by Noah Raford
If the warlord entrepreneur problem is a wicked problem, do we simply accept it as a new norm and move on to other areas of inquiry? That would certainly be the easy way out of our dilemma, but hardly satisfying and definitely not worthy of us and our society. There are questions and avenues to explore, solutions to be sought, for if we have anything to offer, we are certain to touch lives and help improve the human condition. Maybe the state will be strengthened and warlord entrepreneurs significantly weakened as we move forward in exploring the problem. Maybe the warlord entrepreneurs will prove more adaptive and resilient than we might imagine. And maybe additional digging into the topic will lead to our uncovering more problems and more issues to confront in the near and far futures rather than leading us to useful insights, offering probative understanding, and allowing for the design of effective countermeasures and solutions. Maybe. But the potential remains for generating insights that can help society and political structures evolve in a beneficial way, allowing insights generated to be leveraged for the greater good. For this reason alone, the essays in this book offer a starting point for digging deeper into the dynamics of governance and warlord entrepreneurialism and for asking the questions that still need to be asked.
Notes
Foreword
1 Forrest D. Colburn, Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 120.
2 William Gibson, Burning Chrome (New York: Ace Books, 1987), 116.
3 Charles Tilly, et al, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” Bringing the State Back In, edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 169–91 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
4 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 197.
Introduction
1 “Cali Cartel Fronts International Network”, Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/js9152.pdf, (2003).
2 Paul Kaihla, “The Technology Secrets of Cocaine Inc.,” Business 2.0, (2002).
3 Elaine Shannon, “The Cali Cartel: New Kings of Coke,” Time, (1991).
4 Adriaan Alsema, “Cali Crime Statistics,” http://colombiareports.co/cali-crime-statistics/ (2013).
Chapter 2. Social and Economic Collapse
1 Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Norman Yoffee and George Cowgill, eds., The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson: U of Arizona, 1988).
2 Martin J. Rees, Our Final Century: Will the Human Race Survive the Twenty-first Century? (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 2003); James Martin, The Meaning of the 21st Century: A Vital Blueprint for Ensuring Our Future (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006); Vaclav Smil, Global Catastrophes and Trends: The Next Fifty Years (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); Chris Patten, What Next? Surviving the Twenty-First Century (London: Allen Lane, 2008).
3 See, for example, Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the Renewal of Civilization, (Washington: Island Press, 2006).
4 This is not to propose, however, an abandonment of scholarly work focused on the negative impact of the absence of a monopoly over violence.
Chapter 3. Innovation, Deviation, and Development
1 For further reading on global guerillas, see John Robb, Brave New War (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2008).
Chapter 4. Sovereignty, Criminal Insurgency, and Drug Cartels
1 According to Gary King and Langche Zeng, “Improving Forecasts of State Failure,” World Politics, 53, (July 2001): 623-658.
2 Jack A. Goldstone, Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 1, (2010): 190–208.
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Threat of Narco-Trafficking in the Americas,” (October 2008).
4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The Globalization Of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” June 2010.
5 UNDOC, (2008): 1.
6 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society (Volume I), (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); The Power of Identity (Vol. II), (Blackwell: Malden, MA, 2004); and The End of Millennium (Vol. III), (Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2008).
7 John Arquila and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
8 John P. Sullivan, “Criminal Netwarriors in Mexico’s Drug Wars,” GroupIntel, 22 (December 2008), at http://www.groupintel.com/2008/12/22/criminal-netwarriors-in-mexico’s-drug-wars/.
9 Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
10 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture: The Rise of the Network Society (Volume I), (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); The Power of Identity (Vol. II), (Blackwell: Malden, MA, 2004); and The End of Millennium (Vol. III), Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2008); Manuel Castells, Communication Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, “Globalization, the knowledge society, and the Network State: Poulantzas at the millennium,” Global Networks, 1,1, (2001).
11 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, (New York: Knopf, 2002) and Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Knopf, 2008).
