Ivan's War
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Moskvin’s reflections trace the path that many communists of the pre-war era would follow. Initially, though he was reasonably thoughtful and already a soldier of some experience, the politruk subscribed to a kind of fantasy, the dream of all those pre-war films. In the first hours of the war, he believed that his own side had to win. It was the judgement of history, and individual lives counted for little beside that. Faith in that old lie would shatter in the blast of German guns. The credulous utopianism of 1938 either dissolved or it gave way to something else. In Moskvin’s case, and those of thousands like him, belief survived because to die for nothing was unthinkable. There was no easy alternative, either. If a Soviet communist was going to have faith, it would be shaped somehow by Soviet paradigms, and even non-believers in the party’s lore borrowed from its vocabulary. For all that, however, wartime belief was grimmer, less sophisticated and more immediate. It was better, through those bleak nights in the forest, to cheer for Zhukov and Stalin than to have nothing in which to place a faltering faith. Ideas were less important than a sense of purpose, and in combat itself, mere survival was probably utopia enough.
Victory, and even the first signs that defeat had been postponed, changed the nature of belief again. As Stalin pointed out in 1943, the army’s progress was proof that Soviet communism worked. There were all those tanks, those heaps of shells, those planes, those skilled young men to use them. But front-line soldiers made their own judgements about meaning. Their kind of communism was a far cry from the grey world of the theoretical manuscripts. The soldiers put their faith in progress, in the collective, and in the value of acquiring skills. What they called communist belief was about the victory of a just cause over the darkness. It was proof that, with the right kind of will and effort, all the pain of the pre-war decades would work out right. It was also a kind of membership pass. If a person was a good soldier, a good comrade, then small misdeeds were unimportant.
By the end of 1942, moreover, pre-war concepts of ideology were less important to a soldier’s sense of his place in Soviet destiny than military experience and training. Even after the demotion of the political officers, ideologically based pep talks continued at the front, but now nation and leader were calling on soldiers to know tactics, to learn the proper use of weapons and the value of commands. In terms of the army’s success, the turn to professionalism was crucial, and the party, for a while, was openly subordinated to the army’s own commanders. But for a soldier – whether an officer or a technician with a single task to master – the image of a ‘good’ soldier, the personal goal, was a combination of patriotism and manliness (a word much used in wartime poetry), loyalty to the collective and professional skill. The skill gave soldiers their confidence, the collective the warmth, often the love, that sustained them through battle. If those shaded into a decision to join the Communist Party, it would have been a relatively small step in their minds. But it was not the ideology of 1937, or even the teaching of purist political commissars, that wartime recruits would have had in mind as they took their new party oaths.
After the war (and even before Zhukov had accepted Germany’s surrender), front-line collectivism would become a target for Stalin’s regime. According to this state’s own reckoning, the veterans were heroes, but it was never likely that the dictator would allow them to apply their hard-won confidence and public spirit to the task of governing at home. The tragedy of the veterans, or part of it, was that their sacrifice counted for almost nothing in the shaping of post-war politics. True, their symbolic value was enormous. But they were used, not consulted. An ideal soldier took the place of all the diverse, the opinionated and self-confident fighters who came back from the front. While this hero was praised, the real veterans were misunderstood, idealized in ways they did not choose, and ignored or rebuffed everywhere else. In Brezhnev’s time, it suited those in power to turn old soldiers into tame, even boring, paragons of developed socialism. No doubt future regimes will evolve uses of their own for the symbols of patriotic war. When the last veteran is dead, there will be no limit upon the words and ideas that the heirs of Russia’s victory can attribute to its heroes, but for a little longer there remains a check. While the soldiers are alive, they can still speak out for themselves.
The place to find the old soldiers in Kursk is in a chilly looking building that is still referred to as the Officers’ Club. The mansion, now somewhat neglected, stands in the shadow of the former cinema, a building which, in 2003, was being restored to its original status of cathedral. The whole site was a maze of scaffolding and heaps of sand when I visited, although it was the very eve of the sixtieth anniversary of the tank battle. The local veterans’ association was holding a meeting, as it always did, in a large room around the back. To step inside was like crossing some fault in time, for Lenin frowned from the walls and there were dismal rows of memoirs in the glazed shelves underneath. The room could not have changed in twenty, maybe thirty years. A huge table occupied most of the space, as if the people were an afterthought. But there they were, stern and austere, failing to hear the chairman as he spoke amid the din of tractors and drills. It was nine o’clock in the morning and they had all arrived promptly, used to discipline.
Their chairman had offered to give me five minutes of the meeting’s time. The idea was that I would say my piece, take down some names and then sit quietly while the meeting transacted its other business. The arrangement was awkward, for it put me in the role of interloper, but it was probably my foreignness that rankled most. I explained that I was looking for volunteers to interview. As ever, I said that I wanted people to tell me what they remembered, and I promised not to pry for secrets. There was a hesitation, then somebody told me that I should go back to Moscow. There were books, he said, to tell people like me whatever stuff we seemed to need to know. The faces round the table closed as quickly and decisively as sea anemones around a rock pool. But then, as always, someone called me over to his chair and asked me to explain again. It was the marvellous Anatoly Shevelev, and when I had described what I was doing for a second time (and promised cognac in the place of tea), he agreed to come to my room the next morning. His generosity inspired the others. The next day, when I had set a banquet out in my hotel room, borrowed a samovar, and piled up blank cassette tapes on a desk, I found a queue in the lobby downstairs. The first person arrived for a late breakfast around nine o’clock. It would be nearly fourteen hours before the last group left.
