French Foreign Legion

by Douglas Porch

  In the very early hours of April 22, 1961, Sergent, given his old company by Saint Marc, drove at breakneck speed from Zéralda to Algiers, brushing aside police roadblocks but stopping long enough to detail his légionnaires to arrest the commander-in-chief in Algeria, General Fernand Gambiez, when he attempted to stop the REP convoy. Once in Algiers, Sergent managed to talk the officer of the guard into opening the gate to army headquarters, which was seized by the paras. Although Sergent insisted that the coup had been minutely planned,21 in practice there were remarkable lapses. Not only was there no coordination with Oran and Constantine, whose commanders reaffirmed their loyalty to Paris, but even in Algiers the navy and air force commanders managed to shut themselves off from the plotters. Perhaps the most egregious lapse occurred at the Palais d'Eté, where Robert Buron, the minister of public works, was in residence. The paras arrested him and confined him to his room. However, they failed to cut off his telephone, which allowed him to alert Paris of the events in Algiers.

  At seven o'clock in the morning of April 22, Algiers awoke to the news that “The army has seized control of Algeria and the Sahara ... Algérie française is not dead.” The streets filled with pieds noirs delirious with joy, beating out 'Al-gé-rie fran-çaise” on their car horns. But in the plotters’ command post, the early euphoria quickly began to wear off. General Zeller's researchers had discovered enough supplies to keep Algeria going for about three weeks, and the vaults of the Algiers branch of the Bank of France virtually empty. The navy would have nothing to do with the conspiracy, while from throughout the country commanders who apparently had given warm assurances of support after a few glasses of wine sobered up quickly when presented with their portion of the bill to pay—“Like to, of course. . . . Agree with you entirely. . . . Give me a little time to think about it.”

  Perhaps the greatest disappointment came when the retired inspector-general of the Légion, General Gardy, visited Sidi-bel-Abbès only to receive a frosty reception from his old command. General de Pouilly, the commander of the Oran military division, admitted that the attitude of Sidi-bel-Abbès worried him immensely, for given the central place Rollet had created for Bel-Abbès in the Legion psychology, many Legion units were likely to take their cue from Colonel Albert Brothier, the commander of the 1er étranger. Brothier, son of a gendarme, began his Legion career in 1940 with the 22e RMVE. After five years as a POW in Germany, in 1946 he joined the 13e DBLE in Indochina. As a major in 1953, he was seriously wounded leading the 1er BEP, but survived to take over the 1er REP upon the death of Jeanpierre in 1958. The following year, he took command of the maison mère at Sidi-bel-Abbès. Brothier appears to have played a curious double role, but ultimately one that benefited de Gaulle. Already, in December 1960, he had refused Dufour's request to help in the capture of de Gaulle during his visit to Algeria. At the same time, according to French historian Henri Le Mire, he maintained contacts with Salan in his Madrid exile. He appears to have continued to play both sides of the street during the putsch, sending two companies of légionnaires from Sidi-bel-Abbès to Oran to support de Pouilly, while the Legion band quietly connected Radio Oran with Algiers so that eastern Algeria could receive the broadcasts of the putschists.22

  While Paris appears to have ignored warnings of the planned coup d'état, warnings that came from the FLN among others, it moved fairly quickly to isolate the plotters. De Gaulle declared a state of emergency, surrounded the National Assembly with tanks (although some were so broken down they had to be towed into place), and arrested a few officers thought to be in cahoots with the plotters. In Paris and other French cities, the trade unions called a very successful one-hour strike to protest the action in Algiers. At the same time, the plotters had their hands full consolidating their toehold in Algiers. The 14e RCP was proving remarkably squeamish when told to seize the naval base at Mers-el-Kébir, while in Oran de Pouilly told Challe in no uncertain terms that if his paras appeared there it would spark off civil war. Strains and dissension were also evident at the highest echelons in the camp of the plotters—General Salan, once commander-in-chief both in Indochina and Algeria, flew in from Madrid, where he reigned over a court of pied noir exiles, to an outwardly polite welcome. However, Challe was less than overjoyed at the sight of the shifty “Mandarin,” while the appearance of OAS “assassins” in Salan's wake caused the saintly Saint Marc to have second thoughts about the purity of the putschists’ motives.

