The Gothic Line

by Mark Zuehlke

The RCR was not the only unit discovering that the paratroopers were falling back. At 0100 hours, a 48th Highlander patrol probed carefully up the slopes of San Martino expecting to trip an ambush. Instead, they got right through to the shattered ruins of the farm buildings there to be greeted only by a deadening silence. When Lieutenant Colonel Don Mackenzie learned that San Martino was empty, he immediately roused ‘D’ Company commander Lloyd Smith and told him to get his men up there. This time, the Germans would not be allowed to infiltrate back into the bastion without a fight. By dawn, Smith’s men were dug in and San Martino was taken.38

  The withdrawals by 1st Parachute Division were prompted by the advances 1 CID had gained on the left flank, particularly the Ausa River crossing made by the Carleton and York Regiment. At 2130 hours, ‘D’ and ‘B’ companies had moved down into the streambed just as the supporting artillery barrage lifted. They caught the Germans on the other side in the midst of a relief changeover and quickly scattered the disorganized opposition. By midnight, ‘D’ Company was dug in on the river’s north bank and the engineers went to work with their bridging equipment.39

  The necessary racket that No. 2 Platoon of 4th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers made with its mechanical equipment drew German artillery and mortar fire, but the work proceeded. Like the 10th Field Squadron a week earlier, 4th Field Company went into the bridging operation seriously depleted. This time, however, it had not been a German shell that had caught the engineers in the middle of forming up for breakfast. Rather, it was a bomb from a Kittyhawk that struck the church in which the sappers were preparing to take their morning meal. When the building collapsed, three men were killed and eight wounded.40

  To build the river crossing, No. 2 Platoon had a D-4 bulldozer and a special bridging unit known as an Ark. This was a turretless Churchill with bridge decking built onto its body and long hinged steel ramps attached to either end. In this case, the incomplete Ark had only the rear ramp installed. As the sappers set to work, they were much assisted by the indirect illumination of searchlights once again lighting the night sky. They drove the Ark into the river channel and found its truncated span sufficient to bridge the river if the bulldozer cut the bank down on both sides to create adequate approaches. By 0320 hours, the engineers reported the crossing ready for traffic.41

  BY DAWN OF SEPTEMBER 19, the Canadians were ready to finally mount a major attack against San Fortunato Ridge. Major General Chris Vokes ordered 2 CIB to assume a holding position while the West Nova Scotia Regiment expanded the Carleton and York Regiment’s bridgehead and the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment won another in front of the PPCLI. Once over the Ausa, both regiments were to push onto San Fortunato and clear that feature.42 By day’s end, Vokes wanted 1 CID firmly established on the heights of San Fortunato, ready to force a crossing of the Marecchia River and end this battle.

  On the Canadian left, the 4th British Infantry Division had also crossed the Ausa and was consolidating its grip inside the major defensive fortifications of the Rimini Line at the extreme western end of San Fortunato Ridge. Farther inland, 1st British Armoured Division, 56th British Infantry Division, and 46th British Infantry Division were all either closing on or fighting through what constituted the final major German fortified line in Italy. The last section of the Gothic Line defence in depth was nearly broken. Once again, Eighth Army’s commanders felt all it would take was one final hard shove to win entrance into the Po Valley.

  That the entire army was worn out, both in physical and numerical strength, was not considered an impediment. Neither was the fact that the regiments given responsibility for carrying out the breakthrough had little idea of the state or strength of opposition they faced or the nature of the ground in which they must operate. Hastings and Prince Edward Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron returned from the Orders Group at 3 CIB headquarters at 2045 hours on September 18 with orders that his men immediately march to battle. The start line was two miles away. While the soldiers gathered their battle packs, Cameron held a hasty forty-five-minute O Group with his company commanders. The entire attack plan was worked out purely by map consultation. There was no opportunity for on-the-ground reconnaissance.

  Cameron had been warned he might have to fight for his start line on the Ausa’s north bank, but that the main German defences were not expected to be met until he had crossed most of the 1,500 yards lying between the river and the base of San Fortunato Ridge. This was because the intervening ground was mostly grain fields that were completely commanded by the ridge. There were likely, however, to be some strong delaying forces dug in across the flat ground to ensure the defenders on the ridge had opportunity to brace to meet any attack.

