Africa
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There were alternative views as to how Nigeria should use its newfound wealth, though they attracted little attention in the rush to wealth that was taking place. Two academics published The Socialist Alternative15 in 1975, preceding the Third Plan. They argued that while 80 per cent of Nigeria’s total arable land remained uncultivated the country was suffering from acute food shortages and that untilled and under-utilized agricultural land was a source of huge waste to the economy. They criticized the industrial sector, which was too small a component of the national economy, as too biased in favour of consumer goods and claimed: ‘There is general absence of a serious foundation of heavy capital goods industries for the industrial transformation of the economy. No meaningful industrialization is possible in Nigeria without a basic structure of industries producing machine tools, equipment, heavy machinery, and chemicals. In this connection, the continued absence of an integrated iron and steel industry is probably the most serious indictment of the country’s putative industrialization efforts… The textile first strategy of concentration on consumer goods which Nigeria has been using so far to produce soft drinks and cigarettes is clearly neo-colonial diversionary and wrong. No single country has industrialized successfully with that strategy in recent history and Nigeria will not be the exception.’16 In that the authors would be proved correct. In a section Objectives of People’s Democratic Industrial Evolution they propose: ‘Industry shall be elevated from its present peripheral status to become the dominant sector of the economy. The contribution of industry to total output from its present paltry 8 per cent will be raised to over 40 per cent within a decade. Correspondingly, there will be deliberate reduction of the existing predominant role of primary production in the economy. The structure of employment in the country will be radically shifted from current concentration on agriculture and mining to industry. This will be accompanied by a parallel revolution in agricultural production.’ They pointed out, correctly, that the colonial ‘export enclave’ was still intact and that, if anything, it had grown in size and importance: ‘Cash cropping for export is still based on imperialist international division of labour that traps us in primary production while our foreign exploiters push mass-produced manufactures at exploitative prices on the country.’17 These arguments were sound enough and were being advanced by radical politicians elsewhere in Africa but Nigeria was in the grip of its oil fever and the demand for imported manufactures for those who could afford them outweighed any longer-term considerations about building a sound, broad-based economy. The readiness to spend was greater than the willingness to plan.
By 1975, despite the launch of the country’s giant Third Plan, Gowon had run out of steam. Despite his success at rehabilitating the Ibos after the war and the mark he had made on the international stage, he had failed to tackle the most urgent internal problems of politics and corruption. He had been unable, or unwilling, to dismiss and replace the 12 state governors who had come to regard their jobs as lifetime sinecures, he had not carried out his promise to create new states, and finding the task of evolving a new political structure for a return to civilian rule too difficult had instead reneged on his promise to return the country to civilian rule in 1976. There were other problems such as the escalating costs and inefficiency surrounding the proposed World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) while the Udoji review of civil service salaries that was envisaged as a way to create a better, less corrupt public service instead turned into a disaster as everyone from house servants upwards demanded dramatic increases of pay and salaries. The result was a military coup, carried out on 29 July when Gowon was in Kampala for the annual OAU summit and had been given the red carpet treatment on his arrival as the head of state of the continent’s most powerful black nation. The northerner, Murtala Muhammed (who had been passed over by the military hierarchy at the end of July 1966 in favour of Gowon), became head of state in a bloodless coup. Soon to be given the nickname ‘no nonsense Muhammed’, the new ruler provided decisive and rapid direction where Gowon had stalled. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) became the centre of government and from this the state governors were excluded and downgraded, merely receiving its directives from then onwards. The 12 state governors were sacked and replaced by men who were appointed to other states than their own in a move to foster greater impartiality in office. The SMC set 1979 as the new date for a return to civilian rule, cancelled the unpopular 1973 census results, postponed FESTAC, which was later cut down to a more manageable size, and created a further seven new states to bring the total up from 12 to 19. It was decided to build a new capital at Abuja in Niger State and radical methods were employed to clear the ports of congestion and reduce the huge lines of waiting ships. Most welcome, at first, was the new government’s assault on corruption which turned into the biggest such exercise the country had seen, affecting the judiciary, the police, the army, the universities, the railways and other branches of the public services. The corrupt, the inefficient, the old, those in poor health or holding outside interests were made redundant and in the process the felicitous phrase ‘dead wood’ was employed to designate those who were to lose their posts. The assets of former corrupt state governors were confiscated. Finally, a 50-man Constitution Drafting Commission under a leading lawyer, Rotimi Williams, was appointed to work on a draft for a Constituent Assembly.
