The First Clash

by Jim Lacey

Chapter 15: HOPLITE WARFARE

  1. A growth rate of 3 percent means Greece’s population doubled every generation.

  2. The development of colonization policies by many Greek cities helped to deal with this population explosion but never fully alleviated the land shortage.

  3. Whereas the literature available on Persian fighting methods is sparse, the sheer volume of material accessible for study on Greek and hoplite warfare may easily intimidate any interested historian. For the most comprehensive and authoritative study, Pritchett’s five volumes still set the gold standard; see Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, parts 1 through 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). However, for the most informative, readable, and thought-provoking works, see Hanson, Western Way of War; Victor Davis Hanson, ed., Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience (New York: Routledge, 1993); and van Wees, Greek Warfare.

  4. Also known as the Battle of the Golden Spurs, for the large number of these items removed from the dead French nobility.

  5. Quoted from the Annales Gandenses/Annals of Ghent, edited and translated by Hilda Johnstone (London: Oxford University Press, 1951). The complete passage can be found at http://www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/goldenspurs.htm/.

  6. In fact, in the following years, continuing even after the start of the gunpowder revolution, Swiss pikemen took the art of phalanx warfare to new heights. It is interesting, therefore, to note that Swiss society was also town based and that the canton is probably the closest political entity to a Greek city-state that has existed since the fall of Rome.

  7. The hoplon shield is where the name hoplite is drawn from.

  8. See Pritchett, Greek State at War, part 2, for an analysis of Greek military training (pp. 208–231).

  9. Sparta, of course, is an exception, as the helots provided the economic underpinning that allowed the Spartans to remain mobilized on a permanent basis. Furthermore, Athens’s switch to olives (requiring less attention than grains) and a greater reliance on trade probably allowed it to keep men under arms for a much greater period than the other city-states. Although it could not carry this burden or expense indefinitely, it was a decisive advantage in the two decades of war before the Battle of Marathon.

  10. See Peter Krentz, “Fighting by the Rules,” Hesperia 71, no. 1 (January–March 2002): 23–39.

  11. Of course, there were exceptions to these general rules, such as the Spartan conquest of Messina. Moreover, this restraint broke down in later generations, from the Peloponnesian War onward. Greek armies were much more likely to fight a battle of annihilation and persist in their wars for years or decades.

  12. Herodotus, 7.9.

  13. Only the Spartans were known to advance at a slow walk, kept in step and at an even pace by flute players.

  14. Euripides, Heracles, http://classics.mit.edu/Euripides/heracles.html

  15. The heretical view is a recent development whose main champion is G. L. Cawkwell. See: G. L. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber & Faber, 1978), pp. 150–153; and G. L. Cawkwell, “Orthodoxy and Hoplites,” Classical Quarterly, new ser., 39, no. 2 (1980): 375–389. Another follower of the heretical view is van Wees, Greek Warfare, pp. 184–197. For a concise essay expressing the traditional view, see A. J. Holladay, “Hoplites and Heresies,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 102 (1982): 94–103; and Robert D. Luginbill, “Othismos: The Importance of the Mass-Shove in Hoplite Warfare,” Phoenix 48, no. 1 (spring 1994): 51–61. Also see any of the classic works listed in the third endnote for this chapter for the traditional view (which I accept as the accurate one).

  16. Athenian hoplites at Marathon had been in a state of almost continuous war for the preceding two decades. It is therefore likely that they possessed individual fighting skills at least on a par with the Spartans.

  Chapter 16: THE WESTERN WAY OF WAR

  1. Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Doubleday, 2001); and John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

  2. Having admitted my conversion, I must also say that I found Lynn’s perspective compelling, and some of his statements paralleled my earlier misgivings on the topic, although he put them far more thoughtfully and lucidly than I was capable of at the time.