  Cameron decided to commit only two companies, ‘A’ and ‘B’, initially. His other two companies would remain at the start line and then leapfrog through the leading companies once they reached the base of the slope and set up a preliminary strongpoint there. Cameron thought it vital that his men be on the ridge “before light broke, as to be caught in the flat would prove extremely costly, therefore no ‘mopping up’ operations would be undertaken.”43 A squadron from the 48th Royal Tank Regiment would be in support. To help them cross the flats during the initial phase, ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies would follow a creeping barrage that lifted one hundred yards every six minutes.44

  Throughout the briefing, Cameron kept his voice calm and moderated. He could have been discussing a simple militia training exercise back in Canada for all the anxiety his manner betrayed. When a newly assigned company commander, looking at the map and the open ground that must be covered, said, “Sir, we’ll never make it,” Cameron ignored him.45 Orders finalized, the companies marched towards the Ausa River.

  [ 30 ]

  We’ll All Be Heroes

  THE HASTINGS and Prince Edward Regiment’s ‘A’ and ‘B’ companies crossed the start line behind the creeping barrage on schedule at 0400 hours, September 19, after a night spent marching hard to get into position for the attack. Soon they were sweeping past empty trenches and unmanned machine guns. Not expecting a night attack, the 1st Parachute Division had pulled its men out of the valley and onto the ridge for a meal and some rest. Resistance was limited to a scattering of listening posts that the Hasty P’s quickly pushed in. A few prisoners were disarmed and sent to the Canadian rear.

  Hopes started running high that there would be no fight at all when the two forward companies reached the base of the ridge at 0530. Minutes earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Don Cameron had committed the two following companies into the plain to carry out their mission of passing through the leading companies and taking the ridge.1 ‘A’ Squadron of the 48th Royal Tank Regiment, under command of Major J. Cromwell, bumped its Churchills across the Ark bridge in the Carleton and York Regiment’s position and then started searching out in the plain for the infantry. The little valley was swathed in a thick cloud of smoke meant to screen the attack from German observation. While the smoke partially succeeded in this purpose, it also prevented the tankers from spotting the infantry companies that had spread out to avoid being detected by the enemy.2

  The morning dawned brilliantly clear and the heat inside the tanks quickly became stifling. Despite the fine weather, the air pressure was lowering rapidly, which caused havoc with radio communication. The tankers’ No. 18 sets stopped working, cutting them off from the Hasty P’s. Every time either Cameron’s tactical headquarters or the tank squadron commander tried calling the other on the No. 22 set, all they heard was a squall of static.3

  Having realized they were under attack, the paratroopers were saturating the valley with artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire. They also pushed men down the slope to meet the attack. The fire directed at ‘B’ Company’s position on the left was so intense that ‘C’ Company was unable to pass through. Cameron ordered it to swing right and follow ‘D’ Company through ‘A’ Company’s position.

  The attack was staggering. Cameron worked frantically to maintain the momentum by bringin
g continuous artillery concentrations down on the ridge and cloaking the slope and valley in ever thickening layers of smoke. Finally, the tankers blundered upon the infantry and, with the artillery pounding the slope and ridge ahead, started climbing alongside ‘D’ Company.4 Infantry and tanks clawed through shell-torn vineyards and orchards, while the British tankers anxiously remarked spotting several Tigers and self-propelled guns forming up on the very edge of the ridgeline to meet them.5

  Moments later, one Churchill took a direct hit and started to burn. Then another died.6 Others were falling by the wayside with thrown tracks or with tangles of the wire used to support grapevines jamming bogey wheels. ‘D’ Company reached a road running laterally across the slope and engaged a company-strength force of paratroopers dug in behind it. A short hand-to-hand fight was followed by a sudden German surrender. The Hasty P’s had noticed on the way up the slope that whenever they closed with a pocket of resistance and a fight with bayonets, rifle butts, and fists seemed imminent that the paratroopers threw in the towel. This time, sixty prisoners were sent streaming down the hill. ‘D’ Company pressed on up the ever steepening slope, with the tanks now forced to use a single narrow track that switchbacked up the steep ridge face. Two hundred yards beyond the road, the infantry was finally halted by machine-gun fire. Left of ‘D’ Company, ‘C’ Company failed to get across the road before being forced to ground.7