12 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009) and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Conceptualizing Crime as Competition in State-Making and Designing an Effective Response,” (Speech at Conference on Illicit Trafficking Activities in the Western Hemisphere: Possible Strategies and Lessons Learned, Brookings Institution, 21 May 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0521_illegal_economies_felbabbrown.aspx.
13 Saskia Sassen, The Global City, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Saskia Sassen, “Neither Global nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights,” Ethics & Global Politics, Vol, 1, No. 1–2, 2008, p. 61.
14 Robert J. Bunker, (Ed.), Networks, Terrorism, and Global Insurgency, (London & New York: Routledge, 2005) and Robert J. Bunker, (Ed.), Criminal States and Criminal Soldiers, (London & New York: Routledge, 2008).
15 Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities—The New Strategic Environment,” Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, No. 4, (2003).
16 Ivan Briscoe, “Trouble on the Borders: Latin America’s New Conflict Zones,” (Madrid: FRIDE, July 2008).
17 Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, (El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008) and Max G. Manwarning, A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies, (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2009).
18 Eric Hobsbawn, Bandits, (New York: The New Press, 2000).
19 Phil Williams, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy, (Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2008) and Gregory O’Hayon-Baudin, “Big Men, Godfathers and Zealots: Challenges to the States in the New Middle Ages,” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, May 2003).
20 See John Agnew, Globalization & Sovereignty, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) and Macur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, (New York
: Basic Books, 2000).
21 UNDOC, 2010.
22 John P. Sullivan, “Criminal Insurgencies in the Americas,” Small Wars Journal, 13 (February 2010).
23 UNDOC, 2010.
24 John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Info Ops: Power and Counter Power in Mexico’s drug War,” MountainRunner, (15 November 2010) at http://mountainrunner.us/2010/11/cartel_info_ops_power_and_counterpower_in_Mexico_drug_war.html.
25 John P. Sullivan and Keith Weston, “Afterward: Law Enforcement Responses for Criminal-states and Criminal-soldiers,” Global Crime, Vol. 7, No. 3–4. (April-November 2006), 615-628.
26 John P. Sullivan and Carlos Rosales, “Ciudad Juárez and Mexico’s ‘narco-culture’ Threat,” Mexidata, (28 February 2011) at http://mexidata.info/id2952.html.
27 John P. Sullivan, “Terrorism, Crime, and Private Armies,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 11, No. 2/3, (Winter 2002), 259-253.
28 John P. Sullivan, “Post-Modern Social Banditry: Criminal Violence or Criminal Insurgency?” (Paper presented to Drug Trafficking, Violence and Instability in Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean: Implications for US National Security, University of Pittsburgh and Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Pittsburgh, PA, 29 October 2009) and John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, (February 2010).
29 World Bank, “Governance Matters 2009: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2008” at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Chapter 5. From Patronage Politics to Predatory States
1 U.S. District Court of California, United States v. One Michael Jackson Signed Thriller Jacket and Other Michael Jackson Memorabilia; Real Property Located on Sweetwater Mesa Road in Malibu, California; One 2011 Ferrari 599 GTO, Case No. CV 13-9169-GW-SS, October 10, 2014, www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/attachments/2014/10/10/obiang_settlement_agreement.pdf.
2 Maïa de la Baume, “A French Shift on Africa Strips a Dictator’s Son of His Treasures,” New York Times, August 23, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/world/europe/for-obiangs-son-high-life-in-paris-is-over.html.
3 UNDP Human Development Report 2014: Equatorial Guinea, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/GNQ.pdf.
4 Stanislav Andreski, The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernisation, (London: Michael Joseph, 1968).
5 De la Baume, “A French Shift on Africa Strips a Dictator’s Son of His Treasures.”
6 Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Roland Hodler, Bradley C. Parks, Paul A. Raschky, and Michael J. Tierney, “Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” Working Paper 3, AidData, November 2014, http://aiddata.org/sites/default/files/wps3_aid_on_demand_african_leaders_and_the_geography_of_chinas_foreign_assistance.pdf.
