Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  In The Times though, there was a bombshell of a different kind – a small article with the innocuous title of “Empire publicity”. It announced that the Ministry of Information was to start a publicity campaign on 7 October, to bring home to people that “the war is not a fight between Great Britain as an island and northern Europe but something that is of interest to the Empire as a whole”. The bombshell was tucked in the end, with the statement: “The Government are working out a policy of war aims and post-war plans, and part of the Empire Publicity Campaign will be to give some definition to these aims”. If that was the case – especially in the context of Churchill’s refusal on 20 August – this was major news. A lot of people wanted to know more.

  As for the shooting war, this day saw something of a reversal in the fortunes of Fighter Command. It lost four Spitfires and nine Hurricanes, with nine pilots killed. Accidents and other losses brought the balance to eighteen, in exchange for ten Luftwaffe aircraft. Total RAF losses in two days of fighting, including bombers, had the two sides close to parity: 59–65. Nor did the sea war offer any comfort. The British steamer Dalveen was sunk by German bombing off the north-east coast of Scotland. SS Queen City was damaged. HMT Recoil was lost on patrol in the English Channel, presumed mined. Then a flotilla of German destroyers from Brest laid mines in Falmouth Bay. Five Allied ships were to fall foul of them. And this was only the tip of the iceberg.

  Very substantial merchant shipping losses were being suffered, attributable in large part to the general shortage of escorts. A. V. Alexander had raised the alarm back on 29 August. But the situation had continued to deteriorate. Furthermore, it was felt that Churchill had contributed to the problem. On 1 July, as a precaution against invasion, he had instructed the Admiralty to “endeavour” to raise the flotilla in the “narrow seas” (the English Channel) to a strength of forty destroyers, with additional cruiser support. These could only come from the convoy escorts, as Churchill was very obviously aware. “The losses in the Western Approach must be accepted meanwhile”, he had written in his minute. But those losses were reaching dangerous proportions.

  C-in-C Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, had never been at ease with his original instructions. There would be sufficient warning, he argued, to permit destroyers to be employed on convoy escort and other duties. Should an invasion seem imminent, they could be rapidly redeployed. This had become a running sore in the relations between Forbes and the Admiralty acting under the direct instructions of Churchill. This culminated in Forbes writing a letter, suggesting that “the Army, assisted by the Air Force, should carry out its immemorial role of holding up the first flight of an invading force”. The Navy, he asserted, “should be freed to carry out its proper function – offensively against the enemy and in defence of our trade – and not be tied down to provide passive defence of our country, which has now become a fortress”.35

  In what must surely have been a complete coincidence, the Mirror made exactly the same point, headlining its lead editorial: “Too much invasion?” It asked whether the “invasion scare” was subtly serving one of the Nazi aims. That aim was to fix the attention of our government and people on the danger of direct attack and on the necessity for vast defensive preparations by ourselves. But now the mere threat of invasion had immobilized millions in the country. “A huge and a hugely expensive Army, with another auxiliary army, tramps, marches, stands, waits and gets fed up”. It says something though that what was obvious to Forbes, and to the editorial writers of the Mirror seemed somehow to have evaded Churchill. Here though, the issue was not the diversion of escorts, but manpower. With the civilians rather than the Army in the front line, could not at least a portion of the Army be used to help clear up the bombing damage?

  Come the night, in this fortress island where this huge idle army waited, air activity started at about eight. London was the main objective again, but the south and south-east of England, East Anglia as far north as Lincolnshire, Nottingham, Derby, Liverpool and South Wales all received visits. To add to the damage done by the Luftwaffe, eighteen Fighter Command aircraft were downed during the day, plus five “heavies” from the other Commands. Against those twenty-three, the Germans lost a mere ten aircraft. Nine British fighter pilots lay dead.

  DAY 82 – SUNDAY 29 SEPTEMBER 1940

  The Sunday Express was asking whether the raid on the Friday might have been something more than “merely an unusually vicious air attack”, speculating that it might have been part of another invasion attempt, smashed once more by the RAF. The paper also recorded Churchill sending his message congratulating Fighter Command on the results of that day.

