Tank Killers

by Harry Yeide

  The Ardennes fighting dealt the deathblow to the towed TD battalion concept because of the high losses suffered by towed units. The Army decided to convert all remaining towed battalions to SP formations, but supplies of the vehicles were not adequate for immediate implementation, and some outfits dragged their 3-inchers all the way to VE Day.103

  Self-propelled outfits that had been directly in the path of the German offensive had suffered as well. The 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion, for example, lost nine men killed, thirty-five wounded, and eighty-two missing in action, as well as seventeen M18s and most of its armored cars.104

  Despite the contributions made by the TD battalions during the Battle of the Bulge, Patton on 14 January 1945 recommended to the chief of Ordnance that production of tank destroyers be ended. He urged further that all TD battalions attached to infantry divisions be replaced by tank battalions.105 The tank destroyer vision had clearly not answered all questions in some very influential minds.

  * * *

  The tank destroyer battalions learned from their experiences and continued to refine their methods. Army Ground Forces noted that the Battle of the Bulge had provided a laboratory to compare the effects of attaching tank destroyer units to armored and infantry formations versus issuing TD units no smaller than company-size general support orders with the freedom to implement them as seemed fit. In divisions using attachments, TDs were parceled out so widely that they were unable to concentrate against armored threats—one armored division, ordered to consolidate a single TD company as a reserve, reported that it could not comply. “Mission-type” orders where used maintained tactical integrity of the TD units, precluded misemployment of the destroyers, allowed for better rotation of the men and equipment in the line, and improved morale. Ultimately, however, it was up to the battalion CO or TD group staff to persuade division commanders to adopt “direct support” practices in lieu of attachment.106

  Other refinements emerged as well. By January 1945, the 803d Tank Destroyer Battalion kept a TD air liaison officer at the closest airstrip at all times. At the first sign of a tank attack, he took to the air, from where he could communicate directly with individual vehicles and was able to position single guns to best respond to the enemy.107 He could also call in artillery strikes. Major General A. D. Bruce had tested such employment of light planes to help TDs in late 1942, but the practice had not been adopted in combat.108

  Chapter 10

  Sought, Struck, and Destroyed

  “Our motto was ‘Seek, Strike, and Destroy,’ and all in all, we did pretty good at it.”

  —Lieutenant Weldon Adams, platoon commander, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion1

  A decision that altered the war for the tank killers emerged from the Führerbunker under the ruins of Berlin during February 1945: 1,675 tanks and assault guns (new or repaired) were sent to the Eastern Front, while only sixty-seven went west. Hitler also stripped the Western Front of half its panzer divisions. The Führer was more worried about the Soviet threat to Berlin than the danger that the Western Allies would leap the Rhine.2 America’s tank destroyers would never again encounter the panzers in large numbers.

  Western Europe was littered with the hulks of the panzers that had tangled with the tank killers. As of 28 February, the TD battalions in Third Army alone had reported the destruction of six hundred eighty-two tanks and one hundred twenty-five SP guns—more than a third of the roughly twenty-two hundred panzers Third Army claimed to have destroyed. One battalion commander told Army Ground Forces that his men (equipped with M18s) had the panzer’s number and considered the highly mobile and easily hidden PAK 75mm antitank gun to be the most dangerous weapon they faced. As for the panzer, “the enemy tank can be easily out-maneuvered and is extremely susceptible to two-way attack.”3 In short, the men had regained confidence in their ability to handle heavy German tanks with their 76mm and 3-inch guns.

