76. Figures taken from Bankers Trust Company, French Public Finance; Apostol, Bernatzky and Michelson, Russian Public Finances.
77. Calculated from the figures in Flora et al., State, Economy and Society, vol. i, pp. 345–449.
78. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 403.
79. Calculated from the figures in Mitchell and Jones, Second Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp. 160 f.
80. For a review of the figures, see Abelshauser, ‘Germany’, table 4.4 and pp. 133–8. Cf. Overy, War and Economy, p. 203. Figures for the Reich budget can be found in James, German Slump, table XXXV.
81. Petzina, Abelshauser and Faust (eds.), Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch, vol. iii, p. 149; Hansemeyer and Caesar, ‘Kriegswirtschaft und Inflation’, p. 400.
82. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 388.
83. Defence accounted for a larger proportion of central government expenditure in Germany in the 1960s, but only because much non-military expenditure was carried out at the regional rather than the federal level. Cf. the figures in Flora et al., State, Economy and Society, vol. i, pp. 345–449.
84. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 45.
85. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 145, 164 ff.
86. O’Brien, Power with Profit, p. 35. It should be emphasized that estimates for national income or national product even for the later twentieth century must be treated with caution, as the margins for error remain large even in the best national statistics. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century estimates used in this chapter and elsewhere are often little more than educated guesses. Here and elsewhere percentages which use historic national product data as the numerator carry a statistical ‘health warning’.
87. Calculated from figures in Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, p. 345.
88. See Ferguson, Pity of War, pp. 105–18.
89. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 644.
90. IISS, Military Balance 1992–1993, p. 218.
91. Financial Times, 15 June 2000.
92. Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army, quoted in Calder (ed.), Wars, p. 340.
93. Pennington, ‘Offensive Women’, p. 253.
94. Beevor, Stalingrad.
95. Overy, Battle.
2. ‘Hateful Taxes’
1. Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste le Roy, 13 November 1789.
2. Capra, ‘Finances of the Austrian Monarchy’, p. 306.
3. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 32 f.
4. Ibid., pp. 49 f., 53 ff.
5. Hocquet, ‘City-State and Market Economy’, pp. 87 f.; Körner, ‘Public Credit’, p. 515.
6. Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, p. 116.
7. Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p. 542.
8. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 365.
9. Ibid.
10. Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, p.42.
11. Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p. 547; Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, p. 192.
12. Hobson, National Wealth, p.19.
13. Hart, ‘Seventeenth Century’, p. 284; Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 448.
14. Ibid., p. 451.
15. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 456.
16. Ibid, p. 460.
17. Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, p. 329.
18. Ferguson, World’s Banker, ch. 2.
19. Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament, p. 140.
20. Calculated for the period 1801–1914 from the figures in Mitchell and Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp. 392–5.
21. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 402.
22. Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament, p. 140.
23. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 490.
24. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 503.
25. Pryce-Jones, War That Never Was, pp. 78 f.
26. Paddags, ‘German Railways’, pp. 9, 22 f., 28.
27. Calculated from figures in Webb, Hyperinflation and Stabilization in Weimar Germany, pp. 33, 37.
28. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, p. 40.
29. Horne, Macmillan, p. 627.
30. Crafts, ‘Conservative Government’s Economic Record’, p.29. See in general, Yergin and Stanislaw, Commanding Heights, esp. pp. 114 ff.
31. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 32 f.
32. Ibid., pp. 49 f., 53 ff.
33. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p.32.
34. Ibid., pp. 40 ff.
35. Hilton, Corn, Cash and Commerce, passim.
36. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, esp. pp. 21–60.
37. O’Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, pp. 98 f., 114 f. Cf. Weiss and Hobson, States and Economic Development, p. 124.
38. Brown, ‘Episodes in the Public Debt History’, p. 234.
39. James, ‘Ende der Globalisierung?’, p. 76.
40. James, Globalization and its Sins, p. 104.
41. James, ‘Ende der Globalisierung?’, p. 69.
42. James, Globalization and its Sins, p. 124.
43. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, vol. ii, pp. 476–80.
44. Research by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner conclusively demonstrates that open economies grew six and a half times faster than closed economies in the 1970s and 1980s: Prospect, May 2000.
45. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 32 f.
46. Ibid., pp. 49 f.
47. Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, p. 112; White, ‘Failure to Modernise’, p. 9.
48. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 164 f.
49. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 54 ff.
50. Hellie, ‘Russia’, p. 502.
51. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 61 ff.
52. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 490.
53. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 74 ff.
54. Buxton, Finance and Politics, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
55. Quoted ibid., p. 19.
56. Compare O’Brien, Power with Profit; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 102 f.; and Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, pp. 572 ff.
57. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 498.
58. See Morrissey and Steinmo, ‘Influence of Party Competition’, pp. 199 f.
59. Isenmann, ‘Medieval and Renaissance Theories of State Finance’, pp. 47 f.
60. Schulze, ‘Sixteenth Century’, pp. 274 f.
61. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 489.