That night, I dreamed of shelling, saw the bodies, woke up in a knot of Russian words. Part of my mind had picked up the horror that was always implied in the soldiers’ tales. But though my own imagination had supplied the blood and flames, the veterans had not dwelled on the grotesque when we talked. As they recounted life before the war, life between battles, and their individual tales of adaptation to the peace, the soldiers could be vivid raconteurs, but their battle stories were as bland as any formal histories of war, the horror disembodied, safe. Even the veterans who talked for hours – and to each other, for the interviews tended to overlap – had kept such details out of their accounts of violence. Rather than trying to relive the grimmest scenes of war, they tended to adopt the language of the vanished Soviet state, talking about honour and pride, of justified revenge, of motherland, Stalin, and the absolute necessity of faith. When it came to accounts of fighting, the individual was set aside, shut off, as if we were all looking at the story through a screen. There were bodies, and there were tears, but there was no blood, no shit, no nervous strain.
This reticence had troubled me when I began the research for this book, but by the time I got to Kursk I had begun to understand. The veterans’ detachment was not merely a feature of their old age, some weakness of psychology to be pathologized and healed, nor was it simply self-defence. Instead, the images that veterans used, and their choice of silences and euphemisms, hinted at the secret of their resilience. Back then, during the war, it would have been easy enough to break down, to feel the depth of every
horror, but it would also have been fatal. The path to survival lay in stoical acceptance, a focus on the job in hand. The men’s vocabulary was businesslike and optimistic, for anything else might have induced despair. Sixty years later, it would have been easy again to play for sympathy or simply to command attention by telling bloodcurdling tales. But that, for these people, would have amounted to a betrayal of the values that have been their collective pride, their way of life.
The war gave veterans very little. The assumption, beloved of a certain kind of well-nourished romantic conservative, that war makes nations stronger and more positive would not stand two minutes’ exposure to the reality of Stalingrad. I asked every veteran I met if their army service had improved their lives, and most told me about the things that they had lost. The list included youth, years of freedom, health, and then the scores of people: comrades, parents, families. True, many soldiers received useful training, but most believe (correctly or not) that their skills could more easily have been acquired in peacetime. As for the loot, the feather pillows and the children’s shoes, they were poor compensation for material loss and scant comfort for veterans’ families in the lean years after the war. War pensions used to be worth a great deal. In the hard times of the 1990s, some veterans helped adult children and grandchildren to feed and warm themselves by sharing these regular benefits, but these days even the handouts have started to lose value, turned to cash in an inflationary world. The only gain that significant numbers of the old soldiers did acknowledge was that the misery of war itself had made them value their survival more. This love for life is one of the most attractive qualities they share.
The veterans of Kursk were winners. They were neither former prisoners nor convicts from a punishment battalion. Their silences defended them from memories of injustice, though it would be impertinent to tell them so. But none of them sailed through the war undamaged. It is a measure of their strength, and of their survival, that they can talk at all about shelling, sniping, decomposing limbs and wounds. It is a measure of an entire generation that it kept its dignity. Perhaps their very reticence helped these soldiers to victory. Morale, after all, is largely based on hope. And memory, for them, is sacred, live. ‘What do the old men talk about when they come back to remember?’ I asked the curator of the museum at Prokhorovka, Russia’s greatest battle site. ‘They don’t talk much,’ she answered. ‘They don’t seem to need to. Sometimes they just stand and weep.’
Chronology of Main Events
1938
13 March: Germany declares Austria to be part of the Third Reich
29 September: Munich conference agrees to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, but guarantees the remaining borders of Czechoslovakia
