national resources. The quarrel with France lasted through 1971 and, apart from oil, was emphasized by Boumedienne’s policy of Arabization and desire to remove the last traces of colonialism as he called for a cultural revolution. A decree of 2 July 1970 established the official use of Arabic numerals and, for example, Al Nasr, one of four Algerian daily newspapers, carried two pages of Arabic that year and then published entirely in Arabic in 1972. Court cases (trials) were to be conducted in Arabic. While these changes were taking place efforts were also made, with indifferent results, to reinvigorate the ruling FLN, which was instructed to conduct a campaign of ‘moral improvement’.