The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty
Page 37
Moreover, the main strategy adopted by the Higher Arab Committee – namely, the general strike – not only failed to break the British authorities in the summer of 1936, it actually worsened the plight of the villagers and urban workers. The British responded with great brutality, destroying parts of ancient Jaffa, including the old port, ostensibly for reasons of sanitation but in reality as a collective punishment. The Zionists’ watchfulness and energy were as impressive as always. As soon as the Port of Jaffa was destroyed, they sought and obtained permission to build one of their own. When it opened, it destroyed the livelihood of Palestinians in Jaffa.
A different approach to the unfolding crisis was offered by the Husayni branch in the city of Gaza, led by the mayor, Fahmi al-Husayni (1887–1940). Having received his superior and university education in Istanbul, Fahmi returned to Palestine to become a prominent lawyer and jurist. He issued Palestine’s first scientific legal journal, al-Hokouk, in December 1923, which was published monthly in Jaffa, in addition to Gaza’s first bi-weekly newspaper, Sawt-al-Hak, in October 1928.73
He was a man of many talents and of independent mind. He translated major legal works from Turkish into Arabic such as Sharh Majallat al-Ahkam (commentaries on the Codified Hanafi Commercial Law, prepared in four volumes by Allama Ali Haidar).74 He projected himself into politics later by winning Gaza’s first municipal elections in 1928, and became mayor of the city for two consecutive terms until 1938, the year of his forced exile by the British to Sarafand where he died a year later on 25 December 1940. As mayor, he is credited for implementing major road and infrastructure works, the establishment of the first girl’s school in Gaza, as well as the urbanization of al-Rimal, Gaza’s current central district, extending the city’s borders to the sea front in an effort to thwart plans for Jewish colonization of the area.
Fahmi refused to take part in the strike, claiming it would only hurt the people of Gaza and not the government. The municipality of Gaza did not participate in the general strike of 1936 and continued to provide services to its citizens. On the other hand, he suggested a constructive approach, which was not adopted by the Jersualemites. In an open letter to Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, dated 10 May 1936, vehemently denouncing clandestine Jewish immigration and British sponsorship to the Zionist project, he put forward a series of proposals to achieve a peaceful solution to the Palestine question – in order to prevent “perpetual racial conflict” – covering inter alia the revocation of the Balfour Declaration, the proclamation of Palestine as a holy land where the rights of the three monotheistic religious communities are equally respected, the implementation of a single education system in Palestine, in addition to the appointment of an Arab government that includes Jewish members.75
His very perceptive understanding of the nature of the conflict was revealed later when he submitted a memorandum to the Peel Commission where he compared the plight of Palestinians to American First Nations.76
In the opinion of Awni Abd al-Hadi, the Nablusite leader of the pan-Arab party Istiqlal, al-Hajj Amin was being too passive. Having received the consent, perhaps even the encouragement, of the High Commissioner, he went in September 1936 to Transjordan to see Amir Abdullah. The Hashemite sheikh – who had astutely converted the southern Syrian province into a separate state in 1921, thereby preventing its inclusion in the Zionist enterprise – was beginning to play an important part in the history of Palestine. His pro-British stance made him acceptable to the decision-makers in London. He agreed to intervene in the Palestinian crisis: he could hardly resist the chance of becoming the king of Palestine instead of the ruler of a desert kingdom with some 300,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the uprising in Palestine might have spread and infected his kingdom.
But Abdullah did not wish to appear to be the sole mediator, and so he enlisted two more kings: his kinsman, the young King Ghazi of Iraq, and his rival Ibn Saud of Arabia. Al-Hajj Amin had earlier sought the help of Ibn Saud to no avail – the British representative in Jeddah had advised Ibn Saud to turn down al-Hajj Amin’s appeal.77 Confronted with this triple intervention, al-Hajj Amin willingly agreed to call off the strike and to respond to a British attempt at conciliation. Britain allowed the Arab kings to mediate while it continued to use military force against the rebels and strikers, thereby expanding the local conflict into a regional one.
