Political Philosophy
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Deontology: Deontological theories stand in contrast to consequentialist theories. They hold that actions can and should be judged right or wrong in themselves, irrespective of the particular consequences that these actions may produce. Deontological theories thus ground morality not in the measurable consequences of particular actions but in rules derived independently of any particular conception of the good.
Act-utilitarianism: The form of utilitarianism which holds that utilitarian calculations should be applied to individual acts and decisions. Act-utilitarians believe that individuals should, when deciding upon what course of action to take in any given circumstance, consider which course of action would most increase utility.
Rule-utilitarianism: The form of utilitarianism which holds that utilitarian calculations should be used to derive the rules which govern a particular society, rather than each and every individual choice.
Higher and lower pleasures: John Stuart Mill’s attempt to distinguish between different orders to pleasure in order to improve upon Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism. Bentham understood pleasure as based entirely on the subjective desires of individual people. Mill thought that this led to counter-intuitive outcomes, and so tried to argue that certain pleasures had objective value.
Dig deeper
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics: 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
John Skorupski (ed.),The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
Fact-check
1 What is consequentialism?
A The view that every action has consequences
B The view that consequences are the only important thing
C The view that morality should be based on consequences
D All of the above
2 Which of the following advantages best applies to utilitarianism?
A It makes it easy to work out what the right thing to do is
B It enables moral judgements to respond to specific circumstances
C It corresponds to our intuitions about the right thing to do
D Its followers agree about what it entails
3 Different utilitarians have given different definitions of utility. What is utility according to Jeremy Bentham?
A Pleasure
B Preference-satisfaction
C Usefulness
D Welfare
4 Who distinguished between higher and lower pleasures?
A Jeremy Bentham
B James Mill
C John Stuart Mill
D Robert Nozick
5 What is the best definition of rule-utilitarianism?
A The view that utility is maximized if rules are followed
B The view that we should act in accordance with the set of rules that best maximize utility
C The view that we should act in accordance with the rule ‘maximize utility’
D All of the above
6 Why might utilitarians disagree about what to do?
A Because some might be act-utilitarians and some might be rule-utilitarians
B Because they might have different definitions of utility
C Because they might make different calculations about utility-maximization
D All of the above
7 Which of the following might be benefits of rule-utilitarianism over act-utilitarianism?
A It makes it easier to know what the right thing to do is
B It enables us to maintain many of our existing moral principles
C It is better for stability and trust
D All of the above
8 In what sense is utilitarianism egalitarian?
A Everyone’s utility counts equally
B Equality is what maximizes utility
C Utilitarianism results in equal utility
D Utilitarianism rules out hierarchy
9 Why might utilitarianism be bad for minorities?
A Because minorities don’t usually believe in utilitarianism
B Because utilitarians ignore the interests of minorities
C Because protecting minority interests might not maximize utility
D All of the above
10 Why might utilitarianism be bad for relationships?
A Because relationships are not accorded special weight
B Because relationships do not maximize utility
C Because relationships are unjust
D All of the above
10
Rawls’s justice as fairness
John Rawls’s work is crucial to contemporary political philosophy. His book A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971) broke with the utilitarianism which dominated political and ethical theory at the time, and broke also with the trend in analytic philosophy to preach the redundancy of normative theorizing. Other thinkers had prepared the way: H.L.A. Hart (in jurisprudence) and Brian Barry (in political science) had begun to criticize the normative implications of utilitarianism (Hart 1961; Barry 1965). But Rawls provided not only a systematic, rigorous critique of utilitarianism, but also a persuasive, far-reaching and elegant defence of a liberal alternative. Rawls’s justice as fairness is a canonical statement of liberal political philosophy. It is the theory against which virtually all subsequent work in Anglo-American analytic political philosophy is compared and tested.
In this chapter, we outline Rawls’s principal ideas: his critique of utilitarianism, his theory of justice, and the philosophical machinery he employs.
Spotlight: Rawls and The West Wing
John Rawls is perhaps one of the few political philosophers who has influenced an American President, albeit a fictional one. An aide to Josiah Bartlett, the President in the TV series The West Wing, turned to John Rawls’s theory of justice when attempting to construct a federal tax plan which would redistribute wealth from top earners to poorer families in order to subsidize education for low earners.
‘To answer your question why the MD [Managing Director] should accept a greater tax burden in spite of the fact that his success is well earned is called a veil of ignorance. Imagine before you’re born you don’t know anything about who you’ll be, your abilities or your position. Now design a tax system. That’s John Rawls.’
Rawls’s critique of utilitarianism
Rawls’s conception of liberal justice is grounded in two criticisms of utilitarianism.
