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The decision for war, endorsed in Berlin almost before it was made in Vienna, came on July 5, 6, and 7. For the next fifteen days, while the Austrian government drafted its ultimatum to Serbia, Berlin pressed for haste. Jagow, returning on July 9 from his honeymoon, told the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin that “the proposed action against Serbia42... should be taken without delay.” On July 12, Tschirschky called on Berchtold “principally to impress41 upon the Minister once more, emphatically, that quick action was called for.” Day after day, Tschirschky returned to Berchtold, exhorting haste. Germany did not understand why Austria should neglect this opportunity for striking. Threats were hinted: “Germany would consider43 our further negotiating with Serbia a confession of weakness on our part and this would damage our position in the Triple Alliance and might influence Germany’s future policy.” The Wilhelmstrasse was distressed to learn that the Emperor Franz Josef refused to mobilize his army until the ultimatum to Serbia had been drafted, sent, and rejected. The German General Staff was chagrined to hear that the Austrian Army required sixteen days to complete mobilization once the Emperor gave the order. By Prussian standards, Austria was going to war frivolously.
Berlin had another concern beyond fear that Austria might lack the will to deliver the blow. It was that the other Powers might find out what was intended and take steps to prevent it by proposals of mediation. Together, Berlin and Vienna met this possibility by constructing an elaborate façade of deception and lies. Summer aided the stratagem: leading officials of the German government were on vacation. Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, was in Karlsbad taking a cure; Tirpitz was taking a holiday in Switzerland; Jagow, who had been honeymooning, returned to Berlin as the War Minister, General von Falkenhayn, departed. Bethmann was said to be studying the stars from the porch of his house in Hohenfinow, although during the month he often travelled secretly to Berlin. The All Highest was cruising beneath the high cliffs and plunging waterfalls of the Norwegian fjords. These absences helped promote the pretext which the Bavarian Minister in Berlin privately reported to his superiors in Munich: “The Imperial [German] administration will, immediately upon presentation of the Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade... claim that the Austrian action has been just as much of a surprise to it as to the other Powers, pointing out the fact the Kaiser is on his northern journey and the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War are away on leave of absence.” Vienna employed the same tactic: throughout the crisis, the Emperor Franz Josef remained at his hunting lodge at Bad Ischl; on July 8, after the decision for war had been made, Berchtold told Conrad, “It would be a good thing45 if you and the War Minister would go on leave for awhile so as to keep up an appearance that nothing is going on.”
During the two weeks in which the Austrian ultimatum was drafted, the German government was kept fully informed. Later, attempting to avoid responsibility for the outbreak of war, the Wilhelmstrasse claimed that it had been unaware of the Note’s contents until it was distributed generally to all the Powers. In fact, although Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow did not read the actual language of the Note until July 23, they knew it was intended not as a basis for negotiations, but as a prelude to war. On July 14, Tschirschky informed Bethmann: “The Note is being composed46 so that the possibility of its acceptance is practically excluded.” This could not, of course, be revealed to the other Powers. To avoid alarming the rest of Europe and to create the impression that Berlin, like other capitals, was wondering how Vienna would respond to Sarajevo, the Wilhelmstrasse deliberately and repeatedly lied to foreign diplomats in Berlin and, through its own ambassadors, to the foreign ministers of other governments. When the British, French, and Russian ambassadors or chargés d’affaires called at the Foreign Office to ask what Germany knew of her ally’s intentions, the Wilhelmstrasse soothingly declared that it regarded the situation with tranquillity; were not the Kaiser, the Chancellor, and all the military chiefs on vacation? Accordingly, the British and Russian ambassadors in Berlin also went on vacation. On July 21, Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador, specifically asked Jagow whether he knew anything about the contents of the Austrian Note known to be in preparation. The State Secretary “assured me he knew nothing,”47 Cambon later wrote. To the Russian Chargé, Jagow declared vehemently that he had no foreknowledge of the nature of the Austrian Note. The Austrian government practiced the same deception. On July 18 in St. Petersburg, when Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov summoned the Austrian Ambassador and asked for news, the Ambassador “spoke in the most peaceable manner48 of an entire absence in Austria of an intent to render relations with Serbia more acute. He [the Ambassador] was as gentle as a lamb,” Sazonov recorded. Three days later, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna was assured that he too could leave on vacation; the Note to Serbia, he was assured by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, would make no demands which might lead to international complications. Even Italy, Germany’s and Austria’s Triple Alliance partner, was deceived. Fearing leaks, or worried that the Italians would object—the Triple Alliance was a defensive pact and did not come into play if one of the three allies was itself the aggressor—the Wilhelmstrasse gave the Italian Ambassador no hint of the approaching storm.