62. Ibid., pp. 433, 435.
63. White, ‘France and the Failure to Modernize’, p. 13; Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 75.
64. Hart, ‘Seventeenth Century’, pp. 289 f.
65. Ibid., p. 51.
66. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 74 ff.
67. Rudé, Crowd in History, pp. 38 ff.
68. Hentschel, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 164 ff.
69. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 402.
70. Shy, ‘American Colonies’, pp. 312 f.; Conway, ‘Britain and the Revolutionary Crisis’, pp. 327 f. The taxes were projected to raise just £110,000, of which £50,000 would have come from the West Indies: Clark, ‘British America’, p. 153.
71. Chennells, Dilnot and Roback, ‘Survey of the UK Tax System’, p. 2.
72. INSEE website.
73. Chennells, Dilnot and Roback, ‘Survey of the UK Tax System’, pp. 7, 22, 25.
74. Kay and King, British Tax System, p. 129.
75. The figures in 1979 were: diesel, 49 per cent; cigarettes, 70 per cent; spirits, 77 per cent; wine, 47 per cent; and beer, 34 per cent: Chennells, Dilnot and Roback, ‘Survey of the UK Tax System’, p. 8.
76. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, p. 120.
77. HMSO, Social Trends 1995, table 5.15.
78. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 106.
&
nbsp; 79. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1999, table 503; Chennells, Dilnot and Roback, ‘Survey of the UK Tax System’, p. 2.
80. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 107.
81. Seldon, Dilemma of Democracy, pp. 76–86.
82. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 472 ff., and ‘France, 1494–1815’, p. 130.
83. Hellie, ‘Russia’, pp. 496 f.
84. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 32 f.
85. Ibid., pp. 60 ff.
86. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 21; Ormrod and Barta, ‘Feudal Structure’, pp. 58 f.
87. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 29; Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, p. 104.
88. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, p. 91.
89. Ibid., pp. 123 ff.
90. Ibid., p. 117.
91. Bonney, ‘Early Modern Theories of State Finance’, p. 204.
92. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, p. 226.
93. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 475 ff.
94. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 61 ff.
95. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 483.
96. Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, pp. 158 f.
97. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 479 ff.
98. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 381.
99. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 49 f. 53 ff.
100. Smith, Wealth of Nations, bk. V, ch. 3. The other canons were that taxes should be certain (i.e. predictable), convenient to pay and cheap to collect.
101. ‘La contribution commune … doit être également répartie entre tous les citoyens en raison de leurs facultés.’
102. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 60 ff.
103. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 30.
104. Hocquet, ‘City-State and Market Economy’, pp. 87 f.
105. Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, p. 130, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, pp. 321 ff., and ‘Revenues’, pp. 479 ff. For Vauban’s scheme to replace all French taxes with a 10 per cent income tax see Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, vol. iii, p. 308.
106. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, p. 86.
107. Ibid., p. 89.
108. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, p. 112.
109. Inland Revenue, ‘Brief History’, p. 2.
110. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 46; Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p.50.
111. Buxton, Finance and Politics, pp. 43 ff.
112. Matthew, ‘Mid-Victorian Budgets’.
113. Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, pp. 116 ff.; White, ‘France and the Failure to Modernize’, p. 8.
114. Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, pp. 554 f.
115. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 433.
116. Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution, pp. 46, 98.
117. Balderston, ‘War Finance’, p. 236.
118. Witt, ‘Tax Policies’.
119. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, p. 100.
120. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 478 ff.
121. Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, p. 115.
122. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 485.
123. Ibid.; Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, p. 164.
124. Matthew, ‘Mid-Victorian Budgets’.
125. Murray, ‘“Battered and Shattered”’.
126. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 479 ff.
127. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, pp. 107 f.
128. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 70. The biggest allowances in 1990 were capital allowances, mortgage interest relief and the married man’s allowance, the first two of which were increased under Margaret Thatcher: ibid., pp. 71, 84.
129. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 348.
130. Brown, ‘Episodes in the Public Debt History’, p. 236.
131. Inland Revenue, ‘Brief History’, p. 7.
132. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 97.
133. According to Engen and Skinner, a reduction of 2.5 per cent in the average tax rate would raise the growth rate by about 0.2 per cent through effects in capital accumulation and technological change: Engen and Skinner, ‘Taxation and Economic Growth’.
134. Duncan and Hobson, Saturn’s Children, pp. 88 f.
135. Social Trends 1991, table 5.12.
136. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, p. 502; O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 61 ff.
137. Buxton, Finance and Politics, vol. i, pp. 39–42.
138. Maloney, ‘Gladstone’, p. 40 f.
139. Figures from Flora et al., State, Economy and Society, vol. i, p. 339.
140. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 402.
141. Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, p. 165.
142. Schremmer, ‘Taxation and Public Finance’, p. 402 (calculated from ordinary and extraordinary revenue).
143. Ibid., p. 390.
144. Burns, Complete Letters, p. 214.
145. Burns, Poems and Songs, pp. 168 f., 602 f.
146. Ibid., p. 523. ‘We’ll make our malt and we’ll brew our drink, / We’ll laugh, sing and rejoice, man; / And many loud thanks to the big black devil, / That danced away with the Exciseman.’
