Book Read Free

Then They Came for Me: A Family’s Story of Love, Captivity, and Survival

Page 34

by Maziar Bahari


  1953: CIA-BACKED COUP

  After two years of embargo, Iranians are poorer, less secure, and disenchanted with Mossadegh’s government. Meanwhile, the communists are becoming more vocal and increasing their activities. The British secretly convince the new American administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, which comes to power in January 1953, to help remove Mossadegh. On August 19, 1953, a coup plotted by the Central Intelligence Agency and a British spy network in Iran is executed by Iranian army officers. Mossadegh is put on trial, and within the next few years dozens of Iranian communists are incarcerated and executed.

  1963: KHOMEINI’S FIRST UPRISING

  After the 1953 coup, the shah, with American help, expands his authority; like his father, he eventually becomes a tyrant. He continues to industrialize Iran, and has the same contempt for his critics and the mullahs. He calls himself the Shadow of God and tries to change the country through a series of decrees. In 1961, the shah grants women the right to vote and distributes large tracts of land among the farmers. These changes, among others intended to modernize Iran, later become known as the White Revolution.

  The large landowners have been the main benefactors of the clerical establishment, and the majority of mullahs regard women as second-class citizens. In October 1962, in a letter to the shah, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a high-ranking seminarian at the time, expresses his concern about the shah’s reforms and calls them un-Islamic.

  The shah refers to his religious critics as “black reactionaries,” and he claims they are working with the communists to undermine Iran and take it back to the Dark Ages. In June 1963, after Khomeini is arrested, his followers rebel against the shah, and the shah’s army kills dozens of people in clashes all over the country.

  In November 1964, after months under house arrest and in prison, Khomeini is sent into exile. He eventually settles in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, the bastion of Shia Islam. In exile, Khomeini communicates with his followers inside Iran through letters, leaflets, and, eventually, audiocassettes.

  In Najaf, Khomeini publishes his theory of velayat-e faqih, or the governance of the jurisprudent, a collection of his teachings about the necessity of establishing a system of government in which a high-ranking cleric is in charge of the affairs of the state until the reappearance of Imam Mahdi, the twelfth saint of Shias. The book is a theological text with many references to the teachings of traditional Shia theologians and interpretations of the Koran. Many nonreligious opponents of the shah, among them socialists, nationalists, and communists, support Khomeini’s anti-shah struggle but don’t read his book on governance. They dismiss it as a complicated, esoteric text like thousands of books on Shia theology before it. Years later, they regret following Khomeini’s path without having understood his philosophy.

  1970S: THE SHARP RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH

  The 1973 oil crisis, triggered by many factors, including an embargo of the West by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and an earlier stock market crash, benefits Iran immensely. The increasing oil prices mean that the shah has more money with which to buy arms and new technology from the West. Consequently, he becomes even more ambitious—some claim that he is delusional—in his plans to modernize Iran. He believes that by the end of the twentieth century, Iran can be among the five most advanced nations in the world. In the early 1970s, the shah is diagnosed with cancer, but for many years he keeps his illness secret from most people, including his wife. Many observers contend that the shah’s insistence on the fast pace of change stems from his feeling that he is fighting against time.

  Much of the progress in Iran happens in its major cities, and many villagers from traditional religious communities move to the big cities in hope of finding a better life. As OPEC members again start selling oil to the West, the price of oil decreases and the shah has a hard time financing his ambitious projects. Most of the villagers who have migrated to the cities do not benefit from his changes. They live mainly on the outskirts and feel alienated by the fast pace of Westernization.

  Contrary to public opinion, the shah is not a stooge of the West. In fact, toward the end of his reign, he becomes quite resentful of Western attitudes toward Iran. In interviews, the shah reprimands the West for allowing too much freedom and for the decline of its economies and cultures. In 1976, Jimmy Carter becomes president of the United States. Because one of Carter’s campaign promises entailed pressuring American allies, such as Iran, to have more respect for human rights, Carter’s election convinces the shah’s opponents that they have an ally in the White House. They become more vocal in their opposition to the shah. The shah, whose illness has worsened in the past few years, becomes paranoid about the change in American attitude, but he refuses to make any compromises with the opposition.

