Africa

by Guy Arnold

  Throughout the 1980s an inexorable determination towards violence characterized the Horn. Ethiopia faced both a civil war and the Eritrean war of secession; Somalia experienced steadily escalating clan warfare; in Sudan there was both a north-south civil war and a subsidiary civil war between the tribes of the south. These wars and confrontations were made immensely more complex and were prolonged as well by the interventions and manoeuvres of the US and USSR and their allies who pursued Cold War interests that did nothing to encourage peace in the region. Furthermore, the wars were inter-related: Sudan supported Eritrean secession; Ethiopia assisted the SPLA in the south of Sudan; Somalia constantly threatened the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. At the end of the decade all three countries – Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia – experienced major changes. In Sudan the military coup that brought Gen. Bashir to power introduced a new period of military rule and a sharp hardening of Islamist attitudes that forestalled any solution to the north-south conflict. In Ethiopia the collapse of the Mengistu regime finally led to the emergence of an independent Eritrea in 1993. In Somalia the collapse of Barre’s rule was the prelude to a decade of clan warfare and a new kind of international intervention.

  CHAPTER TWENTY - SEVEN

  West Africa: Nigeria and Ghana

  During the 1980s a pattern of interwoven conflicts developed across the whole of West Africa: on the political front this took the form, on the one hand, of a struggle between the civilian-military establishments that had come to power after independence and would go to almost any lengths to hold onto their power and, on the other hand, the forces of grassroots democracy that, despite endless setbacks, fought to achieve a greater say for the people as a whole. On the economic front all the countries of the region, including Nigeria the most powerful, strove, usually in vain, to shake off external market controls so as to follow the development paths of their choice. The result was a state of almost perpetual upheaval countered by repression at home and a deepening suspicion of external forces from abroad, which was made all the worse by growing economic depression and constant failure to meet development targets.

  Although the one-party state structure, ‘populist’ military dictatorships and other anti-democratic forces had been strongly entrenched by the ruling elites, the people demanded – and supported their demands by a growing resort to protest in many forms – a return to full democracy so that even the most autocratic leaders were obliged to make periodic gestures towards greater democratic involvement in the process of government even though these leaders, such as Abdou Diouf of Senegal, constantly tried to fob off their people with limited rather than full participation in the processes of government. It was a Western myth, largely fostered by the departing colonial powers, that Africans preferred strong authoritarian rule to democracy. This was never the case but the myth suited the interests of the Europeans, who wanted to perpetuate their influence, and the Cold War warriors, who needed to justify providing support for autocratic regimes that would safeguard their strategic and financial investments on the continent. The task for democrats was to prise control from the civilian and military powerbrokers who had seized it at or shortly after independence and would go to great lengths to retain it. By the 1980s outsiders who suggested that dictatorial regimes were somehow appropriate for Africa appeared to have forgotten that the nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s that had led to the end of the European empires had been soundly based upon democratic principles.

  NIGERIA

  By virtue of its size and huge population Nigeria was always destined to dominate West Africa and for most of this period it was ruled by the military. Lt-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo had succeeded as military head of state on the assassination of Murtala Muhammed in the abortive coup attempt of February 1976. Obasanjo promised to return Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979 and much of his three-year period in office was taken up with working out a new constitution and a proper distribution of powers between the centre and the (then) 19 states to come into place in 1979. The ban on political activity was lifted in September 1978 and within two months 50 political parties had emerged. These had to be assessed by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and pass a test of nationwide as opposed to regional acceptance. In the event only five parties were accepted as fully national parties. These were the Yoruba-based Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), led by Chief Awolowo; the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), based upon Kaduna in the north with Shehu Shagari as its presidential candidate; the People’s Redemption Party (PRP), also northern-based and led by Aminu Kano. The other two parties – the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the Greater Nigerian People’s Party (GNPP), led by Waziri Ibrahim – had begun as a single party and then split. These five parties contested the elections, which were complex since five separate elections (local, state, state governors, legislature and presidential) had to be fought simultaneously. The NPN gained 37 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives, 36 per cent in state assemblies and 38 per cent in the Senate, and won seven of 19 governorships. The UPN came second. In the presidential elections Shagari won the most votes (5.7 million) with 25 per cent of the votes in 12 states but not in 13, and this led to an immediate challenge that he had not won two-thirds of the 19 states as stipulated in the constitution. FEDECO, however, ruled that he had won on what his opponents saw as a technicality.

  Shagari was sworn in as President of the Second Republic on 1 October 1979. The question then and for the rest of the century was whether the federal concept could work successfully to overcome the deep regional and ethnic differences that lay at the heart of all Nigeria’s political problems. Only the NPN had managed to perform on a truly national scale and, arguably, the anger at Shagari’s win, whether on a technicality or not, was really the anger of regional-based parties that only his party had achieved a national showing. Shagari’s term of office, from 1979 to 1983, was dominated by the way the parties constantly looked to what would happen the second time round in 1983. There was the question of how the federal framework set up by Obasanjo would work. There was, as always, the matter of political spoils – who obtained what offices. There was widespread corruption and the question of the management of the economy – how and for whom. Shagari was not to have an easy ride.

