See Something, Say Nothing

by Philip Haney

  “These attacks will be planned and conducted in partnership with affiliated Jihadist groups,” I wrote, “partly because the West is considered a distinct enemy of Islam itself, and partly to weaken Israel by alienating and isolating her from the West.”3

  But in 2006, my own agency and the CIA role players somehow found the subject so threatening that they investigated me twice for it, exonerating me in one case but finding me guilty of misconduct in the other.

  While all this was happening, and despite the fact that it was not actually in TECS, the Hamas Network report continued to circulate internally within the federal law enforcement community.

  One of the people who read it was José E. Meléndez-Pérez, the famous CBP officer who intercepted the twentieth 9/11 hijacker, Mohamed al-Kahtani, in Orlando.

  Meléndez-Pérez was so impressed by the Hamas report that he nominated my colleague and me for the Diana Dean and José Meléndez-Pérez Anti-Terrorism Award, which is given to CBP officers who perform exemplary work in protecting the nation’s borders.

  On August 14, 2007, Meléndez-Pérez sent a letter to James M. Chaparro, deputy assistant secretary in the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis:

  It was a pleasure to meet you on August 9, 2007 at the Summer Hard Problem Program (SHARP) dinner in Orlando, Florida. I enjoyed the conversation we had and I would like to provide you some information regarding the two Customs and Border Protection Officers (CBPO) that we discussed at the dinner.

  I would like to recognize CBPO Philip B. Haney and CBPO [Martin] from the Atlanta, Georgia Passenger Analysis Unit who have gone above the call of duty to analyze, sort, and prepare intelligence reports and databases relating to Islamic terrorist groups and threats against the United States.

  The intelligence reports have been on topics relating to Global Jihad & Developing Trends. CBPO Haney has also created a database of approximately 185 Islamic Jihadist Groups operating in 81 countries. In addition to other reports, a report titled, Hamas Network in the United States has been created to provide the intelligence community with important information regarding terrorist groups.

  The documents they have prepared have been beneficial to local, state, and other federal agencies. We must recognize and keep motivating those that excel and go above the call of duty. Therefore, I feel that the initiative, determination and professionalism of these two officers should be commended.

  I will always be grateful to you for the opportunity to recognize these two Customs and Border Protection Officers. I believe this is the right thing to do for their service to the Department of Homeland Security and the United States of America.

  Meléndez-Pérez never received a response from anyone in the agency regarding his recommendation.

  Nevertheless, the Hamas Network report produced fruit.

  RESPECTED COMMUNITY LEADER

  On July 23, 2007, I was contacted by a US Citizen and Immigration Services officer in California regarding “respected community leader” Abdel Jabbar Hamdan, who had been arrested and detained by ICE on July 27, 2004, for a non-immigrant F-1 visa overstay.4 He then was released from custody on July 28, 2006,5 and was now pending deportation to his home country of Jordan.6

  USCIS contacted me because the Hamas report included a TECS record on Hamdan, who had now filed a Petition for Employment Authorization, despite the fact that he was under an active court order to “voluntarily depart the U.S.” by November 6, 2006.

  Citing information in the report, I replied to my USCIS colleague that Hamdan was a “close affiliate of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), which is currently on trial in Richardson, TX.”

  “Some of the people that Hamdan has been associated with are also on trial, and Mr. Hamdan himself has been named twice as an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial,” I wrote.

  Two other colleagues in the e-mail string who had also created TECS records on Hamdan agreed with my assessment, with one replying “Ditto!” and the second adding:

  I totally concur with Mr. Haney’s assessment and comments. We do not believe that Hamdan should not receive any benefits from the USG as SAC/Dallas proved in Immigration Court that he is defined as a “terrorist” for I&NA [Immigration and Nationality Act] purposes. The attached court order, which can be opened with MS Word, will give you more information.

  On August 15, 2007, I received another word of thanks, in an e-mail from a CBP supervisor at the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach:

  Thanks to Atlanta for the great intelligence report on Hamas posted on DHS Fusion. And what a coincidence it was to find that our Port had also run across information on Hamas Network suspect [author’s redaction] and the organization IslamiCity.7

  Three weeks later, I was notified that I would be attending the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) program, October 30, 2007, through February 1, 2008, to prepare to become a Customs and Border Protection officer.

  I got the news while I was in Herzliya, Israel, to attend the seventh annual International Conference on Global Terrorism, titled “Terrorism’s Global Impact.”

  The conference is hosted by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, an Israel-based independent think tank providing expertise on national security that serves as a forum for international policymakers and scholars to share information.

  The ICT sent me a formal invitation to speak at its 2007 conference, saying, “We believe that as an expert in this field, your participation in this debate, together with various other experts could be an important opportunity to examine terrorism trends and to reach operative conclusions to counter this phenomenon.”

