Russia's Dead End: An Insider's Testimony from Gorbachev to Putin

by Andrei A. Kovalev

  The destruction by Russian warplanes on September 19, 2016, of a humanitarian convoy some six miles from Aleppo and the bombing of rebel-controlled living quarters and of hospitals located in that city must certainly be considered war crimes. Overall Russian policy in Syria should be recognized as a crime against peace and humanity.

  During the Cold War, the leaders of both camps, divided by the Iron Curtain, understood very well the danger of incorrectly interpreting the intentions of the other side and, to a greater degree, even the most insignificant unpremeditated military incident between the USSR and the United States. In that context, the current deployment in Syria of S-300 and S-400 antiballistic missile systems intended to prevent U.S. strikes against Syrian objectives appears to be a flagrant provocation directed toward further, possibly uncontrolled escalation of tension in Russian-American relations. The fanning of war hysteria by the Russian authorities, their announcement guaranteeing daily bread rations in Saint Petersburg in time of war, and their assurances that all residents of Moscow will be provided underground shelters together raise questions about the intentions of the Russian authorities and their competence.

  Until the recent past, extremely distressing references circulated regarding pre-perestroika Soviet foreign policy. Against the background of what is going on in Ukraine and in Syria, the exacerbation of relations with the West, unprecedented since 1966, Soviet policy during the Cold War looks comparatively rational.

  The situation became significantly more complicated after the start of Russia’s intervention in Syria in September 2015. And it would seem that the sudden declaration in March 2016 about cutting back the scale of this intervention provoked many questions and conjectures about why Putinocracy considered this necessary.

  It is possible, of course, that Putin wanted to end Russia’s isolation and, moreover, enter the international antiterrorist coalition as an equal member. But in that case, he did it in a very strange way—by primarily striking blows against the moderate opposition and by killing peaceful citizens, women, children. Moreover, the question arises: by doing so, isn’t Russia sustaining the Islamic State?

  The results of what is taking place in Syria are tragic. And without Putin’s active support of Bashar al-Assad, the bloodletting in this country might have ended. In the five years from the start of the civil war in Syria about 470,000 people have died and about 1.9 million have been wounded. About 13.8 million Syrians have been deprived of their livelihoods. All in all, 45 percent of the population have had to leave their homes, with 4 million having left the country and 6.4 million having become internally displaced persons.

  If anyone speaks of Russia’s return to the role of a world power, it is worth looking at the Syrian tragedy in a broader context. As noted, the Putin regime does not accept freedom and democracy. It despises the very possibility that a nation might freely choose its rulers or, even worse, overthrow them, especially if Putin considers them his allies. Here one may draw a parallel between Putin’s policies in Syria and Ukraine.

  Moreover, Putinocracy considers the EU a hostile organization and that the best thing to do is to destroy it. Everything else is no more than hypocrisy and intrigues. This I already knew from the time I worked on the staff of the Russian Security Council, and what I have seen later on basically comports with that given inclination. In saying this, I am by no means asserting that there were not persons who initially took opposing positions as a matter of principle. Among them I can name Igor Ivanov, who was then minister of foreign affairs of Russia and opposed seeing the EU as a threat.

  And now let us look at how Russia’s policy toward Syria played out in the EU.

  Europe was overwhelmed by a wave of terrorism. The most notorious acts of terror took place in Paris on January 7, 2015. Twelve persons, including two policemen, were killed and 11 wounded in the offices of the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo. On January 9 a terrorist seized a kosher grocery at the Vincennes Gates in Paris and took 15 persons hostage. Four people died. The largest-scale series of terrorist acts in Paris took place on November 13, 2015. In those acts, 130 persons died and more than 350 were wounded. On July 14, 2016, Bastille Day, a nineteen-ton truck killed 86 persons and wounded 308 by driving through a crowd that had assembled on the English embankment in Nice to observe France’s national day.

  There can be no doubt that the terrorist acts in Brussels on March 22, 2016—killing 31 and wounding 340—were closely connected to those in Paris. But why Brussels? The argument that many Arabs and many Muslims live there both clearly reveals racial and religious intolerance and is incompatible with a civilized worldview. The hypothesis about a conflict or even a war of civilizations looks more than doubtful in this context. We know that for a conflict to flare up, especially between cultures that until then had lived amicably together, someone had to have organized this conflict. After all these attacks are not part of a family quarrel that arose simply from a misunderstanding or the bad mood of some family member. Let us focus on the fact that, summing up, these terrorist acts were directed against democracy, freedom of speech, and religious freedom, which, incidentally, Muslims living in Europe fully enjoy. To this list, however, one must unfortunately add the issue of still extant anti-Semitism, as evidenced by the shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and another at the Grand Synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015.

  But let us return to the facts.

  As a result of the fighting in Syria, for which Russia bears considerable blame, a wave of a million refugees overwhelmed Europe in 2015. In this connection many EU countries experienced both domestic as well as inter-state problems. A split appeared in the solidarity of EU countries. And England voted to leave the EU in June 2016. The very foundations of European civilization, including humanism and the observance of international law, also came into question.

