Predator

by Richard Whittle

  Big Safari’s game: Knotts and O’Malley, “The Big Safari Program Story … as Told by the Big Safari People.”

  taken by surprise: David A. Fulghum, “Quiet USAF Organization Fields Covert Spycraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 24, 2000, p. 176.

  Of forty U.S. aircraft: David A. Fulghum, “Creating the Plan to Crack Iraq’s Antiaircraft Defenses,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 24, 2000, p. 177.

  Big Safari studied: Author interviews with William D. W. Grimes.

  DarkStar crashed: “DarkStar—High Altitude Endurance UAV,” paper presented by Harry A. Berman, DARPA HAE UAV Program Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, at Unmanned Vehicles ’87 Conference and Exhibition, Paris, France, June 12–13, 1997.

  Meermans talked regularly: Author interviews with former representative Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.) and Letitia White, Michael Meermans, and William D. W. Grimes.

  House Intelligence Committee’s report: The fiscal 1998 legislation also abolished the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, an umbrella organization superimposed in 1994 over the Navy Joint Program Office to handle funding for all UAV programs.

  committee’s report: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,” 105th Cong., 1st Sess., 1997, report 105–135, part 1, p. 30.

  directed to install laser designators: “Point Paper on Predator Laser Designator,” drafted by Maj. Mark Mattoon of Big Safari, April 19, 1999.

  pilots were soon having trouble: Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 2001), pp. 21–22.

  Clark even had a TV: Author interview with Gen. (Ret.) Wesley Clark, June 18, 2013.

  General Clark, who was peering: Ibid.

  his immediate response: Clark remembered the incident much as Short did, but with the key difference that Clark recalled being in Aviano at the time, while Short thought Clark placed the call from Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) headquarters in Belgium.

  Short admitted: The story as Short told it to the AFA was repeated in Maj. Todd P. Harmer, USAF, “Enhancing the Operational Art: The Influence of the Information Environment on the Command and Control of Airpower,” master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, June 2000, p. 87; and again in Lt. Col. Michael W. Kometer, USAF, “Command in Air War: Centralized vs. Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower,” doctoral dissertation for the degree of doctor of philosophy in technology, management, and policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 2005, p. 100n54.

  “Invent it”: Author interviews with Col. (Ret.) James G. “Snake” Clark and Gen. (Ret.) Michael E. Ryan. The account of Ryan’s phone call was recalled by Clark and was verified by Ryan.

  some in Congress had proposed: H.R. 3230, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, as passed by the House; also letter from Rep. Curt Weldon to Lt. Col. Sean M. Frisbee, USAF, May 24, 2004, provided to the author by Frisbee.

  His 110-page master’s thesis: Capt. Brian Dean Raduenz, “Digital Signal Processing Using Lapped Transforms with Variable Parameter Windows and Orthonormal Base,” thesis presented to the faculty of the School of Engineering of the Air Force Institute of Technology, Air University, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of science in electrical engineering, December 1992.

  Bahrain Hilton: The date and hotel information were supplied by Raduenz from travel vouchers and airline boarding passes he kept.

  officer at Big Safari’s headquarters: Mattoon, “Point Paper on Predator Laser Designator.”

  at a premium of roughly 40 percent: Author interview with William Casey, the Raytheon Corp. engineer who managed the company’s work on the projects to adapt the AN/AAS-44(V) and MTS laser balls for use on the Predator, November 8, 2013.

  commander refused to let his crews: Grimes, The History of Big Safari, p. 331.

  “not my kind of warrior”: Author interview with Grimes. The 11th Reconnaissance Squadron commander at the time, Lt. Col. Dana Richards, declined several requests for an interview, but in an e-mail exchange with the author replied that Grimes’s “comment displays his ignorance in what authorities I had. Big Safari trained a select group to employ the WILD Predator. The software was different, the hardware was different. I did not have the authority to decide who could and could not fly the aircraft.” Richards also suggested the chief of staff of the Air Force would have had to issue a waiver to permit a “conventional crew” from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron to operate an aircraft using “red line” technical orders, meaning maintenance and crew manuals that have not been “validated and verified.” Others involved in the WILD Predator deployment side with Grimes on the question.

  On May 4, 1999: Details of the tests at Indian Springs come from an e-mail from Raytheon engineer William M. Casey sent to Air Force Lt. Col. Sean Frisbee on May 3, 2004, when Frisbee was working on a master’s thesis about the Predator. Frisbee provided this e-mail from Casey and dozens of other documents related to his thesis. The author is deeply grateful.

  When the team later watched: A copy of the nose camera video is in the author’s possession.

  Snake Clark used his pull: Author interview with Werner.