1939
15 March: Germans invade ‘post-Munich’ Czechoslovakia
31 March: British guarantee to Poland
23 August: Non-aggression pact signed between Germany and the Soviet Union
1 September: German troops invade Poland and annex Danzig
3 September: Britain and France declare war on Germany
17 September: Red Army enters Poland from the east
28 September: German troops capture Warsaw
30 November: Russians invade Finland
14 December: Soviet Union expelled from the League of Nations
1940
11 February: Soviet attack on the Mannerheim Line.
3 March: Red Army captures Vyborg (Viipuri)
12 March: Finland signs peace treaty with USSR, ceding the Karelian isthmus and the shores of Lake Ladoga
10 May: Germans invade Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg
29 May: Beginning of British evacuation from Dunkirk (to 3 June)
14 June: Germans enter Paris
17–23 June: Russians occupy Baltic states
22 June: France signs armistice with Germany
11–18 August: Peak of the Battle of Britain
7 September: First blitz over London
9 December: 8th Army begins offensive in north Africa
1941
22 June: Germany invades the Soviet Union; Finland attacks Soviet Karelia
27 June: Romania declares war on Russia
28 June: Germans capture Minsk
3 July: Stalin’s first wartime broadcast to the Soviet people
16 July: Germans reach Smolensk
25 July: Germans capture Tallinn
30 August: Mga, the last rail link to Leningrad, is captured by the Germans
17 September: Encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev
30 September: Beginning of the Battle of Moscow
2 October: Germans capture Orel
12 October: Germans capture Kaluga
13 October: Germans capture Kalinin (Tver)
16 October: Height of the ‘Moscow panic’
20 October: State of siege declared in Moscow
30 October: Siege of Sevastopol begins in the Crimea
3 November: Germans capture Kursk
22 November: Germans break into Klin
26 November: Germans capture Istra
6 December: Soviet counter-offensive begins near Moscow
7 December: Japanese bomb Pearl Harbor and raid British Malaya
8 December: USA and Britain declare war on Japan
15 December: Soviets recapture Klin and Istra
25 December: Russians begin to establish bridgehead in eastern Crimea
30 December: Soviets recapture Kaluga
1942
15 February: Singapore falls to Japanese
8 May: Germans attack in eastern Crimea
12 May: Unsuccessful Soviet offensive opened near Kharkov
20 May: Germans retake the Kerch peninsula
3 July: Fall of Sevastopol
30 July: Stalin’s order no. 227, ‘Not a Step Back.’
23 August: 40,000 killed in air raid on Stalingrad
13 September: Launch of German offensive to take Stalingrad
23 October: Beginning of Battle of El Alamein
19 November: Launch of Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad
1943
31 January: Paulus surrenders at Stalingrad
2 February: Final German surrender at Stalingrad
8 February: Soviets recapture Kursk
14 February: Soviets take Rostov
16 February: Soviets take Kharkov
15 March: Germans recapture Kharkov
5 July: Beginning of German offensive at Kursk
12 July: Soviet counter-offensive launched near Kursk
5 August: Russians take Orel and Belgorod
23 August: Soviets capture Kharkov
3 September: Allies invade Italy
25 September: Smolensk recaptured by Red Army
6 November: Soviets recapture Kiev
1944
27 January: Final relief of Leningrad
2 April: Soviets enter Romania
9 May: Liberation of Sevastopol
13 May: Final defeat of Germans in the Crimea
18 May: NKVD troops round up Crimean Tatars, who are exiled to central Asia
6 June: Allies invade Normandy
22 June: Launch of Operation Bagration in Belorussia
3 July: Soviets recapture Minsk and take about 100,000 German prisoners
18 July: Red Army troops under Rokossovsky enter Poland
1 August: Beginning of Warsaw Rising
25 August: Liberation of Paris
2 October: Surrender of Polish nationalist forces in Warsaw
1945
17 January: Soviet troops take the ruined city of Warsaw
4 February: Beginning of Yalta conference
13 February: Budapest falls to Soviets
9 April: Surrender of Koenigsberg to Soviets
13 April: Russians take Vienna
16 April: Launch of final offensive for Berlin
23 April: Russians reach Berlin
30 April: Hitler and his closest aides commit suicide
/> 2 May: Berlin surrenders to Russians
8 May: ‘VE Day’. Keitel surrenders to Zhukov near Berlin (final documents signed just after midnight on 9 May)
9 May: Russians take Prague. Official ‘Victory Day’ in Soviet Union
17 July: Potsdam conference opens
6 August: Atomic bomb on Hiroshima
8 August: Soviet Union declares war on Japan
9 August: Atomic bomb on Nagasaki
14 August: Japan agrees to surrender
2 September: Japan signs capitulation on board USS Missouri
Note on Sources
This book draws on extensive comparative literatures on soldiers, combat and the Second World War. The bulk of it, however, is based on several kinds of primary source. Most of the detail comes directly from archives in the former Soviet Union and Germany. A list of these, together with the abbreviations used in notes to the text, appears below.
The sets of documents involved include soldiers’ letters and diaries, the reports of political officers and secret-police operatives, reports intended for use as the basis for political agitation, military intelligence reports and the evidence of prisoner-of-war interrogations. In addition, I have used Soviet government sources, including documents associated with the trials of former soldiers accused of anti-government agitation in the immediate postwar years. Many of these include evidence gathered from otherwise semi-literate respondents, so they provide insights into the world of soldiers who could not – or chose not to – write. Finally, I have gathered evidence from civilian sources about the army’s impact on the regions it liberated or occupied, and also about the conditions and morale of civilian members of soldiers’ families. I have often found myself reading documents that have not been opened – except for routine checking at the archive – since they were filed sixty years ago. In every case, whatever the source, I have changed the names of all parties unless the material has already been published elsewhere.
I have also used a range of published sources, and notably the multi-volume editions of wartime documents that have appeared in Russian bookshops in the last ten years. Literally tens of thousands of individual documents are involved, and although the most sensitive material has been withheld, such volumes constitute a formidable primary source in their own right.