Trials of Truth
Page 4
As planned, Captain Chopra left the house at about 8.45 p.m. to pick up the children. On reaching the AIR building, he discovered that they were not there. Upon inquiring, he found to his utter shock that the children had never reported for the show in the first place. He called home frantically to check whether the children had reached home. After learning that they hadn’t, he instantly rushed back and started making anxious phone calls to friends and family to determine their whereabouts. Finding no answers, he went all over town looking for them. At about 10.15 p.m., Captain Chopra called the police control room and lodged a missing persons report. Chopra himself went looking for them at the Willingdon Hospital and various other places, including the Parliament Street police station. Disheartened, he lodged another report at the Dhaula Kuan police station. By then, the police had already started to look for Geeta and Sanjay.
On the same day at about 10.15 p.m., Billa and Ranga sought treatment at Willingdon Hospital for a head injury sustained by Billa; they used aliases. An X-ray was also taken to examine the extent and seriousness of the injury. After receiving a few stitches, Billa was allowed to leave.
Two days after the kidnapping, on 28 August 1978, one Dhani Ram came across two dead bodies, a girl’s and a boy’s, while grazing his cattle at the Ridge. This information was relayed to the Rajinder Nagar police station, which, in turn, sent a wireless message to the Delhi Cantonment police station. As the police suspected the bodies to be Geeta’s and Sanjay’s, their parents were summoned to identify the bodies, which they conclusively did, and the missing persons case officially became a murder case. An FIR was registered at the Rajinder Nagar police station.
The Chase
The tragic abduction and murder of the siblings was quickly picked up by the media and turned into front-page news. Specific details were published daily in the newspapers. Doubts and questions were being raised against the government, prompting government representatives to release statements promising prompt action for apprehending the perpetrators of the heinous crime. The police also came under pressure to perform. They began the murder investigation by examining the crime scene from where the bodies had been recovered. In the meantime, the bodies were sent for a post-mortem. The doctors opined that the wounds on the bodies of Geeta and Sanjay had possibly been caused by a kirpan (a short sword or knife with a curved blade, worn as one of the five distinguishing signs of the Sikh Khalsa) and that the time of death was about fifty-four to sixty hours before the time of discovery of the bodies. The extensive media coverage of the case led to many witnesses coming forward to record their statements. Among them was the doctor who had given the teens a lift from Dhaula Kuan to Gole Dak Khana.
The police started investigations on various lines. Subsequent police investigations revealed that Billa and Ranga could possibly be involved in the commission of the crime. After learning about their antecedents, the Bombay police were contacted and a manhunt was launched for their capture. However, in the absence of any solid leads, the duo continued to evade arrest.
A major breakthrough in the investigation came on 31 August 1978, when the residents of Majlis Park informed the police about an abandoned mustard-coloured Fiat they had spotted. The car matched the description given by the eyewitnesses. The police recovered fingerprints, blood and hair samples and fake licence plates from the car. The DNA examination of the blood and hair samples proved beyond doubt that this was indeed the car that had been used to abduct the unfortunate siblings. The police recovered evidence from the Fiat which later proved to be very useful in convicting the accused, along with the testimony of the witnesses.
On 8 September 1978, Lance Naiks Gurtej Singh and A.V. Shetty were travelling with other military personnel in the military compartment of the Kalka Mail. They found the activities of two civilians who had entered the military compartment near Agra suspicious. The Lance Naiks were soon able to identify the two men as Billa and Ranga, suspected to be involved in the abduction and murder of the sister–brother duo, thanks to the extensive media coverage. They tied up the two suspects with ropes and handed them over to the station house officer of the Delhi railway station police in the early hours of 9 September. A live .32-mm gun was recovered from Billa while a kirpan was seized from Ranga.
The Trial
The trial of Ranga and Billa became the cynosure of all eyes. During interrogation, Billa and Ranga described their plan of stealing a car from somewhere, offering a ride to some young children, kidnapping them and extorting ransom from their parents. In case of any unforeseen contingency, they had decided they would kill the children. The valour and courage of young Sanjay and Geeta, who staunchly resisted surrender, as well as the fact that Billa and Ranga, while molesting the children, had managed to extract information about their father being a government servant who would be unable to pay a fat ransom, had angered the criminals and led to the children’s murder.
At the trial, the prosecution presented a watertight case, with forensic evidence collected from various sites including the Ridge, the Fiat and many other places. In addition to such evidence and the confessional statements of both the accused, the prosecution submitted the testimonies of the various eyewitnesses. These Good Samaritans volunteered to testify against Billa and Ranga. This is in direct contrast to cases such as the Nirbhaya rape case, wherein people turned a blind eye to the occurrence of a crime to avoid being harassed by the police or other authorities. The eyewitnesses gave several accounts of the happenings of the fateful day of the children’s disappearance and eventual murder.