  Only on June 2: The June 2 date comes from a Bronze Star justification narrative for Col. Stanley Shinkle. A document provided by Snake Clark pinpoints the date as June 4. Neither document, unfortunately, is definitive.

  never got closer to combat: In a 2011 academic paper for the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, the author incorrectly reported, based on documents that included Shinkle’s Bronze Star medal citation and on interviews later determined to be misinterpreted or inaccurate, that the WILD Predator crew followed a tank or some other armored vehicle to the building bombed by the A-10 and buddy-lased the target. (Richard Whittle, “Predator’s Big Safari,” Mitchell Paper 7, Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Mitchell Institute Press, August 2011, pp. 15 and 41n.) Subsequent interviews have established to my satisfaction that no actual enemy target was ever buddy-lased by the WILD Predator team, but an A-10 was directed to and bombed a derelict building in a proof-of-concept exercise. The author regrets the error in the Mitchell Institute paper.

  daily maintenance report for June: “Operation Joint Forge WILD Predator in Action, Bosnia-Herzegovina European Resort Travel Provided by Big Safari Maintenance Report, Current as of 2 July 1999,” copy in the author’s possession.

  7: THE SUMMER PROJECT

  killing 213 people: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), p. 308.

  CIA’s Counterterrorist Center: The original name of the CIA Counterterrorist Center, “counterterrorist” with a “t” on the end, was changed in 2005 to Counterterrorism Center, with an “m” on the end. See Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013), note on page “Principal Characters.”

  No evidence: Wright, Looming Tower, p. 308.

  killed twenty to thirty people: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, authorized edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 117.

  decided against a strike: Ibid., pp. 126–31.

  administration officials were wary: Ibid., p. 141.

  In early April: Author interview with Allen, who pinpointed the time as early April 2000.

  Gration had asked Fry: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 189; author interviews and e-mails with Ambassador and Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Scott Gration.

  Pavitt also made it clear: Author interview with Allen.

  “I want to try something else”: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 524.

  “I will take the message back”: Author interv
iew with Allen.

  Clarke had sent a memo: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 187.

  killing dogs: Wright, The Looming Tower, p. 343; also Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda (New York: Free Press, 2011), p. 222.

  Four weeks later: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 506, n. 113.

  imposed by the White House: Ibid., p. 189.

  in Uzbekistan: Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 77; author interviews with participants.

  issued retroactively: Special Order GD-09, which officially created the 32nd Expeditionary Air Intelligence Squadron, was issued on behalf of the commander, U.S. Air Forces Europe, by Maj. Gen. Stephen Lorenz, director of plans and programs, on January 16, 2001, but made retroactive to August 1, 2000. “The verbal orders of the commander are confirmed, circumstances prevented written orders in advance,” the document explained. Copy in the author’s possession.

  “If anything goes wrong”: Author interview with Col. (Ret.) Edward J. Boyle.

  Wallace thought: Author interview with Col. Ginger Wallace.

  Computer terminals lined the walls: Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York: Penguin, 2012), p. 152.

  Black told Crumpton: Ibid., p. 153.

  Berger wrote: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 189.

  he saw no downside: Author interview with Richard A. Clarke.

  Clarke was utterly fascinated: Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004).

  killing seventeen: Wright, Looming Tower, p. 361; Kirk S. Lippold, Front Burner: Al Qaeda’s Attack on the USS Cole (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), p. xxi.

  certain the United States would strike: 911 Commission Report, p. 191.

  neither the CIA nor the FBI: Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 223.

  President Clinton later wrote: William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 925.

  Summer Project officially ended: Author interview with Gration.

  strategy paper about Al Qaeda: Richard A. Clarke, “Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: Status and Prospects,” p. 8, partially declassified in 2004, accessed at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/clarke%20attachment.pdf, July 9, 2012.

  8: THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP

  Then Jumper talked: C. R. Anderegg, Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001), p. 56.

  the wonder of laser guided weapons: Anderegg, Sierra Hotel; and author interviews with C. R. Anderegg.

  On April 27, 1972: Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), p. 489.

  he strongly supported: Jumper’s April 28, 1999, Combat Mission Needs Statement for the laser designator addition to the Predator is referenced in Capability Development Document for MQ-1 Predator Multi-Role Remotely Piloted Aircraft System, Increment 2, ACAT II, March 12, 2004, copy in the author’s possession.

  billed his Air Armament Summit: Commerce Business Daily, October 25, 1999, PSA #2461, and December 10, 1999, PSA #2493.

  Maybe, he reasoned: Author interview with Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Michael C. Kostelnik, USAF, April 18, 2011.

  A PowerPoint slide: Weaponized UAV Demonstration, PowerPoint presentation by Brig. Gen. Kevin Sullivan, Air Armament Center vice commander, March 16, 2000, Air Armament Summit 2000, copy in the author’s possession.

  Jumper sent an announcement: “Air Combat Command message to Headquarters USAF et al., Subj: RQ-1, Predator, Program Direction,” May 1, 2000, copy in the author’s possession.

  Contrary to later accounts: P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin, 2009). In Wired for War, Singer asserts on page 35 that the “CIA armed its Predators and the Air Force decided that it couldn’t be left behind.” In Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence, pp. 156–57, the author writes that after being refused permission to send commandos into Afghanistan to capture or kill bin Laden, “I realized that arming the Predator was perhaps our only chance of achieving our lethal mission.” He also writes that CIA officers chose the Hellfire, a choice made by Jumper based on briefings produced by Big Safari, according to Jumper, those who prepared the briefings, and the dates on the briefings.

  revealed Jumper’s decision: “Air Force Plans Demonstration of Predator’s Ability to Drop Bombs,” Inside the Air Force, May 26, 2000.

