Peacerunner

by Penn Rhodeen

  Despite considerable overall progress, the cold hand of the Troubles was never far away. Many argued that Gerry Adams, who had always denied being a member of the IRA, should be held accountable for orders some believe he gave as an alleged IRA commander. Efforts to expose as fraudulent Adams’s claim that he was a politician seeking peaceful resolution of issues became something of a cottage industry on both sides of the Atlantic. In 2014, he was detained by the police in connection with the IRA murder of a mother of ten whose body had been discovered buried on a beach. He was released within days and never charged; in 2015, prosecutors decided that they wouldn’t prosecute him because there wasn’t sufficient evidence.

  Also in 2015, while the Northern Ireland government was struggling with a difficult fight over welfare cuts planned by the UK, two former IRA operatives were murdered in separate shootings, most likely by former IRA men. The second victim was a suspect in the first murder. The killings appeared to stem from criminal activity, not paramilitary violence. Sinn Féin and politicians of all stripes immediately denounced the murders; Martin McGuinness said the killers were “low-life criminals.” Nevertheless, unionists raised concerns that the IRA might still be operating as a paramilitary force. They thought that an ambiguous statement from the police that the IRA “was not on a war footing” implied that it might still be involved in violent activity.

  Many unionists wanted Britain to take over governing power once again and when they said no, DUP and UUP resignations followed. First Minister Peter Robinson avoided a complete breakdown by keeping his party’s participation in the power-sharing government alive in what The Guardian called “zombie form.” The British agreed to appoint an independent commission to investigate whether the IRA was operating as a paramilitary force.

  Drawing on the resources of MI5 and the Northern Ireland police and citing “confidence in our judgments,” the commission concluded that the IRA and other paramilitary groups were “committed to peaceful means to achieve political objectives.” They said that the paramilitary structures that remained actually aided the transition from warfare to politics and were a way to maintain more control over individual members. They cited the danger of republican splinter groups and general criminal activity for personal gain but said that IRA return to large-scale conflict “is well beyond recall.” That was good enough for the DUP and its ministers returned to their posts.

  While the substantial and generally steady progress since the Good Friday Agreement is an accurate measure of how far Northern Ireland has come, it is also an accurate measure of how far it still has to go. At some point the peace lines—high walls separating Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods—need to come down. Politicians have to find ways to attract votes from both communities based on shared concerns. Overcoming the segregation resulting from the sectarian divide is the enormous issue that the Good Friday Agreement did not—and surely could not—resolve. But in the generally improving situation in which the aspirations of the Good Friday Agreement are becoming more and more realized, the political focus is becoming more on solving practical problems and less on identity and symbolic issues. Identity, of course, is always in the picture and can flare up at any time, but the movement away from the symbolic issues to which Northern Ireland has for so long been drawn suggests that, in time, tackling the huge problem of a fundamentally segregated society will be within reach. Morrison says that’s the next frontier for Northern Ireland.

  It is likely, though, that these changes will not come quickly, especially since the children of each community are for the most part educated only with their own: Catholics almost all in parochial schools; Protestants almost all in the public school system. Efforts have been made to change that, but a reasonably integrated education system is not on the near horizon. Hopefully the time will come when leaders and voters understand the price children are paying for this sectarian division. As these children mature, they will struggle to make their way in a world that is increasingly diverse. It’s one thing to want to stay close to your roots, but quite another to grow up unequipped to deal with people from different backgrounds.

  In the meantime, Northern Ireland, like many places in the world, may for a time have to muddle through as an essentially segregated society. But as its people well know, muddling through isn’t the worst option. The way forward, of course, remains the same one that brought things this far: a vigorous political process in which everyone has a voice. Leaders on both sides must commit to negotiating and hashing out deals to meet their constituents’ practical needs and to address the problems holding the society back. Morrison sums it up perfectly: “It’s all about process. The process is to get up every day, don’t kill each other, keep negotiating, and at the end of the day find yourself further along.”

  In the years following the Good Friday Agreement, several noteworthy figures passed from the scene. The most consequential death was that of David Ervine, who suffered a heart attack and a stroke in early January 2007 and died two days later, at the age of fifty-three. Tributes poured in from every direction. Green Party leader Trevor Sargent said, “His death leaves a major vacuum in terms of the quality of political representatives in Northern Ireland.” Morrison had always made it a point to meet with Ervine whenever he went to Belfast, regarding him as a dependable barometer of what was really going on. Whenever Ervine seemed discouraged, Morrison found himself getting discouraged as well.

  A sense of what Ervine might have been able to help bring about by way of politics that would cut across sectarian lines can be gleaned from his words at a conference in 1994:

  The politics of division see thousands of people dead, most of them working class, and headstones on the graves of young men. We had been fools: Let’s not be fools any longer. All elements must be comfortable within Northern Ireland. We have got to extend the hand of friendship, we have got to take the peace lines down brick by brick, and somehow or other we have got to introduce class politics. You can’t eat a flag.

