Partner to Power

by K. Ward Cummings

  Bush began to ignore Cheney’s insistence on war and began to open himself up to the recommendations of advisers such as Rice, who were recommending diplomacy over combat. Rice’s appointment as secretary of state after Powell’s departure signaled a clear shift in the president’s approach to the war. In his first term, and with Cheney’s help, Bush had laid the foundation for the global “war on terror.” In his second term—this time, with Rice’s leadership—he began to rebuild America’s international alliances. Whereas in his first term, Bush had joined Cheney on the march to war, in his second he chose to follow the beat of his own drummer.

  IV

  Cheney: Partner to Power

  Cheney was not the first vice president to function as a right-hand man. That distinction belongs to Martin Van Buren. Van Buren was the first vice president to have been personally chosen as a running mate by a presidential candidate—in this case, Andrew Jackson—and the first to be included as a member of the president’s inner circle.

  President William McKinley seemed to follow Jackson’s example when he relied on Vice President Augustus Hobart as his “assistant president.” Van Buren and Hobart represent points on a timeline of progress that has made it possible for vice presidents like Cheney to exist today. The transformation of the vice presidency from the marginal role it was during the Washington Administration to the central one it has become is the result of environmental, institutional and personal influences on the office.

  The explosive growth of the federal government beginning in the 1930s and the attendant pressures on the presidency rank high among the environmental influences that have shaped the evolving perception of the vice president. Starting with FDR’s administration, these factors made it necessary for someone of the most senior rank to be available to speak and act for the president in times of crisis. FDR wanted to been seen as responding to the problems of suffering Americans with the full resources of the government, and as he leaned on Vice President John Nance Garner during his first term, he was unwittingly expanding the duties of the office of the vice presidency in the public’s understanding.

  Another environmental factor, the growing popularity of television and radio, further raised the profile of the vice presidency—particularly after 1976, when official debates among vice-presidential candidates began to be televised. The Cold War and the dawn of the nuclear age had increased the importance of choosing a vice president capable of safeguarding the nation’s security. Americans tuned in to the vice-presidential debates to judge for themselves whether these men and women were up to the task.

  Institutional influences on the evolution of the office have included the Twelfth Amendment, which mandated that the president and the vice president be elected separately, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which settled the issue of presidential succession. Prior to the Twelfth Amendment, whichever candidate for the presidency received the most votes won that office, and the person with the second-highest number became vice president. This created a situation whereby two people with potentially diametrically opposed political views might serve at the top of the same administration. When this practice was changed in 1804, it enabled presidents and vice presidents from the same political party to serve together—increasing the chances that they might establish a working partnership.

  In 1967, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment helped clarify under what conditions a transfer of presidential power would be necessary and how exactly it would be conducted. President Eisenhower’s heart attack and President Kennedy’s assassination had elevated the urgency of resolving these questions. By tightening the institutional links between the office of the president and that of the vice president, the amendment helped raise the importance of the vice presidency. Both presidential candidates and the American public recognized that more needed to be done to ensure that vice presidents were capable and equipped to serve in the event of a constitutional crisis. Presidents began treating their vice presidents more like deputies as they included them in important meetings and briefings, increasing the opportunities for mutual consultation and collaboration.

  Before President Andrew Jackson’s day, vice-presidential candidates were chosen by party leaders. Starting with Jackson, as presidents began choosing their own vice presidents, personal considerations came into play. The chemistry between men and the extent to which they shared goals affected not only who was chosen but also how much influence he enjoyed. Carter was the first president to conduct thorough, long-term personal interviews of vice-presidential candidates. He eventually chose Walter Mondale because he appreciated his personality, ability and experience. Carter’s highly active role in the selection of his deputy soon became standard practice among presidential candidates.

  Mondale was involved in every major issue in the administration, including the Camp David Accords, and even functioned as the president’s chief intergovernmental and political adviser. At their weekly private lunches, Mondale would help Carter interpret events in Washington, and together they would analyze the president’s agenda from a political perspective. Mondale’s contribution was vital because the president preferred not to discuss politics with his cabinet and because many of the advisers the president had brought with him from his home state of Georgia were unschooled in the ways of Washington.

  Though other vice presidents have served in high-profile roles (Richard Nixon was a member of Eisenhower’s National Security Council, Spiro Agnew oversaw intergovernmental affairs for President Nixon, and Nelson Rockefeller ran President Ford’s Domestic Policy Council), none of them were members of the president’s inner circle. Mondale was the first vice president in the modern era to enjoy that distinction.

  Vice Presidents Al Gore, Dick Cheney and Joe Biden all owe Mondale a debt for formalizing this unique partnership with the president, but Cheney raised the relationship to another level. Before Cheney, the vice presidency was sometimes an active and high-profile role, but its potential as the potent extension of the president’s power and leadership had yet to be fully explored.