  On 1 February 1945, ETOUSA caught up with the field expedient adopted in many TD battalions and ordered that supplementary machine gun mounts be installed on the front of all M10 and M36 turrets. The theater headquarters acknowledged that crews generally wanted a hull-mounted or coaxial machine gun but observed that this was the best available solution.4

  Surge to the Rhine

  Hitler may have decided to stop worrying so much about his Western Front, but the Americans—having eliminated the vestiges of the Ardennes offensives and stopped Nordwind in its tracks—were preparing to take a wrecking ball to the West Wall. On 2 February, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved Eisenhower’s plan to advance to the Rhine along its length and cross in strength in Montgomery’s sector north of the Ruhr at the earliest opportunity. Most of Bradley’s and Devers’s troops were to halt offensive operations in February while Ninth Army (under Monty’s operational control) crossed the Roer plain in support of British and Canadian operations to the north.5

  American forces finally seized the Schwammenauel Dam near Schmidt on 10 February, but the Germans jammed open a release gate, and the Roer River quickly became a temporarily uncrossable barrier. By the time Ninth Army could get going, the American advance would resemble a broad-front offensive.

  * * *

  In the meantime, troops all along the line probed and gathered intelligence they would need when they headed for the Rhine.

  The 614th Tank Destroyer Battalion was deployed east of the Vosges Mountains near Prinzheim, France, in early February. Lieutenant Joseph Keeby, a Chicago man in command of the 1st Reconnaissance Platoon, had orders to capture some prisoners for intelligence purposes. The infantry had tried several times without success because of extensive mine fields along the German line. Keeby gathered the thirty-one men of his raiding party three days before the operation. They went over sketches, drawings, and maps of the route to a mill the Germans were using, probably as a command post. Keeby divided his team into an assault group and a security group to provide cover.6

  The night of 4 February, Keeby led the assault team through the freezing darkness in a cautious approach to the objective. As the men neared the first German outposts, a machine gun opened fire. Keeby and his team dropped to the ground. The security group returned fire immediately, and the machine gun fell silent. One man spotted a second German MG preparing to open fire and killed the crew. The assault group moved forward again.

  The men crept closer to the mill. Suddenly, automatic rifle fire snapped through the air. Private First Class Henry Weaver, close behind Keeby, spotted the German and shot back. His aim was true.

  Surprise lost, six men stormed through the door of the mill. Private George Bass raked the first room with submachine-gun fire while Keeby tossed hand grenades. When the smoke cleared, eight German soldiers lay dead on the floor. Six others surrendered. The recon men took them back to the battalion’s position. Mission accomplished.

  * * *

  Along most of the front, the halt in offensive operations was strategic, not tactical, and the Americans continued to batter away at the West Wall. The doughs, tanks, and TDs were working together better than ever. AARs indicate that provisional platoons combining the two types of armor were occasionally created for some small missions. Captain Duchossois, commanding Company B, 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (M36), described combined armed operations at Brandscheid at the stump of the Bulge in early February:

  We moved across the line of departure as a tank destroyer, tank, infantry team—infantry, a tank, and a tank destroyer followed by more infantry, another tank, and a tank destroyer. We used this formation because of the poor visibility, the limited routes of approach, and uncertainty of the definite location of all fortifications.

  The infantry advanced until they were held up by a fortification. When this happened, the tankers “closed up” the aperture with machine gun fire followed by the tank destroyers firing several rounds of 90mm.

  Usually, the Jerries would put some white article out of the embrasure, but they would not come out to surrender until the infantry moved in and broug
ht them out….

  We found we had to keep a tank destroyer right behind the lead tank because our routes of approach were such that unless a tank destroyer was up there initially, it would be impossible to pass the tanks in order to fire on the pillbox. As a result, the leading tank destroyer and tank did the majority of the firing.

  It is absolutely necessary to have communications with not only the infantry, but the tankers also. One of the simplest ways to accomplish this is to have both tank destroyer and tank platoon leaders equipped with SCR-300 radio sets on the infantry frequency.7

  * * *

  Ninth Army crossed the Roer River on 23 February. Tank destroyer battalions played a secondary role, firing direct (typically at ranges between two and three thousand yards) in support of the assault infantry, and reinforced division artillery units. Battalion recon companies crossed the river with the assault wave to provide radio links back to the destroyers.8

