Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain
Page 12
Attacks on shipping continued. The Belfast registered MV Orlock Head, was bombed, sinking in the Pentland Firth. In the Thames Estuary, the armed trawler Staunton was presumed blown up by a magnetic mine. All thirteen crew were lost. And there had been very active minelaying during the night. As to the air casualties, Fighter Command on the day flew 758 sorties with a loss of five aircraft. Bomber Command lost three. Ten Luftwaffe aircraft were lost.
As this was Sunday, J. B. Priestley gave one of his Postscript talks. This time he used for his foil RAF pilots. “In return for their skill, devotion, endurance and self-sacrifice, what are we civilians prepared to do?” Priestley asked. At the very least, we could “give our minds honestly, sincerely and without immediate self-interest, to the task of preparing a world really fit for them and their kind – to arrange for them a final ‘happy landing’”. He stressed the virtues of co-operation, as practised by RAF pilots, rather than the competitiveness which they experienced in business life, where the watchword was “survival of the slickest”.40
5.
Closing the door
Before however any such requests or proposals could even be considered it would be necessary that effective guarantees by deeds, not words, should be forthcoming from Germany …
Winston Churchill, 3 August 1940. Response to German peace feelers sent via the King of Sweden1
In the following six days, history was made. To a counterpoint of threats from Göring and continued fighting, peace diplomacy continued. Meanwhile, a different question was being explored – what was to be the shape of Britain, Europe and even the world, after the war? Even in the darkest days of the war, these questions were being considered, the answers thought vitally necessary if people were to resist the blandishments of Hitler and his new order. Churchill, however, wanted to get on with the war. He would have to wait. The German Naval Staff was still looking at the problem of invading England.
DAY 20 – MONDAY 29 JULY 1940
The Express, following on from the New York Times, was talking up the invasion threat. But it also tapped into the New York Sun, retailing the details of another exclusive interview by Karl von Wiegand, this time with Herman Göring. The Luftwaffe chief had told him: “My air force is completely prepared and all set for the signal of command from the Führer to do our part in the general attack”. He had added ominously, “I can assure you our attacks on England so far have been merely armed reconnaissances”. There was some recognition of this in Britain.
The Foreign Office Permanent Secretary, Alexander Cadogan, wrote in his diary of “half-hearted air raids”. Despite “various good indications” that the Germans were going to attack, they had not done so. The British War Cabinet, meanwhile, was being appraised of a telegram sent by the Ambassador at Angora on 16 July, reporting that the German Military Attaché had stated that the invasion of Great Britain had been postponed until the first week in August, and that he intended to go to Germany to follow events. On the 27 July the Ambassador had reported that the German Attaché had left Istanbul on the previous day, for Belgrade.2
The Cabinet could hardly have known that Göring was pursuing his peace initiatives and the Naval Staff had only just completed their feasibility study into Sealion. From the latter came a memorandum initialled by Admirals Otto Schniewind and Kurt Fricke, two key members of the planning staff. They stated that the landing could only be towards the end of September, which meant the weather would be “a source of great difficulty”, particularly during the supply phases of the operation. Worse still, they did not think the German navy could stop the Royal Navy breaking into the crossing area. They thus advised against an invasion in 1940. If the air war and the naval blockade did not induce the enemy to make peace, the invasion could be considered in May 1941 or thereafter, they suggested.3
To this Schniewind added a note confirming that the navy could not take responsibility for the landing in the current year. Carrying out the operation at all appeared “extremely doubtful”. With this, Räder was in full agreement. He felt that the only possible way of carrying out the operation would be to reduce the crossing area to the Dover Straits, thus dropping the other two crossing zones. He intended to tell the Führer this, without delay.