UTILITARIANISM IGNORES THE ‘SEPARATENESS OF PERSONS’
The first problem with utilitarianism, Rawls argues, is that it takes the idea of an individual who is self-interested and rational and applies it to society as a whole. According to utilitarians, an individual has a variety of preferences and chooses the course of action which satisfies as many of those preferences as possible. Similarly, a utilitarian society should choose the course of action that satisfies as many of the various preferences of its many members as possible.
But Rawls argues that there is a crucial difference between an individual and a society. For any one individual it makes sense to say that the satisfaction of some preferences can compensate for the dissatisfaction of others: the fact that I am eating ice cream for pudding makes up for the fact that I could not also have cake. But this is not true for society as a whole. Utilitarianism at the social level imagines an impartial spectator, a perfectly rational individual who can observe the preferences of the members of society and then decide which should be sacrificed and which satisfied. In doing this, the impartial spectator treats the members of society not as separate individ
uals, but as parts of a whole. But members of society are separate persons. If I want public money to be spent on education but it is spent on defence, it is no consolation for me that those who supported defence are now happy. From the standpoint of the impartial spectator, their happiness outweighs my unhappiness, but from the individual’s point of view there is no corresponding benefit. What this means, Rawls argues, is that utilitarianism ignores the separateness of persons. It treats people as if they were simply members of a group, and ignores their own individual moral worth and interests.
Moreover, Rawls argues that sacrificing the happiness of some people in order to increase the happiness of others is unjust. What matters to the utilitarian is the general level of happiness in society, rather than the level of happiness experienced by any one individual. So a utilitarian seems to have no moral objection to persecuting minority groups if in doing so we make the majority happier, for example. Indeed, utilitarianism seems to require such persecution! Similarly, if overall social utility could be increased by allowing public executions, the suppression of minority religions, or the imprisonment of climate change sceptics, utilitarianism seems to require the state to do these things. But, Rawls argues, such conclusions are counter-intuitive and wrong. Instead of leaving minorities open to mistreatment by majorities, a theory of justice should protect minorities by enshrining basic rights for all individuals which cannot be violated – irrespective of whether doing so would increase overall happiness. As Rawls put it ‘[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override’ (Rawls 1971: p. 3).
UTILITARIANISM MISUNDERSTANDS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
Rawls’s second problem with utilitarianism is that it is a teleological theory, not a deontological one. Teleological theories start by stipulating the telos, or good, to which society as a whole should be aimed. They then derive principles of morality and justice from that good. For utilitarians, the good is utility, and so the right (the morally right thing to do) is whatever maximizes this good of utility. But, Rawls argues, modern societies are populated by citizens who have different views about what is good. Teleological theories ignore the fact that individuals have their own ‘conception of the good’ which may or may not be the same as anyone else’s.
Furthermore, utilitarianism requires that everyone subordinate their own interests and desires to the one overall good of utility. It requires us to engage in utilitarian calculations in our daily lives, and in matters of personal morality. Hence, Rawls argues, it does not take seriously each individual’s own personal motivations, moral convictions, or their attendant forms of moral reasoning: it views individuals not as ends in themselves but as means by which the wider end of society as a whole might be achieved. Should I go out to the shops or stay in and watch TV? Should I read a book or offer to mend my neighbour’s fence? The answer to these questions for the utilitarian is always the same: I should do whatever would bring about the greater good for all. But, Rawls argues, it is not fair to require that everyone always put the general happiness of society above their own reasonably held interests. People may have moral convictions to act in ways which do not bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number, or they might just want to engage in private pursuits which bring them, and not other people, happiness. Why should a gay or lesbian person be morally required to hide their sexuality in order to please lots of homophobic people? Why should a woman be morally required to submit to sexist norms in order to please a sexist majority?
The challenge for Rawls was to come up with an alternative to utilitarianism which was capable of respecting the separateness of persons, taking seriously the ideals and aspirations of individual citizens, and establishing a stable, cohesive society. He did so by rejecting the teleological approach of utilitarians like Bentham and Sidgwick, and turning instead toward the deontological approach favoured by Kant. Whereas a teleological approach such as utilitarianism derives the right from the good, a deontological approach such as Rawls’s defines the right independently of, and prior to, the good. So, Rawls does not understand the right to be whatever maximizes some pre-determined good. Instead, the right is a constraint on action. It acts as a constraint on what conception of the good a person can reasonably pursue. So if a person’s conception of the good requires treating others unjustly, then that conception of the good is ruled out. Rawls’s argument thus requires us first to work out what justice is, and then to use this conception of justice (a) as a guide to the actions of social and political institutions, and (b) as a constraint upon the kinds of lives that people can legitimately pursue.