The police, on the other hand, had made a major blunder by releasing to the press the photographs of the accused without having sufficient proof of their involvement in the crime. This led to the obvious defence that the witnesses who testified were preconditioned by the photographs published prominently across the national media, thus raising doubts about the identification process. Similarly, the tangibly hostile public sentiment towards Billa and Ranga, aroused by the excessive publicity given to the case by the national newspapers, was contended to be damaging to the prosecution’s case.
Upon his arrest, Billa made a disclosure statement and was taken to the Willingdon Hospital for a medical examination. The doctor found a wound on his forehead and, upon examination, it was discovered that the X-rays of Billa’s skull tallied with those of the man who had visited the hospital on the night of the murder. This established the presence of Billa and Ranga near the crime scene on 26 August 1978. The fingerprints on the X-ray slip, which were taken on the night of the incident, when the accused went to the hospital, were also proved to be Billa’s.
Billa made another statement disclosing the whereabouts of the shop from which they had bought the kirpan used in the crime. Subsequently, they were produced before the metropolitan magistrate to record their fingerprints, and so on.
The post-mortem revealed that the wounds on the bodies were possibly caused by the kirpan and that Geeta had also been raped before being murdered. This discovery further enraged the public.
Kuljeet Singh, alias Ranga Khus, and Jasbir Singh, alias Billa, were convicted by the learned additional sessions judge for various offences in connection with the murder of Geeta and Sanjay Chopra. The two accused were sentenced to death for the offence of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and to varying terms of imprisonment under Sections 363, 365, 366 and 376 read with Section 34 of the code.
Ranga made a confessional statement in September 1978, but later retracted it in November. In October 1978 Billa also made a voluntary confessional statement but he too retracted the statement a month later. In their confessional statements, both of them testified against one another. This is a classic case of prisoner’s dilemma, where one prisoner does not know what the other prisoner is going to say, and, consequently, because of mutual distrust, both end up testifying against each other.
The trial court noted that:
Evidence produced by the prosecution, as already discussed, l
eaves no doubt that the appellants were seen at about 6.40 p.m. with the deceased in the Fiat car at Gole Dak Khana and later on the road leading to Shankar Road, at about 7.30 P.M. they were with the deceased at Buddha Jayanti Park; the deceased breathed their last at about 9.30 P.M., and the appellants came to Willingdon Hospital at 10.15 P.M. The appellants give no explanation as to what did they do to Sanjay and Geeta. On the other hand, they have given false explanations. The circumstantial evidence leaves no room for doubt that the appellants are the murderers.
The order of conviction and sentence, including the sentence of death, was confirmed by the Delhi High Court by a judgment on 16 November 1979.
The high court while agreeing with the trial court’s verdict, made the following observations:
We are satisfied that the appellants are desperadoes who have no compunction in killing.
They hit upon a most diabolical plan of a cold-blooded, ruthless, cruel murder of two young innocent teenagers.
Immediately after killing Sanjay, the appellants had no compunction in raping Sanjay’s helpless sister by stripping her naked. After satisfying their beastly lust, they killed her and threw her body in the bushes. Evidently the appellants had a fiendish sadistic pleasure in committing the crime.
Whether we look at the crime or at the criminals the conclusion is irresistible that with the elimination of the appellants the society would be much better off and its safety will no longer be endangered. Indeed, to award any other sentence except death sentence will amount to complete failure of justice. We are in complete agreement with the special reasons given by the trial judge for awarding the death sentence.
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeals against the conviction and upheld the verdict of the high court.
Post-Trial Consequences
As is common practice in India, even after confirmation of the sentence by the highest court of the land, the petitioners still find grounds for yet another appeal to the Supreme Court. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions, Ranga filed a writ petition,2 praying for reconsideration of the death-sentence penalty on the grounds that it was Billa who was the main perpetrator of the crime and not him, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that: ‘[The duo] sail on the same boat and must stand or fall together . . . The survival of an orderly society demands the extinction of the life of persons like Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and security. They are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in terms of the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society.’
Yet another petition3 was filed before the Supreme Court that raised the contention that the court should scrutinize the denial of clemency by the President of India. Billa and Ranga submitted that by refusing to commute the death sentence imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President had transgressed his discretionary power under Article 72 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court noted that this particular provision is one that enjoins in itself a duty to exercise the clemency power fairly and reasonably. The court, however, refused to go into the scope of the powers of the President and any guidelines for the exercise of power under Article 72 as such exercise of power has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this instance, the only sentence possible was that of the death penalty. The verdict was unyielding—the convicts were professional killers and deserved no mercy.
