Caesar

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  The Pontifex Maximus was an office of immense prestige, in many ways the most important of all Roman priesthoods. As a result it was eagerly sought by many of the Republic’s leading men. Catulus was standing for the post, as was Publius Servilius Isauricus, Caesar’s old commander from Cilicia. Both were older and far more distinguished than Caesar in terms of the offices and honours they had held. Had the appointment still been controlled by the Senate, it is virtually certain that Catulus would have been appointed. In an election the outcome was far less certain, for the voters remembered Caesar’s lavish spending as aedile, and his constant support for popular causes. He also seems to have spent lavishly during the campaign, giving gifts and doing favours to win over the key men in each tribe. His rivals were doing the same, and in one sense the reliance on the vote of only seventeen tribes instead of the full assembly made it easier to employ bribery. As the campaign went on, Catulus became deeply concerned that the upstart Caesar had turned into a serious challenger. Great though his auctoritas was, it would certainly be dented by an electoral defeat, especially one inflicted by a man so much his junior. Knowing that Caesar’s debts were huge even before the campaign had begun, Catulus wrote to him offering him a considerable sum of money on condition that he withdrew from the race for the priesthood. Caesar interpreted this as a sign of weakness and immediately took out new loans to have more to spend on wooing the tribes. It was a desperate gamble. His creditors were relying on his prospects for the future, chiefly the high office and the opportunities for profit that these would bring. In itself the office of Pontifex Maximus brought no real financial reward, but Caesar could not afford any electoral failure. If he could no longer win over the voters, then he would begin to look like a very poor risk for his creditors. These might well press him for repayment of his debts, before his fortunes failed altogether and he was utterly ruined.

  When the day of the election came–there is no record of when this was, but it must have been near the end of 63 BC – Caesar knew that the result would for him decide more than simply whether or not he won the post. Aurelia was there, and kissed him in parting before he left. Caesar told her that he would either return home as Pontifex Maximus or he would not return at all. This is one of the rare mentions of Aurelia from these years, but once again indicates the vital role she played in her son’s life. It is notable that the story has Caesar speaking in this way to his mother rather than to his wife Pompeia or to any of his lovers. Although we cannot be absolutely certain, it does seem that Aurelia lived in her son’s household. Perhaps in some way she symbolised the debt that Caesar owed to his family, making every success not simply significant to him, but part of restoring its importance and status. The contest for the priesthood was a gamble, and the price of failure very serious, certainly sufficient to retard his public career and possibly to terminate it. Yet before taking the gamble Caesar had done everything that he could to promote his success. Backing down from the challenge, as Catulus had tried to persuade him to do, was against Caesar’s instincts, for he was a gambler at heart, though never a wild one. He had raised the stakes by spending even more, but he had also judged that his prospects of success were good and hence that the risk was justified. Failure was a real possibility, but Caesar seems to have estimated that the odds on his success were good. Given Catulus’ hostility to him in the past, most recently following the erection of Marius’ trophies, his offer suggested that his main rival had reached a similar conclusion.19

  In the event Caesar prevailed. Plutarch describes the voting as very close, but Suetonius suggests a landslide victory, where more votes were cast for Caesar in Catulus’ and Servilius’ own tribes than they received in the entire Assembly. It was a great victory for him, particularly since he had overcome such strong rivals. As Pontifex Maximus he would in future take a central role in many aspects of State religion and ritual. He could not command the other pontiffs, for a majority of the other members of the college could overrule the Pontifex Maximus, but nevertheless his prestige and auctoritas were immense. Also, unlike the office of Flamen Dialis, there were no restrictions that hindered a political and military career. Physically it marked an important change, for the post came with a house, the domus publica, on the edge of the Sacra Via. Caesar had moved from the relative obscurity of the Subura to a place close to the heart of the Republic. The domus publica lay at the eastern end of the Forum and adjoined the Temple of Vesta and the Regia, where the records and texts of the pontiffs were housed and where they assembled as a college. The name Regia or ‘palace’ suggests a connection with Rome’s monarchy, and excavations have shown that there was certainly a building on the site from a very early period and that subsequent phases and rebuildings all broadly conformed to the same, unusual design. There is a fierce debate over the precise nature of the early buildings and whether it had ever been a royal residence or palace as such, but this need not concern us. In the Late Republic the domus publica and the Regia were hallowed for their great antiquity and long association with the sacred.20

