Chiang Kai-Shek

by Emily Hahn

  And now, asked Hurley, what about letting Chiang in on the Yalta agreement?

  Stalin had an excellent excuse for putting off the moment for another two or three months. He wanted to prepare, he said. It would not do for the Japanese to know what he was up to, and Hurley accepted this reasoning, even though as Stalin had already served notice on the Japanese that their neutrality pact was to be allowed to lapse, there would not seem to be much point in this continued caution. The Ambassador proceeded to Chungking. Faithful to the agreement, he said nothing even yet to the Generalissimo about those “pre-eminent” clauses.

  Though he was not alarmed, however, other Americans were. Harriman and Kennan (who acted as Harriman’s relief in Moscow) read his cheerful report and hurriedly wrote to Truman. They warned him against relying on Russia’s good faith in dealing with China after the war. Yet even to them “after the war” seemed a long way off, and other worries were clamoring for attention. The State Department came to the conclusion that they had plenty of time to watch Russia and frustrate her plans. They knew in theory and from experience what she would do: take control through the agency of the Chinese Reds, masking her interest and avoiding outright intervention. But they were busy, and even at that point some of them refused to be convinced. In the meantime, it was decided, the original program must go forward. Come what may, China must be unified by coalition, both militarily and politically: it was too late to turn on the Communists at this date, who might in such case sell them out to Japan, or go on strike, or precipitate undesired action from Russia, or——

  Far better wait. Deliver a knockout blow to Japan, and then deal with the Russian question. It was a remote, complicated matter for the newcomer Harry Truman to handle, and he left it to die-hards who insisted that all would yet be well. They argued that a unified China would naturally wish to be independent of Russia. A unified China would be friendly to America. Didn’t the Chinese need the trade such friendship would bring? Everything would be all right if only Chiang would consent to that coalition.

  Yet, considering what Mao Tse-tung was saying quite openly about the coalition, Hurley as well as the optimists in Washington seemed indefatigable. Mao delivered a report on April 24, 1945, at the Party’s Seventh National Congress.

  “There exist in China two different guiding lines,” he said, “one of which helps to defeat the Japanese aggressors, but the other, while incapable of defeating the Japanese aggressors, in some respects actually helps them to undermine the anti-Japanese war. The passive policy adopted by the Kuomintang government toward the war with Japan and its reactionary policy of oppression toward the people have resulted in military defeats, the loss of large parts of territory, a financial and economic crisis, the oppression of the people, hardships in the people’s livelihood, and the undermining of national unity.… But the movement of the people’s awakening and unity has never been halted, it has been developing in a circuitous manner under the double oppression of the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang government.…

  “Our regular forces have been expanded to the strength of 910,000 men, while the people’s militia have increased to over 2,200,000.…

  “The leading ruling clique in the Kuomintang has persisted in maintaining a dictatorial rule and carried out a passive policy against Japan while it has upheld a policy of opposing the people within the country. In this way the Kuomintang armies have shrunk to half their former size and the major part of them has almost lost its combat ability; in this way a deep chasm exists between the Kuomintang government and the people, and a serious crisis of poverty, discontent, and revolts among the people is engendered; thus the ruling clique of the Kuomintang has not only greatly reduced its role in the war against Japan, but, moreover, has become an obstacle in the mobilization and unification of all the anti-Japanese forces in the country.…

  “Why did this serious situation come into existence under the leadership of the major ruling clique of the Kuomintang? Because this ruling clique represents the interests of China’s big landlords, big bankers, and the big comprador class.… There are many indications that they have prepared, and, particularly at present, are preparing to start civil war once the Japanese aggressors are sufficiently driven out of China by the troops of a certain ally.…

  “Many negotiations were conducted between us and the Kuomintang government to discuss the way to end the one-party dictatorship, to form a coalition government, and to effect the necessary democratic reform. However, all our proposals were rejected.…

  “The New Democracy we uphold demands the overthrow of external national oppression and the doing away of the internal feudalistic, Fascist oppression.”