  The Second Republic lasted just over four years until the military resumed control at the end of 1983. The government faced severe problems throughout this period: Shagari’s credibility was at issue since his electoral win was rejected by his political opponents; there were the constant regional pulls against the federal centre; on the economic front over-dependence upon oil would lead to a severe economic downturn when the oil price plummeted in 1982 to produce a foreign exchange crisis, financial panic and a consequent foreign reluctance to invest. On the social-religious front, between December 1980 and 1982 the sermons of the populist preacher Alhaji Muhammad Marwa (Maitatsine) led to serious rioting in the north, causing many deaths. The rioting was brutally suppressed and Maitatsine himself was killed. He had appealed for an Islamic-based system of justice – Sharia – and an end to ‘western-oriented corruption’ and he had found a ready following. In October 1982 the police arrested 16 of Maitatsine’s followers in Maiduguri, leading to rioting in Kano and Kaduna during which the police killed hundreds of dissidents. In November the sect was banned. However, the movement renewed its activities in February–March 1984 when over 1,000 people lost their lives in the disturbances and in 1985 when another 100 people were killed in Gombe. By that time Gen. Buhari was in power and he blamed the troubles on religious extremism rather than underlying economic deprivation.

  The government obtained 90 per cent of its revenues from the oil industry and in order to redeem its election promises embarked upon some massive federal spending projects that assumed a continuing high oil price. This policy led to a programme of rapid investment, a ‘boom’ import-led economy and a scramble for wealth that was led by politicians and businessmen. The gap between rich and poor widened dramatically. The
n came the collapse in oil prices of April 1982 and oil export earnings slumped through 1983, accompanied by a loss of foreign investor confidence. Subsequent government measures to control imports and limit the export of foreign exchange led to widespread corruption and financial malpractices. As a consequence Nigeria found it had become a debtor nation and was forced to turn to the IMF for assistance. As always, the poor suffered most from the crisis and this led to growing resentment against the government. Nigeria’s clear commitment to Western free enterprise and dependence upon Western investment undermined its public condemnations of apartheid in South Africa, which were regarded largely as rhetoric, while its intervention in the civil war in Chad at this time was seen as little more than political opportunism, though supposedly done to limit the spread of Libyan influence.

  Early in 1983 Nigeria expelled some two million foreign workers, the majority from Ghana but also from Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It was a panic measure in response to the deteriorating economic situation and did much to undermine Nigeria’s standing in West Africa. The expulsions led to huge problems in Ghana while doing nothing to solve Nigeria’s economic problems. The year was dominated by the elections that were due to be held over August–September. The NPN party machine achieved a triumph for the ruling party and Shehu Shagari won 47 per cent of the votes cast (12.2 million) although the other presidential candidates together obtained one million more votes than Shagari. The NPN won 60 of 96 seats in the Senate, 264 of 450 in the House of Representatives and 13 of 19 state governorships. As usual in a Nigerian election there were accusations of widespread corruption. Shagari was sworn in for his second term on 1 October to find he was presiding over a country that was divided rather than united as a result of the elections. All elections in Nigeria are bitterly contested and their results hotly disputed. This is not just a question of corruption but arises rather from the nature of the power structures of the country and its ethnic divisions: the people have not been persuaded of the fairness of the federal solution to Nigeria’s politics.

  Shagari, who had been closely associated with Nigeria’s first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and was a founder member of the Northern People’s Congress, was a consummate politician. He was trusted for his sincerity and made an ideal presidential candidate. ‘He became President in 1979, at a time of great political tension and economic crisis. He found it difficult to hold together the divisive political forces in the face of a looming economic crisis. Though his regime collapsed in an orgy of recrimination and accusations of corruption, he remained personally untainted and still liked and respected by the majority of his people… He saw his principal task was to preserve democracy by sticking to the letter and spirit of the law even if the process was cumbersome, slow and painful.’1 By the end of 1983, however, the economic situation provided the soldiers with an excuse to intervene and this they did on New Year’s Eve of 1984 to return Nigeria once more to military rule. Shagari was retired on 31 December 1983 along with many other civilian leaders. He was never considered to have enriched himself and was released from detention in 1986 though banned for life from politics.