In the Dover Straits this day, the weather was fine with light, north-westerly winds and haze. Two sizeable convoys were on the move and an early morning raid was brewing. Just after seven, however, it became apparent that the ships were not the target. The raid was heading for the harbour. Air Vice-Marshal Park, from his bunker in Hillingdon, was now under considerable pressure from the Admiralty to protect the port. He and Dowding both preferred to hold back the fighters to deal with intruders further inland. But, nevertheless, he released a squadron of Spitfires and one of Hurricanes.
These fighters met what turned out to be twenty Stukas supported by about fifty Me 109s. As the waters of the harbour erupted under a storm of bombs, four Stukas were shot down. But the Me 109s had the advantage of height and extracted a toll of five British fighters, killing one pilot. The ferocious fighting was made all the more hazardous for the RAF by the enthusiastic participation of anti-aircraft gunners.
This was the first of two attacks. By the end of the second, SS Grondland, which had been damaged on July 25, had been sunk. Nineteen crewmen were killed. Patrol yacht Gulzar was sunk in the submarine basin.4 The depot ship HMS Sandhurst – damaged two days previously – was set on fire.5 With the half-submerged wreck of the Codrington still alongside, her substantial stores of fuel and explosives threatened to devastate the town. Again and again, personnel from Dover Fire Brigade and the Auxiliary Fire Service forced their way into the burning ship. Despite thick black smoke creating a pyre visible for miles, they stayed in place as the bombers returned. The fire was extinguished and the town saved. Three senior fire officers were awarded the George Medal: Ernest Harmer, Cyril Brown and Alexander Edmund Campbell. Six firemen were commended.6
In Portland, the Royal Navy lost its fourth destroyer in a month. This was HMS Delight, escorting a Channel convoy. She had sailed from Rosyth, through the English Channel and had stopped at Portland on the way, departing on July 29. In contravention of local orders and placing herself at considerable risk, she was sailing in daylight. After leaving the harbour, German radar at Cherbourg picked her up and directed aircraft to attack her. Some twenty miles off Portland Bill by then, she put up a spirited fight but a bomb on her fo’c’sle ended it, causing a major fire and explosion. She managed to limp towards Portland Harbour but sunk early the next morning, having lost six of her company.7
This was not the end of the fighting. A heavy raid on Harwich by Heinkels and Dorniers developed, but was beaten off by elements of three squadrons. They downed three Heinkels. Steamers Clan Monro and Moidart were sunk by mines in the same area. The mine was turning out to be a potent weapon.8 SS Ousebridge found one in Queen’s Channel, Liverpool. Her bow was blown off and back broken. Two of her crew were killed.
Raids were seen in Wales, with incendiaries and explosive bombs dropped in three locations, including Port Talbot. In the early morning, bombs had been dropped at Altcar (Lancashire), near Crewe, in Essex, Gloucestershire, Cheshire, Midlothian and Berwickshire, causing little or no damage. Bombs were also dropped near the aerodromes at Yatesbury and Hawarden. During the early hours of the morning, a Heinkel en route to bomb the Bristol works at Filton was downed by anti-aircraft fire. The crew baled out. Two were at large for some 48 hours, but one crew member wandered abroad for nine days, believed to be the longest period a German airman was at large before capture.
For Fighter Command, the day had seen 758 sorties, for the loss of four aircraft. One Blenheim bomber was lost. Total Luftwaffe losses were thirteen across the whole country, although the RAF claimed “17 of 80 raiders” shot down in thirty minutes in the Dover action. In later news bulletins, the censor permitted Dover to be named – the first permitted mention of a place name.
DAY 21 – TUESDAY 30 JULY 1940
On 9 August, War Illustrated was to repeat the claims that nothing had been hit, showing “during and after” photographs of ships in outer harbour. With thick, black smoke pouring from the stricken Sandhurst in the naval basin, no one within miles could have been unaware that the Luftwaffe had scored a hit, not counting the sinking of the SS Grondland and the patrol yacht Gulzar. Nevertheless, War Illustrated headed its article, “This Battle of Dover was won in the sky”. There was a line between omitting material on the instructions of the censor, and actively telling lies. On this occasion, the press crossed it.