Behind this façade, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was carefully crafted. Europe knew that something was coming; the Entente Powers counseled moderation. On July 21, Sazonov told Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, that Russia would do its best to persuade Belgrade to make reasonable amends, but he warned that the Austrian Note must not be an ultimatum. In London the next day, Sir Edward Grey declared that “everything would depend49 on the form of satisfaction demanded and whether moderation would be exercised.” England would exert pressure on Serbia to meet Austria’s demands, providing “they are moderate and made reconcilable50 with the independence of the Serbian nation.” Because its demands were anything but moderate, the timing of the Note was crucial. Originally, in response to German pressure for haste, the date had been set for July 18. Then Berchtold remembered that from July 20 to 23 President Raymond Poincaré of France would be in St. Petersburg, making a state visit. The Austrian Foreign Minister decided on caution: “We should consider it unwise51 to undertake the threatening step in Belgrade at the very time when the peace-loving, reserved Tsar Nicholas and the undeniably cautious Herr Sazonov are under the influence of the two who are always for war, Isvolsky [then Russian Ambassador in Paris] and Poincarè.” Accordingly, delivery of the note was timed to coincide with the departure of the French President from the Russian capital: July 23 at five P.M. The ultimatum had a time limit of forty-eight hours and would expire at the same hour on July 25. (Later, to be certain that Poincaré would be at sea, delivery of the note was delayed one hour, until six.)
When the ultimatum was handed over in Belgrade, the Serbs—expecting chastisement but not abasement—were stunned. The note charged that “the murder of Sarajevo52 was prepared in Belgrade.” It contained ten demands, each involving infringement of Serbian sovereignty: All Serbian publications critical of Austria-Hungary must be suppressed. All schoolbooks presenting “propaganda against Austria-Hungary”53 must be withdrawn. All Serbian government officials, army officers, and schoolteachers holding these views must be dismissed; specific officials and officers named in the note must be arrested. These changes must be monitored inside Serbia by Austrian officials.
The demands were those that a defeated state might expect to receive from a victor. At least one Austrian was candid about the nature and implications of the note. “Russia will never accept it,”54 said the Emperor Franz Josef. “There will be a big war.”
Copies of the ultimatum were distributed to the Foreign Ministry in every capital on the morning of July 24. Sir Edward Grey characterized it as “the most formidable document55 ever addressed from one state to another.” In St. Petersburg, Count Sazonov angrily told the Austrian Ambassador, “You are setting fire56 to Europe!” In the days that followed, a race developed between the Entente Powers, despe
rately trying to stave off war by establishing a basis for mediation, and the German government, relentlessly pushing Austria to begin the war before these mediation efforts could bear fruit. Seeking room to maneuver, Grey and Sazonov immediately asked that the time limit be extended. The request was rejected. Vienna informed St. Petersburg that Russia seemed to hold the “mistaken idea”57 that Austria’s “Note to the Powers had been sent out with a view to learning their opinion of the case. All we intended was to inform the Powers of our step and thus conform to international etiquette. We consider our action as an affair which concerns exclusively us and Serbia.” Berlin grimly approved this approach and demanded war. “Here every delay58 in the beginning of war operations is regarded as increasing the danger that foreign powers might interfere,” telegraphed the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin. All German diplomats steadfastly repeated the falsehood that the Wilhelmstrasse had had no previous knowledge of the contents of the Austrian Note; Jagow said this “very earnestly”59 to the British Chargé in Berlin.