  But there was no respite. The Luftwaffe came soon after dawn, clocking in just before seven and again at nine, the bombers visiting Berkshire, Essex, Kent and Surrey. But, in the dry words of the official log, “no incident of importance took place”. Later in the morning it was the turn of east and south-east England. Just before eleven thirty, eighteen bombs were dropped near the naval base at Lowestoft. A land mine detonated and some ammunition exploded, causing damage to property, water mains and telegraph wires. There were several casualties. Then came a sweep by about a hundred Me 109s, shortly after four in the afternoon, flying at great height from the Dover–Dungeness direction. Part of this force approached central London, but most of it had remained over Kent. In the evening, Sittingbourne was heavily bombed.

  The night brought a fresh wave of bombers. They started their murder at about eight in the evening, hitting London but spreading death around south and south-east England once more. South Wales and the Midlands suffered visitations. Bombs were dropped just after nine at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Unfortunately, as some averred, the only result was a burst water main. Many bombs were dropped on the Guildford–Sevenoaks line.

  Liverpool’s visits were later, but before midnight, when fires were started at Duke’s and Salthouse Docks. Four warehouses, including one containing grain, caught fire. Birkenhead Docks were also attacked. Railways generally took a hit again, but not on any great scale. A number of factories were damaged and the City of London received its quota of bombs. From just after midnight, they caused several fires, the most serious being in Upper Thames Street. An unexploded bomb was also reported in the south-east corner of St Paul’s Churchyard, causing major traffic disruption. Cheapside and Queen Victoria Street were already closed. Horse Shoe Wharf, Cannon Street and Carter Lane were also affected.

  So went the war. The Luftwaffe dropped their bombs, and the people endured. Fighter Command lost six aircraft in what was rapidly becoming its own private war. Three British bombers went down and the Luftwaffe lost eight machines.

  DAY 83 – MONDAY 30 SEPTEMBER 1940

  The Daily Mail gave its front-page lead to air correspondent Noel Monks, under the headline “Triumph in ‘crisis month’”. The RAF, Monks wrote, have weathered, with the passing of September, the “crisis month” of the war. He continued:

  On the first of the month that ends to-day a high Air Ministry official said to me: “As far as the RAF are concerned, this is the critical month of the war: I will be glad when it is past.” Now it IS past. And the RAF, who have hurled back every attack made on them, the airmen who have destroyed more than 1,000 German aircraft for the loss of only 286 of their own fighters, have come out on top.

  The Air Ministry “spin” failed to impress the Daily Mirror. Giving its page lead to the weekend raid on Berlin, it then attended to domestic matters. A Sunday lie-in for Tube shelterers had caught the eye of one of its reporters, who noted how Londoners had taken advantage of the late start to the traffic, the men going topside to collect hot tea for their womenfolk. The Daily Express also featured the raid on Berlin and the claims of damage to “Nazi bases”. But the paper’s war reporter, Sefton Delmer, warned: “Revenge bombs will not win the war”. He wrote: “I spent five hours yesterday morning driving round London and its suburbs carefully observing the damage done by Hitler’s bombs in last night�
�s raids”. From this he had concluded: “Random bombing, of the kind the Germans carried out over London on Saturday night, just does not pay. And it’s not worth imitating. Let us stick to our careful selection of economically and militarily important targets”.

