Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  13 For an overview, see: http://www.secondworldwar.org.uk/merchantnavy.htm

  14 Most accounts have the convoy leaving in the afternoon. Saunders (2010) is adamant that it left in the morning. His book offers a detailed account of the action.

  15 An account of the night battle is given in McKee (1957). Air and naval detail from Saunders, op cit, Mason op cit, and Wood with Dempster, op cit. There is also a detailed account, with commentary, in James (2000), pp. 49–55.

  16 Kent (1971), p. 101.

  17 Mason, op cit, p. 172 – he puts the date as 12 August and the recipient of the congratulations as Dowding. The Cabinet Record, however, is dated 9 August, with the recipients as stated. War Cabinet: (40) 223. National Archives. The message (to the Secretary of State for Air) was published on the front page of the Daily Mirror on 12 August.

  18 Colville, op cit, p. 250. Two days earlier, Churchill had written to the Minister of Mines asking about coal stocks and, on 13 August, was asking about the stocks held by railways, assuming that “with the stoppage of our export trade to Europe there should be a great surplus just now”. Churchill, op cit, pp. 515 and 517. It would thus appear that the Prime Minister had little knowledge of the distribution problems being experienced.

  19 Colville, ibid.

  20 Mason, op cit, p. 195.

  21 Details from a local history website: http://www.goosemoor-lane.com/history.htm

  22 See: http://1940homefrontbritain.com/#/the-liverpool-blitz/4545612278 and also Wirall News, 11 August 2010. http://www.wirralnews.co.uk/wirral-news/ local-wirral-news/2010/08/11/wirral-marks-70-years-since-prenton-maid-became-first-merseyside-blitz-casualty-80491-27032518/2

  23 Colville, op cit, p. 250.

  24 Assmann, op cit, p. 28; Wheatley, op cit, p. 45.

  25 http://cylchgronaucymru.llgc.org.uk/browse/viewobject/llgc-id:1078288/article/000016932 Morale in Swansea

  26 Daily Telegraph, 10 August 1940.

  27 There is no direct support for this assertion, but there is much evidence, such as contemporary photographs of British fighters. The camera gun port is visible externally, usually fitted on the leading edge of the port or starboard wing root. The absence in so many dated photographs tells part of the story. That there were so few films published (then and now) tells another part. The processing of the films required laboratories, staff and offices. It stands to reason that squadrons based on satellite stations would not have the facilities. Further, the clips do not always show what was expected. A montage produced by the Imperial War Museum (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9mDy8jH0jo) has a clip (1:40 into the film) showing an RAF Hurricane in the gunsight of an RAF Spitfire flown by Sgt Alan Feary of No. 609 Sqn. There is a fuller treatment of the issue at: http://www.google.co.uk/ig?brand=DSGJ&bmod=DSGJ

  28 Orange (2001), p. 98, suggests this might have been in late July. There is an acknowledgement here, though, that a fully equipped air-sea rescue service was not created until August 1941.

  29 Richards (1953), p. 160.

  30 Yorkshire Post, 12 August 1940, p. 3.

  31 Daily Mirror, 12 August 1940, p. 10, and Yorkshire Post, ibid.

  32 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume III, p. 18. Online edition: http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-3Doc-c1-11.html

  33 Addison and Crang, op cit, pp. 316–17, 319 and 321.

  34 Assmann, op cit, supplement (OKW Directives), p. 9.

  35 Jenkins (1986), pp. 40–54.

  36 Mason, op cit, pp. 182–7. Bishop (2009), pp. 156–9 adds colour to the narrative, as does Deighton, op cit, 158–65.

  37 See: http://ww2today.com/12th-august-1940-bomber-commands-first-victoria-cross

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 7

  1 Assmann, op cit, supplement (OKW Directives), p. 11.

  2 Orwell (2009) Diaries, online edition: http://orwelldiaries.wordpress.com

  3 Wheatley, op cit, p. 47.

  4 A detailed account can be found online at: http://www.airmen.dk/p014aalb.htm and http://www.flensted.eu.com/194014.shtml. See also: Donnelly, op cit, p. 87.

  5 Domarus, op cit, p. 2076. These statements, Domarus writes, “once more revealed that Hitler was not at all serious about a landing in England. He was searching for excuses to cancel the undertaking while still preparing for it”. See also: Wheatley, op cit, pp. 46–7.

