French Foreign Legion

by Douglas Porch

  The obvious explanation for this hostile reception is that the mentality and outlook of the two groups were so radically different, similar to the problems that caused friction between the Paris firemen cadres and the Legion volunteers noted by Cendrars:

  They felt out of place among us, understanding nothing of our mentality of foreign volunteer enlistees whom they considered as a collection of “bouffeurs de gamelle” [mess tin guzzlers], treating us badly, abusing us and ragging those among us who had money, that they took for the heirs of rich families or madmen. . . . It was completely beyond their understanding that all these men could come to fight gratuitously. They could not believe it. And if that flabbergasted them, they looked for shameful reasons, demeaning motives and were not far from considering us as criminals. They were different from us and cordially detested.50

  Maurice Magnus was also told by his sergeant to request a transfer to France from Sidi-bel-Abbès because “no one is going to believe that you have come here for idealistic purposes of doing your share to aid the Allies. They could not understand that.... Besides, the greatest objection they will have always is that you are not one of themselves.”51

  The Bulgarian Kosta Todorov recorded the shock waves sent out by this collision of two worlds: “Idealists who had come to defend the principles of the French Revolution marched in the same ranks with professional soldiers indifferent to all ideals and values save one—the honor of the Legion and its fighting prestige,” he wrote. “ ‘Fools! So you've come to fight for freedom and civilization? Words, empty words!’ ” he was told by his sergeant.

  “Then why are you here?” I asked him. “Orders, of course. We're professional soldiers. We don't give a damn what we fight for! It's our job. We've nothing else in life. No families, no ideals, no loves.” Others, like Rouanet who was tattooed all over with obscene pictures, considered us rank amateurs who had no right to the glorious name of legionnaire. To earn that, one had to live through the grueling African school of desert outposts, hunger, and thirst. They all drank heavily, talked their own colonial slang, knew the field-service regulations by heart, were crack marksmen, bore up easily under prolonged marches, and had as much contempt for other regiments as for civilians. On their pre-Legion past they kept silent, but their military records could be read from their medals—China, Indo-china, Madagascar, Morocco . . .52

  The mixing of veterans and foreign volunteers in the Foreign Legion was to have at least three unfortunate consequences. The first was that quality leadership was difficult to come by. The Legion in Africa was already short of cadres, and ill-equipped to handle the flood of volunteers that more than doubled the size of the unit. This was all the more true because a number of Legion officers, fearing that the Legion would not be sent to France, which meant that they would miss out on the war, which was expected to be nasty, brutish and short, successfully obtained transfers to line units. Some of the foreign contingents, the Italians in particular, were allowed to name some of their own cadres. Others had to be scraped up by the government from the territorial army—that is, the second-echelon reserve made up of men over thirty years old. It was to the territorial reserve that the government turned to staff the 3e régiment de marche. However, “apart from ten or so,” these men refused “to take their places in a regiment which was obviously to play an active role, but invoked as a pretext the foreign origins of the men.”53 Therefore, the Paris fire brigade, a regular army unit, was designated to furnish cadres for the volunteers of the 3e régiment de marche. But Cendrars was categorical that even these professional soldiers saw their assignment to the Legion as an “unmerited insult.”54

  This was to have two results: The first was that the demands by the cadres to be transferred out led to a constant turnover of training personnel. “They left us one after the other during the first months, and I believe that there was not a single original instructor who remained of these men who should have set an example ...,” wrote Cendrars.55 Second, those who did remain often made poor leaders, either because as veteran legionnaires they lacked the experience and tact to deal with men whose backgrounds and motivations were usually far different from those of the pre-1914 vintage, or because, as Frenchmen, often reservists or territorials, sent to the Legion by default and usually against their will, they despised their men. With the exception of his captain, whom he believed “a brave man,” Cendrars showered contempt upon most of his leaders, from colonel to corporal. The colonel, “a decrepit old man sent from the army geographical service, a bureaucrat, with a lorgnette and ideas from another era,”

  obliged them to march from Paris to the front, although a train was available. His captain, whom the men nicknamed “Plein-de-Soupe” (Fatass), was a reserve officer who in civilian life was a judicial functionary in a Norman market town. “He believed himself to be of superior quality, and looked upon us as a collection of delinquents.” The NCOs from the Paris fire brigade were sticklers for parade-ground discipline, “but as trainers of men, they were hopeless, because there is a great distance between theory and practice.... Not one of them fancied having their hide riddled with us.” Both the lieutenant and the company sergeant were relieved after they were discovered cowering in a dugout during their first night in the trenches, leaving their men to fend for themselves.56 Farnsworth was favorably impressed by his captain, who, a veteran of 1870, must nevertheless have been too old for the job. His fireman NCOs were “nothing but a nuisance.” “We were disreputably officered in the 3me de marche” the American Victor Chapman concluded after the unit was amalgamated with the 1er étranger in August 1915.57