  1978: THE ANTI-KHOMEINI ARTICLE AND THE SECOND UPRISING

  In January 1978, the shah orders the biggest Iranian daily newspaper, Etela’at, to publish an article against Khomeini. The article calls the ayatollah “a non-Iranian of Indian origin and a reactionary agent of the British who rose against the shah in protest against advancement of the country, including the progress of women.” The publication of the article leads to a series of demonstrations in the cities of Qom and Tabriz, where the shah’s army kills many protestors. According to Shia tradition, people gather to mourn for the dead forty days after their death. The suppression of each gathering on the fortieth day results in yet another protest, and increasing numbers of murdered protestors every forty days.

  In this period Khomeini’s supporters start calling him Imam Khomeini for the first time, even though “imam” is a title reserved by Shias for saints. On September 8, 1978, the shah announces martial law in Tehran and eleven other cities. Many Khomeini followers take to the streets. The army opens fire on them in central Tehran. The reported number of dead varies from forty to eighty, but in the absence of any accurate report, and as anti-shah sentiments heighten in the country, there are rumors that four thousand people were martyred by the shah’s henchmen. The rumors intensify the public’s resentment of the shah.

  A few weeks after the massacre, the shah forces the government of Iraq to deport Khomeini to another country. The shah hopes that Khomeini’s influence will subside once he is outside Iraq, but Khomeini moves to Paris, where he gains access to international media and can easily communicate with his followers inside Iran. Over the next four months he grants hundreds of interviews in which he promises greater liberties and prosperity for Iranians. There is not a single mention of governance of the jurisprudent; in many interviews, he offers freedom of expression, equality between men and women, and a better economic situation for every Iranian.

  Khomeini recognizes the weakening of the shah’s regime and asks his followers not to resort to violence. Despite the martial law, people continue to demonstrate against the shah. In early November 1978, millions of Iranians in Tehran and cities around the country peacefully demonstrate on the holy days of Tasu’a and Ashura, during which Shias commemorate the martyrdom of Hossein, their third imam.

  The shah is surprised by the public’s hatred of him. He becomes erratic and unable to make firm decisions. He frees hundreds of political prisoners, who will join the revolution, and orders the arrest of his top officials. In November, he appears on television and says that he has heard the voice of the people’s revolution and he will reform his system. But most Iranians believe that the shah’s time is over. He leaves Iran two months later. The shah spends the rest of his life in exile, in Morocco, the United States, Panama, Mexico, and Egypt, where he dies on July 27, 1980.

  EARLY 1979: THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

  Khomeini returns to Tehran on February 1, 1979. Exactly ten days later, a group of commanders of the Royal Iranian Army reach an agreement with Khomeini to put down their guns and accept a new revolutionary government, assigned by Khomeini. The Iranian revolution is victorious. Twenty-five hundred years of monarchy in Iran come to an end.

  Less than
two months later, in a referendum, 98.2 percent of Iranians vote for the establishment of an Islamic republic. Later in the year, an assembly writes the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution, according to which Khomeini’s concept of governance of the jurisprudent effectively becomes Iran’s form of government.

  LATE 1979: HOSTAGE TAKING, SUPPRESSION OF DISSENT

  On November 4, 1979, a group of radical students, with Khomeini’s blessing, raids the American embassy in Iran and takes sixty-six Americans hostage. On the surface, the hostage taking is a protest against the American government’s support of the shah’s dictatorship, but in reality, it is a way for Khomeini to fully consolidate his authority by suppressing the moderates in his government, who criticize the takeover. The hostages are freed after 444 days, but the crisis brings formal Iran-U.S. relations to an end and ignites a series of American-imposed sanctions that are still in place more than three decades later.