On 13 February 1976 Murtala Muhammed was assassinated during an attempted coup that was led by Lt-Col. Bukar Dimka. Muhammed’s deputy, Lt-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, became head of state. He maintained Muhammed’s programme but lacked his predecessor’s ruthless dynamism. A reduced FESTAC was held and provided welcome publicity for Nigeria’s leading role in Africa. Under Obasanjo the government instituted (or continued) measures to combat inflation, to indigenize the economy, to promote self-reliance and discipline. It launched Operation Feed the Nation as it became increasingly clear that agricultural output was being outpaced by population growth. Universal primary education, which had been promised by Gowon, was implemented, though with huge imbalances depending upon local resources of teachers and schools, and seven new universities were created. In September 1978 the final version of a new constitution was accepted and the state of emergency, which had been in place since 1966, was lifted. Political parties were allowed to register in preparation for elections in 1979 but they had to meet a basic requirement of having a nationwide (as opposed to purely regional) appeal and in the end of 19 parties only five met this requirement. These were: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari; the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Chief Obafemi Awolowo; the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe; the Greater Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP), Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim; and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP), Malam Aminu Kano. There were to be five successive elections during July and August 1979 for local government, state government, state governors, the Federal Legislature and President. The elections were fiercely fought and in the presidential elections Shagari, the most popular candidate, obtained 25 per cent of the votes in 12 but not in 13 states as laid down in the Constitution. Subsequently, the Electoral Commission ruled that a 25 per cent vote in 12 and two-thirds states gave Shagari the victory; this ruling was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court. On 1 October 1979, after 13 years of military rule, Nigeria returned to civilian rule again and Shehu Shagari became Nigeria’s first executive president.
TANZANIA
The Arusha Declaration of 1967, endorsed by the ruling party TANU, had laid down the socialist principles that were to guide Tanzania, while ever since Nyerere had stepped down from the premiership in January 1962 to mobilize the party at the grassroots, he had been propounding a socialist path for the country. By the beginning of the 1970s there was broad acceptance that Tanzania was a socialist country, in intention if not always in practice, but an African socialist country that was creating its own socialist principles suitable to its particular needs and history. Unlike Algeria, Tanzania had no mineral base and was a
desperately poor rural-oriented society whose economy depended upon its agriculture. Again unlike Algeria, it was not a military dictatorship but a one-party state democracy and 1970 was to witness the second election under its one-party state constitution. Nyerere, the sole presidential candidate, won 3,456,573 yes votes to 109,828 no votes and 74,388 spoilt papers.
The government designated 1970 Adult Education Year: adult education officers were appointed in every district and 324,664 adults enrolled in literacy classes. There was a rapid extension of ujamaa villages during the year (the programme of villageization had been launched in the 1960s) but it suffered from an acute shortage of farm managers, agricultural officers and extension workers. At this time agricultural output from the traditional (peasant) sector accounted for 95 per cent of the whole. The First Development Plan (1964–69) had failed to achieve its targets, partly through lack of enough highly trained manpower and partly due to insufficient funds, for only about 40 per cent of expected finance from abroad had materialized. Of great psychological and international importance, the construction of the TANZAM railway to Zambia by the Chinese was commenced. The international implications of the railway were to be much discussed during the decade since it meant a major economic penetration of East Africa by China, a development that was much resented by the West, which saw this as a threat to its interests. South Africa was even more worried since it saw the railway siphoning off northwards freight that until then had to pass through the south. Western concerns were not lessened by the sheer speed with which the Chinese worked to complete the first stage of the 1,100-mile-long railway; by November 1971 the first 310 miles of track from Dar es Salaam to Mlimba in Central Tanzania had been completed.
The year 1971 was to prove a difficult one economically for Tanzania, which in any case had little leeway to offset economic downturns. The development programme had to be cut back, foreign reserves fell, there was a deficit and the cost of living rose. The government pressed ahead with its socialist programme and the acquisition of all rentable property had an unsettling impact upon the 80,000-strong Asian community, many of whom left the country. A major boost for Nyerere’s socialism came with the decision of the 200,000 Wagogo peasants of the Dodoma region to abandon their traditional way of life and adopt in its place the socialist village pattern of ujamaa. Their move into ujamaa villages took both government and TANU by surprise and led Nyerere to move to the region so as to supervise and help in what was a mass movement of people. A clear divide was developing between the desk-bound bureaucrats in Dar es Salaam, who lauded rural change but themselves remained firmly urban, and the rural peasants who actually did the moving and so changed their lifestyles. Only a relatively few people had moved into the new villages during 1970 but this Wagogo move was on a different scale. They tore down their old houses, took their belongings to the new area and then waited to be settled into villages. There were suggestions that they had been coerced although no evidence was advanced in support of the claim.18
In February 1971 TANU published its Guidelines, which among other subjects dealt with trade unions and labour. Clause 13 stated: ‘The truth is that we have not only inherited a colonial governmental structure but we have also adopted colonial working habits and leadership methods. For example, we have inherited in the government, industries and other institutions the habit in which one man gives the orders and the others just obey him. If you do not involve the people on work plans, the result is to make them feel a national institution is not theirs, and consequently workers adopt the habits of hired employees. The party has a duty to emphasize its leadership on this issue.’ Clause 15 of the Guidelines stated: ‘Together with the issue of involving the people in solving their problems, there is also the question of the habits in their work and in day-to-day life. There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead. For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation and is not a tyrant.’19 Such instructions for model leaders, as well as other TANU policy statements, were to be challenged at the highest level. Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume of Zanzibar came out publicly against two aspects of policy. He objected to a race policy that would allow Asian and European citizens; ‘Tanzania is for black Africans and not others,’ he said. And he opposed the decision that had emerged from the Arusha Declaration that leaders should not own houses to rent out for income. By the end of 1971, 800,000 rural peasants were living in 3,200 ujamaa villages where community living was changing the customs of centuries. In many cases those who had moved were enjoying the social advantages of education, clean water and health services for the first time.