  A great void in the politics of Northern Ireland is that while the urban working-class Catholics have a strong and effective political voice in Sinn Féin, the urban working-class Protestants have nothing comparable because the top unionist parties are geared principally toward those who are middle-class and up, living mostly in rural and suburban areas. Ervine was a political leader of real scope, profound goodness, and great gifts, and it isn’t hard to imagine that resolution of the toughest issues would be closer if he hadn’t died so soon.

  In August of 2014, Albert Reynolds, the Taoiseach who did so much to lay the foundation for the peace process, died after a long battle with Alzheimer’s. John Major attended the funeral, and when the priest thanked him for coming, he replied simply and perfectly, “Where else would I be on this day?”

  Just a few weeks later, Ian Paisley died at eighty-eight. The sadness of Martin McGuinness, Paisley’s improbable partner in government, was palpable. Paisley’s family invited McGuinness as a family friend to visit Paisley at home during his last illness, as well as to the private family service after he died. The Sinn Féin man was the only political figure invited.

  In April of 2015, Jimmy Creighton, the loyalist community organizer whose name Morrison didn’t catch, the man with the unforgettable cigarette ash early in 1992 and the perfect benediction for Morrison late in 1998, died suddenly in Glencairn.

  A central question asked persistently about Northern Ireland, with varying levels of anxiety, is whether or not the peace will last. Although it seems highly likely that it will—there is simply no substantial constituency for a return to warfare—worrisome possibilities can be imagined. If the government were to become so stuck that nothing of importance could be dealt with or if through either relentless majority domination of the political process or takeover of government by the British, the nationalist community came to despair that it had been stripped of any effective voice, the peace could be vulnerable to the voices of hard men arguing that the idea of a political way fo
rward was, and remains, nothing but a fantasy. Yet even if such a situation were to develop, the likelihood of a return to warfare seems remote, because there are solid answers rooted in important changes that have been institutionalized in Northern Ireland today—particularly the reform of the policing and criminal justice systems, as well as the creation of a basic foundation of equal rights and opportunity.

  But nested within that worrisome though unlikely scenario is a crucial point: The Good Friday Agreement is inherently vulnerable, and it will continue to be so as long as Northern Ireland remains so intensely segregated and politically divided. It requires unflagging attention and protection.

  What has been accomplished in Northern Ireland is one of humankind’s great political creations. Its essence is process—complicated, messy, shifting, uncertain, imperfect, and vital process, like democracy itself, like life itself. If the creation that arose from the peace process had been a concrete object—iconic works of art like Michelangelo’s David or van Gogh’s Starry Night come to mind—it would be regarded as a one of the great masterpieces, something to be treasured and, because of its inherent fragility, protected and always handled with great care.

  That creation is now in the hands of the people of Northern Ireland; they, along with the UK, of which Northern Ireland is a part, and the Republic of Ireland, of which it may one day become a part, are its trustees. It is an indispensable part of the heritage and abiding greatness of Northern Ireland, as essential as its great legacy of ship building, engineering, and linen making, as well as its magnificent landscape and stunning coastline. While there is good reason to believe that the trustees of this remarkable creation will meet their responsibilities, it is crucially important for all who helped, including the American friends of the process, to attend to it, protect it, and help it evolve and develop to better meet the needs of the people by whom, and for whom, it was created.

  CAST OF CHARACTERS

  Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair

  Adair, a fierce loyalist and head of the West Belfast Brigade of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), had a reputation for viciousness— and was known for his unabashed boasting about it—that set him apart in a decidedly violent crowd of loyalist paramilitary men. He claimed to have killed at least 20 Catholics.

  Gerry Adams

  The Belfast native headed the Sinn Féin party and worked with great political skill to move the IRA away from armed struggle and toward politics. Many had doubts about him, but Adams was central to winning the peace. He now sits in the Irish parliament.

  Bertie Ahern

  Ahern became prime minister of Ireland in 1997, shortly before all-party negotiations began. He played a crucial role in bringing about the Good Friday Agreement.

  Tony Blair

  Blair’s election as prime minister of the UK in May of 1997 opened the way to all-party talks. The IRA declared a new ceasefire that July, and Sinn Féin was at the negotiating table that September. In the final stages of the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement, Blair threw himself with total commitment into the effort. He tirelessly oversaw the post–Good Friday processes that gave substance to the Good Friday Agreement.

  John Bruton

  Bruton was the Irish prime minister in the period after the 1994 ceasefire and before the 1997 all-party negotiations. He was generally more open to the British viewpoint than his predecessor Albert Reynolds or his successor Bertie Ahern. At critical points, however, he spoke bluntly and truthfully about the futility of the British position that made arms decommissioning a precondition of all-party talks.

  Joseph Cahill

  An elderly IRA hard man with an extensive record of violence and gun-running, Cahill was nonetheless granted a US visa in order to explain the 1994 IRA ceasefire to its hardcore supporters in Irish America.

