Caesar

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  THE BELGAE

  Leaving his army to winter in the lands of the Sequani had shown that Caesar did not intend his intervention in the affairs of Gaul to be temporary. Even he admits that this caused disquiet amongst certain tribal leaders, who wondered whether they had truly gained from the expulsion of Ariovistus, if they were now to be dominated by a Roman proconsul. During the winter rumours and reports reached the proconsul south of the Alps that the Belgae, the tribes of northern Gaul, were even more disturbed and had formed a ‘conspiracy’ against Rome. They were encouraged by chieftains in some of the Gallic/Celtic peoples-men whom Caesar claims aspired to kingship – but judged that such revolutions would be harder to achieve in a region dominated by Rome. The Belgae also felt that once the Romans had secured control – ‘pacified’ is the word used in the Commentaries – of Celtic central Gaul, then the legions might soon march against them. In the light of subsequent events this was not an unreasonable concern, for Caesar was about to do precisely that. By taking his army outside Transalpine Gaul in the previous year, driving out first the Helvetii and then Ariovistus, he had shown that Rome was willing to intervene on behalf of its allies. In the past, the Roman province had maintained a ring of friendly states around its borders. Caesar had decided to push the Roman sphere of influence further north, claiming that this was necessary to prevent other forces from dominating the region, and ultimately threatening the security of the province. These motives were entirely appropriate for a Roman governor, and even if Caesar’s actions interpreted his duty in an extremely aggressive way, he still remained within the boundaries of proper action for a magistrate of the Republic. Pompey had behaved in a similar fashion during his eastern campaigns, but his and Caesar’s campaigns differed only in scale from the actions of many earlier Roman generals. Few of these men had subsequently been challenged because of their actions, and even fewer actually punished. In the Commentaries Caesar claims that the Belgae planned and began a preemptive attack to challenge Roman power. He was effectively acting in the same way. By the standards of the time, neither of them were acting unreasonably.12

  Caesar uses the term Belgae or Belgians fairly vaguely to refer to all the peoples living to the north of the Celtic tribes. The area was much wider than modern Belgium, and included not only parts of Holland, but much of northern France. The ‘true’ Belgae appear to have been the tribes living in what is now the Pas de Calais and upper Normandy. Caesar considered all of the Belgae were Gauls, but also claims that many of them were descended from German settlers. As we have already seen, the distinction between Gaul and German was not always as clear as our ancient sources suggest but there may well have been some truth in this. At the end of the first century AD Tacitus also believed that the Nervii and Treveri were both Germanic. In Caesar’s case his mention of the Germanic connection may well have been intended to make the Belgae seem more threatening, and therefore more deserving of Roman ‘pacification’. He also takes care to report that one tribe boasted that they were the only people who had resisted the migrating Cimbri and Teutones, while another was descended from these great enemies of Rome. The Belgae were more warlike than the Celtic tribes, in part because they were further away from Roman influence. Ancient authors believed that access to the luxuries of civilisation softened a people, while a simple life preserved natural virtue and courage. The archaeological record confirms that Roman wine was far less common in northern Gaul than amongst those peoples who lay nearer the trade routes. The Nervii are supposed to have forbidden all imports, but elsewhere the tribal aristocracies did value wine, and possessing it even in small quantities helped to confirm their status. Less is known about the walled towns of northern Gaul than the oppida of the Celtic tribes, but in general they seem to have been somewhat smaller and less developed. Some of the tribes still had kings, a few of whom were powerful, although aristocratic councils were more important in other tribes. Only a generation or so before, one monarch is supposed to have controlled much of the region and also part of Britain.13