  Mao grew really eloquent on the subject of China’s relations with Russia. “We maintain that the Kuomintang government must end its hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and immediately improve the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Soviet Union was the first nation to abrogate the unequal treaties and to sign equal new treaties with China. During the First Kuomintang National Congress … and the subsequent Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union was the only nation that assisted the Chinese war of liberation. After the war of resistance broke out on July 7, 1937, the Soviet Union was again the first to come to the aid of China.… We believe that the final, thorough solution of Pacific problems is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union.”

  Ah well, said Hurley, no doubt this could all be arranged later on. The State Department opined that there was a good deal in what Mao said. They felt they must not let Chiang get the idea that he had a blank check. The Kuomintang must work toward a broadly representative government and aim for stability, democracy, and all the rest of it after the war. Americans must hold themselves free, otherwise, to approve other arrangements. And when, a little later, an all-out raid on the Amerasia offices disclosed the extent to which espionage had been carried on, Truman submitted to advice that a scandal involving Russia just at that time, before the San Francisco Conference, would be fatal. The affair was accordingly hushed up.

  Germany surrendered on May 8. Amid all the appropriate rejoicing the Allies still looked forward with apprehension to the grueling battle they expected before Japan could be whipped. Once more Hurley reminded the President that Chiang had not yet been told the truth about Yalta and asked for directions.

  The fact was that by this time, though the Ambassador’s misgivings did him credit, Chiang knew the main clauses of the agreement, at least in general outline. How much resentment he felt after the first impact is impossible to say; he seems never to have expressed it to Hurley. Certainly he must have still felt confident that America would see him through the worst of the sorting out, once Washington realized how impossible it was to depend upon Russian good faith, and at this moment, all too obviously, Washington was realizing it. In the meantime the formal notification was once again postponed for another month.

  But much reassurance was felt from some of Stalin’s statements. Hopkins tried to pin down the Russian as to his exact plans and interpretation of the Yalta agreement, and Stalin was very easygoing and pleasant. His armies would be ready to get out of Manchuria by August 8, he said, within the terms of the three-month clause. Furthermore, he declared himself perfectly willing to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, who was obviously the man to unify China. Russia had no designs, no territorial claims, on Manchuria or Sinkiang or any other part of Chinese territory. Even if Soviet troops entered and occupied Manchuria, he would depend on Chiang to organize civil administration in the occupied areas.

  It was therefore with relief that Truman at last, on June 9, had the long-awaited talk with Soong and broke the news to him in detail. At least he was able to preface the bald account of the Yalta agreement with all the pleasant promises Stalin had just made. Hurley was asked to tell Chiang Kai-shek when Soong arrived in Chungking. So Chiang, who knew all about it in essence anyway, was informed twice again before the official unveiling: once by private coded message from Soong in Washington,
and once by the Soviet Ambassador.

  Naturally the Generalissimo did not react in any violent manner to the American Ambassador’s disclosures. He listened attentively to the interpreter. He sat quiet for a minute when the announcement was done. He asked for the speech to be repeated, and again listened carefully. Then he said that he was terribly disappointed.

  He had three suggestions for modification all ready, however; anything, he implied, rather than leave him alone to face Russia. He wanted America and Britain to become parties to whatever agreement China might sign with Russia, so that the Soviet Union would have to live up to it. Port Arthur, he said, should be a joint naval base for all four of the powers; this corresponded to Roosevelt’s earlier suggestion that it be an international port. He suggested that the matter of Sakhalin and the Kuriles be discussed by the four powers. But Hurley said that as all these matters bore on Sino-Soviet relations, he hardly thought that America or Britain could be expected to be party to agreements between the other two nations.