In November 1936, Lord Peel, a liberal politician and the son of the Conservative Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, was appointed to head a commission of inquiry that would seek a solution to the problem of Palestine. It seems that the British government had been shaken by the fact that more Jews and Palestinians had been killed in a single month than during the entire period of the mandate. Though al-Hajj Amin called off the strike, he was not in position to cooperate with the commission. At first he tried, but he was insulted and withdrew. He was offended by the fact the commission met in the former Palace Hotel, which had been the apple of his eye before the King David Hotel opened. But chiefly he was angered by the attitude of Lord Peel, who must have forgotten that his purpose was to mediate, not to humiliate.
On 14 January 1937, al-Hajj Amin came to the hotel accompanied by many of the Higher Arab Committee. Said Qabani, one of the country’s best interpreters, was assigned to him personally. From the moment he began to testify, Lord Peel needled him and challenged each and every one of his arguments, beginning with his claim that in 1922 General Allenby had promised the country independence and ending with the avowed 1930 British policy that was never implemented.78
Consequently, the Higher Arab Committee boycotted the commission. The reasons for the boycott were, of course, more profound. The committee’s position was clear and would remain unchanged when the United Nations sent a Commission of Inquiry of its own in 1947: the cessation of immigration and land purchases were not subjects for negotiations but preconditions for negotiations, and the very willingness to negotiate should be seen as a concession on the part of those who were the original inhabitants of the country dispossessed by outside invaders.
But while boycotting the Peel Commission, al-Hajj Amin continued to seek channels of communication with the Zionists. This time it was Musa al-Alami, a member of a renowned family and a high official in the mandatory judiciary, who acted as intermediary. His contacts on the Zionist side were associates of Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the head of the political department, and were implicitly approved by Mapai (the dominant Zionist labor party). The contacts that took place in 1936 were intended to achieve a suspension of Zionist activity and a cessation of Palestinian resistance that would lead to substantive negotiations about the country’s future.79
But this round also ended fruitlessly. In the meantime, al-Hajj Amin found himself, inadvertently and perhaps unwillingly, the sole leader of Palestinian politics. Some of the leaders of the opposition had left the country because of the violence. Public opinion was no longer confined to the press – people were now forming groups to fight the strikebreakers and individuals suspected of having a moderate attitude towards Zionism. The remaining members of the committee resigned in protest at the mufti’s ‘mildness’. This criticism, and presumably the heated atmosphere, caused even Jamal to demand that the mufti take firmer action against the British.
This time it was Amin who was more cautious and who occasionally reined in Jamal’s fighting spirit. Jamal’s main activity was pressuring apolitical members of the family to join the national struggle. He persuaded the economist Muhammad Yunis to take on the directorship of the Agricultural Bank (a subsidiary of the Arab National Bank) and to join in on the effort to save Palestinian lands. He also convinced educator and journalist Abd al-Salam III to devote much of his time to national education and journalism.
Jamal remained a cautious leader even at the end of 1936, but not in his relations with opponents within the camp. One of the ugliest passages in the history of Palestinian internal politics began when the Nashashibis adopted a more extreme rhetoric and accused the mufti of cowardice. The newspa
per Al-Difaa wrote:
Antara and Hatim al-Tay [two famous Jahiliya poets] met on the road. Hatim asked Antara, ‘What is courage?’ Antara replied, ‘Put your finger between my teeth and take my finger between your teeth. You bite hard and so will I.’ They both began to bite down with all their might. ‘Stop, enough!’ shouted Hatim. ‘Courage is patience,’ said Antara. ‘If you had waited a moment until I cried out with pain, you would have been a greater hero than I. But you cried out first, so I am a greater hero than you.’ Oh, Arab! Your finger is in your enemy’s mouth and his finger is in yours. Be Antara and wait.80
These charges of cowardice stemmed from al-Hajj Amin’s refusal to adopt extreme measures, including an anti-British strike.81
The mufti did not support the strike and even managed to prevent government employees from striking. Nor did he support violent action, and until June 1936 he avoided inflaming the situation. Al-Hajj Amin also made a special effort to mitigate anti-Christian hostility, one of the bitter results of the fiery sermons of Izz al-Din al-Qassam. After the latter’s death his followers called for a jihad against the infidel Christians. Al-Hajj Amin had intervened and, by touring the mosques and speaking movingly about the Christians who had laid down their lives for Palestine, managed to nip that morbid growth in the bud.82
But in 1936, wherever al-Hajj Amin went the Nashashibis provoked outbursts that embarrassed him – whether in Jaffa, or at the Haram al-Sharif.83 Yet they did not undermine al-Hajj Amin’s election as chairman of the executive.