  The contest for the priesthood was critical for Caesar, but in spite of its surprising result, its significance was far less than the consular elections. Catiline was once again a candidate, as was Servilia’s husband Decimus Junius Silanus. This was Silanus’ second attempt–a few years before Cicero had dismissed him as a nonentity. As consul, Cicero was now in charge of overseeing the election. Encouraged by one of the other candidates, he had himself created and ensured the passage of a new, even harsher law against electoral bribery, which carried the penalty of ten years’ exile. It did nothing to stop the already rampant bribery, perhaps begun by Catiline, but soon copied by all of the other candidates. Cato announced that he would prosecute whoever won the election, on the basis that no one could have prevailed in such a contest honestly. He did make an exception of his brother-in-law Silanus. While this may seem hypocritical to the modern eye, the Roman aristocracy placed huge importance on family connections and fully understood. Catiline’s fortunes were at a dangerously low ebb and he was clearly desperate, presenting himself as a champion of the poor, whose plight he could well understand because of his own poverty. He openly talked of the domination of the Republic by a clique of unworthy and vulgar individuals who looked only to their own interests. When challenged in the Senate by the consul, he spoke of two Republics–the great mass of the population were a powerful body without a head to guide them, while his opponents were a head without a body, since there was no real substance to their support. He declared that he would become the head that the mass of the population so urgently longed for. It was clear that many were rallying to him, and his agents were especially active in the rural areas. He does seem to have been slowly losing the friendship of the many leading men who had in the past supported him in court. Crassus and Caesar probably continued to back him throughout the campaign. Cicero postponed the elections once, and when they were finally held in late September he arrived accompanied by a bodyguard of equites voted to him by the Senate. He also made sure that everyone could see that he was ‘secretly’ wearing a breastplate under his toga. The successful candidates were Silanus and Lucius Licinius Murena, who had served as one of Lucullus’ senior subordinates in the Mithridatic War.21

  Catiline had clearly considered using force even before the election, but had presumably hoped to succeed by conventional means. His failure left him with little choice other than facing political extinction and exile, for, like Caesar, his debts were massive and many were due by 13 November, when he would face bankruptcy. Unlike Caesar his gamble was very much a longshot and he seems to have been undecided as to how to put his plan into operation. One of his followers, Caius Manlius, was busy raising an army in Etruria, but Catiline remained in Rome, attending the Senate as if nothing was happening. Manlius was a former centurion who had served with Sulla, but since the dictatorship had lost the fortune he had made in the civil war. He appears to have been a capable man, but was from outside the senatorial class
and so could never be more than a subordinate. Catiline had a number of aristocratic followers, but these were chiefly characterised by their dubious reputations and conspicuous lack of ability. It was hard for many to take such incompetents seriously, and this, combined with Catiline’s continued presence in Rome, helped to foster uncertainty amongst the Senate. There were rumours of plots and rebellion, but as yet nothing had happened to suggest that there was any substance behind them. Cicero was better informed, for he had assembled a network of spies who observed the conspirators. One of the most important sources was Quintus Curius, who had boasted of the plans in an effort to impress his mistress Fulvia. She was a member of an aristocratic family and married to a senator, and Cicero was able to persuade her to convince her lover to betray his fellow conspirators. As a result the consul knew much of what was going on, and was able to safeguard himself against a murder attempt. The ability to thwart the conspirators was all very well, but it did not permit the consul to stand up in the Senate and publicly prove that a plot was underway. As yet, they had not actually done anything to warrant his acting against them. Catiline was clearly exploiting this public uncertainty, but it may also be that he had not quite made up his mind when and how to act.22