  When working on the staff of the Russian Security Council, in 1997 I encountered schemes by the special services to direct Islamic extremism and Islamic terrorism against Europe and the United States under the pretext that these phenomena were supposedly purposefully created by them and aimed against Russia. Are we perhaps not witnesses to the successful implementation of these schemes? But this is just one among a number of possible and rather vague conjectures.

  In any case, we possess the facts concerning Russia’s disruption of the attempt to end the civil war in Syria through diplomacy, then its military support of the Assad regime, and its deliberate or unintentional provocation of the most dangerous challenges and threats to European civilization. By taking the path of Cold War, revanchism, and high-handed rule, Russia has once more chosen a road that leads to self-destruction—to organizational self-destruction, since it is by no means a homogeneous empire, and to moral self-destruction, since the denial of what is humane in people and in politics signifies none other than the complete contempt for people on the part of Putin and his gang, as well as their dullness, their cruelty, and their greed.

  As demonstrated, contemporary Russia manifests all the symptoms of slipping into a thinly disguised form of totalitarianism, which, to a high degree for that country, is a synonym for terror. Most of all it takes the form of periodic actions against persons and organizations the authorities dislike. The Russian authorities cannot permit themselves to indulge in massive repressions; but in any case, they have no need to when it suffices to intimidate those who step out of line.

  Neo-stagnation may have extremely dangerous foreign policy consequences. Russia’s imperial ambitions will be further developed. Fortunately, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which are the objects of the Kremlin’s special hatred, are protected by membership in NATO and the European Union, but other post-Soviet countries are in a more vulnerable situation. The West, too, is under threat. By underestimating Moscow’s aggressiveness, Western leaders greatly assisted in strengthening the position of the hawks and their preparations for initiating a new Cold War. If the leaders of Western countries continue to take a relaxed view regardin
g Russian politics, then the consequences may turn out to be unfortunate. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, however, may have finally taken the scales from their eyes.

  With regard to Russia’s domestic politics, ultimately, neo-stagnation may either lead to a new wave of reforms and to a new perestroika, but in a new guise, or it may lead to an upheaval, the result of which may be the establishment of a genuine democracy, one not bestowed from above but seized from below. In case of an upheaval, regrettably, violence will be unavoidable, for those in power will not retreat without engaging in bitter resistance. However, for all of this, neo-stagnation will inevitably progress through certain stages of development that may take quite some time and require the passage of at least three generations.

  The most dangerous, and entirely probable, outcome of stagnation in Russia is disintegration. It is fraught with extremely serious consequences. Russia is a country saturated with nuclear and other weapons, potential Chernobyls, and discarded debris from the chemical industry. It is a country with a collapsing monoculture economy oriented to the export of oil and gas. It has been intellectually bled white from a brain drain and the authorities’ inadequate attention to science, art, education, and culture. It has promoted antagonisms throughout its own territories and among its own people along ethnic, religious, property-holding, and other lines. Apart from Moscow, too few components of the Russian Federation have a strong enough interest in preserving the country’s unity.

  In the event of a breakup of Russia, a number of new nuclear powers with serious disputes with other post-Russia states might arise on Russia’s present territory. Grave problems would inevitably arise over the disintegration of the armed forces and their infrastructure. (This was one of the arguments Russia used in annexing Crimea.) Moreover, the majority of post-Russia states would be headed by persons insufficiently schooled in military-political issues, and that situation might seriously elevate the threat of deploying weapons of mass destruction, to say nothing of the high risk of armed conflicts using conventional weapons. At the same time, it is very likely that the breakup of Russia would decrease the level of confrontation between the post-Russia states and their neighbors as well as with Western countries.

  The economy of the country would collapse once and for all. However, in the event the enormous territory breaks up into small states, under certain conditions their economies might revive for a historically brief period. The West would almost certainly be engulfed by a wave of refugees.

  The vertical of power that Putin created, and that serves as his insurance against democracy, is incapable of overcoming the breakup of the country. However, it guarantees the virtually universal accession to power of the siloviki and other corrupt officials with their characteristic mentality in the post-Russia states.

  In any case, environmental pollution will continue to present a serious danger. By the late 1990s, the ecology of Russia was already disastrous. For a long time Russian authorities did not want to devote sufficient attention to preserving the environment, and post-Russia authorities, even if they desired to do so, would be unable to address it. This enormous territory is turning into a constant source of global environmental pollution.

  Unfortunately, a pessimistic prognosis regarding Russia’s future may be altered only in the event of some sort of extreme situation occurring—for example, if those in power are overthrown due to a social upheaval during which the internal security forces and the army remain at least neutral. But who would come to power then? They could be rabid nationalists and “faithful Leninists,” but they could also be democratically inclined persons. This scenario has one indisputable advantage—the probable loss of power of the special services and other siloviki.

  There are additional reasons why Russia’s immediate future looks bleak. For example, the collapse of Russian science and primary through secondary education, as well as higher education, inevitably impacts the entire country. From the early Yeltsin period on, for some reason education has been considered almost unnecessary. The main goal now is to make money, preferably without having to work too hard. The miserable salaries of school and university teachers have produced a situation in which people simply purchase graduation certificates and diplomas, to say nothing of buying admission to institutes of higher learning. Furthermore, there has been a significant decline in the quality of professional teachers. The consequences are lamentable.