  The three remaining operable tanks pressed on alone until, at 1100 hours and just thirty yards from the ridgeline, a Faustpatrone knocked out the lead tank. Then the paratroopers swarmed the surviving Churchills. Tankers fought hand-to-hand to save their tanks and only narrowly managed to beat a hasty retreat to the comparative safety of a hull-down position behind a farmhouse near ‘D’ Company.8 There was so little ammunition left for the main guns that the tankers reported they had to save these for their own defence.

  Cameron, enjoying a momentary return of communications with the tankers, forwarded their ammunition needs to their brigade and asked for more tanks. Even with renewed munitions, two tanks were not going to be enough. He told his companies on the slope to dig in, but to be ready to advance again just before last light. The current 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade plan was for the Hasty P’s to push onto the ridge at dusk with the West Nova Scotia Regiment on the left flank. This, Cameron was assured, “would secure the whole feature and beyond on our front.”9

  Cameron was dubious because the West Novas were still in the valley, having barely left their start line. He figured the West Novas would still be trying to reach the base of the ridge when the Hasty P’s had to try carrying the top. Back at brigade headquarters, a two-battalion attack might appear to be taking shape, but here at the front Cameron saw two regiments fighting individual battles.

  There was another worry. On the maps, the regiment’s final objective had appeared to be the ridgeline. But his two company commanders, who were on the slope just two hundred yards from the objective, reported that this position appeared to be a false summit completely dominated by the proper ridgeline. So even if his men got to the objective, Cameron doubted they would be able to hold it.10

  They never had to try. Late in the afternoon, Cameron received word that “further tanks would not be forthcoming and that the [2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade] under heavy artillery support were going to infiltrate through to our right. This artillery plan, received on short notice, necessitated withdrawing from previous positions to clear the danger area.”11 When the shelling ended, the companies were to infiltrate back but not go any farther up the slope. The Hasty P’s were to hold and let 2 CIB take over the advance.

  In the valley, the West Novas had been pinned down three hundred yards north of their Ausa River start line. While the Hasty P’s had attacked on schedule at 0400 hours, the West Novas had been an hour late.12 This gave the Germans time to rush men from the ridge to their positions on the valley floor. As the two leading companies moved towards the river, they saw the enemy clambering into their forward gun positions. When the West Novas emerged from the Ausa channel, the Germans tore into them with close-range fire. No amount of smoke or artillery fire could suppress the enemy guns. Repeatedly, the infantry and tanks of ‘C’ Squadron, 48th Royal Tank Regiment tried and failed to push forward.

  It soon became apparent “that the biggest thorn in the flesh of both infantry and tanks was a certain Tiger tank which moved about from fire position to fire position on the high ground above. One of its positions from which its spotted firing was practically unassailable was between two buildings protected in front by a brick wall, apparently some five or ten yards in front of the tank and below which the ground fell sharply. The only target which the Tiger presented was its gun barrel and the very top of the turret, which was just visible.”13

  By last light, the attack remained stalled and the regiment had suffered eighteen men killed and forty-five wounded.14 The tanks, short of both ammunition and fuel, withdrew, leaving the West Novas to endure a night of intense shelling and mortaring in slit trenches zeroed in by the Germans.

  AT 1600 HOURS, Vokes ordered 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade to “exploit the success” of the Hasty P’s by sending the Royal 22e Regiment to the left of the pinned- down West Nova Scotia Regiment to seize Villa Belvedere, a sprawling estate on the western flank of San Fortunato Ridge.15 While the Van Doos distracted the Germans, 2 CIB’s Loyal Edmonton Regiment would advance under cover of darkness onto the ridge between the West Novas and the Hasty P’s. Rather than securing a strongpoint on the ridge itself, however, the Eddies were to cross right over and split into two columns to capture the villages of San Lorenzo in Monte l’Abate and Le Grazie. Then they would advance across the flats beyond to win a bridgehead on the north bank of the Marecchia River. Once the Edmontons departed the ridge, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada would follow through to the ridgeline and swing right to clear the Germans completely from the eastern flank.16

  At no time did Vokes seriously turn his mind to developments on his right-hand flank and consider exploiting the glimmer of success realized there on September 19. His attention was entirely focused on bludgeoning a path over San Fortunato Ridge. Perhaps, however, this was due less to a failure to truly “exploit the success” won by one of his regiments than to the imposition of a political decision on his operations.