  THE RETURN TO MILITARY RULE: BUHARI AND BABANGIDA

  When the army seized power on 31 December 1983 under Maj.-Gen. Muhammed Buhari, a northerner from Kaduna state, the new leader emphasized the corruption of the NPN government. All political institutions were banned or dissolved and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) was reinstated. The coup appeared to be widely popular but Nigeria had once more come full circle. The new regime faced two immediate problems: what to do about the economy; and how to deal with corruption. Negotiations with the IMF broke down during 1984 and the government then initiated its own austerity programme. At the same time, special tribunals were set up to deal with former politicians, governors and others, and many were given sentences for corruption. One objective was to recover the huge sums of money that had been smuggled out of the country. Two days after the military coup Umaru Dikko, who had been Minister of Transport and Aviation, fled the country to Britain. He was accused of large-scale corruption, hoarding of essential commodities and enriching himself but when charged by the government with having stolen one billion naira, he replied: ‘Whatever money a politician makes goes back to the people because he wants their votes. The military are only talking about money because they can only think of their own bank accounts.’ The government made an unsuccessful attempt to abduct him from Britain – in a crate from Stansted airport – but he was found and released. The incident led to a break in Anglo-Nigerian relations when both countries withdrew their diplomats. Bad management of the economy forced the government to resort to barter trade with its oil; at the same time the regime became increasingly authoritarian and imposed severe restrictions upon the media. In May 1985, for a second time, another 700,000 foreigners, including 300,000 Ghanaians, were treated as scapegoats for the state of the economy and expelled from the country. By mid-1985 the government had virtually resolved itself into a two-man show run by Buhari and his Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. Tunde Idiagbon. In July Idiagbon gave a speech in which he called for greater economic retrenchment and more public discipline while at the same time banning all political debate.

  Despite its initial welcome, the Buhari regime lacked charisma. The accusation was levelled at Buhari that few of those convicted of corruption belonged to the NPN and that apart from the ex-governor of Kano, no prominent northerners had been found guilty of corruption. During 1985 Buhari became notably more authoritarian while failing to come to grips with the country’s economic problems. Although 2,500 political detainees were released, the government retained powers of detention without trial. Buhari’s responses to the continuing economic crisis were negative: ‘Buhari also clamped down on press freedom (using the notorious clause 4) and other political liberties. He tried to impose his iron discipline on doctors, trade unionists and other professional bodies that tried to resist his austerity measures. But criticism continued, so in July he banned all political debate. This last despairing measure to crack down on civil liberties opened the way to another coup.’2 On 27 August 1985 the Army declared Buhari deposed and Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, the Chief of Army Staff, took control. Both Buhari and Idiagbon were detained and a number of senior officers were retired. Despite his austere, unpopular rule, Buhari was to emerge again as a presidential candidate in the elections of 2003.

  A new Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) was established and Babangida, like his predecessor, faced a continuing economic decline and was obliged to initiate further economy measures. In January 1986 he announced that the armed forces would hand back power to the civilians in 1990. Religious or sectarian unrest in Northern Nigeria that would recur for the rest of the century persuaded Babangida to take Nigeria into the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that February. Repeated clashes between Muslims and Christians highlighted the country’s religious divide; in April 1987, therefore, the government established an Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA) consisting of both Muslims and Christians. As the date for a return to civilian rule approached the military demonstrated an increasing reluctance to give up power – an attitude that became a recurring theme of the country’s politics to the end of the century. The government postponed a full return to civil politics until 1992 but proposed a transitional period to begin in 1987 and the establishment in 1988 of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Thereafter, local and state elections were scheduled for 1990 when two political parties were to be allowed to come into being. Elections for a bicameral legislature and the presidency would finally be held in 1992.

  In May 1989 President Babangida lifted the ban on political activity as a prelude to the proposed Third Republic. Much political activity followed and 13 associations applied to be one of the two political parties to be registered by the national government. However, in October Babangida refused to recognize any of them; instead he began to construct the framework for the two parties he intended to
create in a form of ‘guided democracy’ scheduled to begin in 1990. Anti-government riots at the end of 1989 forced Babangida to cancel visits to the US and Italy planned for early 1990. Then riots followed the sacking of Lt-Gen. Domkat Ya Bali from the defence portfolio. He was a Christian and his sacking raised fears that Muslims were to be favoured at the expense of Christians. On 22 April 1990 a coup attempt was mounted by middle-rank officers who attacked Dodan Barracks in Lagos (the effective seat of military government) and took control of Radio Nigeria but after 10 hours of fighting the coup collapsed. The event again highlighted north-south rivalries and Christian fears of Muslim domination. On 27 July Maj. Gideon Orkar, the coup leader, and 41 other soldiers were executed.

  Having stepped down as head of state in 1979 Obasanjo employed part of his time during the 1980s running an Africa Leadership Forum or ‘think tank’ that held ‘Farm House Dialogues’ to discuss a range of social and political topics. Some of their discussions were published in 1991.3 Discussions concerning the state of Nigeria provide some important insights into the country’s problems relating to development, the military, centralism, relations between north and south and corruption. ‘It was argued that while the Nigerian economy has grown appreciably in the past two decades, the growth has not been transformed into development’ and that ‘a more meaningful approach is to see development as “people inspired, human centred and citizen anchored”’.4 In relation to rural development the Forum was scathing: ‘Rural areas are characterized by their depleted work-force, their rudimentary and inefficient mode of production, their general lack of basic infrastructure and social amenities such as safe potable water, all season access roads, telecommunications, electricity, schools, medical facilities, good houses and recreational facilities, the paucity of processing factories, markets, banks, storage depot and machine repair shops and their low level of health care delivery, nutrition, hygiene, education and social awareness. For those reasons rural areas are normally unable to fully harness their abundant natural resources.’5 The statement says just about everything that needs saying about the neglect of rural areas – and not just in Nigeria.