  I was unable to speak at the 2007 conference, however, because my agency would not allow me to participate as a CBP officer. It was the second time I had requested CBP to sponsor my participation in the ICT conference, which included counterterrorism specialists from more than fifty countries. The port refused both times, so I paid my own way as a private citizen.

  Over the years, I continued attending the ICT conferences, using the information I gathered to inform and enhance my work as a CBP officer.

  In just one of many examples, in 2008, a South African political party leader informed me that jihadist training camps were forming all over his country.8 Since Atlanta had a daily flight from Johannesburg at the time, I considered the information to be significant. However, I was never able to formally share any of the intelligence with port management.

  4

  WORDS MATTER

  On October 30, 2007, I reported for duty at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, FLETC, for basic training with a class of fifty. I was fifty-four years old, well past the normal age when people consider putting themselves through such an ordeal. But I was determined to do whatever it took to continue working in counterterrorism as an 1895 CBP officer.

  I mention my age here because about two or three weeks into the training program, our instructor announced that a change in policy had been made that would affect anyone who sought appointment to a position as a CBP officer from that point forward. CBP officers would now be eligible to retire after twenty years of service. That was good for the younger trainees coming in, but there was a catch for people my age.

  According to the new official policy,1 the “day before an individual’s 37th birthday is the maximum age for original appointment to a position as a Customs and Border Protection Officer.”2

  Wow, that was a close one!

  If, for some reason, my entrance into FLETC had been delayed for just a week or two, I would have been deemed ineligible to convert from agriculture to armed officer, and I would have been unable to continue working in the counterterrorism field at all.

  I’m fairly sure that everyone who goes through basic training encounters difficulty in at least one part of the course, and I was no exception. I did well in the academic classes and even outperformed quite a few of my younger classmates in some of the physical training portions, such as running and training, defensive tactics, and search and arres
t techniques (except for one remediation in the search and arrest qualification exam).

  But what I had trouble with was qualifying with our H&K P-2000 .40 caliber pistol. In the first seven weeks of basic training, we went to the range about fifteen times to practice, but I never qualified. I got close a couple of times, but never shot over the minimum score of 240 out of 300 in the course of fire.

  The problem was that if you didn’t qualify in shooting, you failed the program and had to leave FLETC. Depending on the circumstances, some people come back to FLETC for a second chance, but I would be too old because of the new policy. If I failed shooting, I probably could never return.

  By late December, I was getting concerned, and as I found out later, my classmates were also worried that I might not make it.

  Fortunately, we were scheduled to go on Christmas break. On December 23, 2007, just before two of my friends from FLETC and I drove back to Atlanta for Christmas, I was practicing in my dorm room with a “red gun” – an exact replica made of hard plastic – when I suddenly realized I couldn’t see the front sights correctly.

  I decided to call my friend Rickey Ferguson, who was one of the firearms instructors at the Port of Atlanta. I told him I was having trouble qualifying.

  “Meet me at the range in Henry County tomorrow about 1500,” he said. “I’ll bring a few boxes of ammo, and we’ll just keep shooting until we figure out what’s wrong.

  “Don’t worry; we’ll get it figured out,” he assured me.

  The next day, on the way to the range, I stopped at a local pharmacy and bought full-frame reading glasses, which enabled me to see the front sights more clearly.

  Right on time, Rickey met me at the range, and we did just what he said. We kept firing until we figured out that I was shooting low and down to the left. Now that I could see better, and now that I knew what I was doing wrong, I began to believe that I just might be able to qualify.

  I didn’t have to wait long to find out. Our class was scheduled for its qualifying session at the outdoor range on December 27 at 7:30 a.m. I remember how cold it was that morning, at least for southern Georgia.

  We all lined up on the three-yard line, as we had done many times before.

  With a snap, the targets flipped, and we went through the course of fire: three yards, seven yards, then back to the fifteen- and, finally, to the twenty-five-yard line.

  We heard the final call, “The line is safe!”

  We all stepped to the back of the range and waited for a few long minutes for the firearms instructors to score our targets.

  Then came the announcement that we could go downrange to see how we did. Off to my right, at the far end of the line, I heard a female colleague shriek that she had passed, and then my target came into view.

  There, written in black magic marker at the top of my target, in lane number seven, was the number 243.

  Thank you, Lord, I passed!

  Thank you, Rickey Ferguson.

  Everyone was happy for me. “Mr. Haney passed!”

  Standing there that cold morning on the firing range, looking around at my colleagues, is the moment when I really became a CBP officer. My life has never been the same since. (Just ask my wife!)

  Then it gradually dawned on all of us that we had just gone through the last difficult pass-fail test we would have to face at FLETC. We were going to become certified federal law enforcement officers.

  It was a great day.

  Graduation was still a month away, but we had passed the last major obstacle together and would be able to help each other finish up the rest of our training.

  DIRECTOR’S AWARD

  We graduated on Friday, February 1, 2008, with friends and family from all over the country gathered in the FLETC chapel. My wife; granddaughter, Lydia; and sister, Diana, from California were there too.

