Africa

by Guy Arnold

  The future of NEPAD must be considered in relation to globalization: are the two concepts compatible? A growing proportion of people worldwide, especially in the developing world, oppose globalization yet seem unable to prevent its spread despite all their protests. If NEPAD is to mean anything it must be about altering the balance between rich and poor and globalization – the rapid spread of corporate power – hardly seems the instrument to alter the balance except in one direction only, towards the rich. There have been too many uncritical African responses to globalization as though the process is inevitable when, in fact, it is nothing of the kind. There appears to be a developing consensus in Africa: if you cannot beat it, join it. It is an attitude that turns the state into a conduit for capital rather than an instrument for controlling it so as to ensure that it is used to bring about greater social equity. The West, greatly assisted by the international financial institutions which it controls, appears to have been only too successful in selling the ‘inevitability’ of globalization to those countries least able to cope with it.

  What, then, will constitute an African renaissance? Nelson Mandela first used the term in 1997 and Thabo Mbeki has sponsored the idea ever since. First, any real change for the better in Africa’s situation can only be effected from within; if the renaissance relies upon assistance from outside the continent it will be a non-starter. Africa must put Africa to rights; outsiders, whatever their proclaimed objectives, always have their own agendas and these, naturally, favour their particular interests. Moreover, it is inherently unlikely that any renaissance can take place as long as African economies remain in the grip of aid donors and the international financial institutions. Too many African leaders look outside the continent for solutions to their problems instead of relying upon self-transformation. They do so for two main reasons of which one is excusable, the other not. Most preside over such small weak economies that they have only limited room in which to manoeuvre; many, however, are more concerned to keep themselves in power at almost any cost rather than pursue genuine development. The cost, as a rule, is accepting Western capitalist pressures and adopting policies approved by the donors.

  The prospects for an African renaissance at the present time are not encouraging for a continent that has a higher proportion of civil wars and failed states than any other region in the world. The best hope for an African renaissance lies with Nigeria and South Africa, the continent’s two regional great powers, creating a working axis between them. Thabo Mbeki is President of the most developed and potentially richest country in Africa and he has done much to bring both the AU and NEPAD into existence. South Africa should be the continent’s economic powerhouse: it is self-sufficient in food, has the best industrial-commercial infrastructure in Africa (the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is ranked tenth in world terms) and is a storehouse of mineral wealth. It also has substantial military capacity that should be used for peacekeeping and is one of the very few African countries strong enough to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy. Nigeria possesses oil, has Africa’s largest market and a highly developed entrepreneurial capacity. It has also, through ECOMOG, deployed its military forces on a number of peacekeeping operations, an activity in which it has built up a certain expertise. Neither country is in receipt of aid, except on the margins, and both are major exporters. If these two states work together to spearhead an African renaissance there is a genuine possibility that it could become a reality.

  The problems are daunting and Africa has fallen into a habit of dependence that must be broken. When the two old colonial powers, Britain and France, suddenly show a renewed interest in Africa, as they have done over the turn of the century, the continent should be wary. Both Tony Blair’s interest in NEPAD and Jacques Chirac’s sudden rescue operation in Côte d’Ivoire reek of neocolonialism. In a speech delivered in Cape Town in January 1999, Britain’s Prime Minister told his South African hosts: ‘Real development can only come through partnership. Not the rich dictating to the poor. Not the poor demanding from the rich. But matching rights and responsibilities.’ Yet despite such Clintonesque rhetoric there are few signs of any real changes in British-African policy. The same is true of France. The Twenty-second Franco-African Summit was held in Paris over 20–21 February 2003. At this summit Chirac promised increased co-operation for the realization of NEPAD. He urged his colleagues in the developed world to join France’s initiative to remove trade barriers to exports from African countries. In stately language he lamented the growing gap between rich and poor and said he saw in NEPAD ‘real hope for Africa to fill that gap that is still keeping Africa at arm’s length from the global economy’. He avoided mentioning the huge efforts France exerts to maintain CAP.