  One man in particular was especially concerned with economically important targets – the Minister of Shipping, a Conservative MP by the name of Ronald Cross. This day he was not the bearer of good tidings, submitting a paper to the War Cabinet which raised the alarm about the increasingly severe merchant shipping losses. “In a matter of this vital importance,” he wrote, “remedial, measures should not be delayed.” He urged an immediate increase in the number of escorts for the convoys.36

  Entirely in tune with Admiral Forbes and his representation to the Admiralty only two days previously, Cross could not have been clearer. He said:

  I am aware, of coursethat there are many demands, including anti-invasion preparations, made upon our limited naval forces but I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent, in the strongest possible terms, the necessity for putting a stop to the present exorbitant risks to which our Merchant Shipping is being exposed.37

  The most senior of the intelligence bodies, the Combined Intelligence Committee (CIC), had information that supported a reduction in the forces held on standby. On this day, it had received a report from the RAF, indicating that the total of barges photographed in the five main ports between Flushing and Boulogne had, since 18 September, reduced from 1,005 to 691. The evidence, however, was judged to be “inconclusive”, possibly only an attempt to move the barges out of the reach of RAF attacks.38

  The Luftwaffe, meanwhile, sent over two attacks, totalling two hundred aircraft. The first crossed the Kent coast at around nine in the morning. It was met by eight squadrons of Hurricanes and four of Spitfires. The bombers got as far as Maidstone before they were turned back. An hour later, a formation of Me 109s and 110s tried its luck. It was met by a strong force of sixty Hurricanes and eighteen Spitfires. A second wave followed, a hundred bombers escorted by two hundred fighters. Crossing the Sussex coast, it headed towards London but only one Gruppe got as far as the outskirts, suffering heavily for its folly. A final raid was tried on the Westland factory at Yeovil. Forty Heinkels, escorted by Me 110s, crossed the coast near Weymouth. Once again, a welcoming committee forced them to scatter. They dumped their bombs over Sherbourne and district and fled.

  The Mail was right about the RAF getting “on top” of the threat – but only the daylight attacks. All Fighter Command had achieved was to establish an airborne “Maginot line”, which was now being circumvented. The main bombing effort had already been transferred to the night, when the slaughter continued unabated. This night, the attacks were concentrated mainly on south and west London, with the Home Counties getting attention as well. There was light bombing on Merseyside. But the traffic was not one-way. Unfavourable weather did not stop the RAF visiting northern Germany. A small number of bombers again raided Berlin. These and other operations cost nine bombers and a Fleet Air Arm Albacore. With nineteen fighters downed, that brought RAF losses to twenty-nine, as against forty-two Luftwaffe losses, including twenty-eight Me 109s.

  On the month, Fighter Command had lost 393 aircraft, bringing its total losses for the battle to 818. Total RAF losses for the month were 511, and for the battle as a whole, the number reached 1,324. Luftwaffe losses were 548 on the month, and 1,374 from the start of the battle. Despite the hyperbole and exaggerated claims, the two side’s losses were very closely matched, as they were to remain throughout the battle.

  That night, the 15in gun monitor HMS Erebus took up station four to five miles off Calais and bombarded gun emplacements. Her two guns, weighing a hundred tons each, were capable of hurling shells each weighing nearly 2,000lbs. They fired seventeen rounds before the ship retired. The Germans responded with nine 240mm rounds from the radar-guided Prinz Heinrich Battery. Curiously, no mention was made of this action in official communiqués. No details were publicized in the British or foreign press, despite reports of RAF activity over the Channel ports.

  DAY 84 – TUESDAY 1 OCTOBER 1940

  Now it was the turn of the Yorkshire Post to declare that the tide of the war was turning. As with the others, it was partially right. During the day, in that now tiny fragment of the war, the RAF was successfully fighting off the raiders. At night, it was letting them through. Nevertheless, there was clearly a concerted attempt to mark up a “turning point” and the Guardian joined in the fray with an article headed: “First phase of the air war”. Citing “official opinion”, it declared that one phase of the air war had ended and Britain was ready to face the next round “full of confidence”.

  Nevertheless, in the article it was “recognised that the question of stopping enemy bombers raiding London and other cities by night remains to be solved”, but it was pointed out “in authoritative Air Ministry quarters” that the prospects of developments “soon” were “favourable”. The attacks on London, these “quarters” said, had been part of the invasion plan “aimed at disrupting communications within and to and from the capital”. If the enemy had won this fight, “it would have gone down as one of the most decisive battle of history”. As he had not succeeded, it was only a phase.