  Some of Chiang’s bitterest non-Communist critics among the Chinese have often referred to this interview and its outcome. At that moment, they say, he should have risen up in his wrath and refused to be a party to the Yalta agreement. To the suggestion that he would have brought abandonment and catastrophe upon the country if he had refused, they retort that catastrophe was inevitable, anyway. But this, surely, is being wise long after the event. Chiang still had reason to suppose that he could rely on the intentions of the non-Communist Western world, in spite of its patent ignorance of strategy. As long as he was not written off America’s books, there was a chance, his only chance; he had no other road to follow. He could no longer play on Washington’s fears that he might surrender to the Japanese.

  The new “secret” of the atomic bomb must have played its part in all the interested nations’ cogitations. Though nobody, outside the small circle of initiates, was supposed to know about it, both Moscow and Chungking were well aware that something tremendous was brewing.

  So T.V. set off for Moscow to talk it all over with Stalin, and the Americans now turned their attention to another matter that had lately been neglected—the political situation in China. Wedemeyer was worried. The encounters between Chinese Communists and Kuomintang forces were stepping up; in fact it was only by diplomatic fiction that China was not actually in the throes of a civil war at that moment. As the Japanese retreated there would be a rush between the two factions to occupy the empty country.

  T. V. Soong found Stalin much less amiable than Hopkins had done; the Russian demands were in excess of anything that had ever been mentioned at Yalta. First of all, the Russian declared that China must recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia. Soong refused to commit himself on this. Stalin proceeded: the Soviet Government would refrain from aiding Chiang’s enemies and would work with him, but it wanted to control Manchuria by means of a military zone including not only Port Arthur and Dairen, but a good deal of adjacent area. There was to be a naval base at Dairen for the exclusive use of Russian and Chinese navies. The railroads and their factories, workshops, coal mines, and so on were to be owned outright by the Soviet Union.

  Chiang Kai-shek’s suggested agreements, of course, were along directly opposite lines. If Russia recognized Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and agreed to withdraw aid from the Chinese Reds and the Sinkiang rebels, he would agree to preserve the status quo in Outer Mongolia until after the war and then hold a plebiscite. The Soviet Navy would have the right to share Port Arthur with the Chinese Navy, but under Chinese administration. Dairen might be a free port (under Chinese administration) and Russia might have a lease on certain docks for merchant shipping. The railroads would be directed and managed by a joint Sino-Soviet company.

  After that the bargaining began in real earnest. During its course Stalin declared flatly that he would support only the Nationalist Government in China. But in spite of the pleasure that T.V. politely expressed at this statement, they remained unreconciled on the crucial questions of Manchurian ports and railroads. On the same day that Soong took his leave the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow requested Stalin’s services as mediator to arrange peace terms—any terms short of unconditional surrender. Stalin replied that he was too busy getting ready for Potsdam to grant an interview: they could talk it over later.

  The occurrences of the next few weeks were of staggering importance and it is not surprising that the world leaders should have been swept off their feet. First was the atom-bomb try-out in New Mexico, which took place during the Potsdam Conference. There were terrifying reports of its power. The Big Three mapped out the zones of influence which each army should handle when the day of victory came. Korea, Japan, and part of Southern Manchuria were to be in the United States zone. On paper, therefore, Chiang had no reason to worry. He was probably not overtrustful, at that, but when Truman spoke to Stalin about Russian demands which seemed to be exceeding those granted at the Yalta Conference, saying that Dairen should be maintained as a free port, Stalin assured him that the city would have that status. Soon afterward, the Potsdam Declaration with its famous “unconditional surrender” terms was drawn up and signed, and sent on to Chiang for his signature. The Japanese ignored the ultimatum which was presented to them on July 26.

  On August 6 the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Two days later Russia declared war on Japan; and on the early morning of the next day, without waiting for China’s concurrence in the Yalta agreement, Stalin sent his armies into Manchuria. Within three days they were swarming all over North Manchuria and marching south, with no one to stop them. On the same day the Russian invasion began, August 9, the Allies dropped another bomb on Nagasaki, and the day after that Japan accepted the “unconditional surrender” ultimatum with certain provisos. On August 14 the Japanese Emperor declared the war at an end. That same day, several days after Soviet troops entered Manchuria, the Sino-Soviet agreements were signed. Both signatories promised “to act according to the principles of mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and on non-interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party.”