7 Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African Affairs 97, no. 388 (1998): 305–41.
8 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
9 M. Utas, “Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts,” introduction to African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. M. Utas (London: Zed Books, 2012), 1–31.
10 H. Vigh, “Critical States and Cocaine Connections,” in African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, ed. Mats Utas (London: Zed Books, 2012), 145.
11 K. Annan, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa,” United Nations General Assembly Security Council, April 13, 1988, S/1998/318, 4, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20A%2052%20871.pdf.
12 Leonardo R. Arriola, “Patronage and Political Stability in Africa,” Journal of Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 10 (2009): 1339–62.
13 World Bank, “Vulnerability to Violence,” in World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 74–89. http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01306/web/fulltext.html.
14 International Crisis Group, Mali: Avoiding Escalation, Africa report no. 189, July 18, 2012, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/189-mali-avoiding-escalation-english.pdf
15 International Crisis Group, Mali: Reform or Relapse, Africa report no. 210, January 10, 2014, 1, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/mali/210-mali-reform-or-relapse-english.pdf.
16 Bridges from Bamako, “IBK One Year On: A Voter’s Remorse,” September 5, 2014, http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2014/09/05/ibk-one-year-on-a-voters-remorse.
17 Diarra Soumali, “Mali Government Pressured to Make Arrests in Bribery Scandal,” Reuters, November 7, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201411071845.html.
18 IRIN News, “Nearly 25 Million Food Insecure in the Sahel,” October 29, 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100769/nearly-25-million-food-insecure-in-sahel.
19 Martin Meredith, The State of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 374–76.
20 Akpan Hepko, “Economic Development under Structural Adjustment: Evidence from Selected West African Countries,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 7, no. 1 (1992), 25–43.
21 Global Witness, Time for Transparency: Coming Clean on Mining, Oil and Gas Revenues, March 2004 www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/oil_061.04.04.pdf.
22 Economist, “China Investment Fund: The Queensway Syndicate and the African Trade,” August 13, 2011, www.economist.com/node/21525847.
23 S. Ibi Ajayi and Leonce Ndikumana, Capital Flight from Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
24 Africa Progress Panel, Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All, Africa Progress Panel Report 2013, www.africaprogresspanel.org/publications/policy-papers/africa-progress-report-2013.
25 James S. Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited: New Estimates for Missing Global Private Wealth, Income, Inequality and Lost Taxes, Tax Justice Network, July 2012, www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf.
26 Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, “Cocaine Politics in Guinea Bissau: The Link between Drug Trafficking and Political Fragility and Its Wider Implications,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs (January 25, 2013), http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/cocaine-politics-in-guinea-bissau.
27 “Mauritania Police Chief Jailed over Cocaine Ring,” BBC News, February 12, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8512195.stm.
28 “Jackie Selebi: South Africa’s ‘Corrupt’ Police Chief,” BBC News, July 2, 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/news/10489457.
29 Rukmini Callimachi, R., “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York Times, July 29, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html.
30 Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, February 2014).
31 I. Briscoe, Crime after Jihad: Armed Groups, the State and Illicit Business in Post-Conflict Mali (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, May 2014), 29.
32 West Africa Commission on Drugs, Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa, June 2014, 20–22.
33 Peter Gastrow, Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion
in Kenya (New York: International Peace Institute, 2011), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2562.pdf.
34 Moisés Naím, “Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137529/moises-naim/mafia-states.
35 Aimee-Noel Mbiyozo and Tuesday Reitano, Unholy Alliances: Organized Crime in Southern Africa, report of an expert seminar hosted by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Cape Town in April 2014, www.globalinitiative.net/unholy-alliances-organized-crime-in-southern-africa.
36 Jakkie Cilliers, “Africa, Root Causes and the ‘War on Terror,’ ” African Security Review 15 no. 3 (2010): 57–71.