  3. See Lieutenant Colonel Bob Bateman, “Carnage, Culture, and Crapola,” posted on the website Altercation, October 22, 2007 (http://mediamatters.org/blog/200710220002/). In this essay, posted on several military history–related websites, Bateman says that Hanson better not take him on, as unlike Yale and University of Wisconsin professors, he is “an academic historian, with 18 years studying the field, and an Army Airborne Ranger.” Besides being a breakdown of civility, Bateman’s attack is an unusual way to characterize the work of one of the world’s foremost historians and an expert on classical Greek warfare. Despite this recent incivility, the debate is important and should not be surrendered to those who claim victory through tossing the most scurrilous invective.

  4. Similarly, the aerodynamic laws we worked with for two generations were proven wrong when it was shown that if they were applied to a bumblebee, its flight would be impossible—yet bees do fly. The laws were wrong, of course, but they were good enough to build long-distance aircraft and rockets for space travel. Economists also know that the model they use to explain global trade is wrong, but nothing better has come along yet, and as the model explains most market activity, it remains in use.

  5. Hanson, Carnage and Culture, p. 5.

  6. Lynn, Battle, p. 25.

  7. Recent studies have revolutionized our understanding of the so-called Dark Ages. It is now clear that far more was transmitted over these centuries than previously believed. See Chris Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome: Illuminating the Dark Ages, 400–1000 (New York: Penguin, 2009), and Peter Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

  8. Vegetius, The Military Institutions of the Romans, edited by Thomas R. Phillips (London: Kessinger Publishing, 2008).

  9. For the best recent work on the Dark Ages, see Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome.

  10. Lynn, Battle, p. 25.

  11. See the start of chapter 2 for a discussion.

  12. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe (New York: Mariner Books, 2009).

  13. Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: Presidio Press, 1995).

  Chapter 17: THE PERSIANS SAIL

  1. Herodotus tells us that the Saka fought at Marathon. It is possible that he picked up this contingent in Ionia, but I find it more probable that they were serving closer to Susa or Ecbatana at the time.

  2. Herodotus, 6.95. As noted earlier, historians have long debated Herodotus’s ship numbers. In this case, further doubt is cast on the numbers as so many ships were lost at Mount Athos. However, if we accept that the Persians had about six hundred ships at the Battle of Lade, even if over half of them were lost in storms and battle, they could easily have been replaced in the interval before the invasion. Remember, Darius would have been able to level the remaining ships of every Ionian city, along with everything the ports of Ionia and Phoenicia could produce.

  3. Herodotus, 6.95.

  4. Herodotus tells us (6.95) that the Persian fleet was six hundred “triremes.” This is open to dispute, but if it was accepted that the Persian fleet sailed without transports (highly unlikely for an army that took logistical concerns very seriously), then the size of the Persian army would be cut in half, unless space was made by removing sailors from a number of ships.

  5. The actual weight of a talent is still in dispute, with most guesses ranging between 75 and 150 pounds. On either end of the range this was a substantial offering, as frankincense was literally worth its weight in gold (or more).

  6. Transitioning a horse from fodder to gras
s too quickly can kill it.

  Chapter 18: THE PLAIN OF MARATHON

  1. While I believe the Persians fully intended to take a large number of Athenians into slavery, they had only enough transport for several thousand at most. It can therefore be assumed that Hippias would be left in charge of the remainder and that most of those enslaved would be enemies of the Pisistratidae clan. It is unlikely that the Athenians looking at what happened to Eretria were making such finely reasoned calculations. However, given the fact that the Persians had removed most of the tyrants in Ionia, it is hard to fathom why they would place one in Athens, as that was a sure recipe for future problems. In the end, we will never know the true reason Hippias was brought along, but it may have been just to give advice and in the hope that his presence could sow some dissension within Athens.

  2. Herodotus states that the prime reason the Persians selected Marathon was that it provided excellent ground for cavalry options. However, this is true of many possible landing sites on the Attic coast. Quite possibly Hippias used Marathon’s horse-friendly location as one of the reasons he presented to the Persians for selecting the site.

  3. A number of historians have declared that given the Persians’ overwhelming numbers, they landed near Eretria at the same time. They suggest Datis’s reason for waiting at Marathon was that he was waiting for Artaphrenes, with the other half of the army, to finish off Eretria and join him for a joint march on Athens. If this is accepted, then the reason the Athenians attacked before the Spartans arrived is that after the fall of Eretria, they had to make their move before the forces joined up. I, however, discount this entire theory, as there is zero evidence for it and its originator never presents an analysis of why it was possible, other than that he wished it that way (see F. Maurice, “The Campaign of Marathon,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 52, part 1 [1932]:13–24). Besides, it breaks a tenet of warfare that no ancient general would violate without good cause: Never split your army in the presence of the enemy!