  After Cheney, Bush would establish close relationships with others on his staff. None of those men and women, however, ever exercised the sweeping authority that Cheney possessed at the height of his power. Some have speculated that Cheney’s influence was a result of his superior skill as a bureaucratic warrior, which enabled him to marginalize those around him. Bureaucratic skill certainly played a role. Only a handful of people working for Bush possessed Cheney’s experience and understanding of Congress and the executive branch. But the source of Cheney’s most potent authority as Bush’s right hand was his role as vice president. Few would challenge the notion that Cheney was the most powerful American vice president ever to serve in the post. He stands as a testament to what is possible when opportunity, ability and experience meet genuine political might.

  Cheney embodied many of the ideal qualities and skills of the presidential right hand while having the added advantage of being vice president. He not only carried the imprimatur of the president, as his chief adviser, but also was clothed in the robes of an office of perceived power. On paper Cheney possessed few authorities, but in reality, if only briefly, he outranked everyone else in the president’s orbit.

  Cheney’s role in the Bush Administration raises an important question about the presidential right hand. Is the vice president the ideal candidate for the role? Is a vice president inherently a better choice than, say, a cabinet officer, a White House counsel or a chief of staff? The answer may depend on who is asking.

  For Bush, a president in search of an aide of unquestioned authority, the vice president was the best choice of right hand. As discussed throughout these chapters, other presidents have at various times chosen a cabinet officer, the White House counsel or the chief of staff to fill the role and suit their purposes. When it comes to their number-one adviser or the person with whom they share the most of their executive power, American presidents have a right to choose whomever they want. Obviously, they need som
eone they can trust. But should public perceptions also impact their decision? For example, some Americans might eye President Trump’s choice of right-hand duo, his son-in-law Jared Kushner and his daughter Ivanka Trump, with suspicion, and not just because of their close family relation. Kushner and Ivanka had no government experience, and accountability was clearly not a determining factor in the president’s decision to place them in his administration. In light of this, and considering the questionable choices of advisers by other presidents, one wonders whether voter expectations, including expectations about accountability, should play a role in presidents’ selection of their right hands.

  For most of this book, the relationship between the president and his adviser, and their collective power and influence, has been illustrated and examined from the perspective of serving the president—at the expense of analyzing expectations about right-hand men and women’s responsibilities, if any, to the voter. Further, to avoid disrupting the narrative flow of the chapters, there has been little comparison of the evolving changes in the role of the presidential right hand across the arc of its development, and few questions have been raised about its function outside of the context of its utility to the president. But these issues are no less important.

  The epilogue will examine aspects of the presidential right hand that are worthy of deeper inquiry and will unpack why one particular type of right-hand man or woman is superior to another—not just in the context of serving the president, but for serving the American voter as well.

  Part II

  The nation’s founding fathers struggled to find consensus on how the presidency should function. Some thought that rather than govern alone, the president should be a member of an executive committee that governed collectively. They also struggled with the role of the vice president in relation to the president. As these two offices evolved and their functions were clarified over successive administrations, they moved progressively toward one another. Sometimes (as in the cases of President Carter and Vice President Mondale, President Clinton and Vice President Gore, President Bush and Vice President Cheney), they worked as a close partnership. The president was still in charge, but the vice president was a powerful, wide-ranging figure, executing the president’s will with an authority unchallenged by any other senior official—a true right-hand man.

  The nine right-hand men and women profiled in this book represent the progress of the right-hand role from the Washington Administration to the modern day. The chronicles of their relationships with the presidents they served show their strengths and weaknesses as model advisers, alter egos and confidants. Looking back on their stories, we can compare and contrast the five types of right hand they represent—(1) cabinet secretary, (2) senior adviser, (3) chief of staff (or chief of staff analogue), (4) family member and (5) vice president—to determine which is, in general, best suited to serve the president.

  Right-hand men and women have often been chosen by presidents for personal reasons. Perhaps a president believed he could work better with one particular adviser than any other, or maybe a certain adviser brought an especially valuable quality or skill to the table. Overall, the profiles of administrations in action in this book have shown the comparative advantages of the vice president as an effective right hand to the president.

  Consider the vice president in comparison to a cabinet secretary. While the vice presidency is obviously broader in scope, being a cabinet officer certainly has its advantages. Like the vice president, many cabinet secretaries are constitutional officers and automatically possess recognized authority, which can help energize a reluctant bureaucrat. And, as Commerce Secretary Harry Hopkins (see the introduction) did for FDR, they can effectively cut through government red tape. But, of course, the advantages of appointing a cabinet officer as right-hand man or woman must be weighed against its disadvantages—for example, cabinet rivalries are always a possibility. Recall how the close friendship between President Lincoln and his secretary of state spurred jealousy within the cabinet and how Lincoln had to go out of his way to ease the conflict that he himself had helped create (chapter two).