  As a clue to the real authors’ grip on reality, however, the article went on to state that, among other types of German aircraft, the fictitious Heinkel 113 had been “tried and severely beaten”. Unabashed though, the RAF continued its propaganda war, adding forty-nine aircraft to the score of the previous day, bringing the claimed total of Luftwaffe aircraft downed in September to 1,095, almost exactly double the true number. Thus, the “summer phase of the war” had come to an end in a resounding propaganda victory.

  Adding to the sense of triumph, the New York Times told of RAF raiders pounding Berlin for five hours. The Germans claimed only one bomb had been dropped, but there was no independent witness. William L. Shirer had no diary entry for this day. Nevertheless, his earlier reports had referred to damage as “negligible”, although he reported that the psychological effects of the RAF raids were profound. The bare statistics were unimpressive, though. Forty-two bombers had been despatched on the night of 30 September/1 October. Only seventeen reached the target and bombed it, for the loss of two aircraft.

  To be fair, the Luftwaffe had the easier job. The distances involved were shorter and, for London, the crews had the Thames to guide them to the city. For other targets, it had radio navigation aids, far in advance of British equipment. Göbbels wrote that following “absolutely massive attacks” on London, it was “possible to see the demoralising effect from the English press”. Of the British attacks on Germany, he claimed: “one can no longer discern English intentions with any certainty”. He was wrong about the effects of the bombing on London. Although the physical damage was significant, the psychological effect was less so. The shock effect had worn off and Londoners were adapting.39

  On this day, a shelter “dictator” was appointed, Admiral Sir Edward Evans, one of two London Regional Commissioners for Civil Defence, charged with bringing order to the chaos. As importantly, the authorities were learning how to deal with the extraordinary situations with which they were daily confronted. Projects which would in peacetime have taken months in the planning and weeks in execution were finished in hours or days. At Kilburn in North London, for instance, the almost complete demolition of a major viaduct was dealt with almost as a matter of routine. A heavy wooden framework was constructed to replace the missing stone and brickwork, and the train service was restored two days after the bombing.40

  DAY 85 – WEDNESDAY 2 OCTOBER 1940

  With the RAF having made daylight conditions dangerous for medium bombers, a major conversion programme was under way to equip large numbers of Me 109s as fighter bombers – or Jabos. Already they were being sent over in large numbers, usually at high altitude, where only the Spitfires could reach them. The tactic was not without cost. Thi
s day, the Luftwaffe lost sixteen aircraft, against the RAF’s three Spitfires – two of those lost in a ground collision.

  Churchill was finally confronting the human consequences of the shelter policy. He had been given a copy of the New Statesman article by Ritchie Calder, which had details about the conditions in the notorious “Tilbury shelter”. This was the area beneath the massive Fenchurch–Tilbury railway goods terminal just off the Commercial Road, part of which had been organized by the local authority as a shelter for 3,000 people. Other parts were used for the storage of margarine. Communist councillors had led residents to break into this area, bringing the occupation on some nights up to as many as 14–16,000 people. There was no sanitation. Poorer families were forced to occupy the more unpleasant areas where the floors were covered by excrement and discarded margarine. One observer reported: “The place was a hell hole. It was an outrage that people had to live in these conditions”.41

  Now, at the War Cabinet, Churchill urged strong action – as a general rule, he was keen on “strong action” – to prevent large numbers of people crowding into the building until it had been made safe. He wanted the man in charge fired. Admiral Evans, the Regional Commissioner, had been given the fullest powers to deal with this matter, taking over from local authority officials.42

  In the wider world, Drew Middleton of the AP was speculating about Sealion. The “zero hour for [the] invasion of Britain this year has passed”, he wrote, citing “neutral military observers and unofficial British sources”. There were “signs that the battle of Britain will be fought in Africa”, where Germany would reinforce the Italians. They would also keep troops in the Channel ports, but only to tie up the British North Sea fleet.