By now, German planning for Sealion was gathering momentum. But the Naval Staff stuck to its view that the operation could not be carried out until after 15 September. Even if the transportation of the first wave succeeded through exceptionally fine weather, there could be no guarantee that further waves could be successfully transported. The operation was suicide.
Thus, the Naval Operations Division added its voice to calls for a postponement. Nevertheless, it suggested preparations should continue. Unrestricted air warfare together with naval measures “should cause the enemy to negotiate with the Führer on the latter’s terms”. As an alternative, they argued for a major German front in the Mediterranean, launching an operation through Spain against Gibraltar. They wanted armoured troops to be sent to support the Italian offensive against Egypt and the Suez Canal, attacking the British in Haifa in order to deprive them of vital oil supplies, and to incite the Russians to sweep southward to the Persian Gulf.
Another key man in the invasion planning process was recently promoted Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the OKH. This Bavarian Catholic, from an old military family, recorded seeing the Navy memorandum on 28 July. He observed that it “upsets all previous calculations about the crossing”. Halder sent Colonel Greiffenberg, Chief of the OKH Operations Branch, from his office in Fontainebleau to the naval headquarters in Berlin to get more detail. He returned with “much depressing information”. As a result, the Army was resigned to prospect that “the Navy in all probability will not provide us this autumn with the means for a successful invasion of England”.9
Führer Headquarters (HQ), meanwhile, sent a signal to C-in-C Air Force ordering preparations for the “great air offensive” to be “accelerated to the utmost” so that the operation could begin within twelve hours of the issue of the executive order.10
So went the war. This day was marked by unsettled weather, low cloud and drizzle. Although flying was heavily restricted, the Luftwaffe was still out hunting in the Channel and North Sea. A group of Ju 88s attacked a convoy off the Suffolk coast – without success. Overnight, the Bay of Liverpool was mined heavily. Bombing in ten separate areas in Wales was reported. He 111s visited the Filton aircraft factory and the oil tanks at Avonmouth. On the other side of the country, bombs were dropped on Hull, with some damage to shops.
For the port city of Hull, bombing was by no means a novelty. The first raid had been on 19 June and raids continued until 1945, making it one of the most heavily bombed British cities of the war. Close to 1,200 people were killed and 3,000 injured. The city spent more than 1,000 hours under alert, suffering 86,715 buildings damaged and 95 percent of houses damaged or destroyed. Of a population of around 320,000 at the beginning of the war, approximately 192,000 were made homeless. Much of the city centre was completely destroyed and heavy damage was inflicted on residential areas, industry, the railways and the docks. Yet the port continued to function throughout the war.11
The censors would not allow Hull to be identified by name. The media thus referred to a “North-East” town or “northern coastal town”, when it referred to it at all, which was not very often. Consequently, it has only been in more recent years that its plight has been recognized. Perversely, at this time, Churchill was headed north for a visit to the north-east. He inspected the Home Guard, coastal and other defences, including those near Hartlepool, returning to London on 31 July.12
Back to this dog-end day of July, Fighter Command flew 688 sorties for two aircraft lost, against seven Germans claimed, including a Heinkel off Montrose and an Me 100 off Southwold. Bomber Command lost one Blenheim. The RAF was meanwhile asserting that its night bombing of Germany was “most effective” and was worrying the German High Command. Intelligence reports, it said, indicated that its raids were causing serious damage. This was despite the whole British nation getting a tutorial on the effect of bombing on national morale and industrial production, and the resilience of populations and industrial systems. The RAF chiefs, however, seemed to be out of the room.
DAY 22 – WEDNESDAY 31 JULY
As July drew to a close, diverse reports in the Axis press were suggesting that preparations for an invasion were nearly complete. German and Italian travellers in Spain claimed that Franco intended to mount an attack on Gibraltar to coincide with an invasion.