  By dawn, the combined Royal Canadian Regiment company formed from the remnants of ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies was well north of the Rimini airfield. Captain J. Milton Gregg’s men encountered only scattered opposition from forces obviously pulling back to Rimini or even the Marecchia River. From the city, the hard thumping sound of explosive demolitions indicated that the Germans were likely destroying anything deemed of tactical value preparatory to a withdrawal. Gregg’s company was moving so fast he worried they might have moved north of the designated bomb line and be at risk of being strafed or bombed by the ever circling Desert Air Force planes. His radio had malfunctioned, so the captain was unable to contact headquarters to warn the planes off. When a couple of fighter-bombers roared low overhead to check the tiny force out, Gregg and his men dashed into a nearby house. Inside, they gathered up a stack of white bed sheets and threw these out on the road. Then the men hastily straightened and twisted sheets to etch out the letters canada. When the planes made a return pass, they waggled their wings and returned to their CAB rank.17

  Gregg’s intrepid little band carried on and at 0610 hours were patrolling the outskirts of Rimini without finding any Germans. Realizing the city could fall with hardly a shot fired, Gregg sent a runner back to headquarters with the news while his men took up defensive positions in some houses.18

  Back at RCR headquarters, adjutant Captain Ted Shuter, who had set the probe towards the city into action the previous night, was elated at the news. Orders were immediately issued for ‘D’ Company to move up on Gregg’s left inside the city. ‘B’ Company’s commander, Captain Len Courtin, was called back to headquarters to receive instructions to also
move up to support the Rimini lodgement.19

  It was 0730 hours and the officers at RCR headquarters were taking a few minutes to wash and shave while things were at a lull. Five officers and several other ranks were in the courtyard cleaning up. Shuter stood next to his friend, Captain Rick Forgrave, who was happily cleaning the muck of battle off his body and talking about his forthcoming forty-eight-hour rest period in Cattolica. Finished before Forgrave, Shuter playfully snapped a towel across the other officer’s backside and then beat a hasty retreat into the headquarters to avoid Forgrave’s legendary towel-snapping reflexive counterattack.20 Suddenly a powerful explosion rocked the courtyard. A piece of shrapnel pierced Forgrave’s skull. Lieutenant Jimmy Quayle had both legs and his right arm broken by the force of the blast, and shrapnel peppered his buttocks and thighs. Lieutenant Benny Potts took shrapnel in his chest and forehead. Courtin, who had just entered the courtyard en route to his briefing, had his face cut open in two places. Five other ranks suffered leg and back wounds. Everyone, except Courtin who was only slightly hurt, was quickly evacuated to the Regimental Aid Post.21 A badly shaken Shuter realized that, had he not fled Forgrave’s certain retaliation, he undoubtedly would have also been injured. Word came soon after that Forgrave’s wounds had proved fatal.22

  The cause of the explosion was never fully determined. While possibly the result of an incoming artillery or mortar round, the regiment’s war diarist believed it was caused by someone accidentally triggering a loose grenade while moving it. The courtyard by this time was littered with packs and weapons belonging to evacuated wounded and a great deal of munitions was scattered about.23

  While everyone was absorbing the shock of this tragedy, Shuter received a radio signal from brigade that rendered him speechless. He was to immediately direct Gregg’s company to get out of Rimini and recall ‘D’ Company. Instead of stiffening the regiment’s position in the city, the RCR was to withdraw from the coastal plain entirely to a holding position on San Martino. The 3rd Greek Mountain Brigade would occupy Rimini. Under no circumstances was any official record to mention RCR’s foray into the city.*