  The AAR of the 821st Tank Destroyer Battalion for February offered the following description of the now-standard operating procedure, in this case during fighting on the east bank of the Roer River near Jülich with the 29th Infantry Division and 747th Tank Battalion: “As the infantry and tanks pushed forward, 821st destroyers provided close-in direct support for the infantry and mutual support for the tanks. As the infantry, tank, and tank destroyer teams approached a town that proved to be an enemy strongpoint, destroyer guns would fire direct covering fire at buildings. This fire neutralized enemy machine gun positions and denied snipers the use of the buildings. When enemy armor or emplaced antitank guns held up the advance of the infantry, destroyer guns were called upon to neutralize the enemy positions. Tanks and tank destroyers were called upon in accordance with the type of mission to be performed and worked together to outflank enemy strongpoints in and around towns. When enemy resistance was neutralized, tank destroyers immediately assumed defensive anti-mechanized positions against possible enemy counterattacks, while the infantry consolidated their positions and prepared to move on to the next objective.”

  During the three-day operation described, the TDs killed seven panzers, two SP guns, six AT guns, and two halftracks.

  The AAR of the 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion, a newly arrived outfit operating with both the 9th Armored and 78th Infantry divisions, noted, “Resistance, mostly from the German 3d Parachute Division, was determined…. Tactics employed were those of tanks rather than tank destroyers. The destroyers followed behind the assaulting wave of infantry. When an obstacle, an enemy machine gun or strongpoint, interfered with the infantry advance, the destroyers [opened fire]. Upon approaching a town, it was customary for the supporting destroyers to fire a preparation. First, destroyers fired on the upper stories of buildings, forcing the enemy into the cellars. The fire was shifted to lower floors and cellars.”

  The 3d Armored Division broke out of the Roer bridgehead on 26 February. The date was another fateful one for the Tank Destroyer Force, because the tankers were using several of the new M26 Pershings in combat for the first time.9 The Pershing was more heavily armored than the Sherman and carried the same 90mm gun as the M36 in a fully protected turret. One of the Pershings during the day destroyed two Tigers and a Mark IV at a thousand yards. The tank destroyer once again had no edge in killing power over the American tank.

  * * *

  Bradley launched Operation Lumberjack—a massive pincer operation with First Army attacking east and southeast and Third Army northeast—on 3 March while Ninth Army was still grinding through stubborn German resistance on the Roer plain. Bradley later crowed, “Lumberjack was very nearly flawless, the kind of campaign generals dream about but seldom see. All five corps of both armies advanced according to plan, with dazzling speed and élan. The German armies opposing us were utterly routed, the men falling back in confusion and disarray, leaving a trail of weapons and equipment behind.”10

  By 5 March, Ninth Army had cleared the west side of the Rhine from Düsseldorf to Mörs, First Army troops had entered Cologne, and Third Army had reached the Rhine near Koblenz.11

  On 7 March—the same day that the First and Third armies’ spearheads closed the pincer jaws—a 9th Armored Division task force from First Army captured the only standing bridge across the Rhine that the Allies would take, the Ludendorff railroad bridge at Remagen. The M18s from C/656th Tank Destroyer Battalion formed part of the column that reached Remagen at 0330 hours. Company CO Capt Richard Tuggle was ordered to push his destroyers across the Rhine to support the 14th Tank Battalion. The TDs rolled through the streets of Remagen, following the Shermans under constant artillery fire. The first TD, commanded by Sgt John Jaroscak, had made it two-thirds of the way across the bridge when a track slipped from the planking laid across the railroad tracks. The crew and engineers worked furiously to get the destroyer, which had blocked the entire U.S. Army advance across the Rhine, under way. By 0600 hours, Jaroscak was on the east bank of the river.12

  When Hodges called Bradley with the news of the bridge’s capture, Bradley responded, “Hot dog, Courtney, this will bust him wide open…. Shove everything you can across it.”

