Political Philosophy
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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 291–3.
Liberals, on the other hand, have suggested that abstract reasoning is perfectly suited to dealing with intergenerational concerns. As we saw in our discussion of affirmative action, it is precisely the fact that deliberators in the original position are not understood as located in any particular historical group that allows them to reflect appropriately about, for example, the just response to claims of historical oppression. Deliberators in the original position are not banned from discussing the importance of identity, or whether justice requires rectifying past injustices suffered by certain groups. They are only banned from knowing whether they are members of that group. Thus, the agreements they strike will deal with historical injustice, but they will do so in ways which ensure against mere self-interest.
Rawls makes a similar claim about future generations. The original position can deal with intergenerational justice because in it no one knows which generation they are a part of (or, to put it in Rawlsian terms, what stage of development the economy has reached). This information is behind the veil of ignorance. So, Rawls argues, parties in the original position would not decide that one particular generation or group could consume all the world’s resources, leaving none for those who come after them, because they might be members of that later generation. Thus people in the original position would agree that everyone should constrain their own consumption of the Earth’s resources and put some aside for future generations. Rawls calls this the ‘just savings principle’: liberal justice requires that currently living individuals constrain the pursuit of their conception of the good in order that they leave sufficient resources for future generations to live worthwhile lives.
Rawls does not stipulate the ‘just savings rate’ (that is, how much of the Earth’s resources should be kept back). Hence, he does not answer the difficult question of exactly how much individuals might be required to constrain their pursuit of their conception of the good. Nevertheless, he does offer a response to at least the first criticism made above: he argues that the liberal state is justified in imposing constraints upon individuals in the pursuit of their particular conception of the good because these constraints would be agreed by parties in the original position. The constraints are therefore fair and, hence, consistent with individual freedom.
Case study: The moral status of children
The principal focus of this chapter has been to discuss intergenerational justice in the context of what obligations, if any, currently living people have with regard to future people. But there are also important questions to be asked about the obligations of justice that exist between different generations that exist at the same time.
The most obvious example is the moral status of children and, specifically, what obligations adults have with regard to children. Liberalism has historically found the status of children rather problematic. Liberals hold a conception of the individual as free, equal and rational. They believe that no individuals should have a life forced upon them by others, and they also believe that power only has authority if has been, or could be, consented to by those subject to it. The fact that children, especially very young children, are neither free nor able to consent to the forms of authority under which they live is problematic, then.
For example, we might think that children have rights. But this is problematic if we believe that rights are grounded in some particular human quality like reason or autonomy – qualities which children do not straightforwardly possess. We do not generally think that children should be allowed to opt out of going to school even if they have a strong preference for doing so, and most liberal democratic states deny children certain basic civil rights (like voting).
The general view among liberals is that it is right to treat people below a certain threshold age differently to people above that age because children are not yet rational, autonomous choosers. They need to have the benefit of skills, abilities and experience before they are capable of making a genuinely reflective judgement about who they want to be and what kind of life they want to lead. Children need education, then, in the broadest sense, in order that they become the kind of rational autonomous individuals that the liberal system requires. Hence, we think that it is right that, for example, the state coerces children into getting an education, and that they and their parents are appropriately liable for punishment should they not attend school.
But this common view only leads to further problems. For example, it states that the ability to reason appropriately about the world, about who should govern us, and about what kind of life someone wants to lead are all dependent upon the possession of certain abilities, skills or knowledge which are thought to be sufficiently acquired by, say, the age of 16, or perhaps 18. But this is controversial, as it ignores the obvious fact that many under-18s will be in a position to make a more informed decision about many aspects of their lives than many over-18s. For example, in Britain adult citizens who suffer severe learning and other mental disabilities are entitled to vote but no under-18, regardless of their cognitive abilities or intelligence, is allowed to do so. It is not obvious that this policy should stand if we accept that the right to vote is contingent upon the possession of certain cognitive faculties.
More generally, however, the idea that we should deny children certain political rights in this way seems to violate a wider assumption in liberalism that access to civil or political rights of one kind or another should not depend upon particular capacities or knowledge, but should instead be universal. The idea that basic rights should be possessed only by people with the right skills or abilities is generally rejected by liberals in favour of universal rights and freedoms possessed by all. After all, the claim that some people and not others are able to exercise rights and freedoms has historically been used to exclude women, black people, aboriginal peoples and other ‘minorities’ from public life, and to deny them equal political or moral status. But if we cannot legitimately deny adults moral equality on the grounds that they lack relevant qualities or faculties why can we systematically deny such status to all children?
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced some of the challenges that arise when we subject widespread assumptions about our obligations to future generations to philosophical scrutiny. There are other, more recent, liberal interventions into this debate, and there is much more to be said about, for example, the non-identity problem, utilitarian approaches to intergenerational justice, and intergenerational harm. However, this chapter, just like this whole book, is aimed at encouraging you to reflect upon the assumptions implicit in public discourse about justice and politics, and to form your own opinions in the light of their complexity.
Key ideas
The repugnant conclusion: The conclusion necessarily drawn by utilitarians that the greatest overall utility in the future is created by radically increasing the general population, thus dramatically reducing the utility experienced by each and every individual. Argument made by Derek Parfit.