  Such political unity under a single strong leader no longer existed, but the Belgic tribes did show a willingness to join together to meet what they perceived as the threat posed by the Romans. During the winter they had exchanged hostages and agreed to form a combined army, to which each was to provide a set number of warriors. The whole force was to be led by Galba, King of the Suessiones, not by any right, but because the other leaders acknowledged his ability Caesar began to concentrate his own forces before the campaigning season began, sending the two new legions under the command of the legate Quintus Pedius to join the rest of the army. The proconsul remained in Cisalpine Gaul, only travelling north to take charge when the spring was sufficiently advanced to provide forage for the army’s animals. He immediately requested the allied tribes to inform him of events further north and received reports of the Belgic preparations. The Roman army marched north, the proconsul pushing on at his usual rapid pace, so that within two weeks they were approaching the Remi, the first of the tribes considered to be Belgae rather than Celts. Envoys arrived assuring him that they had never been hostile to Rome, immediately agreeing to Caesar’s demands for hostages and supplies of grain. He questioned them about the numbers of warriors he was likely to face and was given a precise list of the tribal contingents. The Bellovaci had promised 60,000 men, the Suessiones and Nervii both 50,000, the Morini 25,000, the Atuatuci 19,000, the Atrebates 15,000, the Ambiani and Caleti each 10,000, while another six tribes altogether offered 50,000, producing a total of 289,000 warriors. These were the figures reported by the Remi and dutifully recorded by Caesar in the Commentaries. He never troubles to say whether or not he believed their estimates were accurate. The narrative of the campaign does suggest that the combined army was an exceptionally large and rather clumsy force, which may well have been significantly bigger than the Roman army Caesar himself made sure that the full strength of the tribes was never united, by arranging with Diviciacus for the Aedui to attack the Bellovaci and keep their warriors busy defending their own lands.14

  The Remi were closely related to the Suessiones, following the same customs and laws, and at times ruled by the same leaders. It is hard to know whether their readiness to join the Romans was a pragmatic acknowledgement of their inability to resist the sudden appearance of Caesar, or was based on rivalry with and fear of the other tribes. Certainly, the Remi were the first target of the Belgic coalition, whose army advanced to assault Bibrax, one of the Remi’s main towns (probably modern Vieux – Laon). Caesar had advanced across the Aisne, which lay on the tribe’s borders, and camped on the far bank. He left a detachment under the legate Sabinus on the other side of the river to build a fort protecting the bridge. Bibrax was about 8 miles away, and its leader-one of the chieftains who had led the delegation to Caesar – now sent word that he could not hold out much longer unless he received help. Guided by the men who had brought this message, the proconsul sent his Numidian, Cretan and Balearic light troops to slip into the town under cover of darkness. The method used by the Belgians for attacking a fortification was simple – a barrage of sling stones and other missiles pinned the defenders down, while other warriors advanced holding their shields over their heads and undermined the wall. The skilled archers and slingers sent by Caesar would have made this extremely difficult, and the Belgians abandoned the attempt, contenting themselves with ravaging the surrounding area, setting fire to the small villages and farms dotted about the countryside. They then moved to confront Caesar, camping 2 miles from the Roman position, with a valley between them. Caesar claims that the fires in the Belgians’ sprawling encampment covered an area of some 8 miles.15

  For days both sides then watched each other. There were cavalry skirmishes, by which Caesar gauged the quality of this new enemy and judged that his own men would be more than a match for them in most situations. His camp was on high ground with the River Aisne to the rear. On the slope in front he deployed his six legions with battle experience, lea
ving the two recently recruited formations to guard his camp-an echo of the deployment against the Helvetii. With no natural feature to protect the flanks, the legionaries dug a 400 – pace (roughly 130 yards) ditch on each side, running back at right angles from the main line. Each ditch led up to a small fort, in which were emplaced light artillery pieces or scorpions, capable of firing heavy bolts with tremendous force and accuracy over distances far greater than any missile weapon the Belgians possessed. Sulla had once entrenched his position in much the same way to secure his flanks against an enemy army that was markedly superior in numbers. The Belgians would have to advance up the gentle slope before attacking the Roman position from the front, and the advantage of such a position had been clearly demonstrated the year before near Bibracte. To make matters worse for the Belgians, in the bottom of the valley between the two positions was a stream and an area of marsh. These were not impassable obstacles, but would have slowed an attack down and caused a line to fall into disorder. It was unlikely that the opposition would give the attacker the opportunity to stop and redress the line before continuing the advance.16