  Warren Christopher

  As Bill Clinton’s secretary of state from 1993 to 1997, Christopher vehemently opposed issuance of a US visa to Gerry Adams. When Clinton called him to say he had decided to issue the visa, Christopher tried for half an hour to talk him out of it.

  Bill Clinton

  President of the United States from 1993 until 2001. When he was an Arkansas governor running for president, his Irish American supporters got him to promise a new American policy on Northern Ireland that was independent of Britain’s. The political conditions created by Bruce Morrison and others helped Clinton make good on those promises, and in time his determination to help bring peace exceeded their wildest hopes. His role in the peace process became one of his proudest accomplishments.

  Jimmy Creighton

  Morrison encountered this loyalist activist twice at the Belfast housing estate Glencairn: first in 1992 when he heard Creighton holding forth at a community meeting and again in 1998 when Creighton offered Morrison his judgment on his performance in the peace process.

  Anne Edwards

  As Bill Clinton’s director of press advance, her job was to make the images and events of his 1995 visit to Northern Ireland visually compelling and supportive of the American policy Clinton was there to advance.

  Reg Empey

  He was an Ulster Unionist Party official who helped party leader David Trimble accept the final draft of the Good Friday Agreement.

  David Ervine

  Ervine was a former UVF man who came to believe while in prison that loyalists should practice politics instead of warfare. He was part of the group that met in secret with Morrison and the other Americans in 1993 and changed their view of the loyalist community. Ervine became a leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and he was an enormously gifted loyalist political leader until his death in 2007 at the age of 53.

  Chuck Feeney

  Feeney, a brilliant and hard-nosed entrepreneur, became one of the richest men in the world and then gave nearly all of his fortune away. After the horrific IRA bombing in Enniskillen in 1987, he became determined to do anything he could to help end the violence. He was part of the team of unofficial peacemakers who went to Northern Ireland in 1993, and he lent crucial financial support to many aspects of the peace process.

  Ray Flynn

  The former Boston mayor and Irish Americans for Clinton-Gore co-chairman promised Niall O’Dowd that he’d lead an American delegation to Northern Ireland in the spring of 1993, a time when Morrison was unavailable. When he begged off at the last minute and the trip had to be cancelled, it threatened the credibility of the new American role.

  William Flynn

  As CEO of the insurance giant Mutual of America, Flynn was the very model of the fully arrived, establishment-certified Irish American business success. He was a major participant in the Irish American push for peace and a member of the small team of unofficial peacemakers who went to Northern Ireland in 1993. Flynn was Irish to the bone and a devout Roman Catholic, but he was able to forge important relationships with both the unionist and loyalist communities.

  Thomas Foley

  The Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1989 to 1995 was Irish American, but he was no friend of the republican cause. He abhorred the IRA and any individuals or organizations that seemed to have the remotest sympathy for their cause.

  Martin Galvin

  Galvin was an uncompromising longtime Noraid activist. When Bill Clinton appeared at the Irish American forum just before the crucial 1992 New York Democratic Primary, it was Galvin who asked the hottest question: Would he give Gerry Adams a US visa?

  Ted Howell

  Howell, who resolutely avoided public attention, was the Sinn Féin theoretician and strategist Morrison described as “Gerry Adams’s right-hand brain.” He was a major architect of Sinn Féin’s creation of a political path for the achievement of republican objectives.

  John Hume

  Hume was the leader of the moderate nationalist SDLP party and a key figure in the civil rights demonstrations that preceded the Troubles. His influence on American policy on Northern Ireland was enormous. His moderate nationalist stance, especia
lly his condemnation of violence, gave him enormous influence over the opinions of the mainstream Irish American political establishment. Hume always did what he thought was right for the peace process even when he knew it would hurt him politically, as when he supported the US visa for Adams. In 1998, Hume was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

  Billy Hutchinson

  Hutchinson was a former UVF man who came to believe while in prison that loyalists should practice politics instead of warfare. He was part of the group that met in secret with Morrison and the other Americans in 1993 and changed their view of the loyalist community. He became a leader of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and a member of the Belfast City Council.

  Christopher Hyland

  As director of outreach to ethnic groups for the 1992 Clinton campaign, Hyland connected with Niall O’Dowd to get Irish Americans behind Clinton. He was a tireless advocate within Clinton’s campaign for him to create a new American policy on Northern Ireland.

  Ted Kennedy

  Kennedy served in the US Senate from 1962 to 2009. He was its preeminent Irish American, and his views on Northern Ireland were by far the most influential. When he decided to support an American visa for Gerry Adams, despite concerns, he did it with the full force of his inimitable voice and heart, which greatly helped move the peace process forward.

  Tony Lake

  As Bill Clinton’s national security advisor from 1993 to 1997, Lake oversaw and provided crucial support for Clinton’s new American policy on Northern Ireland.

  Richard Lawlor