The assassination of Sheikh Karume on 7 April 1972 ushered in an uneasy period of tension between the mainland and Zanzibar. Karume had ruled with an iron hand and made many enemies so that his assassination caused neither surprise nor much sorrow. He was succeeded by Aboud Jumbe as First Vice-President and ruler of Zanzibar; Jumbe was the most senior member of the Revolutionary Council and he acted quickly and decisively to prevent serious repercussions from the assassination damaging Zanzibar. Later in the year a crisis developed with Uganda when on 17 September about 1,000 of Obote’s armed supporters crossed into Uganda from Tanzania in an ill-organized and unsuccessful attempt to raise a rebellion against Amin who had been threatening Tanzania over the previous 20 months.
As the socialist revolution was put in place those adversely affected by it had to be placated or helped. In June 1972 Nyerere met a group of West Kilimanjaro settler farmers to tell them that state and co-operative farming were the only two forms of agriculture that would be allowed in the country and that there was no future for large-scale individual farms. In the circumstances Nyerere agreed to approach Britain for a loan to buy them out although he had not accepted aid from Britain over the previous two years because of disagreements with its policies towards Rhodesia and South Africa. In line with comparable Algerian import restrictions (on luxuries) the government passed the Motor Vehicles (Restrictions and Disposition) Bill to legalize its decision to restrict the import of saloon cars, stationwagons, mini-buses, pick-up trucks and kombis, for what was needed for the people were trucks and buses. In May 1972 the National Executive Committee of TANU produced a paper, Politics is Agriculture, which stressed the vital importance of agriculture in relation to the population in which the young and old groups were increasing relative to the whole. Between 85 and 90 per cent of the country’s total exports consisted of raw or processed agricultural products and to maintain the existing level of imports, exports had constantly to be increased because of changing world market prices. ‘For example, in 1965 we could buy a tractor with 5.3 tons of cotton or 17.3 tons of sisal. The equivalent tractor now would cost 8 tons of cotton or 42 tons of sisal.’20 That was a problem that affected all Africa. Agricultural efficiency had gone down since independence although production had increased because more land was being cultivated, there was increased use of tractors and ox ploughs, new and improved seeds, and there were more farmers as a result of population increase. But, and this was the crucial point, ‘Our methods of husbandry have not improved, so that the increases in output are much less than they should be given the labour effort expended.’ The population of Tanzania, which had reached a figure of 12,231,000 in 1967, was increasing at an estimated rate of 2.7 per cent a year.
In 1973 TANU adopted a number of new policies likely to test the leadership. The most important and far-reaching of these was the decision to make it compulsory for peasants to move into ujamaa villages by 1976. By the end of the year one million peasants were living in ujamaa villages and, if the 1976 deadline were to be achieved, a further 10 million peasants would have to move in the space of three years and that represented a massive human relocation by any standards. TANU took the decision to move the capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma in the centre of the country although a poll of TANU regio
nal working committees found that 842 out of 1,859 were opposed to the move. Relations between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar were always difficult and usually strained for the union was not a natural one. Karume’s successor, Jumbe, despite the early hope that he would be easier to work with in fact was unpredictable and sometimes harsh with the Zanzibaris. During 1973, for example, he initiated an austere dress code that laid down the length of women’s dresses, what could or could not be shown, dresses that showed the contours of the body were outlawed as were see-through materials, wigs and make-up. Regulations for men forbade shorts, bell-bottom or tight-fitting trousers and shirts that exposed the chest; hair length was limited to two inches. Zanzibar enjoyed total autonomy except for ‘union subjects’ such as foreign affairs.
Tanzania was obliged to import food during 1974 because the country was unable to produce sufficient for its needs after seven years of drought and poor harvests. This failure naturally drew attention to the ujamaa programme and the upheavals associated with moving between seven and eight million peasants to new villages, either voluntarily or compulsorily. Moving people was only the first phase of the ujamaa concept; thereafter, the people had to be educated and converted to the idea of common ownership and common endeavour for the common good. The end of the process was villages that were also socialist cooperative communities. Even under the best conditions the process was bound to be slow. In some districts the preparations for the moves were well done: sites were properly selected, transport was laid on, assistance was available and discussions were held with those about to move so that they understood what was to happen and why. In other cases the preparations were inadequate and there was little explanation so that instructions from TANU to move were seen as commands and resented. This led the party to issue clarifications in October 1974 so as to minimize the confusion or sense of coercion.