The original position and the veil of ignorance
So, how do we work out what justice is? Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves in a hypothetical situation called the original position. We can think of the original position as a position before there is a society. People in the original position get together to decide what the principles of justice should be in a society. In some ways, they are like contractors in the state of nature, deciding on social rules. However, they are not trying to decide whether it would be rational to form a society. They know that they will live in a society, so they are trying instead to decide how that society should be organized – what principles of justice it should adhere to.
To make the principles of justice fair, Rawls stipulates that the people in the original position must be deprived of certain sorts of knowledge about themselves and others. This deprivation of knowledge is called the ‘veil of ignorance’. Rawls specifies three sorts of things that are concealed behind the veil of ignorance:
1 Social status: In the original position you do not know if, when you are in the society you are thinking about, you will be rich or poor, aristocratic or working class, a leader or a servant. You also do not know if you will have a job that is regarded as impressive or lowly, whether you will be thought of as being at the top of the heap or the bottom.
2 Talent: You do not know if, once you are placed in the society that you are planning, you will be clever or stupid, strong or weak, or what kind of work you will be good at.
3 Conceptions of the good: Your conception of the good is your set of ideas or beliefs about how you should live. In the original position, you are deprived of knowledge about your particular conception of the good. You do not know what you will believe once the veil of ignorance is lifted.
Why should fairness require the veil of ignorance? The idea is that people are more likely to choose principles of justice which are fair if they do so under conditions of ignorance.
Imagine there are two people and one cake. Each person is to have a portion of cake, and each person wants as much as possible for themselves. Only one person can cut the cake. In this situation, the fairest way of dividing the cake is if one person cuts it and the other person chooses which of the two slices to have. This way, the person cutting the cake knows that the other person will choose the biggest slice. It is therefore in the cutter’s interest to cut the cake in half as fairly as possible, to make the two slices as similar as possible. If the person who cuts the cake does not know which slice she will get, she will cut the cake fairly. If, on the other hand, she knows which slice she will have, she will cut the cake unfairly – she will make her slice bigger.
A similar idea is behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance. Because they do not know what sort of person they will be, the people in the original position will choose principles of justice that adjudicate fairly between different sorts of people. If you knew that you were going to be an upper-class atheist, you might choose a system of justice whereby upper-class atheists got more rights and resources than anyone else. However, if you knew there was a chance you might turn out to be a working-class Muslim instead, you might well think that things like rights and wealth should not depend on class or religion, and this would be a fairer outcome.
So, the idea of the veil of ignorance is to deny people knowledge of their particular
circumstances: knowledge that they might use to bias the principles of justice in their favour. If they did that, the principles would not be fair. So, in order to develop fair principles of justice, it is necessary that people are ignorant of their particular circumstances.
However, some more requirements are needed if the original position is really to produce fair principles of justice. Think back to the cake example. Imagine if you were cutting the cake, and that you knew that your companion were very self-effacing. Although she likes cake very much, and would like as much cake as possible if she were on her own, her natural kindness and modesty leads her to put herself after others. So, if you cut the cake unevenly, she will take the smaller slice. Of course, if you know this, and if you are not troubled by matters of conscience, you will not cut the cake fairly. Instead, you will cut the cake into one small slice and one much larger slice, knowing she will take the smaller one. If she is asked to cut first, she will also cut unfairly, feeling that others are entitled to more than her.
If fairness is to be maintained in this sort of situation, everyone must be self-interested. That is to say, everyone must think only of their own position, and not of the position of others. So, Rawls makes this a further condition of the original position: in it, people are self-interested, and they are also rational. So, people in the original position calculate and prefer what is best for them. This way, the chosen principles will be fair.
It is very important to note that this does not mean that the principles chosen in the original position are based on selfishness and individualism, and that is the role of the veil of ignorance. Imagine we were all in a political philosophy lecture and we were asked, there and then, to agree on principles of justice to govern the lectures. If we were asked to do so using our self-interested rationality, each of us would argue selfishly for the principles that would most benefit us as individuals. Women would argue for principles favouring women, tall people would argue for principles favouring tall people, and so on. But if we used our self-interested rationality from behind the veil of ignorance, we would be forced not to be selfish but actually to think through what it would be like to be each and every person in the lecture. Because we do not know whether we will be male or female, tall or short, and so on, we have to imagine what it would be like to be each of those things. We might imagine that it would be difficult for a short person to be stuck at the back. We might imagine that if there were a rule that only women or tall people were allowed hand-outs, we would not like it if we turned out to be male or short. Far from encouraging selfishness, the original position encourages us to think what it would be like to be each and every different person. It therefore encourages us to be empathetic and kind – and, above all, fair.