Perfect Rigour

by Masha Gessen

  Published in the UK in 2011 by

  Icon Books Ltd, Omnibus Business Centre,

  39–41 North Road, London N7 9DP

  email: info@iconbooks.co.uk

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  This electronic edition published in 2011 by Icon Books

  ISBN: 978-1-84831-309-5 (ePub format)

  ISBN: 978-1-84831-310-1 (Adobe ebook format)

  Printed edition previously published in the USA in 2009 by

  Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company,

  215 Park Avenue South, New York, New York 10003

  Printed edition (ISBN: 978-1-84831-238-8)

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  Text copyright © 2009, 2011 Masha Gessen

  The author has asserted her moral rights.

  No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, or by any

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  Typeset by Marie Doherty

  BOOKS BY MASHA GESSEN

  Blood Matters: From Inherited Illness to Designer Babies, How the World and I Found Ourselves in the Future of the Gene

  Ester and Ruzya: How My Grandmothers Survived

  Hitler’s War and Stalin’s Peace

  Dead Again: The Russian Intelligentsia After Communism

  In the Here and There, by Valeria Narbikova (as translator)

  Half a Revolution: Contemporary Fiction by Russian Women

  (as editor and translator)

  Perfect Rigor: A Genius and the Mathematical

  Breakthrough of the Century

  Contents

  Prologue: A Problem for a Million Dollars

  Chapter 1: Escape into the Imagination

  Chapter 2: How to Make a Mathematician

  Chapter 3: A Beautiful School

  Chapter 4: A Perfect Score

  Chapter 5: Rules for Adulthood

  Chapter 6: Guardian Angels

  Chapter 7: Round Trip

  Chapter 8: The Problem

  Chapter 9: The Proof Emerges

  Chapter 10: The Madness

  Chapter 11: The Million-Dollar Question

  Epilogue

  Acknowledgments

  Notes

  PROLOGUE

  A Problem for a Million Dollars

  Numbers cast a magic spell over all of us, but mathematicians are especially skilled at imbuing figures with meaning. In the year 2000, a group of the world’s leading mathematicians gathered in Paris for a meeting that they believed would be momentous. They would use this occasion to take stock of their field. They would discuss the sheer beauty of mathematics—a value that would be understood and appreciated by everyone present. They would take the time to reward one another with praise and, most critical, to dream. They would together try to envision the elegance, the substance, the importance of future mathematical accomplishments.

  The Millennium Meeting had been convened by the Clay Mathematics Institute, a nonprofit organization founded by Boston-area businessman Landon Clay and his wife, Lavinia, for the purposes of popularizing mathematical ideas and encouraging their professional exploration. In the two years of its existence, the institute had set up a beautiful office in a building just outside Harvard Square in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and had handed out a few research awards. Now it had an ambitious plan for the future of mathematics, “to record the problems of the twentieth century that resisted challenge most successfully and that we would most like to see resolved,” as Andrew Wiles, the British number theorist who had famously conquered Fermat’s Last Theorem, put it. “We don’t know how they’ll be solved or when: it may be five years or it may be a hundred years. But we believe that somehow by solving these problems we will open up whole new vistas of mathematical discoveries and landscapes.”1

  As though setting up a mathematical fairy tale, the Clay Institute named seven problems—a magic number in many folk traditions—and assigned the fantastical value of one million dollars for each one’s solution. The reigning kings of mathematics gave lectures summarizing the problems. Michael Francis Atiyah, one of the previous century’s most influential mathematicians, began by outlining the Poincaré Conjecture, formulated by Henri Poincaré in 1904. The problem was a classic of mathematical topology. “It’s been worked on by many famous mathematicians, and it’s still unsolved,” stated Atiyah. “There have been many false proofs. Many people have tried and have made mistakes. Sometimes they discovered the mistakes themselves, sometimes their friends discovered the mistakes.” The audience, which no doubt contained at least a couple of people who had made mistakes while tackling the Poincaré, laughed.

  Atiyah suggested that the solution to the problem might come from physics. “This is a kind of clue—hint—by the teacher who cannot solve the problem to the student who is trying to solve it,” he joked. Several members of the audience were indeed working on problems that they hoped might move mathematics closer to a victory over the Poincaré. But no one thought a solution was near. True, some mathematicians conceal their preoccupations when they’re working on famous problems—as Wiles had done while he was working on Fermat’s Last—but generally they stay abreast of one another’s research. And though putative proofs of the Poincaré Conjecture had appeared more or less annually, the last major breakthrough dated back almost twenty years, to 1982, when the American Richard Hamilton laid out a blueprint for solving the problem. He had found, however, that his own plan for the solution—what mathematicians call a program—was too difficult to follow, and no one else had offered a credible alternative. The Poincaré Conjecture, like Clay’s other Millennium Problems, might never be solved.