  6 See: Liddell, op cit.

  7 The inadequacies of the Hurricane are adequately rehearsed by Leo McKinstry (2010), pp. 220–2. Flight Lieutenant John Cunningham, No. 604 Sqn spoke of “chaps who had just learned to fly, suddenly faced with instrument flying, were not instrument pilots. An awful lot of accidents happened at night”. Flying Officer William David (No. 87 and 213 Sqns) described the idea of a Hurricane fighting at night in 1940 as “an absolute waste of time”. Levine, op cit, pp. 310 and 309.

  8 Diaries, condensed edition, p. 191.

  9 Garfield (2005), op cit, p. 336.

  10 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 471.

  11 See: War Cabinet: (40) 222. National Archives. “The Chief of the Air Staff said that there was little to report. The usual anti-invasion reconnaissances had been flown, without yielding any definite results … “

  12 Wheatley, op cit, p. 47, Ansel, op cit, pp. 224–5. See also: Domarus, op cit, p. 2076.

  13 von Leeb, Diaries. Online version (Nuremberg collection) in German, pp. 251–2 at: http://www.flenstedhttp://www.trialreview.info/webgallery_leeb_diary/index.htm#252 (author’s translation). See also: Irving (2001), Hitler’s War, online version, p. 327.

  14 Partial transcript published in the Daily Mirror, 15 August, p. 3. The broadcast was given little coverage in the British press, but widely covered throughout the Empire and the USA. The Ottawa Citizen, for instance, gave it considerably more space, albeit on p. 26 – from which some of the text cited is drawn.

  15 Assmann, op cit, supplement (OKW Directives), p. 11.

  16 Berlin Diary, op cit, pp. 479–80.

  17 Ansel, op cit, p. 229. The background is covered in detail by Taylor, op cit. The inland waterways were also badly damaged. Army staff at the beginning of August estimated that at least a month would be required to effect repairs. See: pp. 257–8.

  18 See: Assmann, op cit, pp. 28–31.

  19 Gilbert (1991), p. 671.

  20 War Cabinet: WP (40) 317. National Archives.

  21 Ansel, op cit, p. 229.

  22 Domarus, op cit, p. 2077.

  23 Details on the Royal Engineers website: http://www.royalengineersbombdisposal-–eod.org.uk/george_cross.htm

  24 Briefly reported in the Daily Mirror on 19 August 1940. A longer report was in the Yorkshire Post of the same date. The fullest report was the previous day, in the Observer.

  25 http://www.dornier24.com/pages/stories/story1.htm

  26 The events of the day are recorded in great detail by Price (1979).

  27 Personal communications. Squadron records for this period have been lost. Details were pieced together by staff at Yeovil FAA Museum. A reference to Walruses being used for air-sea rescue is at: http://www.hmshood.com/crew/biography/gdonnelly_bio.htm

  28 Of rather dubious performance, these and other such devices were much favoured by Churchill.

  29 Dobinson, op cit, pp. 221–3.

  30 War Cabinet: WP (40) 322. National Archives.

  31 Galland (1955), pp. 47–8.

  32 See: James, op cit, p. 339: Group Instructions to Controllers, No. 4.

  33 http://cylchgronaucymru.llgc.org.uk/browse/viewobject/llgc-id:1078288/article/000016932

  34 The narrative is taken from Scott (2000).

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 8

  1 HC Deb 20 August 1940 vol. 364 cc.1132–274.

  2 HC Deb 20 August 1940 vol. 364 cc.1112–13.

  3 This appeared in Dowding’s despatch on the Battle, published as a supplement to the London Gazette on 10 September 1946.

  4 There is a useful treatment of the logistics of the Battle of Britain at: http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/sha
red/media/document/AFD-100120-058.pdf

  5 King (1979), 21 August 1940.

  6 http://www.devonheritage.org/Places/Newton%20Abbot/Casualtiesofthe bombingofNewtonAbbot.htm

  7 Gilbert (1997), p. 720.

  8 http://www.shottshistorygroup.co.uk/William%20Morton.htm

  9 Portsmouth Times (Ohio), 22 August 1940, p. 4.

  10 Communiqué published in the New York Times, 23 August 1940.

  11 Pitchfork, op cit, pp. 19–20. As far as I can ascertain, three flights of four aircraft were rotated through No. 11 Group area. Thus, at any one time, no more than four aircraft were available.