Unaware that Germany and Austria were determined on war, both England and Russia brought pressure on Serbia to be conciliatory. The Serbs, said Grey, should “give a favorable reply60 on as many points as possible within the time limit.” Sazonov urged Belgrade to make all concessions compatible with the dignity of the nation, and counselled that if war came, Belgrade put aside any idea of armed resistance, allow itself to be occupied, and appeal to the Powers for protection through mediation. Privately, Sazonov admitted that the Serbs deserved “a lesson.”61 Ultimately, however, the Russian Foreign Minister was not prepared to see Serbian independence abolished. To the German and Austrian ambassadors, he insisted that the issue was an international one and that any Austro-Serbian war could not remain localized. He proposed arbitration, to be placed in the hands of Germany, Italy, Britain, and France; later Tsar Nicholas suggested that the matter be placed before the International Court in The Hague. Russia was willing to accept any compromise which left Serbia with its sovereignty intact. The Serbian government recognized that many of Austria’s demands would have to be met. Even before the ultimatum was received, Belgrade had informed the Powers that Serbia “would only be unable to comply62 with such demands as were inconsistent with the dignity and independence of the Serbian nation.” By noon on the twenty-fifth, with only six hours remaining before the ultimatum expired, Serbia informed the British and French ambassadors in Belgrade that it intended to accept Austria’s demands with only minor reservations.
When the Serbian reply to Austria’s ultimatum was handed to Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, it contained submission on every point except one: the demand that Austrian officials be allowed to participate in the judicial inquiry into the plot which had resulted in the Archduke’s assassination; this, the Serbs protested, would be a violation of their constitution and of their laws of criminal procedure. Wherever the reply was read, in Europe and in the United States, it was regarded as a remarkable concession to overbearing demands. The Serbs enhanced their submission by offering, if the Austrians agreed, to submit the entire issue either to the Great Powers for arbitration or to the International Court at The Hague. Serbian accommodation, of course, was the last thing desired by Vienna and Berlin. Giesl was handed the Serbian reply at 5:58 P.M. He glanced at it only long enough to note the Serbian refusal to permit Austrian participation in the judicial inquiry. Here were sufficient grounds for war. Giesl reached for his bag, already packed, and boarded the regular six-thirty train which left Belgrade and crossed the Danube into Austrian territory. From there, he telegraphed Vienna. As soon as it was known in Vienna that Giesl had left, the city erupted in celebration. Crowds paraded through the streets, singing patriotic songs. Austria-Hungary was to crush the Serbian “viper.”
Diplomatic relations were severed, but war had not been declared. The Entente Powers continued their efforts to mediate. On July 26, Grey sent telegrams to Berlin, Paris, and Rome, proposing a Four Power Conference in London. France and Italy immediately accepted; the Germans brusquely declined. The Kaiser announced that he would participate only at Austria’s express request, which he doubted would be forthcoming “since in vital matters63 people consult nobody.” In Vienna, the British offer was shunned. After the severing of relations with Serbia, Berchtold departed for Bad Ischl to report to the Emperor—and to elude Entente ambassadors anxious to talk of mediation. Austrian officials left behind constantly repeated the official argument that the issue concerned only Austria and Serbia and that “action had been forced64 on Austria-Hungary.”
The Dual Monarchy was resolved on a final reckoning with its neighbor; war had been decided upon and the support of Germany promised. The Austrian government’s inability to establish the complicity of the Serbian government in the crime at Sarajevo had become irrelevant. Indeed, Count Berchtold thought it wise to conceal, both from Berlin and from his own Emperor, the report of Herr Wiesner, an official he had dispatched to Sarajevo to investigate the circumstances of the assassination. “There was nothing to prove65 or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian government’s cognizance of the steps leading to the crime,” Wiesner had reported.