  Solving any one of these problems would be nothing short of a heroic feat. Each had claimed decades of research time, and many a mathematician had gone to the grave having failed to solve the problem with which he or she had struggled for years. “The Clay Mathematics Institute really wants to send a clear message, which is that mathematics is mainly valuable because of these immensely difficult problems, which are like the Mount Everest or the Mount Himalaya of mathematics,” said the French mathematician Alain Connes, another twentieth-century giant. “And if we reach the peak, first of all, it will be extremely difficult—we might even pay the price of our lives or something like that. But what is true is that when we reach the peak, the view from there will be fantastic.”

  As unlikely as it was that anyone would solve a Millennium Problem in the foreseeable future, the Clay Institute nonetheless laid out a clear plan for giving each award. The rules stipulated that the solution to the problem would have to be presented in a refereed journal, which was, of course, standard practice. After publication, a two-year waiting period would begin, allowing the world mathematics community to examine the solution and arrive at a consensus on its veracity and
authorship. Then a committee would be appointed to make a final recommendation on the award. Only after it had done so would the institute hand over the million dollars. Wiles estimated that it would take at least five years to arrive at the first solution—assuming that any of the problems was actually solved—so the procedure did not seem at all cumbersome.

  Just two years later, in November 2002, a Russian mathematician posted his proof of the Poincaré Conjecture on the Internet. He was not the first person to claim he’d solved the Poincaré—he was not even the only Russian to post a putative proof of the conjecture on the Internet that year—but his proof turned out to be right.

  And then things did not go according to plan—not the Clay Institute’s plan or any other plan that might have struck a mathematician as reasonable. Grigory Perelman, the Russian, did not publish his work in a refereed journal. He did not agree to vet or even to review the explications of his proof written by others. He refused numerous job offers from the world’s best universities. He refused to accept the Fields Medal, mathematics’ highest honor, which would have been awarded to him in 2006. And then he essentially withdrew from not only the world’s mathematical conversation but also most of his fellow humans’ conversation.

  Perelman’s peculiar behavior attracted the sort of attention to the Poincaré Conjecture and its proof that perhaps no other story of mathematics ever had. The unprecedented magnitude of the award that apparently awaited him helped heat up interest too, as did a sudden plagiarism controversy in which a pair of Chinese mathematicians claimed they deserved the credit for proving the Poincaré. The more people talked about Perelman, the more he seemed to recede from view; eventually, even people who had once known him well said that he had “disappeared,” although he continued to live in the St. Petersburg apartment that had been his home for many years. He did occasionally pick up the phone there—but only to make it clear that he wanted the world to consider him gone.

  When I set out to write this book, I wanted to find answers to three questions: Why was Perelman able to solve the conjecture; that is, what was it about his mind that set him apart from all the mathematicians who had come before? Why did he then abandon mathematics and, to a large extent, the world? Would he refuse to accept the Clay prize money, which he deserved and most certainly could use, and if so, why?

  This book was not written the way biographies usually are. I did not have extended interviews with Perelman. In fact, I had no conversations with him at all. By the time I started working on this project, he had cut off communication with all journalists and most people. That made my job more difficult—I had to imagine a person I had literally never met—but also more interesting: it was an investigation. Fortunately, most people who had been close to him and to the Poincaré Conjecture story agreed to talk to me. In fact, at times I thought it was easier than writing a book about a cooperating subject, because I had no allegiance to Perelman’s own narrative and his vision of himself—except to try to figure out what it was.

  PERFECT RIGOR

  ESCAPE INTO THE IMAGINATION

  1

  Escape into the Imagination

  AS ANYONE WHO has attended grade school knows, mathematics is unlike anything else in the universe. Virtually every human being has experienced that sense of epiphany when an abstraction suddenly makes sense. And while grade-school arithmetic is to mathematics roughly what a spelling bee is to the art of novel writing, the desire to understand patterns—and the childlike thrill of making an inscrutable or disobedient pattern conform to a set of logical rules—is the driving force of all mathematics.

  Much of the thrill lies in the singular nature of the solution. There is only one right answer, which is why most mathematicians hold their field to be hard, exact, pure, and fundamental, even if it cannot precisely be called a science. The truth of science is tested by experiment. The truth of mathematics is tested by argument, which makes it more like philosophy, or, even better, the law, a discipline that also assumes the existence of a single truth. While the other hard sciences live in the laboratory or in the field, tended to by an army of technicians, mathematics lives in the mind. Its lifeblood is the thought process that keeps a mathematician turning in his sleep and waking with a jolt to an idea, and the conversation that alters, corrects, or affirms the idea.