147. Fowler, Burns, pp. 142 f.
148. Burns, Complete Letters, pp. 435–8.
3. The Commons and the Castle: Representation and Administration
1. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, part II, chs. 12, 13. Cf. Bonney, ‘Early Modern Theories of State Finance’, p. 192.
2. Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, passim.
3. Wagner, Die Ordnung des Österreichischen Staatshaushalts (Vienna, 1863), cit. James, ‘Ende der Globalisierung’, p. 74.
4. Schumpeter, ‘Crisis of the Tax State’.
5. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 32 f.
6. Quoted in Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p. 545.
7. Ormrod, ‘West European Monarchies’, p. 143.
8. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, pp. 20, 29.
9. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 171 ff.
10. Quoted in Gelabert, ‘Fiscal Burden’, p. 539.
11. North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, pp. 810–14.
12. Sharpe, Personal Rule of Charles I, pp. 105–30; Adamson, ‘England without Cromwell’, pp. 120–22.
13. North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’, pp. 815 f.
14. Ormrod, ‘England in the Middle Ages’, p. 20.
15. Henneman, ‘France in the Middle Ages’, p. 107. The name of the French currency franc (‘free’) originated with the coins used to pay the ransom.
16. Bosher, French Finances, p. 3.
17. Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, p. 131; Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution, p. 49.
18. Ibid., pp. 99–114.
19. Finer, History of Government, vol. iii, pp. 1490 f.
20. Shy, ‘American Colonies’, p. 313.
21. Winch, ‘Political Economy’, p. 15.
22. See Clark, ‘British America’, esp. pp. 150–59.
23. Conway, ‘Britain and the Revolutionary Crisis’, pp. 332, 335.
24. Hoffman and Norberg (eds.), Fiscal Crises, p. 306.
25. See in general Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. ii.
26. Quoted in O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 61 ff.
27. Filipczak-Kocur, ‘Poland-Lithuania’, passim.
28. Bonney, ‘Struggle for Great Power Status’, pp. 347 f.
29. Buxton, Finance and Politics, vol. i, pp. 12–15.
30. Inland Revenue, ‘Brief History’, p. 1.
31. Matthew, ‘Mid-Victorian Budgets’.
32. Maloney, ‘Gladstone’, p. 33.
33. Figures in Mitchell and Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp. 392–5, 427–9.
34. McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p. 275 n.
35. Quoted ibid., p. 270 n.
36. Clarke, ‘Keynes, Bucha
nan and the Balanced-Budget Doctrine’, p. 76.
37. Ibid.
38. Peacock and Wiseman, Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom, p. 67.
39. Calculated from figures in Butler and Butler, British Political Facts, pp. 213–19; Jamieson, British Economy, p. 145.
40. Hogwood, Trends in British Public Policy, p. 98.
41. Crafts, ‘Conservative Government’s Economic Record’, pp. 23 ff.; Jamieson, British Economy, pp. 146 ff., 158. The total tax burden including national insurance was reduced from a peak of 40 per cent of GDP in 1981 to a low of 33.8 per cent in 1994, though the figure had been 35.5 per cent in 1979, and by 1995 it had once again risen above that level. On the other hand, the proportion of total tax accounted for by indirect taxation rose from 33 per cent to 41 per cent between 1985 and 1995; income tax now accounts for around 26 per cent of the total.
42. Flora et al., State, Economy and Society, vol. i, p. 112.
43. Ibid., vol. i, p. 126.
44. Goldsmith, Premodern Financial Systems, pp. 123 ff.
45. Ibid., pp. 94–107.
46. Compare Elton, Tudor Revolution in Government, and Williams, Tudor Regime.
47. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, pp. 61 ff.
48. Bosher, French Finances, p. 8.
49. Winch, ‘Political Economy’, pp. 9 ff. Cf. Mathias and O’Brien, ‘Taxation in Great Britain and France’, pp. 606 f.
50. White, ‘France and the Failure to Modernize’, pp. 18 f.
51. Schama, Citizens, p. 73.
52. Schulze, ‘Sixteenth Century’, p. 272.
53. Carruthers, City of Capital, p. 111.
54. White, ‘France and the Failure to Modernize’, p. 26.
55. Hart, ‘Seventeenth Century’, p. 292; Bonney, ‘France, 1494–1815’, pp. 131 ff., 152 f.
56. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, p. 74.
57. Bonney, ‘Revenues’, pp. 442 f.
58. O’Brien and Hunt, ‘England’, p. 57.
59. Weiss and Hobson, States and Economic Development, p. 45.
60. Brewer, Sinews of Power, p. 66.
61. Bosher, French Finances, esp. pp. 303–18.
62. Wallerstein, Modern World-System, vol. iii, p. 82 n.
63. Schama, Citizens, pp. 73, 76 f.
64. Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 244.
65. Kafka, Castle, pp. 244 f.
66. Canetti, Torch in My Ear, pp. 245 f.
67. See in general Caplan, Government Without Administration.
68. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s Table Talk, pp. 237 ff.
The Cash Nexus: Money and Politics in Modern History, 1700-2000 Page 58