  Poor leadership quite naturally translated into poor morale, a second negative consequence of this unimaginative handling of the foreign volunteers. This would have serious enough implications for the fighting efficiency of the Legion. But more, it was to have a long-term effect upon the Legion's strength. The initial apprehension that many foreigners felt at being incorporated into the Legion seemed to be confirmed by the actual conditions in the regiments. Those who could began to request more congenial surroundings—the English and Belgians were allowed to transfer to their national armies, while in the spring the Italians were released to go home after Italy joined the Allies. This began a stampede to be released or transferred from the Legion, which, as will be seen, reached the point of mutiny in some units of foreign volunteers by the summer of 1915. “Every man was finding fault, grumbling, making all the possible steps to get out of the Legion into French regiments,” Victor Chapman wrote.58 Alan Seeger certainly spoke for them when he wrote in September 1915, “I feel more and more the need of being among Frenchmen, where the patriotic and military tradition is strong, where my good will may have some recognition, and where the demands of a sentimental and romantic nature like my own may be gratified,” he wrote, after noting that the departure of the Russians and the Belgians in July 1915 had reduced regimental strength by almost two-thirds.59

  The discontent among the foreign volunteers inside the Legion was reflected as well on the outside, a third consequence of the French government's policy of incorporating all foreign volunteers into the Legion. This made for bad publicity. It tarnished the propaganda victory that France had been handed by the influx of volunteers at the beginning of the war— the fact that the French government had required foreign volunteers to join the Legion was a forceful component of anti-French propaganda in neutral countries, a parliamentary committee led by the eminent French sociologist Emile Durkheim discovered in 1916.60 It is also possible that it actually cost France some manpower, because those already in the Legion chafed to get out while those still on the sidelines were made more reluctant to enlist.

  Captain Danjou, who perished with most of his small detatchment of legionnaires in the heroic defense of Camerone in Mexico on April 30, 1863. Camerone became the Legion's most powerful legend, and Danjou's wooden hand its most celebrated relic. Today, Legion recruits sign their enlistment papers beneath Beauce's painting of the fight.
<
br />   The last moments of the Siege of Camerone, as painted bv I -A. Beaucé.

  Abd el-Kader, leader of the Algerian resistance against the French.

  Legionnaires around 1840.

  Marshals of France who served with the Legion (clockwise from top left): Saint-Arnaud, MacMahon, Canrobert and Bazaine. Despite the famous officers who had served in its ranks, the Legion was eclipsed in prestige before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 by the zouaves. (Saint-Arnaud, from Le Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud by Quatrelles L'Épine)

  Colonel Carbuccia, who commanded the Legion during the 1849 siege of Zaatcha. He died of cholera during the Crimean expedition of 1854.

  Colonel Viénot commander of the 1er étranger, killed in the Crimea in 1854. The Legion headquarters at Sidi-bel-Abbès and later at Aubagne in the south of France bear his name.

  The death of Colonel de Chabrière, commander of the 2e étranger, at the Battle of Magenta, painted by P. Benigni.

  A modern painting of the 2e étranger at the battle of Ischeriden (June 24, 1857). This painting was part of acampaign between the two world wars to reinstate the white kepí, the potent symbol of Legion particularism.

  General Bernelle commanded the Legion in Spain in 1835–36.

  Colonel Conrad, killed at Barbastro in 1837.

  Combat in the streets of Constantine. (From Histoire de L'Algérie contemporaine by Charles-André Julien)

  Marshal Bugeaud, commander-in-chief in Algeria in the 1840s, who doubted the Legion's ability to adapt to his counter-insurgency methods in Algeria and called for its abolition.

  General Paul Rollet, known as the “Father of the Legion,” assiduously stood guard over its public image in the interwar years.

  Marshal Hubert Lyautey, Resident General of Morocco between 1912 and 1925 and an avid patron of the Legion.

  For the general public, the Legion's dual image of mystery and brutality proved irresistible. Georges d'Esparbès's 1912 book portrayed legionnaires as men with interesting pasts to whom the Legion offered a second chance.

  In Germany, authorities tried to staunch the flow of young men into the Legion through such organizations as the “International Human Rights League in Opposition to the Foreign Legion,” which urged their countrymen “to resist the degradation of Germans.” (Edimedia)

  Emperor Behanzin of Dahomey.

  General Dodds, who commanded the 1892 invasion of Dahomey.

  “Amazons.”

  General Duchesne, commander of the Madagascar expedition of 1895, who ordered his troops to “march or die.”

  A supply barge in Madagascar.

  Foreign volunteers for the French army in front of the Gare Saint-Lazare, Paris, August 25, 1914. (From American Fighters in the Foreign Legion by Paul A. Rockwell)

  Legion volunteers with their national flags in September 1914. (From American Fighters in the Foreign Legion by Paul A. Rockwell)

  Legionnaires preparing to go over the top near Belloy-en-Santerre, July 4, 1916. (From American Fighters in the Foreign Legion by Paul A. Rockwell)

  A Legion machine-gun company moves forward near Verdun on August 20, 1917.