  “The mathematician needs no laboratories or supplies,”1 wrote the Russian number theorist Alexander Khinchin. “A piece of paper, a pencil, and creative powers form the foundation of his work. If this is supplemented with the opportunity to use a more or less decent library and a dose of scientific enthusiasm (which nearly every mathematician possesses), then no amount of destruction can stop the creative work.” The other sciences as they have been practiced since the early twentieth century are, by their very natures, collective pursuits; mathematics is a solitary process, but the mathematician is always addressing another similarly occupied mind. The tools of that conversation—the rooms where those essential arguments take place—are conferences, journals, and, in our day, the Internet.

  That Russia produced some of the twentieth century’s greatest mathematicians is, plainly, a miracle. Mathematics was antithetical to the Soviet way of everything. It promoted argument; it studied patterns in a country that controlled its citizens by forcing them to inhabit a shifting, unpredictable reality; it placed a premium on logic and consistency in a culture that thrived on rhetoric and fear; it required highly specialized knowledge to understand, making the mathematical conversation a code that was indecipherable to an outsider; and worst of all, mathematics laid claim to singular and knowable truths when the regime had staked its legitimacy on its own singular truth. All of this is what made mathematics in the Soviet Union uniquely appealing to those whose minds demanded consistency and logic, unattainable in virtually any other area of study. It is also what made mathematics and mathematicians suspect. Explaining what makes mathematics as important and as beautiful as mathematicians know it to be, the Russian algebraist Mikhail Tsfasman said, “Mathematics is uniquely suited to teaching2 one to distinguish right from wrong, the proven from the unproven, the probable from the improbable. It also teaches us to distinguish that which is probable and probably true from that which, while apparently probable, is an obvious lie. This is a part of mathematical culture that the [Russian] society at large so sorely lacks.”

  It stands to reason that the Soviet human rights movement was founded by a mathematician. Alexander Yesenin-Volpin, a logic theorist, organized the first demonstration in Moscow in December 1965. The movement’s slogans were based on Soviet law,3 and its founders made a single demand: they called on the Soviet authorities to obey the country’s written law. In other words, they demanded logic and consistency; this was a transgression, for which Yesenin-Volpin was incarcerated in prisons and psychiatric wards for a total of fourteen years and ultimately forced to leave the country.

  Soviet scholarship, and Soviet scholars, existed to serve the Soviet state. In May 1927, less than ten years after the October Revolution, the Central Committee inserted into the bylaws of the USSR’s Academy of Sciences a clause specifying just this. A member of the Academy may be stripped of his status, the clause stated, “if his activities are apparently aimed at harming the USSR.” From that point on, every member of the Academy was presumed guilty of aiming to harm the USSR. Public hearings involving historians, literary scholars, and chemists ended with the scholars publicly disgraced, stripped of their academic regalia, and, frequently, jailed on treason charges. Entire fields of study—most notably genetics—were destroyed for apparently coming into conflict with Soviet ideology. Joseph Stalin personally ruled scholarship. He even published his own scientific papers, thereby setting the research agenda in a given field for years to come. His article on linguistics,4 for example, relieved comparative language study of a cloud of suspicion that had hung over it and condemned, among other things, the study of class distinctions i
n language as well as the whole field of semantics. Stalin personally promoted5 a crusading enemy of genetics, Trofim Lysenko, and apparently coauthored Lysenko’s talk that led to an outright ban of the study of genetics in the Soviet Union.

  What saved Russian mathematics from destruction by decree was a combination of three almost entirely unrelated factors. First, Russian mathematics happened to be uncommonly strong right when it might have suffered the most. Second, mathematics proved too obscure for the sort of meddling the Soviet leader most liked to exercise. And third, at a critical moment it proved immensely useful to the State.

  In the 1920s and ’30s, Moscow boasted a robust mathematical community; groundbreaking work was being done in topology, probability theory, number theory, functional analysis, differential equations, and other fields that formed the foundation of twentieth-century mathematics. Mathematics is cheap, and this helped: when the natural sciences perished for lack of equipment and even of heated space in which to work, the mathematicians made do with their pencils and their conversations. “A lack of contemporary literature was, to some extent, compensated by ceaseless scientific communication, which it was possible to organize and support in those years,” wrote Khinchin about that period. An entire crop of young mathematicians, many of whom had received part of their education abroad, became fast-track professors and members of the Academy in those years.

  The older generation of mathematicians—those who had made their careers before the revolution—were, naturally, suspect. One of them, Dimitri Egorov,6 the leading light of Russian mathematics at the turn of the twentieth century, was arrested and in 1931 died in internal exile. His crimes: he was religious and made no secret of it, and he resisted attempts to ideologize mathematics—for example, trying (unsuccessfully) to sidetrack a letter of salutation sent from a mathematicians’ congress to a Party congress. Egorov’s vocal supporters were cleansed from the leadership of Moscow mathematical institutions, but by the standards of the day, this was more of a warning than a purge: no area of study was banned, and no general line was imposed by the Kremlin. Mathematicians would have been well advised to brace for a bigger blow.