  In Chungking there was not much time for mutual congratulations, or the sort of celebration that went on in America and Britain. The world war was over, but Chiang’s chief headache was still with him, and Russia herself had never before loomed so large on his horizon. However, for what it was worth he had Stalin’s agreement to recognize him as head of the country; it now remained to deal with the great waste area that had been Occupied China.

  Until the latest development it had been thought that the liberating American forces would land along the south coast of China, straight from the Pacific islands. Therefore as the Japanese were drawn out or beaten off, most of Chiang’s troops had been sent to South China, there to await the landings. Chiang arranged with Wedemeyer that for the moment Wedemeyer take command of all landing American troops in the North, and he planned to move his Chinese in as soon as possible. Chinese civil government groups were to take over in good time, as things straightened out, and American troops were to avoid co-operating with Communists.

  But Russian soldiers were pouring into Manchuria. The Chinese Communists were being reinforced by friends, and their enemies were still hundreds of miles away. It was a mad scramble to see who could get into the Japanese-occupied areas first, and the Reds had a head start. They were aided by Washington’s directive to American forces not to become involved in any major land campaign in any part of the China theater.

  Wedemeyer was to help with the transport of Chinese troops to key areas. Americans were authorized to accept local surrenders of Japanese when necessary, turning over such places as they liberated only to agencies accredited by the Central Government; no action, however, must impair the principle that Americans shouldn’t support the government in case of civil war.

  Wedemeyer tried to hurry as much as possible, but the Reds were wasting no time at all. On August 12 they announced by radio from Yenan that
the Japanese and their puppets should surrender to Communist forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Wedemeyer appealed for reinforcements against this danger, said that there were many claims elsewhere; they needed troops in Japan and Korea, and the most General MacArthur could spare for a long time to come would be two divisions.

  In Moscow, T. V. Soong, with Harriman’s help, was battling against a Stalin in a new mood; a Stalin who pretended to be surprised at any objection to his proposition that Russia manage the port of Dairen and control the area surrounding it. T.V. gave in at the end, more than the Americans liked, by acceding to a compromise; the Soviet Union promised not to exercise military authority over the city, the port, or the railways in times of peace. Soong said there was little else he could do as long as Stalin’s troops kept advancing through Manchuria. Besides, Stalin had reiterated his promise to respect China’s full sovereignty over Manchuria and permit Chinese civil government in liberated territory. Nevertheless American observers were uneasy, and pointed out in private dispatches that all these assurances meant next to nothing if Stalin wanted to trick the world. For years Russia had maintained her own lofty, diplomatically correct position in China while Chinese Communists did her dirty work. The same technique would doubtless be applied now. Hurley, however, was not worried on this account. The Chinese Communists seemed to be not a part of the same problem, but an entirely different and far more pressing one.

  When General Chu Teh made the famous broadcast from Yenan he not only commanded the enemy to surrender to the Communists, but declared that the Reds were to occupy any city, town, or communication center formerly occupied by pro-Japanese forces. They were to advance northward to meet the Outer Mongolian armies which had recently gone on the warpath in defense of their autonomy. Red General Ho Lung in Shensi was to seize control of the Tatung-Pukow Railway. Chiang denounced this “abrupt and illegal action” and commanded the Reds to stay where they were, take no independent action against the Japanese, and await his orders. Chu Teh ignored him and broadcast again, this time denouncing Chiang as a Fascist chieftain. On August 16 he wrote identical letters to the American, British and Soviet governments, claiming that it was the Reds who had won the war against the Japanese while the Kuomintang did nothing. The Reds had liberated most of nineteen provinces. It was they, and not the Kuomintang, who represented the people. Yenan had the right to accept Japanese surrender and join in the peace conference, said Chu Teh, as well as share in the control of Japan.