  The flag of the RMLE, which received the medaille militaire in 1919, making it the second most decorated unit in the French army.

  Scenes of regimental life around the turn of the century: pose après la boxe; saïda; washing clothes; guard meal; siesta.

  General de Négrier, father of the mounted companies. He commanded Legion units in Algeria in 1881 and during the Lang Son expedition in 1885.

  A Legion mounted company. Originally designed as a cavalry support unit in 1881, the mounted companies, operating two men to a mule, gradually assumed more independent roles in North Africa.

  The flag of the3e étranger, successor to the RMLE, in enemy hands in January 1943. (Editions Tallandier)

  The Gaullist 13e DBLE parading before their leader in Rome in 1944 in their Narvik berets rather than in white kepis, regarded as a pro-Vichy symbol.

  “Crab” units of the REC in the Plaine des Jones.

  Legion infantry in the Tonkin delta.

  A Legion post in the Rif War.

  Sick call in the Moroccan Atlas in 1934. Medical visits offered a battle of wits between doctors ordered to maintain unit strength and legionnaires eager to escape fatigues or punishments.

  Inspection of the guard at Sidi-bel-Abbès around 1930.

  The midday break on the march.

  The Legion was often used as a construction unit, which could lower morale and combat readiness.

  Legion created both cavalry and artillery units in the interwar years, despite fears expressed by Rollet and Lyautey that desertion and rebellion made such innovations dangerous.

  The Legion shows the flag before a limited but appreciative audience in Morocco in 1936.

  A sergeants’ mess in Morocco.

  Elements of the 13e DBLE fighting with the British 8th Army in the Western Desert in 1942. (ECP Armées—France)

  Beau Geste. (Photofest)

  Laurel and Hardy lampooned the myth that behind every legionnaire stood a tragic love affair by having all the men, including the rebel Arab chief, carry a picture of the same woman. (Photofest)

  An allegorical painting that depicts Rollet, standing before the Legion monument with the flag of the 3e étranger, receiving the salutes of past generations.

  Major Hélie de Saint-Marc and officers of the 1er REP during the Algiers putsch of 1961. (Editions Tallandier)

  Legionnaires interrogate FLN prisoners. (From Legionnaire by Simon Murray)

  The Legion departs Sidi-bel-Abbès on September 29, 1962, for Aubagne in the south of France, preceded by the hand of Danjou, the ashes of Legionnaire Moll of Chicago, and the caskets of General Rollet, Prince Aage and Legionnaire Zimmerman.

  Général de Lattre de Tassigny.

  General Salan.

  Legion paras drop near Lang Son during Operation Hirondelles, July 17, 1953.

  A legionnaire prepares a fire to heat rations at Dien Bien Phu. The shallow trench, the lack of camouflage and the obvious profusion of equipment, not to mention the smoke he is about to make, would have struck a World War t veteran as suicidal behavior.

  1er REP marches through Bône on May 8, 1958, led by Colonel Pierre Jeanpierre. (ECP Armées— France)

  A helicopter guides elements of the 1er REP as they clear a djebel of “fellaghas.” (ECP Armées—France)

  Legionnaires near Hoa Binh in February 1952.

  A Legion patrol.

  The evil reputation of the Legion and the low morale of those who had offered their services to France could not long be kept secret. As early as November 30, 1914, the French military attaché in London received a letter from “a former MP for Dartford” complaining about the treatment given his nephew, “a British subject for many years resident in Paris, and has therefore as strong an attachment to France as he has to his own country,” in the 2e étranger.

  The composition and character of this regiment is only too well known. I feel sure that it could not be the desire of the French government to place young men of good character amongst the scum of Europe. My nephew writes that he is willing to fight to give his life if needs be amongst French or English Regulars, but that existence is “hell upon earth” in the midst of bad characters by whom he and his comrades are surrounded . . . They don't ask to be relieved of their military duties, but to be treated as men and not outcasts.61

  The important socialist daily L'Humanité complained on July 1,1915, that some of the Russian refugees “who could have formed entire battalions” were so put off by the “arbitrary, brutal, authoritative discipline and mechanical submission” required of them that some had actually taken the, for them, risky option of returning home to Russia. Even the conservative popular weekly Petit Parisien published a letter on June 27, 1915, from the president of the Society of Jewish Merchants complaining that stories of “crude” treatment of Jews at the hands of officers in the Legion were such common c
urrency “that their friends and coreligionists in Paris were deterred from joining the Legion.”62

  Of course, one must be careful to place the Legion's problems in context. The efficiency and morale of many French units suffered in 1914 from the large influx of recruits and reservists, which the cadres were hard-pressed to assimilate and lead effectively into combat, and from the high losses of the war's opening weeks.63 Yet this cannot disguise the fact that the French government displayed a great lack of imagination in dealing with the foreign volunteers of 1914–15. The obvious course was simply to integrate most of these foreigners into regular line regiments, as most nations like the United States, Canada and Great Britain did as a matter of course, and as France eventually was obliged to do.