In June 1936, al-Hajj Amin began to move against his opponents. It was not weakness but rather a new sense of power that drove his campaign. The sense of power was born the previous month, when he summoned all the national committees that had formed that year and led the uprising in all the towns and cities in Palestine. The headmen of the surrounding villages came and swore loyalty to each of these committees, confirming their standing.
This gathering, representing all the Palestinians in the country, testified to al-Hajj Amin’s stronger position. He opened the meeting with the words, ‘In the name of Allah the merciful and compassionate, we open this national gathering with greetings to our wounded, and I ask you to stand up in remembrance of our fallen and say together the fatwa for their souls.’
Before the year ended, al-Hajj Amin had to repeat these words several times. He explained to his audience that Britain had broken all its promises, notably the promise made by the British government in 1930 to implement the recommendations of the Hope Simpson Commission. The national committee from Hebron agitated for stronger measures, such as a boycott on Jewish products and non-payment of taxes, but al-Hajj Amin seemed more concerned to move against his opponents than against the British. After the spate of national rhetoric, he invited his friends among the Higher Arab Committee to dine at his house. Over his favorite dish of lentil soup, they planned a campaign that included violent acts of vengeance. At the end of the month, al-Hajj Amin took the members of the Higher Arab Committee on a tour of the country, and wherever they went they received an ecstatic welcome.84
Following the successful tour, al-Hajj Amin gave the green light to eliminating several of his opponents. This unprecedented fratricide lasted for two years, until the summer of 1938. Among the targets were Khalil Taha, one of the directors of the waqf in Haifa, who had supported the Husaynis before switching to Istiqlal. He was assassinated in September 1936.85 Hassan Shukri, the mayor of Haifa, narrowly escaped assassination, unlike other less fortunate opponents. This chapter in al-Hajj Amin’s biography marred much of what he had done before. It seems he was personally responsible for establishing internecine terror as a means of control.
Another casualty of the campaign was Arif al-Asali, who in the summer of 1937 published a booklet calling for Arab–Jewish understanding. He was abducted from his house by the mufti’s bodyguards, tried and condemned to death. Only after his father, a district governor in Transjordan, made certain that his son would never engage in political activity for the rest of his life did the mufti allow him to be taken out of the well in the courtyard of his office, where he had been held. He was expelled to Beirut, where he died in 1990.86
In the summer of 1937, Lord Peel published his recommendations to divide Palestine up into a tiny Jewish state, an Arab state and a British protectorate, and to annex the Arab state to the kingdom of Transjordan. The opposition accepted the idea of a Hashemi annexation but rejected the partition. The mufti refused to become a protégé of the Hashemite kingdom and represented Palestinian public opinion well when he rejected the commission’s recommendations outright. Most of the Husaynis agreed with him, but not all.
Unlike the mufti, Jamal had no objection to Abdullah. He had visited the amir in May 1936 and persuaded him to demand the suspension of Jewish immigration as a precondition for his intervention in the Palestinian crisis. The amir’s consent increased Jamal’s confidence in the Hashemites. Indeed, the last time in the 1930s that Jamal was invited to a tea party at the High Commissioner’s, he told the guests that if the country had to be partitioned, it might be best for the Arab part to be given to Abdullah. ‘If only the Arabs and the Jews had known how to speak to each other,’ he said, ‘we would have reached an agreement.’ Al-Hajj Amin, on the other hand, adopted an openly anti-Hashemite attitude. In February 1937, he went on a Hajj in order to seek Ibn al-Saud’s help against Abdullah, and he even asked the Hijazi tribes to enter Transjordan.