The official German news agency rejected any idea that “the war against England is being waged only half-heartedly”. Since the fall of France, it said, purely military considerations had been eclipsed by politics. But Germany was now waging war against England with as much determination and certainty of victory as she had against Poland and France. Such stories got little coverage in the British media. Home Intelligence observed that they aroused only “limited” public interest.
The preparations, though, were far from complete. In a bid to speed things up, Hitler had summoned a meeting at his Berghof mountain retreat in Austria. This was to be a key moment. Head of the Army, Walther von Brauchitsch, was there; so was his number two, Franz Halder. Räder was there to represent the Navy and the conference began with his report. All preparations, the Grand Admiral said, were in full swing. Granted air superiority and favourable weather, minesweeping, which had already begun, would take three weeks. Minelaying could only then begin at the end of August. He thus confirmed to Hitler’s face what his Naval Staff had told him. The Navy could not be ready until after 15 September.13
As to the exact date of the invasion, there were technical requirements which had to be satisfied. First, the Army insisted on a landing at dawn, which meant that last part of the crossing would be at night. To enable the fleet to be manoeuvred and controlled, a half moon rising about 11 p.m. was essential. Then, the landing had to take place about two hours after high tide, when the ebbing sea would enable the barges to be firmly run ashore. This fixed the landing to between 19 and 26 September.
This late start was likely to create weather difficulties, especially during the supply phase of the operation. Even if it was fine for the first wave, there was no guarantee that it would stay that way. “Weather conditions,” Räder pointed out, “are of the utmost importance.” Not least, the sea had to be calm enough for the barges to cross and be beached safely. In heavy seas, it would be impossible to transfer loads from steamers into barges lying alongside. Then Räder addressed the contentious issue. Going over the heads of the Army and the Supreme Command, he appealed directly to Hitler for a landing on a narrow front, crossing at the narrowest parts of the Dover Straits. To finish off, Räder pleaded for May 1941 as a better time.
In a curiously anodyne response, Hitler began by observing that nothing could be done about weather conditions, though he recognized that storm tides must be borne in mind. But his inclination was to seize the moment. Delay would only make things more difficult. The British Army, still in a poor condition, would by spring have a formidable force of 30–35 divisions. The strength of the Kriegsmarine relative to the Royal Navy would not have improved by then.
&nbs
p; Aware of the potential advantages to accrue from his Axis ally drawing troops away from the UK, Hitler was nevertheless dismissive of the staying power of the Italians, especially in East Africa. Pondering over a postponement, he reviewed the options of using air and submarine warfare. Although this might decide the war, it would take from one to two years. He spoke of an operation against Gibraltar which was dependent on the attitude adopted by Spain. When von Brauchitsch proposed the dispatch of two armoured divisions to support the forthcoming Italian offensive on Egypt, he said “this diversion manoeuvre” should be studied. But, he concluded, “a positively decisive result can only be achieved by an attack on England”.14
Hitler therefore decided that the air war should start immediately. If the results were not satisfactory, invasion preparations would be stopped. But, he said, “If we gain the impression that the English are being crushed and that the air war is, after a certain time, taking effect, then we shall attack”. An attempt had to be made to prepare the operation for 15 September. But, as to the all-important question of the narrow front, Hitler was silent. He simply did not comment.
Instead, he went on to look at the bigger picture. Britain, he said, was reliant on Russia and the USA. If Russia dropped out of the picture, this would tremendously increase Japan’s power in the Far East, forcing the US to focus its attention and resources there. By this means, America would be lost to Britain. Russia’s destruction, therefore, had to be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941 was the time to take on Russia, with the state “shattered to its roots with one blow”. Hitler’s words were later summarized by Franz Halder: “Russia is the factor by which England sets the greatest store … If Russia is beaten, England’s last hope is gone. Germany is then master of Europe and the Balkans … Decision: As a result of this argument, Russia must be dealt with. Spring 1941”.