  When a hard right wing US Republican President decides to visit Africa the continent should analyse his every move and promise, with courtesy of course, but also with suspicion. Already, for example, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Togo and Tunisia have allowed themselves to be bullied by Washington into agreeing to accept the iniquitous US demand that in the case of US citizens committing crimes in their countries that qualify for reference to the ICC, they bypass trial by the ICC and instead send them back to the United States. Much has been said and written since the beginning of the new century about the spread of US worldwide hegemony and this will affect Africa as it will just about everywhere else. As it claims to support democracy Washington in fact extends its influence. At some point this extension of its power must be halted: ‘… a civilization that purports to be based on the twin pillars of democracy and the rule of law cannot for long impose itself on the rest of the world by systematically betraying those principles.’7 Meanwhile, increasingly warily, the world adjusts to overwhelming US power. Prior to his July 2003 African trip, President Bush spoke at a US-Africa business summit in Washington. The President outlined his optimism about Africa. Peace and security were the first goals, he said, and then the fight against hunger. But the US could not assist this process if some governments refused to import genetically engineered food. ‘The ban of these countries is unfounded; it is unscientific; it is undermining the agricultural future of Africa’ (though a cynic might be tempted to substitute America for Africa). He went on to say that another US goal was ‘to help African nations develop vibrant, free economies through aid and free trade’. US foreign aid would go to countries whose governments were committed to good governance and invested in health and education. ‘Corrupt regimes that give nothing to their people deserve nothing from us.’ Present at the Summit was the executive secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, K. Y. Amoako, who called upon the developed countries to reduce and then end their subsidies on agriculture. ‘If Africa could freely compete in the agricultural sector, literally millions of women and men could abandon their dependence on aid, revitalize Africa’s rural sector and contribute significantly to the global economy.’8

  When President Bush went on his five-country African trip in July no great enthusiasm was manifested by Africans. The war in Iraq was extremely unpopular in Africa where the US action was seen as bullying and racist. The President’s promise of US$15 billion to fight AIDS, after the first welcome, was regarded with suspicion since most of the money, it was suspected, would go back to US pharmaceutical corporations. There was a sense of ‘promise fatigue’, that too many US promises had not been kept, and there were anti-Bush demonstrations. Oil was very much on the US agenda. Writing in the Guardian, Julian Borger said: ‘The US is currently importing 1.5 million barrels a day from West Africa, about the same as imports from Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile the US has so far invested US$10 billion (£6 billion) in the West African oil fields this year. The US department of energy expects African oil imports to reach 770 million barrels a year, and US investment in the oil fields to exceed US$10 billion a year.’ The US African Oil Policy Initiative Group (an advisory panel) said in 2002 that it considered ‘the
Gulf of Guinea oil basin of West Africa… as a vital interest in US national security calculations’.9 Any region thus designated should expect increased US pressures. The same panel, which included Pentagon officials, advised setting up a ‘unified command’ for Africa. Gen. James Jones, commander of the US European Command with responsibility for African operations, said the US was trying to negotiate the long-term use of a ‘family’ of military bases across the continent to include large installations for up to 5,000-strong brigades ‘that could be robustly used for a significant military presence’ and also smaller bases for marines and special forces in times of crisis. An early option, it was hoped, would be Mali while possibly the tiny island state of São Tomé, where large offshore oil has been found, would become the first US base. These reflections alone suggest a US determination to colonize Africa militarily if in no other way. In South Africa, though Bush wanted to talk about Mugabe, Mbeki was only concerned to point out that poverty breeds corruption, lack of democracy, disease, despondency and is thus a fertile breeding ground for terrorism. An editorial in the South African Mail and Guardian said:

  It would be a mistake to take Mr Bush’s compassionate agenda seriously. His tour must be seen for what it is – hard-eyed self-service posing as a mercy mission. African leaders should approach it in the same self-interested spirit. Bush’s primary concerns, as they were before the invasion of Iraq, are domestic security, the advancement of corporate America and the securing of strategic assets, mainly oil. The African countries seen as ‘pivot states’ by US government strategists – primarily Nigeria and South Africa – may have more leverage than usual. Above all, they should raise their voices against glaring US hypocrisy in forcing norms on other countries – increasingly by military means – while regarding itself as above international regulation. The cause of multilateralism was dealt a grievous blow by the Iraqi war, waged in the teeth of overwhelming international condemnation. Africa can exert some beneficial influence in bringing the world’s most destructive and irresponsible rogue state back into line.10

  The US is not often subjected to such strong language and condemnation from Africa; the feelings exist, however, and the US and the West generally should try to understand just how deeply resented their pressures upon the continent can be. It comes back to the question of power. Africa’s current (2003) contribution to international trade is 1.7 per cent; its world exports are 2 per cent; its global direct investment 0.9 per cent; its share of global GDP 1 per cent. International relations are all about power: who has it and who does not. Africa has little influence and less power, a fact that attracts the major powers like vultures to a carcase to be exploited. If there is to be an African renaissance it will be achieved by the skilful deployment of what Africa itself controls. NEPAD funded by the West is not the answer.