  “its long-term viability remains in question”: Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation,” PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 2000, p. 546.

  “All I wanted to do”: Author interviews with Gen. (Ret.) John P. Jumper, USAF, April 2010.

  first launch: Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance Drones, p. 184.

  The Navy, meanwhile, cancelled: Newcome, Unmanned Aviation, pp. 86–88. Details on weapons tests using the QH-50 DASH can be found in “Summary of ARPA-ASO, TTO Aerial Platform Programs: Volume 11, Remotely Piloted Helicopters,” Report No. A-4642-II, Task No. 44, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Tactical Technology Office Contract No. DAAHOI-/2-C-0982, ARPA Order No. 2209, July 1975.

  Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty: “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),” accessed at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text.

  authority solely over “nonlethal” drones: Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1988, Senate Report 100–235, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 250.

  as Weldon later wrote: Letter from Rep. Curt Weldon to Lt. Col. Sean M. Frisbee, USAF, May 24, 2004. Weldon wrote the letter when Frisbee was researching his 2004 master’s thesis, “Weaponizing the Predator UAV: Toward a New Theory of Weapon System Innovation,” School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 2004.

  Raggio told Kostelnik: More details on Raggio’s decision can be found in Whittle, “Predator’s Big Safari,” pp. 15–19.

  two experimental ones: The one-hundred-pound cruise missile was the Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS), which was being developed at the time by Lockheed Martin Corporation as an Air Force Research Laboratory project. The LOCAAS was later cancelled.

  Jumper got a briefing: “Predator Weaponization Decision Brief,” Col. Bob Dehnert, ASC/RA, June 21, 2000, copy in the author’s possession.

  leaders were especially sensitive: Tom McLemore, “New Start Notification,” American Society of Military Comptrollers (Washington chapter newsletter), June 2000; and House Report of the Committee on Appropriations, July 20, 1999, report 106–244, p. 9.

  Jumper turned to Tom Cassidy: Author interviews with Jumper and Cassidy.

  “wants to make rapid progress”: Jumper’s explanation comes from a memo Dehnert wrote the next day to his immediate superior, “Memo for AFMC/CC, Subject: Predator/Hellfire Demo, Baseline vs. Accelerated, Robert E. Dehnert Jr., Colonel, USAF, Director, Reconnaissance SPO,” copy in the author’s possession.

  On July 28: “Predator UAV Program—HELLFIRE Monthly Acquisition Report,” November 2000, copy in the author’s possession.

  Because the Hellfire would get away: Dr. [Lawrence J.] Delaney [SAF/AQ] Predator/Hellfire Demo Status Update, August 16, 2000, Col. Bob Dehnert.

  Predator 3034: Predator MQ-1L 97-3034 flight records, on file at the National Air and Space Museum, Washington, D.C.

  lawyers issued a legal opinion: Predator/Hellfire Demo Status Update briefing, Maj. Ray Pry, ASC/RAB, October 25, 2000.

  e-mail to Jumper and others: E-mail from Lt. Gen. Stephen Plummer, principal deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, to Gen. John Jumper et al., “Subject: Predator Weaponization,” September
23, 2000, copy provided to the author by Air Force Public Affairs.

  the ACC commander e-mailed: E-mail from Gen. John Jumper to Gen. Michael Ryan, “Subject: Predator Weaponization,” September 24, 2000, copy provided to the author by Air Force Public Affairs.

  9: HELLFIRE AND HESITATION

  China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station: China Lake fact sheet, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, accessed at http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=AB5BB400-266F-4410-8733-7D90BCA793C1.

  Clarke … pointed out: Author interview with Richard Clarke.

  on January 2: Timeline of Predator 3034 modification and Hellfire testing provided to the author by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.

  Reaching Mach 1.3: The missile speed calculations were provided to the author by former Army Hellfire engineer Terry McLean.

  crashed Predator 3023 at Nellis: “Predator UAV Destroyed by Crash During Testing at Nellis Last Week,” Inside the Air Force, September 21, 2000; and author interview with Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ken Kilmurray.

  finished on December 29: Clarke, “Strategy for Eliminating the Threat,” was classified on December 29, 2000, eight days after Big Safari Director Bill Grimes was told that the conflict with the INF Treaty had been resolved and the Hellfire project could proceed. Clarke’s memo was declassified in part on April 7, 2004.

  Clarke sent the new national security adviser: Richard A. Clarke, “Information Memorandum for Condoleezza Rice, From: Richard A. Clarke, Subject: Presidential Policy Initiative/Review—The Al Qida Network,” classified January 25, 2001, declassified in part April 7, 2004.

  For three full days: Author interviews with participants.

  The unarmed missile traveled: Christopher Dusseault, “Predator Hellfire Live Fire Demonstration,” paper presented by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc., engineer Christopher Dusseault, to the Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, August 1, 2001.

  draft an order: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 210.

  paint a target from five miles: Author interviews with William M. Casey.

  offered a dry assessment: Timeline of Predator 3034 modification and Hellfire testing provided to the author by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.