  The decisive strike against the conspiracy came at eight o'clock on the evening of April 23. De Gaulle appeared on television, dressed in his brigadier's uniform, to give what became perhaps the most celebrated speech of his career: “In the name of France,” he commanded, “I order that all means, I repeat all means, be employed to block the road everywhere to those men.... I forbid every Frenchman, and above all every soldier, to execute any of their orders.... Françaises! Français! Aidez-moi!” This speech, followed by one by Premier Michel Debré that conjured up flocks of volunteers to defend France against an expected invasion of Legion paras, struck at the heart of the coup's support in the army, in what came to be called the “victory of the transistors.” Fence-sitting officers in Algeria now had a clear line to follow. Those who were still leaning toward the putschists were given a decisive impetus by their conscript soldiers, some of whom took matters into their own hands by seizing depots, imprisoning their commanders and establishing soldiers’ committees.

  But mostly the resistance was passive—when Saint Marc visited the barracks of the zouaves to convince its commander to rally to the revolt, he was met at the gate by sentries who announced, “You cannot come in here. This is the legal army of the French republic.” When he finally did gain access to the commander, he was told, “There are soldiers’ committees. They only half obey me. I support you with all my heart, but I can do nothing.” Saint Marc concluded that the conscripts provided officers disinclined to intervene in any case with a perfect alibi.23 This was not entirely true, for even in regiments where the officers had joined the revolt, such as the 14e and 18e RCP, or where the putsch counted many sympathizers, as in the 2e, 3e and 8e régiments de parachutistes d'infanterie de marine and the 9e RCP, the troops took de Gaulle's speech of April 23 very much to heart.24

  At Sidi-bel-Abbès, Brothier came down firmly on the side of legality. Legion units from all over Algeria telephoned him for direction, to be told, “We cannot take the risk of seeing the Germans fire upon Frenchmen. The putsch is a French affair; it is unthinkable that foreigners should become mixed up in it.”25 That decision, seconded by the intervention of Defense Minister and ex-captain of the 13e DBLE Pierre Messmer, no doubt saved the Légion, whose abolition had been sought by a number of left-wing politicians and was apparently seriously considered by de Gaulle.

  Nevertheless, small tremors of revolt rattled both the 1er REC and the 2e REP at Philippeville. As the 2e REP drove west toward Algiers through crowds of cheering pieds noirs, Simon Murray thought that “The entrance of the Allies into Paris at the end of the war could not have received a more enthusiastic welcome.” Still, it was not clear to him “which side are we really on?” That question should have been answered when they were ordered to occupy an air base held by a unit of conscript marines,

  and they weren't having any of it. So we were given wooden batons, heavy, with sharp points, and in one long line we slowly eased into the marines, pushing them forward like bolshie rams. They frequently turned and attacked with aggression. This was met in many cases with savage beatings and it became a sad and shoddy business. Marine officers were pushed around by our officers—there were scenes of officers yelling at each other with questions of loyalty and accusations of traitor and so on. L'Hospitallier [the company commander, Lhopitallier] bust [sic] his baton on the head of one of the marines. Gradually they were herded out of the airport premises and we were in control of the base from which we will apparently make the drop on Paris.26

  But that was not to be, as the massive Noratlas transport p
lanes had already slipped quietly back across the Mediterranean. “This news provoked a shock,” Sergent confessed. “We are already without the Navy. What will we do if the aviation abandons us? It will mean isolation.” Sergent believed that the desertion of the air force caused an even more important psychological blow to air force general Challe than the resistance of the conscripts.27 It was apparent even to légionnaire 2e classe Murray that “The army is completely divided and we appear to be very much a minority.... I wonder what will happen if this putsch does not succeed and what our own position will be—perhaps we'll be disbanded and all sent home. Nice thought to sleep on!”28 Rather than a springboard to power in France, Algeria increasingly appeared to have become the conspirators’ prison.

