Great War Syndicate
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forships that were worthy to be called men-of-war,--ships to defend theharbours and bays, ships to repel an invasion by sea. Suggestions wereinnumerable. There was no time to build, it was urged; the Governmentcould call upon friendly nations. But wise men smiled sadly at thesesuggestions; it was difficult to find a nation desirous of a war withEngland.
In the midst of the enthusiasms, the fears, and the suggestions, camereports of the capture of American merchantmen by fast Britishcruisers. These reports made the American people more furious, theAmerican Government more anxious.
Almost from the beginning of this period of national turmoil, a partyof gentlemen met daily in one of the large rooms in a hotel in NewYork. At first there were eleven of these men, all from the greatAtlantic cities, but their number increased by arrivals from otherparts of the country, until at last they, numbered twenty-three. Thesegentlemen were all great capitalists, and accustomed to occupyingthemselves with great enterprises. By day and by night they mettogether with closed doors, until they had matured the scheme whichthey had been considering. As soon as this work was done, a committeewas sent to Washington, to submit a plan to the Government.
These twenty-three men had formed themselves into a Syndicate, with theobject of taking entire charge of the war between the United States andGreat Britain.
This proposition was an astounding one, but the Government was obligedto treat it with respectful consideration. The men who offered it werea power in the land,--a power which no government could afford todisregard.
The plan of the Syndicate was comprehensive, direct, and simple. Itoffered to assume the entire control and expense of the war, and toeffect a satisfactory peace within one year. As a guarantee that thiscontract would be properly performed, an immense sum of money would bedeposited in the Treasury at Washington. Should the Syndicate beunsuccessful, this sum would be forfeited, and it would receive no payfor anything it had done.
The sum to be paid by the Government to the Syndicate, should it bringthe war to a satisfactory conclusion, would depend upon the duration ofhostilities. That is to say, that as the shorter the duration of thewar, the greater would be the benefit to the country, therefore, thelarger must be the pay to the Syndicate. According to the proposedcontract, the Syndicate would receive, if the war should continue for ayear, one-quarter the sum stipulated to be paid if peace should bedeclared in three months.
If at any time during the conduct of the war by the Syndicate anAmerican seaport should be taken by the enemy, or a British forcelanded on any point of the seacoast, the contract should be consideredat an end, and security and payment forfeited. If any point on thenorthern boundary of the United States should be taken and occupied bythe enemy, one million dollars of the deposited security should beforfeited for every such occupation, but the contract should continue.
It was stipulated that the land and naval forces of the United Statesshould remain under the entire control of the Government, but should bemaintained as a defensive force, and not brought into action unless anyfailure on the part of the Syndicate should render such actionnecessary.
The state of feeling in governmental circles, and the evidences ofalarm and distrust which were becoming apparent in Congress and amongthe people, exerted an important influence in favour of the Syndicate.The Government caught at its proposition, not as if it were a straw,but as if it were a life-raft. The men who offered to relieve theexecutive departments of their perilous responsibilities were men ofgreat ability, prominent positions, and vast resources, whose vastenterprises had already made them known all over the globe. Such menwere not likely to jeopardize their reputations and fortunes in a caselike this, unless they had well-founded reasons for believing that theywould be successful. Even the largest amount stipulated to be paidthem in case of success would be less than the ordinary estimates forthe military and naval operations which had been anticipated; and incase of failure, the amount forfeited would go far to repair the losseswhich might be sustained by the citizens of the various States.
At all events, should the Syndicate be allowed to take immediatecontrol of the war, there would be time to put the army and navy,especially the latter, in better condition to carry on the contest incase of the failure of the Syndicate. Organization and constructionmight still go on, and, should it be necessary, the army and navy couldstep into the contest fresh and well prepared.
All branches of the Government united in accepting the offer of theSyndicate. The contract was signed, and the world waited to see whatwould happen next.
The influence which for years had been exerted by the interestscontrolled by the men composing the Syndicate, had its effect inproducing a popular confidence in the power of the members of theSyndicate to conduct a war as successfully as they had conducted othergigantic enterprises. Therefore, although predictions of disaster camefrom many quarters, the American public appeared willing to wait withbut moderate impatience for the result of this novel undertaking.
The Government now proceeded to mass troops at important points on thenorthern frontier; forts were supplied with men and armaments, allcoast defences were put in the best possible condition, the navy wasstationed at important ports, and work at the shipyards went on. Butwithout reference to all this, the work of the Syndicate immediatelybegan.
This body of men were of various politics and of various pursuits inlife. But politics were no more regarded in the work they hadundertaken than they would have been in the purchase of land or ofrailroad iron. No manifestoes of motives and intentions were issued tothe public. The Syndicate simply went to work. There could be nodoubt that early success would be a direct profit to it, but therecould also be no doubt that its success would be a vast benefit andprofit, not only to the business enterprises in which these men wereseverally engaged, but to the business of the whole country. To savethe United States from a dragging war, and to save themselves from theeffects of it, were the prompting motives for the formation of theSyndicate.
Without hesitation, the Syndicate determined that the war in which itwas about to engage should be one of defence by means of offence. Sucha war must necessarily be quick and effective; and with all the forceof their fortunes, their minds, and their bodies, its members went towork to wage this war quickly and effectively.
All known inventions and improvements in the art of war had beenthoroughly considered by the Syndicate, and by the eminent specialistswhom it had enlisted in its service. Certain recently perfectedengines of war, novel in nature, were the exclusive property of theSyndicate. It was known, or surmised, in certain quarters that theSyndicate had secured possession of important warlike inventions; butwhat they were and how they acted was a secret carefully guarded andprotected.
The first step of the Syndicate was to purchase from the United StatesGovernment ten war-vessels. These were of medium size and in goodcondition, but they were of an old-fashioned type, and it had not beenconsidered expedient to put them in commission. This action causedsurprise and disappointment in many quarters. It had been supposedthat the Syndicate, through its agents scattered all over the world,would immediately acquire, by purchase or lease, a fleet of fineironclads culled from various maritime powers. But the Syndicatehaving no intention of involving, or attempting to involve, othercountries in this quarrel, paid no attention to public opinion, andwent to work in its own way.
Its vessels, eight of which were on the Atlantic coast and two on thePacific, were rapidly prepared for the peculiar service in which theywere to be engaged. The resources of the Syndicate were great, and ina very short time several of their vessels, already heavily plated withsteel, were furnished with an additional outside armour, formed ofstrips of elastic steel, each reaching from the gunwales nearly to thesurface of the water. These strips, about a foot wide, and placed aninch or two apart, were each backed by several powerful air-buffers, sothat a ball striking one or more of them would be deprived of much ofits momentum. The experiments upon the steel spring and buffersadopted by
the Syndicate showed that the force of the heaviestcannonading was almost deadened by the powerful elasticity of thisarmour.
The armament of each vessel consisted of but one gun, of large calibre,placed on the forward deck, and protected by a bomb-proof covering.Each vessel was manned by a captain and crew from the merchant service,from whom no warlike duties were expected. The fighting operationswere in charge of a small body of men, composed of two or threescientific specialists, and some practical gunners and theirassistants. A few bomb-proof canopies and a curved steel deckcompleted the defences of the vessel.
Besides equipping this little navy, the Syndicate set about theconstruction of certain sea-going vessels of an extraordinary kind. Sogreat were the facilities at its command, and so thorough and completeits methods, that ten or a dozen ship-yards and foundries were set towork simultaneously to build one of these ships. In a marvellouslyshort time the Syndicate possessed several of them ready for action.
These vessels became technically