For three weeks, the Supreme War Lord of the German Empire cruised amidst the natural grandeur of the Norwegian fjords, relaxing by listening to lectures on the American Civil War. William was not absent by choice. Urged by Bethmann to leave Berlin after the historic decision of July 5, the Kaiser was kept away because the Chancellor, seconded by Jagow, felt that the crisis could be better managed without the presence of the excitable Kaiser. On July 18, when the possibility of William’s return was raised, Jagow said: “We cannot afford to alarm66 the world by the premature return of His Majesty.” William continued to cruise the waters of the Utenefjord, receiving only scanty information from Berlin, until he learned what was happening:
“While I was on my summer vacation trip67... I received but meagre news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to rely principally on the Norwegian newspapers from which I received the impression that the situation was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to the Chancellor and the Foreign Office that I considered it advisable to return home, but was asked each time not to interrupt my journey.... When... I learned from the Norwegian newspapers—not from Berlin—of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and immediately after of the Serbian note to Austria, I started upon my return journey without further ado....”
On Monday, July 27, the Kaiser reached Berlin. Bethmann, exhausted and pale, waited on the railway platform. “How did it all happen?”68 William asked. The Chancellor offered his resignation. “No, you’ve cooked this broth69 and now you’re going to eat it,” the Kaiser informed him. Early the next morning, William read for the first time the text of the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. He was jubilant. “A brilliant performance70 for a time limit of only forty-eight hours,” he wrote to Jagow. “This is more than one could have expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; with it every reason for war drops away.” William ordered the State Secretary to initiate immediate mediation between Austria and Serbia, with Belgrade as a temporary hostage to ensure Serbian good behavior. Jagow and Bethmann were shocked by this Imperial command. Had their master not realized that the purpose of the ultimatum was to ensure rejection and provide grounds for war? Vienna was not interested in “a great moral victory”; she meant to reduce Serbia to vassalage. The Chancellor’s reaction was simply to ignore the Kaiser. His instructions that evening to the German Ambassador in Vienna made plain that Tschirschky must “avoid very carefully71 giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back.” This holding action was not required for long: that evening an Austrian declaration of war was conveyed to Serbia in the form of an open telegram from Count Berchtold to the Serbian Foreign Office. The following morning, July 29, Austrian artillery, across the Danube from Belgrade, opened fire on the Serbian capital.
The Austrian declaration of war and the commencement of hostilities plunged St. Peter
sburg into gloom. Until that moment, Sazonov had remained conciliatory, sending assurances that he wanted to find a peaceful solution and “was ready to go to the limit72 in accommodating Austria.” He admitted that Austria had grounds for complaint, but he urged that “there must be a way73 of giving Serbia a deserved lesson while sparing her sovereign rights.” Tsar Nicholas II also abhorred the idea of war. Trying to save the peace, resisting pressure from his military staff to order general mobilization, the Tsar reached out to Germany, using the channel of personal appeal to a brother monarch. At one A.M. on the night of July 28–29, after the Austrian declaration of war was sent but before the guns opened fire, Nicholas II telegraphed William II: “Am glad you are back74... An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country.... I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far.” William, reading the Tsar’s telegram, noted in the margin: “A confession of his own weakness75 and an attempt to put the responsibility on my own shoulders...” The Kaiser replied to Nicholas that he could not accept the terminology “ignoble war.” He accused Serbia of “unscrupulous agitation,”76 an “outrageous crime,” and a “dastardly murder.”
Nicholas, he trusted, “will doubtless agree with me that we both... as well as all Sovereigns, have a common interest in seeing all regicides punished.”fn1
The shelling of Belgrade weakened the chances for European peace. Sazonov was informed as he sat in conference with the Austrian Ambassador; the announcement “transformed”77 the Foreign Minister, reported his uncomfortable guest. That afternoon, Nicholas II signed a ukase ordering mobilization of four military districts—Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, and Kazan—containing thirteen army corps directed against Austria. The northern districts opposite the German frontier remained unaffected. The Kaiser immediately bombarded the hard-pressed Tsar with bullying telegrams demanding that Russia’s partial mobilization be cancelled and warning that “the whole weight of the decision78 lies solely on your shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for... involving Europe in the most horrible war she has ever witnessed.” On July 29, the German government formally demanded a halt to Russian mobilization, declaring that only an immediate suspension could prevent German mobilization.