  12 Wheatley, op cit, p. 48.

  13 Thiele (2006) explores the development and use of German aerial torpedoes. Fortunately, the Luftwaffe did not exploit their successes and aerial torpedo attacks on British shipping in home waters remained relatively rare.

  14 War Cabinet: 233 (40). National Archives.

  15 http://lower-edmonton.anidea.co.uk/leisure/leisure.html

  16 Richards (2006).

  17 Recounted at great length in Ray (1994); Orange (2001) and Dixon (2008), among others. It is very easy to gain to impression that this controversy was the main preoccupation of senior Fighter Command personnel.

  18 Jenkins, op cit, p. 64. This time though – unlike in the earlier raid – there were to be no reports in the press. On the contrary, the emphasis was now on escapes, miraculous or otherwise, of people sheltering in Andersons. On this day, the Daily Mirror (p. 12) ran an article headed: “Be wise and be safe”, reporting how the shelters had “again proved their worth yesterday”. The report recalled: “One received a direct hit, but the two occupants are alive, although badly injured. Another bomb fell a few feet away from a shelter containing five people. It wrecked six houses and buried the shelter, but the occupants were unharmed. In another instance people in shelters five yards from where a bomb fell were unhurt”.

  19 Jenkins, ibid.; News (Portsmouth), The day the bombs rained down on Portsmouth, 9 July 2010. http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/local/east-hampshire/the_day_the_bombs_rained_down_on_portsmouth_1_1257068

  20 Churchill, op cit, p. 271.

  21 Sunday Express, p. 6: “A man just back from France says:”.

  22 Observer, p. 8.

  23 http://www.bbm.org.uk/Sprague.htm

  24 Reporting policy and official censorship, in respect of Birmingham, is explored on this website: http://www.goosemoor-lane.com/dnotice.htm. See also: War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 254. National Archives, for an official explanation of the policy.

  25 Details of the Leeds attack: http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/leeds_bomb_raids_anniversary_1_3017

  26 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 486.

  27 Composite sources, including http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4008-21AUG02.htm and http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=207

  28 Wheatley, op cit, p. 49.

  29 NE Diary, http://www.bpears.org.uk/NE-Diary/Inc/ISeq_04.html

  30 Mason, op cit, pp. 247–9. See also: Orange, op cit, pp. 121–2, and Ray (2000), pp. 94–5.

  31 Klee (Volume 3, p. 66 – online edition) reports the decision having been made by Hitler on 25 August, and conveyed formally in writing on 27 August. See also: Wheatley, op cit, p. 48 and Assmann, op cit, p. 31. The latter cites the directive, stating: “The Army operation must allow for the facts regarding available shipping space and security of the crossing and disembarkation”.

  32 Wheatley, op cit, p. 49. See also: Klee, op cit, p. 66. OKW War Diary entry for 30 August 1940. In view of the “small basis” of the operation now ordered, the only objective to be reached could be to strike the coup de grace on an enemy already battered down by the air war.

  33 Even the previous day, the Daily Mirror (p. 7) had reported on the Folkestone raid of 26 August, noting: “A bomb which fell in the back garden of Mr. George Bailey’s house made a crater twenty feet deep and thirty feet wide, and damaged houses round about. The edge of the crater was about 2ft. from an Anderson shelter, which was still intact”.

  34 Diary, op cit, p. 379. The reference to rejecting the Swedish mediation seems to be a Hitlerite inversion, the peace feelers having come from the Germans and been rejected by the British. Later, Ciano is to tell Mussolini that the Germans seem resigned to war beyond the winter.

  35 Mason, op cit, pp. 248–9 refers to this tactic. Many general narratives refer to the Germans not being aware of British radar direction but, as Mason indicates, by this stage of the battle, they were very well aware that their formations were being tracked across the Channel and were adjusting their tactics accordingly.

  36 Details from the Altrincham History Society website – one excellent example of how local historians have augmented the official record, which is very sketchy on this incident. The lack of local detail very often distorts the official narrative, giving disproportionate attention to the air-to-air fighting, when the summation of the total air effort conveys a different impression.

  37 War Cabinet: WP (40) 342. National Archives.

  38 Diary, op cit, p. 103.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 9

  1 A copy of the complete order (verbatim translation) can be found in Wheatley, op cit, pp. 116–22. See also: Ansel, op cit, p. 236.