  By Tuesday, April 25, Challe had lost heart. A mountain of militants led by Sergent and Degueldre contemplated deposing, even assassinating, the too-polite-by-half air force general and replacing him with a committee of public safety under Salan, whom they believed prepared to risk civil war and even a clash with army units loyal to de Gaulle. However, Challe was cajoled into soldiering on for Algérie française for the rest of the day. That night, however, he drove to Zéralda with the intention of giving himself up. Zeller, Salan and Jouhaud put on civilian clothes and disappeared. Saint Marc placed his Legion paras in their trucks and led them back to Zéralda, not without difficulty, for some were reluctant to return.

  On the morning of April 26, the Legion camp awoke to find themselves surrounded by heavily armed police and army units, with helicopters buzzing overhead. In the mess, some officers talked of fighting it out, proposals that fortunately came to nothing. A colonel appeared to fetch a pale Challe. Saint Marc turned out an honor guard for the general as he disappeared out the gate and into captivity. In Algiers, Lieutenant Colonel Guiraud, who had been on leave when his regiment had been hijacked by Saint Marc, was convoked before Defense Minister Messmer and forced to watch as he dictated orders dissolving the 1er REP and the 14e and 18e RCP.

  In Zéralda, the légionnaires began smashing up the barracks and burning archives as tremendous explosions tore through the three magazines. And to think that, in the old days, they received up to five years in the section spéciale for selling their underwear! They boarded trucks, many tearing off their decorations and shooting their submachine guns into the air, as some of their officers bitterly taunted journalists. As they awaited departure, légionnaires in one of the trucks began to sing Edith Piaf's “Je ne regrette rien,” which was soon picked up by others. Throwing out defiant bras d'honneur to all and sundry, they disappeared through the gates to the applause of a local crowd. “It was the most magnificent quartier in the French army,” Murray recorded, “which they built themselves from scratch, brick by brick, in the tradition of the Legion.” The 2e REP paid for the gesture, for upon returning to their barracks they found it occupied. “It was probably feared that we also would blow the place to pieces.” Camerone 1961 was the most sober since the original event almost a century earlier. “No passes were issued so we just sat in misery on the hill and guzzled the extra food and beer that was issued to cheer our sinking spirits.”29

  In subsequent trials, Challe and Zeller were sentenced to fifteen years’ prison, Hélie de Saint Marc to ten years, and Colonels Lecomte and Masselot of the 14e and 18e RCP to eight years apiece. Saint Marc's crime was considered especially heinous because, in the opinion of Le Monde's defense correspondent Jean Planchais, he commanded a Legion of foreigners, “that is to say, men whose loyalty is to their superiors. To use that loyalty which is essential to enlist in the Legion in an internal French affair was a very grave gesture.”30 Kemencei, although he disapproved of the coup, agreed that in the place of the paras, he would have done the same thing.

  The légionnaires of these two great and prestigious units [the 1er REP and the 1er REC] who joined the insurgents obeyed their officers, as all légionnaires have always obeyed their superiors. If I had been in their place, I would have also followed the orders to the “letter”. . . . And even today, I find that my comrades were right to have confidence in their officers: They never received the order to shoot at Frenchmen! Never on any Frenchman! And this intangible fact, this honor was never shared with certain other corps constituted and armed during these unfortunate events.31

  Kemencei ignores how close the coup came to provoking a civil war in which the légionnaires would certainly have been ordered to fire upon Frenchmen. This was prevented only by Challe's unwillingness to do so. Had events been dominated by Salan, or had Sergent or Degueldre had more influence, they certainly would have been ordered to fire upon Frenchmen. This is not to forget that the criteria for criminal behavior is determined in large measure by the victor—after all, the fact that légionnaires had fired on Frenchmen, like much of the rest of the French army, during the Commune of 1871 had not made them criminals from the government's viewpoint. Nor did this prevent over one hundred légionnaires from murdering Frenchmen as part of the OAS. Those who had absconded, including Generals Salan, Jouhaud and the ex-inspector of the Légion, General Gardy, were sentenced to death in absentia. All of the convicted were amnestied by de Gaulle in 1968, following the large-scale opposition to his regime in May of that year, possibly as a condition laid down by Massu, who was then commanding French troops in Germany and to whom de Gaulle turned for support.