  4. I learned this as a young officer, when my unit had a chance to attend the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School. While we were often able to sort out the confusion, it took time. If we had ever had to attempt it against a waiting enemy force, we would have been slaughtered. My respect for those who did this in World War II, under fire, rose by an order of magnitude after these experiences. Still, a number of classical historians state that such landings were a minor matter. For instance, one of the greatest of them, Arthur Munro, states: “It is scarcely credible that the Persians were afraid of the Athenians, that they doubted their own power to force a landing on the shore of the Sardonic Gulf. There can have been no insufferable difficulty in effecting a disembarkation at some point on so extensive a coast from so numerous a fleet. The advantage of an unopposed landing may have counted for something, but it cannot have been a reason for putting in at Marathon.” (See Arthur R. Munro, “Some Observations on the Persian Wars,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 19 [1899]: 187.) I for one can think of no greater nightmare scenario than to be still unloading his ships as a phalanx bore down on him. As learned as Munro was in classical literature, his unfamiliarity with military affairs leads him to say a number of ridiculous things about Marathon, and I have thereby been forced to discount him as a serious source, although many since him have followed his path.

  5. A tactic the Britons tried against Caesar’s 54 BC invasion of their lands.

  6. Of course, Datis could have viewed this as an advantage, as once he had posted it with good troops, it would be impossible for the Athenians to march down on his landing site.

  7. At the very least, the Marathoni (residents of the deme of Marathon) would probably have been in the area, and there were at least several hundred hoplites in this group. This would be one of the groups that Hippias would have expected to come over to him (Munro would find fault with this, as he believes the deme was part of the Aiantis tribe, not known as strong supporters of the Pisistratidae). To find them strongly outposted at the exit of the plain and unalterably opposed to his return accounts for his pessimism on the beachhead better than the reason Herodotus presents (a quaint story of him coughing up a tooth, which he uses to interpret a dream that predicts his failure to return to power).

  8. Munro claims that the Persians’ failure to send forces to secure the passes proves that they had no intention of marching on Athens. It apparently never occurred to him that the Athenians may have already been on the passes when the Persians arrived. Besides, the Persians had come a long way and gone to a lot of unnecessary bother if they were not planning to march on Athens.

  9. Some historians have stated that Athens could not have mustered its forces in a central location, as it would have been impossible to feed them for any lengthy period of time. Therefore the hoplites must still have been at their homes or at least scattered widely, and it would have taken a considerable amount of time to mass them. This theory, however, neglects some basic facts. By this time, Athens was importing over half of its wheat supply, which was stored in granaries in Piraeus (Athens’s port) or Athens, for distribution as required to the rest of Attica. As the harvest was not in yet, Attica was probably subsisting almost entirely on this food supply. In fact, by concentrating the army to the food stores, the distribution of food was probably greatly eased.

  10. The Decree of Miltiades; see Plutarch (Moralia, 628e) and Aristotle’s Rhetoric (3.10.7) (http://www.attalus.org/info/moralia.html).

  11. One historian has made the case that protecting their land was probably not a factor in the Athenian decision, as “the land near Marathon was not good enough for the Greeks to risk an army for its protection.” Apparently, he believes the Persians would be content to lay waste to Marathon and spare the rest of Attica. And he neglects to consider that no matter how poor the soil was, it was all Athens had. They would surely fight for it, as they did many times before and after Marathon. See W. R. Loader, “Questions About Marathon,” Greece & Rome, 16, no. 46 (January 1947): 17–22. Loader goes on to conclude that the Athenian army was tricked into going to Marathon by those who wanted the Persians to win. They figured the best way to accomplish this was to send the army out to certain destruction.