  On the night of 18 October, Crassus and several other senators received anonymous letters, which warned them to flee because a massacre of leading men was going to occur on the 28th. They took the letters straight to Cicero, who had them read in the Senate. More reports of Manlius’ activities in Etruria reached the city, and on the 21st Cicero brought this information before the Senate, which passed the senatus consultum ultimum. He claimed that the rebel army would openly declare itself on 27 October. This occurred, although the threatened massacre did not. Various forces, including a number of armies who had been waiting outside Rome until their commanders were allowed to celebrate triumphs, were despatched to deal with the rebels. On 8 November the Senate met once again and Cicero harangued Catiline to his face, accusing him of past crimes and declaring that he knew all about his current plans. Although at the time he returned the invective, dismissing the consul as a ‘naturalised alien’ with all the contempt a patrician could show for a ‘new man’, this meeting finally stirred him into action. He left Rome that night, claiming that he was going into voluntary exile to spare the Republic from internal conflict. In a letter sent to Catulus, he complained of the wrongs done to him by his enemies and how he had been robbed of the proper rewards for his efforts and ability. In a properly Roman way, he commended his wife and daughter to Catulus’ protection. It was soon discovered that Catiline had not in fact fled abroad, but had instead joined Manlius and the army. Both men were declared public enemies. He left behind in Rome a number of supporters, who began to negotiate with some ambassadors from the Allobroges, a Gallic people who were in the city to complain of their desperate plight. The conspirators hoped to persuade the tribe to rebel and open a second front to distract forces loyal to the Senate. Instead the Gauls went to Cicero and betrayed them. One man was caught when the Allobroges led him into an ambush, and the four other key figures arrested shortly afterwards. Confronted with damning evidence, the initial declarations of innocence were soon replaced by admissions of guilt. It was now a question of what to do with them.23

  VII

  SCANDAL

  ‘The Republic, citizens, the lives of you all, your property, your fortunes, your wives and your children, together with this heart of our glorious empire, this most blessed and beautiful of cities, have, as you see, on this very day been snatched from fire and the sword. The great love that the immortal gods hold for you has combined with the toil and the vigilance that I have undertaken, and with the perils that I have undergone, to bring them out of the very jaws of destruction and restore them to you safe and sound.’–Cicero, 3 December 63 BC.1

  Caesar’s attitude throughout these months seemed to many to be deeply ambiguous. Along with Crassus, he had backed Catiline’s candidacy. He probably knew Catiline quite well, but then the world of Rome’s aristocracy was so small that most senators knew each other. Although Cicero’s speeches from 63 BC and afterwards painted Catiline as an irredeemable monster, he had not always thought of him in this way. As recently as 65 BC, he had considered defending him in court, ‘hoping that this will encourage them to join forces in our canvassing’ for the consulship in 63 BC.2 Caesar had persisted in his open support for Catiline for much longer and, as previously noted, the similarities between them were striking. Both men were inclined to support ‘popular’ causes and keen to associate themselves with Marius. When he reached Manlius’ army, Catiline paraded an eagle that had been the standard of one of Marius’ legions. Caesar would also have seemed a likely man to join a conspiracy of debtors, for his lifestyle was similar in many ways. When Cicero addressed the crowd in the Forum, he described many of the conspirators as: ‘the men you see with their carefully combed hair, dripping with oil, some smooth as girls, others with shaggy beards, with tunics down to their ankles and wrists, and wearing frocks not togas’.3This image could almost be an exaggerated portrait of Caesar himself, who had probably set the fashion for wearing long sleeves and whose loose girdled tunic hung low. In later years Cicero was suspicious of almost everything Caesar did, but even then is supposed to have said that: ‘On the other hand, when I look at his hair, which is arranged with so much nicety, and see him scratching his head with one finger, I cannot think that this man would ever conceive of so great a crime as the overthrow of the Roman constitution.’4Like many of the conspirators Caesar was a dandy, a man whose sexual exploits and massive debts were equally notorious, but unlike them he was also very successful. He had gained each office in the cursus as soon as he was eligible, and had just had the spectacular success in the competition for the post of Pontifex Maximus. Caesar had no need for revolution, which is not to say that he might not have joined the rebels if he had thought it likely that they would succeed.