Jamal spelled out for al-Hajj Amin the choices he was facing: either negotiations with the Zionist movement, forming a common front against the British, or an out-and-out fight against the British. Until August 1937 al-Hajj Amin allowed Jamal to try to get non-Zionist Jewish groups in the United States and the Brith Shalom group in Palestine to support voluntary Jewish restrictions on immigration and land purchases. That summer Jamal also tried to persuade the mandatory government to recognize the Palestinian leadership’s passionate opposition to immigration, especially illegal immigration. ‘It is especially curious’, he wrote to the government secretary, ‘that it is through the ports under government supervision that most of the illegal immigrants enter.’ In reply, the secretary decried the importance of the government-supervised ports.87
Almost without warning, the earth began to shake under al-Hajj Amin’s feet. It seems he was unaware how far the mandatory authorities were willing to go in their attempts to silence him. In July 1937, al-Hajj Amin saw the first indication that the British Empire regarded him as an enemy.
At daybreak on 17 July, armored vehicles of the British police surrounded the offices of the Higher Arab Committee, blocked all the streets leading to al-Hajj Amin’s house and encircled the entire neighborhood. The telephone lines were cut, and troops broke into the offices. Al-Hajj Amin had slipped out in time and was lying low at his former residence in the Old City, which adjoined the Haram al-Sharif and was an integral part of the main complex around the mosque of al-Aqsa. He sealed all the openings of the house except the tunnel that linked it to the mosque. Apparently the British authorities knew where he was hiding but decided not to act against him yet. He was still able to establish contact with the world at large and the Arab world in particular, his last gambits before the mandatory government eventually resolved to act decisively against him.
His first move after this attack should be viewed in light of these efforts to survive. In August al-Hajj Amin again asked Nazi Germany for help (he had been refused before). The new German consul in Jerusalem, Wilhelm Dalle, was more interested in this contact than his predecessor had been. Rumors had been coming in from German embassies in the Arab world that the Nazis were changing their attitude towards the Palestine conflict, and Musa al-Alami went to Berlin to find out if they were true. He discovered that the Nazi government was showing no sign of support or even interest in the problem. For al-Hajj Amin this was one of several attempts to strengthen the Palestinians’ international position. Israeli historiography would claim, with very little evidence, that b
y this time the mufti endorsed the Nazi ideology and was therefore looking for closer ties with Berlin. This accusation would be accepted in the West in general and in Britain in particular.88
When all these efforts failed, al-Hajj Amin attempted once more to rally the Arab world to the Palestinian cause, this time with more success than in the past. The growing Arab interest in Palestine neutralized Abdullah’s involvement in the country, eliminated the Hashemites’ clients (the Nashashibis) as an influential factor on the domestic scene and allowed al-Hajj Amin to maintain his position as the national leader of most Palestinians. Using the funds of the Supreme Muslim Council, in September 1937 al-Hajj Amin convened a pan-Arab conference at the Syrian resort of Bludan. Its 400 delegates supported al-Hajj Amin, assured him that he was a regional leader and urged him to launch an all-out revolt against Britain. It even helped him prepare an ambitious scheme for broad Arab support for military action.
It was an unofficial conference – in part because Britain and France had pressured Syria to disallow an official one – but it marked the beginning of external Arab involvement in Palestinian affairs. This involvement, however, consisted of much verbiage and little action, an impotency that contributed significantly to the disaster of 1948. The British apparently followed the conference with interest. Their consul in Damascus, Gilbert McGrath, had an agent in place who sent in daily reports in which he described the mufti as one of the empire’s main enemies in the region. After the Bludan Conference, the rift between the Palestinians and Britain was irreparable, and it severely damaged the Palestinians’ ability to influence London in their favor.