  Aware of such hazards, President Washington strove, sometimes unsuccessfully, to communicate to Secretary of State Jefferson that he and Treasury Secretary Hamilton were on equal ground in his eyes. Like Lincoln, George Washington was a good judge of character, and, while he encouraged vigorous debate within his cabinet, he recognized that showing favoritism threatened the cohesion and effectiveness of his team (see chapter one).

  Lincoln and Washington served in the days when the vice president, for reasons discussed above, was rarely welcomed as a member of the president’s inner circle. Andrew Jackson was the first president to include his deputy among his closest advisers, but it would be a century before another president would follow his example. President Carter became the first in the modern era to involve his vice president deeply in the work of his administration, strongly influencing the relationships that subsequent presidents shared with their deputies. The important roles played by Vice Presidents Mondale, Gore, Cheney and Biden show that Carter helped establish the vice president as almost as potent an executive as the president himself.

  Though the option of a Cheney-like figure (see chapter nine) was unavailable to Washington and Lincoln, they would have benefited from the use of such a politically seasoned and powerful personal adviser. And Cheney’s actions are illustrative of how a vice president can be a solution to the problem of cabinet rivalries.

  Organizing the American response to 9/11 required the coordination of multiple federal agencies. The heads of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the State Department, the CIA and the NSC could each have asserted a legitimate claim to leadership, but Bush gave Cheney the premier role in the effort. In pursuit of his mission, Cheney had to reach into the portfolio of numerous cabinet officials on multiple occasions. Yet he faced little resistance, because the department heads understood that Cheney was acting on behalf of the president and that, as vice president, he did not owe them the courtesy of seeking their approval. The fact that Cheney and Bush shared a special relationship that was not restrained by portfolio or defined area of expertise only enhanced Cheney’s influence within the cabinet. The vice president’s broad scope gave him the freedom to address, at a high level and under the same umbrella, issues that stretched across numerous agencies. By assigning Cheney broad oversight of these issues, Bush avoided the inter-agency conflicts that would have undoubtedly arisen.

  For similar reasons, the use of the vice president as right hand also has an advantage compared to the use of other senior White House actors, including the assistant to the president, the White House counsel and the chief of staff. Since these are not constitutional roles, these figures must derive their influence predominantly from their relationship with the president. Under such circumstances, they are at risk of having their actions challenged or dismissed by those outside of the executive mansion. Consider the conflict between Clark Clifford and State Secretary Marshall over the recognition of Israel (chapter five). After that, Marshall never spoke to Clifford again, and anyone at the State Department who chose to work with Clifford risked his or her relationship with Marshall. Given these toxic conditions, it would be understandable if a State Department official refused to help Clifford without first seeking the approval of his or her superiors.

  The vice president also has huge advantages where opening doors is a major priority. Unlike other government offices, the office of vice president enjoys a level of sweeping access across the executive branch that rivals that of the president. Cheney understood this all too well and routinely reached out directly to lesser officials deep within the bowels of agencies when he needed an answer to a complicated question or a duty quickly performed. Given the friction between them, imagine Thomas Jefferson hearing from one of his subordinates that Alexander Hamilton was ordering around State Department employees the way Cheney had a habit of doing. It would not have b
een welcome news.

  When it comes to raw power, the vice president has advantages over even the president’s family members. Over the centuries, presidents’ relations have been a popular source of aides of unquestioned loyalty. But this scenario raises its own catalog of dangers.

  Recall when President Clinton was sued over the secrecy of the task force on health-care reform (chapter eight). One of the issues the court case turned on was whether Hillary was a government employee. The distinction is important because of federal laws that govern the paid employment of family members of the president. Had the court decided that Hillary was indeed a federal employee, the president would have been open to the accusation that he knowingly committed a crime by employing a member of his family.

  A similar debate arose when Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump were appointed to high-level advisory posts in the Trump White House. Some among the public and in the media expressed concern that the Trump children might use their positions to enrich themselves. Others questioned their qualifications to serve in positions of such high influence in the administration. And, of course, questions regarding nepotism arose. The federal anti-nepotism laws do not exactly forbid family members of the president from serving in the administration, but they do make it illegal for them to receive compensation. So, Trump’s lawyers decided that the best solution was for Jared and Ivanka to serve without pay. Though this approach may be legal, there are many good reasons why subsequent presidents may not want to follow Trump’s example and consider, instead, the ready-made role of vice president.

  Unpaid family members of the president serving in the White House have potentially less influence than regular senior White House employees. Being outside of the official chain of command, their actions on the president’s behalf are potentially open to legal challenge and can possibly be deemed voidable on the grounds that these people are not “genuine” representatives of the government. To see how this scenario might play out, consider the blow-up between President Wilson and Colonel House over the promises House made to delegates during Wilson’s brief absence from the Paris Peace Conference (chapter three).