  Crassus was in a similar position, for he had openly backed Catiline in the elections. Probably, like Caesar, Crassus would have made sure that he was on the winning side, whichever it might be, but the uncertainty of the situation made this a nervous time for anyone suspected of involvement in the plot. Even while his agents were openly raising an army, Catiline remained in Rome. After he left, it was known that other conspirators had remained behind to cause mischief in the city. With the consul announcing almost on a daily basis that he had uncovered new plans for assassinations and arson attacks, it was unsurprising that senators looked at many of their fellows with suspicion. Both Caesar and Crassus had to be very careful in their behaviour. Therefore Crassus immediately took the anonymous letter to Cicero as soon as he had received it. Even so, following the arrest of the conspirators, an informer was brought into the Senate who claimed that he had been sent by Crassus with a message to Catiline, telling him not be worried by the arrests, but to press on with his enterprise. According to Sallust:

  But when Tarquinius named Crassus, a man of enormous wealth and great influence, some found the accusation incredible, while others thought it was true, but reckoned that at a time of crisis it was better to win over than to alienate such a powerful man; a good number of them were in Crassus’ debt from private deals, and they all loudly called out that the accusation was false…5

  A vote was taken declaring the statement false and placing the informer in custody, pending investigation. The historian Sallust says that he himself later heard Crassus say that the informer had acted on the instructions of Cicero, who had wanted to force him to make an open breach with Catiline and the rebels instead of sitting on the fence. Certainly, the whole incident seems to have worsened the already poor relations between the two men.6

  Cicero was under great pressure in these weeks. Even at the time he was aware that this was his finest hour, the moment when the ‘new man’ from Arpinum would save the Republic. Throughout his life he would revel in recounting his great success, but it was not a victory th
at came easily. From the beginning it had been difficult to persuade all senators that the threat of rebellion was real, especially since for a long time there were few hard facts that he could report openly. Eventually, the arrest and interrogation of the key conspirators in Rome convinced the entire Senate that the threat was real and serious. It was now a question of dealing with it, but Cicero was hindered by the fact that his own year of office as consul had only a few more weeks to run. Like any Roman magistrate he was eager to ensure that the main threat was defeated in that time, both to ensure that it was done properly and because he wanted to gain the credit for this achievement. It was extremely inconvenient when Cato fulfilled his promise and prosecuted Murena, consul elect for 62 BC. Murena was clearly guilty of electoral bribery, but Cato was displaying his characteristic lack of timing. At a time of crisis it would obviously have been dangerous to have removed one of the two senior magistrates due to begin guiding the Republic in just a few weeks. Therefore, Cicero took the time off to defend Murena, emphasising the dire threat faced by the State and the valuable service that his client, as an experienced military man, could do for the threatened Republic. His speech was later published, and although it was said at the time that fatigue made his delivery less perfect than his normal standard, Murena was acquitted. Largely ignoring the charges, he mocked the motives of the prosecutors, depicting Cato as a naive idealist, trying to impose impractical philosophical principles in the real world. Cato is supposed to have responded by grimly saying ‘what a witty chap our consul is’. Cicero always preferred to speak last after the other defence counsels, in this case Hortensius and Crassus. It was an indication of the complex web of obligations and friendships in Roman politics that Crassus and Cicero found themselves working together in court on this and other occasions. Both men liked to defend, gaining the gratitude this brought from the client, his family and his close associates.7