  To my great surprise, I won the Director’s Award, the highest honor a trainee can be given at FLETC. It is awarded to the person, chosen by classmates, instructors, and staff, who most consistently exemplifies the core values of a federal law enforcement officer: integrity, fairness, respect, honesty, courage, and compassion.

  One other amazing thing happened during the graduation ceremony that day. The commencement speaker was our director of field operations, Robert Gomez. He was the official who had led the CAIR VIP tour at Chicago O’Hare airport in June 2006, which I recounted in chapter 3.

  When I went up to the stage to accept the Director’s Award, Gomez was already there. As we stood side by side for photographs, he turned and said quietly, “This is one of the most significant things I have ever done as a DFO [director of field operations).”

  During his commencement address a few moments later, in the presence of my family, FLETC friends, colleagues, and staff, Gomez mentioned me.

  “When you go back to your home port, find yourself a mentor, someone you can follow as an example and learn from,” he said. “For example, Mr. Haney here, one of your classmates, is one of the bestknown counterterrorism specialists in the whole agency. Pick someone like him to mentor you, when you go back to your home ports.”

  It was a wonderful compliment, but it was put to the test many times in the years ahead.

  I have often wondered: If my own management at the port and DFO level was already well aware that I was a gifted counterterrorism specialist, why didn’t they back me up when higher management in Washington started pushing back against the work my colleagues and I were doing on the Muslim Brotherhood network in the United States and the Tablighi Jamaat Initiative?

  But that aside, graduating from FLETC was a high point in my life.

  After a couple of days of celebration and rest, I went back to the Port of Atlanta and reported for duty as a new CBP officer. There, I was assigned to primary, the most basic duty of CBP officers, to become familiar with the systems and procedures we use for processing passengers.

  LETHAL DEFINITIONS

  On January 28, 2008, just three days before I graduated from FLETC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation released an official policy document titled the Counterterrorism Analytical Lexicon.3

  Fourteen pages in length, it mentions “violent extremism” four times and “religious” three times,4 but never uses the words Muslim, Islam, or jihad.

  The Lexicon contained a dizzying array of definitions, such as this one for “homegrown violent extremist”:

  A “homegrown violent extremist” is a US person who was once assimilated into, but who has rejected, the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the United States in favor of a violent extremist ideology. He or she is “US-radicalized” … and intends to commit terrorism inside the United States without direct support or direction from a foreign terrorist organization.5

  For frontline officers who have taken an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States” against “all enemies, foreign and domestic,” these grammatically confusing, subjective definitions of the threat to America’s security can be lethal.

  In the real world, such abstract terms as “without direct support or direction from a foreign terrorist organization” muddy the waters and obscure the legal standard of probable cause, making it essentially impossible for law enforcement officers to conduct effective counterterrorism investigations and connect the dots.

  On February 12, 2008, a colleague of mine with Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) forwarded me an e-mail string that originated within the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. It included the draft of a policy paper titled “Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims.”6 The document, which soon became known simply as the “Words Matter” memo, was being circulated for internal review among subject matter experts in the counterterrorism community.

  The author of the original e-mail commended the document for adding “value to the ongoing discourse on terminology,” noting it had been distributed to Michael Chertoff, the second Homeland Security secretary under Presi
dent George W. Bush:

  Attached is a paper our Office [CRCL] recently produced, which summarizes the recommendations of a group of influential Muslim thinkers/commentators on the critical issue of terminology.

  Specifically, the paper addresses the terms USG officials should both use and avoid when describing terrorists and their ideology. Please note that this paper neither reflects DHS-wide policy, nor represents the final word on this topic.

  Nevertheless, we believe the opinions expressed in it add value to the ongoing discourse on terminology. You have seen earlier drafts of the paper; this version incorporates edits and thoughts from a wide range of people across government. We have shared the paper with Secretary Chertoff and other senior leaders in DHS, as well as officials from the UK and Canadian governments.

  The message in the e-mail string from my colleague read:

  This was disseminated to all of ICE Intel. I value your experience and knowledge on this topic and would like to hear your opinion on the paper. My thoughts, I wonder who exactly contributed to the paper? Good question, don’t you think?

  I replied to my colleague with a few observations and questions. From my perspective, I wrote, the average person, having relatively little familiarity with the Quran or Islamic theology, “will probably be mystified by what the writers of this paper are really trying to say.”

  I also found the phrase “Recommendations from American Muslims” in the title to be problematic, because, from the standpoint of the global Islamic community, which Muslims call the Ummah, “American Muslims” aren’t authorized to promote their own distinctive policy apart from a consensus of opinion derived from legal specialists within their branch of Islam.

  In my response, I also wrote that their “policy may appear to be tailored for the current cultural/political sensitivities of the American audience, but in the end, it will always be based on the accepted and traditional policy of the historic global Ummah,” meaning Islamic law, also known as sharia.