Before the execution of the sentence, however, yet another petition was made before the Supreme Court. This new petition was different from some of the others filed in connection to the case. Ms Prabha Dutt, a reporter for the Hindustan Times, sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus (meaning a writ that is ‘issued as a command to an inferior court’) directing the Delhi administration and the superintendent of Tihar Jail to allow her to interview Billa and Ranga. Under the rules of the jail manual, only the relatives, friends and legal advisers can be allowed to meet the death-row convicts. The Supreme Court, in a landmark decision in Prabha Dutt v. Union of India in 1981,4 ruled that if the convicts were willing to give the interview then there was no reason for denying the interview.
Bravery and Valour
History will record the bravery and courage of these children who fought against all odds. One of the witnesses stated that he had seen the girl catching hold of the driver sitting in front of her and raising an alarm, while the boy quarrelled with the person sitting next to the driver. The Indian government bestowed the Kirti Chakra gallantry award on Geeta and Sanjay Chopra on 5 April 1981. In 1978, the Indian Council for Child Welfare instituted two annual bravery awards for children under the age of sixteen, the Sanjay Chopra Award and the Geeta Chopra Award, given each year along with the National Bravery Award.
The murder of children is always particularly devastating. This case is especially heart-rending as the victims were siblings and the family lost two of their children to the same atrocious crime, on the same day. The grief and anger of the parents in such cases is unimaginable and unfathomable. The case touched a chord with every Indian and generated a huge public outcry. It is this general uproar that led to vigilant pursuit by the police and the eventual apprehension of the criminals. However, the Delhi High Court castigated the police, saying: ‘Before parting with this case we are constrained to observe that the lives of the two children could have been saved if the police had acted promptly . . . Had flying-squad cars been put into operation immediately, there was a good chance for preventing the murders. A general alarm should have been sounded to apprehend the culprits.’
We can’t turn the clock back. But we have lessons to learn. We can only hope that the next time there is a complaint, it should not fall on deaf ears. Promptness and diligence by the police is needed not only after the offence but also for crime prevention. I end this chapter by saying that full accountability on the part of the authorities must be ensured so that next time a Sanjay and a Geeta may be saved.
4
BLOODLESS MURDER: DEFAMATION
The subcontinent of India takes pride in its democracy. It is often a wonder that a nation as vast and diverse as ours has had a successful democratic government for seventy years now. It often strikes me that the cornerstone of a true democracy is always the degree of freedom of speech and expression afforded to its people. The idea that the citizens of a country can express themselves without any fear of unjust retribution has always played an important part in the functioning of global affairs. I am of the firm belief that the reason India stands as one of the foremost functioning democracies is that our freedom to speech and expression is uncompromisingly protected.
Free speech and expression, though rightly irrefutable, can often take the turn into the territory of defamation if not used responsibly. Statements made wantonly, without confirming facts, have the potential to harm beyond reparation.
In the case of Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath,1 the Supreme Court observed: ‘Reputation is not only the salt of life but also a revenue generator for the present as well as posterity.’ In Umesh Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh,2 the court observed that the personal rights of a human being include the right of reputation. A good reputation is an element of personal security and is protected by the Constitution equally along with the right to enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and as such it has been held to be a necessary element with regard to the right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution.
When we look at the law of defamation, the first question that strikes us is the concept of ‘reputation’. What exactly constitutes reputation? Is it goodwill? Is it the status one has in the eyes of society? Or is it the character we associate ourselves with? Reputation can loosely be understood as property, albeit intangible, and is often associated with the status or character we seem to possess in the society we live in.
In India, particularly, reputation is considered to be a huge asset. Indian history is rife with examples of men who rose to hero status trying to protect their honour,
or of women who are revered as goddesses because they died trying to protect their reputations. In almost all societies, reputation is the gauge by which the social worth of an individual is assessed.
Just like the idea of good and evil, nature seems to exist in opposites, so the idea of reputation coexists with notoriety. The law of defamation seeks to curb that. It exists to protect citizens and organizations from notoriety and seeks to curb loose tongues and rogue ink to mar the reputation painstakingly created by people so that no damage is done by wanton minds and wagging tongues.
The origin of defamation can be traced to the idea of scandalum magnatum—‘the slander of great men’—a concept invoked to protect the carefully built and nurtured reputations of aristocrats. The IPC, however, derives the law of defamation from more humble backgrounds, which many argue was a direct result of the need to protect the interests of the British Raj in colonial India. The legislature, however, has, in its wisdom, retained these statutes in the IPC under Sections 499 and 500.
Section 499 states:
Defamation: Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the case hereinafter expected to defame that person.
Section 500 states that whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both.
Reputation and defamation are at opposite ends of the same spectrum. The idea of repute as an intangible property creates a case for a strong and dynamic law. It is evident that there is a need to protect an individual from defamation, and the tort of defamation seeks to achieve that purpose.