  The coup attempt had several unfortunate results. The first was that, as in December 1961, efforts by partisans of Algérie française to secure their future merely served to hasten their defeat, because they had seriously weakened the French negotiating position in Algeria. It became clear that de Gaulle had to pull out of Algeria, and the FLN simply had to wait him out. Over the next weeks, position after position defended by French negotiators collapsed in the face of FLN intransigence. The coup attempt also divided and demoralized the army. With three of the army's best units disbanded outright, and others transferred, decapitated or kept short of fuel to prevent any extracurricular activity, army morale bottomed out, its officers still split over where the true course of “duty” and “honor” lay. At Sidi-bel-Abbès a few days after the attempted coup, Colonel Brothier assembled the NCOs of the 1er REP “to tell us that the Foreign Legion had no business intervening in a politico-military conflict,” Janos Kemencei remembered. “He was applauded by almost everyone.”32 Nevertheless, the commander of the 1er étranger reported in November 1961 that NCOs from the 1er REP had been “sensitized to the maximum, they have a special spirit, and one must admit are profoundly politicized.”33

  The Legion officer corps became a primary target of a government housecleaning. According to Kemencei, the Legion was inundated with officers who not only lacked professionalism, but who also came with a definite political mission: “And you, the rebel.... Shut up!” a drunken officer newly assigned to the Legion shouted at him in a bar. “We'll tame all of you, the anti-Gaullists, OAS and all that. We'll show you our Republican metal.” “Alas,” Kemencei wrote, “this was not a solitary case.”34 In early May, a helicopter swooped down on the 2e REP in the middle of an operation to take away two senior officers sympathetic to the putschists: “It circled round and round above us as we stood to attention at ‘present arms’ in farewell and then it hovered for a second and was gone. Sad, because of what they represent to us as officers, and very fine officers the Legion has always had.” Two days later the colonel was replaced by an officer who “is viewed with some suspicion as he is obviously a Gaullist and therefore a potential enemy.”35

  Morale in the Legion plummeted following the events of April. The commander of the 1er étranger reported in November 1961 that

  The successive spectacle of generals arrested by their subordinates, then junior officers tried and thrown out of the army for having executed the orders of their superiors has profoundly troubled the spirit of discipline.... As far as the Legion is concerned, the dissolution of the 1er REP, the momentary suspension of recruitment, then its difficult reinstitution, and fina
lly the impression that the Legion was made the scapegoat of this affair by the atmosphere of distrust and general suspicion of which it is the object, all this has provoked bitterness and a defensive reaction which consists of enclosing oneself in the attitude of an outcast.

  He complained that the government appeared intent upon “disabling the Legion by breaking its officer corps.” The fact that the failure of the coup had led to a renewal of FLN activity and the prospect of having to deal with the pied noir population also had depressed morale, because “all of this throws an honorable outcome to the conflict in doubt.”36

  French Algeria was finished. On March 18, 1962, representatives of France and the FLN agreed to a cessation of hostilities on the basis of Algerian self-determination. Attempts by the OAS under the direction of Salan and Degueldre to delay the inevitable through terror built up so much animosity between the Moslem and pied noir communities that it became impossible for those of European extraction to remain after independence, even had they elected to do so. The summer of 1962 witnessed a mass exodus of pieds noirs from Algeria. Crowded into airports and docks, each person clutching the two suitcases allowed by officials, some departed for Spain, Canada or Israel. But most sailed for France, where they would form pockets of deeply bitter anti-Gaullist emigrés scattered mostly throughout the south, “half-French and half-Algerian,” Albert Camus's widow lamented, “and, in truth, dispossessed in both countries.”37 Behind them lay the empty European quarters of Algiers and Oran, the ashes of their possessions, which many had burned in the streets before departure, still smoldering and the walls of the eerily empty buildings scrawled with fading OAS slogans.