  The decline in the general level of education has been accelerated by attempts to compel all young men without exception to serve in the army. If these efforts succeed, this will surely lead to not only an intellectual but also a demographic disaster, considering that the army even recruits persons who are unfit for military service due to health reasons. There are not enough eligible others to sustain Russia’s enormous military organization.

  Scientific work has ceased to be prestigious. Therefore, young people are not attracted to it. There can be no science without a fundamental change of direction that averts its extinction, with all the ensuing fatal consequences for Russia and for world science.

  Considering that many Russian misfortunes are rooted in politics, both contemporary and past, it is appropriate to mention that in place of real politics, which Russia has not had for a long time, “political technological fixes” have been substituted that aim at achieving instantaneous results via any means. What kind of future awaits a country whose leaders for many years have given no thought to its relatively distant future; for whom people do not exist, only voters; and who substitute their personal interests and ambitions in place of the national interest?

  Can Russia escape a catastrophe? Yes. But for it to happen, there must be a miracle—that is, Russia’s genuine intellectual and moral elite must come to power. By “elite” I have in mind a new generation of persons of the caliber of Academician Andrei Sakharov, leading rights defender Sergei Kovalev, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Yakovlev, and other such honest, brave, and unselfish people. Several points should be noted here. First, contemporary Russian leaders and prominent politicians do not belong to this intellectual and moral elite. In reference to this particular political elite, one can only say they regularly and systematically violate all written and unwritten laws. Second, the ruling pseudo elite has driven the genuine elite out of the political arena as well as the arena of public opinion. Third, as far as it is able, the ruling pseudo elite denies the genuine elite access to the mass media and other sources of influence.

  In 1851 Alexander Herzen, the outstanding oppositionist to the tsarist regime, wrote, “Just one more century of despotism such as we have now, and all the good qualities of the Russian people will disappear. It is doubtful whether without a principle of active individuality, the people will preserve their national character, and the civilized classes their education.” For all the pessimism inherent in this pronouncement, Herzen did not envision the possibility of an incomparably more savage despotism. He could not even imagine such a thing. It is interesting that the Bolshevik dictatorship was aimed precisely at extirpating the principle of active individuality. But despite the mental devastation wreaked by the authorities, this very same principle of individuality remained intact, at least among some talented children, fleeing from the prevailing dullness, who chose paths that did not depend on the authorities—for example, music and chess, as well as activities to defend rights, and so forth. There were also exceptions among those in government service, including the most highly placed, even if they were considered “party loyalists.” The most outstanding examples are found in the splendid trio from the era of reformation: Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev.

  But Herzen was mostly right. In one guise or another, the dystopias of Yevgeny Zamyatin, George Orwell, and Aldous Huxley came into being on Russian soil and included the mass hypnosis of the people, the establishment of a “ministry of truth” and its reconstitution under Putin, the predicted substitution of “we” for “I,” the happiness in slavery, and the welding together of the
lower classes of society. Moreover, under Putin, stability—part of the main slogan of Huxley’s Brave New World—became the foundation of Russian politics.

  The main reason why Russia once again, as in Soviet times, has been caught in a maelstrom of violence, lies, and fear is because the people have been crippled by the authorities for generations. This very same maelstrom also has tried to swallow countries that were in geographic, economic, or political proximity to Russia itself.

  What could be more dangerous than the Russian authorities taking revenge for nonexistent threats and supposed insults? Especially when they live in an imaginary world light years from reality.

  Somewhere a hundred years ago, Russians lost such concepts as soul and conscience. There were eccentrics who wrote about this, such as Dostoevsky, for example. Now one of his books—namely, The Devils—especially pertains to the Russian authorities, for in it he calls the “right to dishonor” the most important and dangerous component of the revolutionary movement.

  On Russian soil the right to dishonor is not an empty phrase. It is just like the aforementioned mental devastation produced by hypnosis and manipulation. Precisely this combination led to the incalculable sufferings of the Soviet empire “from Moscow to the farthest borders,” as a popular song of Soviet times went. It is this degradation of national consciousness that is fraught with the greatest risks for everyone.

  Will Russia escape from the spiral of destroying itself and other countries? The repetitiveness of events in Russian history is fascinating, especially since every loop in this spiral leads to an ever-increasingly inhuman level.

  In the twenty-first century, Russia as never before has become a danger to itself and to those around it. I am not even referring to nuclear weapons; what is truly dangerous are elementary thoughtlessness, thriftlessness, and irresponsibility. They are dangerous in any industrially developed, well-armed, or simply densely populated country. Any one of these factors is capable, at a minimum, of producing serious consequences for its neighbors. Russia is a disintegrating ecological and chemical time bomb in which—under the influence of moral senility and the material disintegration of the state and its infrastructure—the incapacity and fecklessness of those responsible for its deployment and the security of themselves and those around them may have already armed the detonator.