  Khomeini is the new Iranian tyrant. He accepts no criticism of his absolute rule, and members of opposition groups, even the nonviolent ones, are thrown into jail, tortured, and executed. In turn, violent groups take arms against the regime. Within a few years, terrorist groups assassinate a president, a prime minister, a head of the judiciary, and dozens of top officials, as well as ordinary sympathizers of Khomeini’s regime. The main opposition group is the Marxist-Islamist MKO (Mujahideen Khalq Organization).

  Two close confidants of Khomeini’s, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei, survive separate assassination attempts. Ali Khamenei’s right hand is paralyzed.

  1980: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

  A few months after the Iranian revolution, Saddam Hussein—who has been Iraq’s strongman for almost a decade—becomes the country’s president. In 1975, Saddam was forced by the shah to reluctantly accept a border settlement with Iran.

  After gaining power, Khomeini promises to export the revolution and asks Muslims around the world to rise against the despots who rule them. Khomeini is surrounded by exiled Iraqis who oppose Saddam Hussein and makes a number of critical remarks about the treatment of Shias in Iraq. As the Islamic government antagonizes the West, and becomes increasingly opposed by various political groups, Saddam Hussein thinks it is an opportune time to both revisit the border dispute and end Khomeini’s rule.

  Iraqi forces invade Iran in September 1980. Saddam Hussein is surprised by the solidarity of Iranians from different backgrounds in defending their country and withdraws from most of the occupied territories in less than two years. But the war gives Khomeini the perfect opportunity to tighten his grip on power and suppress the opposition. Iranian forces invade Iraqi territories, and a war of attrition continues for eight years.

  1981–89: PRESIDENT ALI KHAMENEI, PRIME MINISTER MIR HOSSEIN MOUSAVI

  After the impeachment of one president and the killing of another, Ali Khamenei becomes president in October 1981. A junior cleric with conservative ideas, Khamenei has been a follower of Khomeini’s since the early 1960s. In the government, he is regarded as one of the closest people to Khomeini and a member of the more moderate faction of the Islamic regime. Yet Khomeini feels closer to the more radical faction and orders Ali Khamenei to appoint Mir Hossein Mousavi, a radical young architect, as prime minister. Mousavi remains Khamenei’s prime minister for the rest of his tenure as president, until 1989. The relationship between the two men is contentious, and they can’t see eye to eye on many important issues.

  Khamenei represents the right, the conservative branch of revolutionaries who support private ownership and a more moderate rhetoric. Mousavi is regarded as a member of the left, the more radical group within the Islamic establishment, which advocates a more socialist economy and supports more government interference in people’s lives. Khomeini never fully supports one group against the others, but there are more leftists surrounding Khomeini than members of the right. Khomeini often has to mediate between Khamenei and Mousavi, and usually takes Mousavi’s side in decisions. Mousavi becomes known as “the imam’s prime minister.” Ali Khamenei’s strongest ally in the government is the head of the Majlis, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the closest person to Khomeini.

  1988: THE END OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

  After eight years of atrocities committed by both sides, the morale of the Iranian troops is weakened and international pressure on Iran to end the war mounts. Khomeini accepts the cease-fire in August 1988. He compares this to drinking “a chalice of poison.” The war ends with one million people wounded or killed, mostly Iranian. There is no tangible gain for either nation, except for a more tyrannical rule in both countries.

  Before the end of the war, in 1986, the MKO terrorist group moves its headquarters to Iraq. After killing thousands of ordinary Iranians and top officials of the regime, and the imprisonment, torture, and execution of thousands of its own members, the MKO becomes part of Saddam Hussein’s army at the height of the Iran-Iraq War. Toward the end of the war, the leader of the group, Massoud Rajavi, tells his people that a weakened Khomeini regime is vulnerable and that the MKO can take over Tehran in less than a week. Almost seven thousand MKO members enter Iranian territory and are swiftly defeated by the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guards. The number of casualties from both sides is somewhere between four and ten thousand killed or wounded.