Non-identity problem: Identified by Derek Parfit, the problem posed for our moral theorizing about intergenerational justice and morality by the fact that the choices of current generations determine the identity of the people who are born in the future.
Person-affecting moralities: The idea that morality imposes obligations between individuals and that, therefore, person-affecting moral systems are incapable of dealing coherently with the moral claims of future generations because obligations cannot exist between people who exist and people who do not.
Just savings principle: The idea, suggested by Rawls, that parties in the original position would rationally agree to constrain their pursuit of their conception of the good in order to ensure that future generations have access to sufficient resources to live free and worthwhile lives.
Dig deeper
Brian Barry, A Treatise on Social Justice, Part 1: Theories of Justice (Hertfordshire: Harvester-Wheatshe
af, 1989).
David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Andrew Dobson (ed.), Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainablility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue (eds), Climate Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (eds), Justice between Age Groups and Generations (London: Yale University Press, 1992).
Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
David Willetts, The Pinch: How the Baby-Boomers Took Their Children’s Future – And Why They Should Give It Back (London: Atlantic, 2010).
Fact-check
1 Who first wrote about the ‘repugnant conclusion’?
A John Rawls
B John Locke
C David Parfit
D Derek Parfit
2 What is the repugnant conclusion?
A Utilitarianism advocates making miserable people
B Utilitarianism advocates making people miserable
C Liberalism advocates making miserable people
D Liberalism advocates making people miserable
3 Why, according to Parfit, does liberalism find intergenerational justice problematic?
A Because liberalism is a person-affecting morality
B Because there are no existing people currently being harmed
C Because obligations are relational
D All of the above
4 Why is it harder to account for our duties to future people than our duties to currently living people?
A Because future people do not vote
B Because future people may not care about the environment
C Because future people may not exist
D Because future people are not autonomous
5 ‘We should care about climate change because climate change harms future generations.’ What is wrong with this argument, philosophically?
A We cannot harm people who do not yet exist
B Climate change may not happen
C Future generations may be selfish too
D All of the above
6 Why is it difficult to have a legitimate and philosophically rigorous complaint against your ancestors?
A Because if they had done anything differently you would not exist
B Because you should be grateful for the sacrifices of previous generations
C Because it is good to respect your elders
D Because they didn’t know better
7 What is the name of Rawls’s form of intergenerational justice?
A The difference principle
B The just savings principle
C The repugnant conclusion
D The person-affecting claim
8 What is Rawls’s claim about intergenerational justice?
A That existing generations should be completely free to pursue their conception of the good
B That resources should be distributed so as to maximize the position of the worst-off generation
C That every generation should preserve sufficient resources for future generations to live worthwhile lives
D All of the above
9 How can a liberal justify denying children the vote?
A Children lack the necessary autonomy
B Children are not yet rational
C Children do not understand politics
D All of the above
10 What is the strongest argument against the liberal claim in Question 9?
A The same things can be said of many adults
B Many children want to vote
C Voting is not very important
D Children should have a say in politics
Answers
CHAPTER 1
1 D
2 B
3 C
4 A
5 C
6 D
7 A
8 C
9 A
10 D
CHAPTER 2
1 C
2 D
3 C
4 D
5 A
6 A
7 C
8 D
9 B
10 D
CHAPTER 3
1 A
2 B
3 D
4 C
5 B
6 D
7 A
8 D
9 B
10 D
CHAPTER 4
1 D
2 A
3 C
4 B
5 C
6 B
7 D
8 B
9 A
10 C
CHAPTER 5
1 C
2 A
3 B
4 A
5 C
6 B
7 A
8 B
9 D
10 A
CHAPTER 6
1 A
2 C
3 D
4 D
5 C
6 B
7 C
8 D
9 A
10 D
CHAPTER 7
1 C
2 D
3 B
4 D
5 A
6 D
7 A
8 D
9 A
10 C
CHAPTER 8
1 C
2 D
3 A
4 D
5 B
6 A
7 B
8 C
9 D
10 D
CHAPTER 9
1 C
2 B
3 A
4 C
5 B
6 D
7 D
8 A
9 C
10 A
CHAPTER 10
1 C
2 A
3 D
4 D
5 A
6 C
7 B
8 A
9 D
10 A
CHAPTER 11
1 A
2 B
3 C
4 B
5 A
6 D
7 A
8 D
9 C
10 B
CHAPTER 12
1 D
2 C
3 D
4 C
5 B
6 B
7 B
8 A?
9 D
10 D
CHAPTER 13
1 D
2 D
3 A
4 B
5 A
6 A
7 D
8 D
9 B
10 D
CHAPTER 14
1 D
2 A
3 B
4 A
5 C
6 A
7 B
8 D
9 A
10 D
CHAPTER 15
1 B
2 A
3 D
4 D
5 D
6 D
7 A
8 B
9 D
10 B
CHAPTER 16
1 B
2 D
3 A
4 C
5 A
6 A
7 C
8 C
9 C
10 B
CHAPTER 17
1 D
2 D
3 A
4 D
5 B
6 C
7 B
8 D
9 C
10 B
CHAPTER 18
1 C
2 B
3 D
4 A
5 C
6 A
7 D
8 B
9 A
10 C
C
HAPTER 19
1 D
2 A
3 D
4 C
5 A
6 A
7 B
8 C
9 D
10 A
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