  AFTERWORD TO THE 2017 EDITION

  The New Colonialism, 2000–2015

  Introduction – Resources – The Impact of China – The United States and Africa – The Arab Spring – The Sahel – Democracy and the Coup – The Democratic Republic of the Congo and its Neighbours – Burundi – The EU and Africa – The United Nations, Peacekeeping and Aid – Development and the Economy – South Africa – Nigeria – The Outlook for Africa

  INTRODUCTION

  As the new century began, the West and China controlled the world economic system and saw Africa as an adjunct to their economic programmes. The West saw the need to impose ‘good governance’ in Africa as a means of control. Nelson Mandela’s ‘Renaissance’ was to be an African affair while the Western aid donors stood on the sidelines to judge the performance of African states. Africa’s problems remained the same: aid dependence, debts, corruption, lack of development and poverty. A question that is rarely asked, yet goes to the roots of the rich–poor relationship is simply: why? Why does the West, through its donor agencies, want to impose political and other human rights programmes upon poor countries in Africa? The involvement can be explained in altruistic terms or terms of realpolitik. Assistance based upon altruism appeals to a wide sector of the public and is represented by the range of NGOs working in Africa. The alternative justification involves the business world: that is those companies that see Africa as a market for their manufactures and where they may make profitable investments. The reasons for intervention can be broad-ranging: strategy, trade, investment – and in colonial times it led to the creation first of spheres of interest and then of colonies. Africans discovered that they were subjects of foreigners in their own land and it was against this state of affairs that they launched their struggles for independence.

  Now, however, the possibility of a new phase of colonial subjection has been introduced with the coming of the Chinese, who, despite their assurances to the contrary, appear to behave increasingly as benign colonial masters. The Chinese seek resources anywhere they can strike a bargain with the government of a country or local authorities that will further this aim. The more infrastructure they create, the more they will establish their development controls and expect a voice in the country’s economic policies. Whatever else results from the growing Chinese presence in Africa, it will galvanize the West to increase its presence on the continent. This is not an outcome that would have met with approval during the independence struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. In history to the present time the Western powers have done nothing to develop Africa except when a direct advantage to the West ensued.

  Safeguarding the investments of the West – especially those in oil – and existing trade links were not sufficient to counter China’s treaties of friendship with forty-eight African countries and a larger Western effort was seen as necessary. Hence the New Partnership For Africa’s Development (NEPAD) agreement of 2001, which demanded three commitments from Africa: clear accountability and open government; an end to gross human rights abuses; and an end to African civil wars. These grandiose ideas for change were Western in conception and African leaders gave the ‘nod’ to NEPAD, but subsequently it was to gather dust on office shelves. In March 2004, Tony Blair, British prime minister from 1997 to 2007, set up a commission for Africa to examine the economics and politics of the continent. The commission made no impact and was largely ignored.

  Blair involved himself in Africa with the zeal of a convert; he believed that what Africa needed was assurances that would work. In Africa at present, a contest between the West and China would see China the firm winner. When Blair spoke of a ‘sore on the conscience of the world’, who was his target? Like-minded Westerners who would discipline Africa, or the Africans themselves. It was plain, once he had established his interest in Africa, that Blair wanted to draw the most influential African leaders towards a development dialogue that would exclude China. All the changes envisaged under NEPAD represented a new bid by Blair to launch a more effective Western hold in Africa. NEPAD arose out of the 2001 meeting in Abuja (Nigeria), at which African leaders considered the dangers of terrorism. They also discussed the New Africa Initiative (NAI) that had been formulated in July 2000 at the last Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit before it transformed itself into the African Union. These high-powered meetings demonstrated a readiness to initiate changes under the new African Union. How much they wanted these new initiatives to be hijacked by the Western aid lobby was another matter. NEPAD established its headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa. It was the excitement of seeing African leaders accept – if only for a short duration of time – responsibility for Africa’s woes that persuaded Mandela to launch the idea of an African Renaissance.

  At the turn of the century, the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal set 2015 as the target date for freedom from want, a goal that in real terms meant very little. What requires examination is the motivation behind donor actions. Hard political advantage is what explains most Western actions. For more than thirty years, Mobutu Sese Seko, the ruler of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and one of Africa’s most corrupt leaders, was supported by the Americans who saw him as a usefu
l ally in the Cold War. That is the kind of realpolitik that makes sense in the West. Supplying aid related to conditions does not yield the same returns. If we are to make sense of aid programmes, we should begin by asking what their impact on the recipient will be, and how much such aid will further the interests of the donor.

  What Africa needs is a single economic voice and this was most imperative when it became plain that China on the one hand and the West on the other were almost certainly gearing up for a confrontation: the West to hold onto its established positions; China to forge new ones. There are perhaps only two countries – Nigeria and South Africa – able to withstand external manipulation. Both have advanced economies in African terms and both, if necessary, would be prepared to tell either the West or China to leave them alone. What the continent needs is a unity that will support any economic reactions to the activities of the Chinese seeking minerals and the West holding on.