  2 Wheatley, op cit, p. 49.

  3 War Cabinet: WP (40) 346. National Archives.

  4 War Cabinet: WP (40) 238. National Archives.

  5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/73/a7467573.shtml

  6 War Cabinet: (40) 238, op cit.

  7 Orwell (2009).

  8 Scott, op cit, p. 71.

  9 War Cabinet: WM (40) 239. National Archives. See also: Colville, op cit, p. 276.

  10 Colville, op cit, pp. 235–6 and Roskill, op cit, p. 334–5. Action details at: http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/4382.html See also: War Cabinet: 239 (40). National Archives.

  11 Colville, op cit, p. 234.

  12 The bombing was reported in the city’s Telegraph & Argus newspaper, the next day, the editorial making precisely that point. The paper, incidentally, was not permitted to name or reveal the location of the department store, even though it was one of the most prominent buildings in the city centre.

  13 Buckton (2010), pp. 159–61.

  14 War Cabinet: WM (40) 239, op cit.

  15 Churchill, op cit, pp. 271–2.

  16 Klee, op cit, p. 70.

  17 Ansel, op cit, p. 248.

  18 Colville, op cit, p. 281.

  19 The fullest account of the incident can be found on a diving website, in the original Danish, at: http://www.nolimitsdiving.dk/NLD/Projekter/Pionier/Pionier_research.htm The action was reported on the front page of the Daily Mirror of 21 September, when Swedish sources were cited, claiming 4,000 troops on board, with most of them drowned.

  20 http://www.royalengineersbombdisposal-eod.org.uk/george_cross.html

  21 A detailed account of this raid is given in J. M. Morris (1983), ‘Morale under attack.’ Welsh History Review. vol. 11, no. 3 (June). The paper is available online from the National Library of Wales. As the title of the paper indicates, it is primarily about the effect of bombing on morale. Morris notes that despite its importance, there was no formal definition of morale in existence until October 1941. Then, Director of MoI’s home intelligence division suggested that it must be measured, “not by what a person thinks or says but by what he does and how he does it”. Tom Harrisson (1976) observed that there was a tendency to confuse morale with “cheerfulness”. The lack of clear definition led to considerable variation, by different workers, in the estimates of morale. In these pre-psephological days, he wrote, “the noise of the general public, as interpreted by the media, could sound very different from the true, private, voice of the people, which might be saying the opposite – or nothing at all”.

  22 Wheatley, op cit, p. 48.

  23 Liddell, op cit, reported in his 6 September entry. National Archives.

  24 Taylor, op cit, p. 157.

  25 Ansel,
op cit, p. 248.

  26 Diary, op cit, online version.

  27 War Cabinet; WP (40) 352. National Archives.

  28 Gilbert (1997), p. 764.

  29 Wheatley, op cit, p. 69.

  30 War Cabinet: (40) 241. National Archives.

  31 War Cabinet: (40) 242. National Archives. Later, a system of watchmen, dubbed “Jim Crows” was adopted. Not until they observed aircraft approaching and had given warnings was shelter taken. It was reported that some workers negotiated extra payments for working though the alert period, and the government undertook to assume complete liability for injuries received by workers who carried on during air raids. See: War Cabinet: 14 October 1940, (40) 270, National Archives; Yorkshire Post. 23 September 1940.

  32 Domarus, op cit. Full text 2081–90. The cited text is on p. 2086.

  33 Berlin Diary, op cit, pp. 495–7.

  34 Daily Express, Mirror, Yorkshire Post, and others, 7 September 1940. The hospital, not named in reports, is at: http://www.dartfordhospitalhistories.org.uk/westhill_intro.html

  35 Reference is made to 160 long-range bombers having been moved from Norway. See: HC Deb 18 November 1946 vol. 430 cc.52–7W.

  36 This assertion is referred to by both Klee and Wheatley, both of whom had independent access to OKW records (each of their phrasing being slightly different). It confirms that which was self-evident. Göring personally never attended any Sealion planning sessions. On receipt of Führer Directive No. 16, he is said to have treated it with indifference.

  37 He had previously been in Finland, from where earlier approaches had been made to the British Government.

  38 The full exchange of telegrams was annexed to the War Cabinet conclusion of 11 September, referenced as WP (40) 366, marked “most secret” – and presented to the Cabinet on that day. The documents are headed “Telegrams exchanged with His Majesty’s Minister in Stockholm”, with a covering note from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Halifax), dated 10 September 1940. National Archives. See also: Roberts, op cit, p. 251, and Gilbert (1997), p. 799.