  The attack gives Khomeini the perfect excuse to reaffirm his waning authority at the end of the war by ordering the massacre of members of the MKO and other opposition groups. In less than six months, almost five thousand people, many of them prisoners and former prisoners, are summarily executed. The massacre is the most organized killing of opposition members in modern Iranian history. More than twenty years later, many of the people involved in the massacre are still in power in Iran or have become members of the opposition inside the country.

  None of the high-ranking members of the regime dares to object to Khomeini’s actions, except for Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who has been regarded as his natural successor since the beginning of the revolution. Montazeri has been Khomeini’s acolyte since the 1940s, but his objection to the killing of thousands of young men and women leads to his dismissal by Khomeini, after which he is forced to spend the remainder of his life under virtual house arrest.

  1989: RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI DIES; ALI KHAMENEI BECOMES SUPREME LEADER

  On June 3, 1989, Khomeini dies after eleven days of hospitalization for internal bleeding. His funeral is the largest public gathering in Iran’s history.

  After Khomeini’s death, the Assembly of Experts, which chooses the supreme leader and supervises his actions, gathers to select a successor. In the assembly, Rafsanjani lobbies for Ali Khamenei to succeed Khomeini. Many suspect that Rafsanjani supports Khamenei because he sees him as a weak character, a supreme leader he’ll be able to control. Rafsanjani becomes president, the post of prime minister is abolished, and Mir Hossein Mousavi resigns from politics. Mousavi continues to work as an artist and architect and eventually becomes the head of Iran’s Academy of Arts.

  1989–97: AKBAR HASHEMI RAFSANJANI’S PRESIDENCY

  Rafsanjani calls his tenure the “era of reconstruction” and proceeds with repairing the damage of the Iran-Iraq War, allowing the private sector to be more involved in industries and the economy, and improving Iran’s relations with the West. Rafsanjani becomes known as “Akbar Shah” because his presidential style resembles that of the shah and the shah’s father; he has the same interest in the industrialization of Iran and a similar disdain for criticism and freedom of expression. He creates hundreds of new industries and builds thousands of miles of roads, but at the same time scores of student activists and opposition figures are jailed and dozens of intellectuals are mysteriously murdered.

  Through unofficial channels, Rafsanjani presents himself as someone the West can work with. His government starts a strategy of rapprochement with the West and Iran’s former enemies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani tries to reverse Khomeini’s xenophobic and
socialist economic policies by opening Iran’s markets to the rest of the world and encouraging foreign investment. Yet the privatization and free market benefit only a limited number of people, those referred to as Iran’s economic mafia. One of the most important achievements of Rafsanjani was helping to establish, and later expand, the Free University in 1982. This semiprivate university has educated millions of young Iranians who want to continue their education but cannot pass the extremely difficult entrance exams of the national universities. This has helped to create a generation of politically aware, educated Iranians who will demand their rights as citizens in post-2009 elections.

  Rafsanjani’s reconstruction also means the return of consumerism to Iran after ten years of revolutionary idealism. While some technocrats and retired Revolutionary Guards who are hired by the government or have started their own businesses become enormously wealthy, many war veterans find themselves dispossessed. In order to gain more power, Khamenei taps into the nostalgic anguish of this war generation and builds a powerful base that will become increasingly strong in the next two decades.

  1997: MOHAMMAD KHATAMI, THE REFORMIST PRESIDENT

  Radical supporters of Khomeini’s, including many of the students who took over the American embassy, are removed from positions of power during Rafsanjani’s presidency. Ostracized from the government, they study and criticize their past actions and create the Iranian reformist movement. During the 1997 presidential elections, they support Mohammad Khatami in a contest against Khamenei’s preferred candidate, Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri. Khatami wins by a landslide. The majority of Iranians hope that the more honest, anti-establishment Khatami will bring an end to eight years of Rafsanjani’s corrupt rule.

 

‹ Prev