  12. Or if the grain had been harvested, it was stored in easily destroyed granaries throughout Attica.

  13. I am aware that Victor Davis Hanson has addressed this issue and declared it near impossible. In chapter 16, I explain why I believe Hanson, despite his unparalleled knowledge of Greek warfare, has erred in this regard.

  14. I will not enter into the debate on whether Herodotus meant Pheidippides and not Philippides. Athens employed a contingent of professional runners to deliver messages who were famous for their ability to run all day.

  15. Laws iii, 692d–698e.

  16. For an excellent analysis of this position, see W. P. Wallace, “Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 74 (1954): 32–35.

  17. It is remarkable how many historians neglect the fact that Athens did have its own small cavalry force (that was not present for the main battle), along with thousands of light troops that were particularly well suited to the job of exterminating foraging parties.

  18. Although I had witnessed this myself on several military operations, I tended to block it from my mind when I reflected on events afterward. If I had thought about it, I would have remembered that after fighting and feeding, sanitation (another delicate term for the problem) was the third major concern for any unit. How important a factor it is was brought home to me in an absolutely hysterical essay by First Sergeant Ron Gregg. The article is entitled “SCHITZSQUIE,” and a copy can be found in the book War on Two Fronts by Chris Hughes (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2007).

  19. N. G. L. Hammond makes the case that the Greeks took this route, but given the military disadvantages such a route would have encumbered them with, I do not find his reasoning convincing. See N. G. L. Hammond, “The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 88
(1968): 13–57. Norman Doenges agrees with him, but his reasoning is also suspect, as it places the three-mile difference in the route at the center of his argument. However, in this case, a three-mile-shorter route does not equate to less marching time. The longer route, being a much better road over flat ground, would have allowed the Athenians the fastest approach to Marathon. See Norman A. Doenges, “The Campaign and Battle of Marathon,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 47, no. 1 (1998), 1–17.

  20. The location of the Grove of Herakles was a matter of great dispute for a number of years but has now been definitively located by Eugene Vanderpool, in the southeast corner of the Plain of Marathon. See Eugene Vanderpool, “The Deme of Marathon and the Herakleion,” American Journal of Archaeology 70, no. 4 (October 1966): 319–323.

  21. Herodotus, 6.109.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Herodotus, 6.110.

  24. Even though this is not certain.

  25. And if he had been dead or infirm, they would have turned to someone else who had distinguished himself in these earlier fights.

  26. A possible answer to the question of why Miltiades got so much of the credit for victory if Callimachus was the real hero of the day is given in chapter 11.

  27. His son Cimon later had a statue erected in honor of his father’s “victory” at Marathon, which is notable as the first work of Athens’s greatest sculptor, Phidias.

  28. Nicholas Sekunda, Marathon 490 BC: The First Persian Invasion of Greece (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), p. 10. For an excellent discussion of the memorial and the breakthrough 1940 discovery that allowed it to be understood, see A. E. Raubitschek, “Two Monuments Erected After the Victory of Marathon,” American Journal of Archaeology 44, no. 1 (January–March 1940): 53–59.

  29. Cornelius Nepos in his brief biography of Miltiades confirms some of this: “The next day, having set themselves in array at the foot of the hills opposite the enemy, they engaged in battle with a novel stratagem, and with the utmost impetuosity. For trees had been strewed in many directions, with this intention, that, while they themselves were covered by the high hills.” The trees could only be abittis, designed specifically to impede cavalry. One can easily picture the hoplites moving forward while hundreds of light troops or slaves move along the flank, placing abittis in depth to stop the Persian cavalry from sweeping into the Greek rear—or, alternatively, making sure that greater Persian numbers could not easily overlap the undefended flank of the phalanx. The reliability of Nepos has come into question, as he was writing five hundred years after the event. However, for a source he probably used Ephorus (who was writing much closer to the Battle of Marathon); and besides, the Greeks had used abittis in the past, and it made good sense to use them now. For anyone who wants Nepos’s short biography, an English translation may be accessed at: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/nepos.htm#Miltiades/. For an interesting essay on the reliability of Nepos and his sources, see W. W. How, “Cornelius Nepos on Marathon and Paros,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 39 (1919): 48–61.