  Eisenhower’s operations chief, MajGen Harold “Pink” Bull happened to be at Bradley’s HQ and was less enthusiastic because the crossing did not conform to the plan. “What in the hell do you want us to do,” asked an irritated Bradley, “pull back and blow it up?”13

  Although still committed to making the main effort in the north, Eisenhower authorized Bradley to push five divisions into the bridgehead.14 The North Africa veterans from the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion—the first TDs ashore at Normandy—crossed the Rhine the next day.

  * * *

  Because TD battalion commanders had little or no control over their widely scattered outfits, they were available for other duties—such as running a task force. On 14 March, the Third Army’s 90th Infantry Division conducted an assault crossing of the Moselle River near Hatzenport. The following evening, LtCol Frank Spiess—commanding the 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion—was placed in charge of TF Spiess. The command consisted of recon and headquarters companies and Company C from the 773d; Company D of the 712th Tank Battalion; and the 90th Reconnaissance Troop. The task force set off on 16 March, its initial mission to screen the division’s southern flank and to clear the enemy all the way to the Rhine at Boppard. By 1430 hours, Spiess had “washed his hands” in the Rhine River per orders from the assistant division commander.

  The task force, however, encountered dug-in troops from the 6th SS Mountain Division south of Boppard. A bitter fight ensued, and the task force lost two men killed, one officer and six enlisted men wounded, and two M10s knocked out before it evicted the Germans. At 0900 on 17 March, the M10s of 3d Platoon entered Boppard without much resistance. The gunners then destroyed three vehicles on the far side of the Rhine to kill time while waiting for relief by the 2d Cavalry Group.

  On 20 March, Spiess was ordered to lead the division advance on Mainz, for which Company A’s TDs had replaced those of Company C. Although the troops were exhausted from the fast movement so far and the lack of sleep, they pushed ahead with lightning speed. By 1200 they had cleared sixteen towns, three minefields, and two roadblocks, and were only three miles from the city limits.

  Here they encountered dug-in infantry supported by AT and flak guns and heavy mortar fire. Two M10s were struck and ground to a halt. Spiess personally flushed a German soldier holding a panzerfaust from cover beside the road. Spiess called in a time-on-target (TOT) artillery strike, and the infantry tried to clear the roadblock. They were driven back, and only another artillery preparation enabled them to bull though.

  Task Force Spiess was able to rest the next day guarding the flank while three infantry regiments cleared Mainz.15

  Charging with the Cavalry

  Captain Charles Seitz, commanding Company A of the 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion, described how tank destroyers operated with the fast-moving armored cavalry during operations to clear the west bank of the Rh
ine River during late March. One M36 platoon worked with each squadron. Seitz reported, “The cavalry’s mission was to exploit the Moselle bridgehead in the north of the Moselle triangle and push as quickly as possible to the Rhine and then sweep to the south along the Rhine as fast as possible. This meant rapid movement, so we found it necessary to place the M36s in the support section of the cavalry teams’ columns, following a reconnaissance troop and a platoon of light tanks. Each team moved along a different route to the objective. The lighter vehicles could move as fast as the situation allowed without being held back by the slower M36s [the M18 could keep up!]. Then, if something were hit, the destroyer would have time to move up to it and size it up.

  “In this type of movement, good liaison was important. This was achieved in one of two ways depending on the situation. One was that the platoon leader rode behind the team commander, and the other was that the team commander had a radio vehicle accompany the platoon leader [the price of having incompatible radio gear].

  “When the cavalry did find opposition—chiefly in towns—the destroyers moved into position to supply assault fire. In one instance, the combination of the cavalry’s speed and the assault fire of the destroyers persuaded approximately seven hundred fifty Germans in the Bingen area to give up to our much smaller force.”16

  * * *

  Seventh Army, meanwhile, on 15 March launched Operation Undertone, which aimed at retaking the ground lost during Nordwind and clearing the southern Saar. On 16 March 1945, the men of the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the 63d Infantry Division, which was trying to crack the Siegfried Line defenses near Ensheim, just south of Saarbrücken. Advances in the north might be unfolding with accelerating speed, but here the Germans still fought tenaciously.