  Caesar’s position was a strong one and he could be confident of beating off even the heaviest of attacks. However, the Belgic host showed no sign of charging to its doom and was content to form up on the far side of the valley, waiting for the Romans to cross the boggy ground and fight at a disadvantage. This was always the risk for a commander who took up a very strong position, for if the advantages it gave were obvious, then there was little incentive for the enemy to engage. Both sides sent forward their cavalry, and the allied horsemen gained a slight advantage over the Belgian horse before Caesar withdrew them. Realising that a full-scale battle was not going to develop, the legions were ordered back to camp to rest. Reaching the same conclusion, the Belgic commanders sent a part of the army to ford the River Aisne and either threaten the Roman supply line by capturing the fort protecting the bridge, or draw Caesar off by ravaging the lands of his newfound allies, the Remi. The outpost at the bridge reported this new threat and Caesar responded by personally leading his cavalry, Numidians, and the other light troops back across to the far side of the river. They managed to catch the Belgic warriors when only a few had got across. The latter were surrounded and dealt with by the cavalry, while the missile troops shot down the other warriors as they waded through the water. After suffering heavy losses, the Belgians withdrew.

  It was a difficult task to keep any tribal army in the field for any length of time, since their logistical arrangements tended to be extremely basic. Only a certain amount of food would have been carried by the warriors, or the wives and servants who in many tribes accompanied them to battle. In the summer months it was often possible to find food and forage from the countryside, but the quantities to be seized in this way were limited, and soon exhausted if the army remained in one place for any length of time. The Belgian army in 57 BC was exceptionally large, even if we must treat the figures given with some caution, and so the problems of supply were made considerably worse. The attack on Bibrax had failed, as had the attempt to cross the river and get behind the Romans. Caesar had shown himself willing to fight only if the Belgians put themselves at a severe disadvantage. He had doubtless told his men that the reluctance of the enemy to attack the Roman position showed that they were frightened. Galba and the Belgian chieftains could equally have assured their warriors that the Roman refusal to come down from their hilltop and trenches was proof that they feared the might of the tribes. The campaign had not been especially successful for them so far, but they had shown their numbers and confidence to this new enemy, and Caesar had not risked attacking their main force. It is possible that Galba and the other leaders felt that they had demonstrated their strength and that this might be enough to deter further invasion. There often seems to have been strong elements of display and gesture in inter-tribal warfare, so we do not necessarily need to follow Caesar and see the Belgians’ next action in purely pragmatic terms. Yet the practical factors were undeniable, for the army had almost run out of food and could not stay where it was for much longer. In addition, news had arrived that the Aedui were advancing to the border with the Bellovaci in accordance with Caesar’s arrangement with Diviciacus. At a council of the senior chieftains present with the army, the Belgians resolved to disperse and go home, each tribal contingent returning to its own lands, where they could easily be fed. Pledging themselves to come to the aid of any tribe that Caesar might attack over the coming months, the great army broke up. It did not do this in any ordered manner, individual leaders and groups simply packing up and walking off during the night.17

  The Roman outposts reported the noisy departure of the Belgian army, but Caesar was suspicious that it might be a trap. The failure of the surprise attack against the Helvetii in the previous year may well have made him rather cautious about operations at night. At dawn he sent out patrols that confirmed that the enemy really were simply drifting away without any serious attempt to cover their retreat. The cavalry rode out under Pedius and Cotta, while Labienus followed them with three legions to provide close support. There was little resistance, and large numbers of Belgic warriors were killed and captured as they fled from the Roman pursuit. For the moment the great army had dispersed-it would take some time before the tribes were able concentrate their forces again. Caesar made sure that they did not have that time. On the following day he marched against the Suessiones, whose lands bordered on those of the Remi. By a forced march he reached one of their main towns at Noviodunum. (Like most of the other Belgic oppida mentioned by Caesar, its precise location is unknown, but it was most probably fairly near modern Soissons.) Believing from reports that the town had no defenders, Caesar sent his men straight into the attack. There were indeed few warriors to resist him, but the Romans had no ladders or other siege equipment and those few were able to repulse the attack. After this failure, Caesar made sure that the business was done properly and set the legionaries to making a ramp, siege towers and mantlets to take his men up to and over the wall. The town was not yet blockaded, and numbers of warriors from the dispersing army took refuge within it. Their morale was shaky, however, and the sight of the Roman siege machines caused dismay. The Suessiones surrendered, winning favourable terms because the Remi interceded on their behalf. They gave up hostages from their leading families, including two of King Galba’s sons, and handed over quantities of weapons-perhaps a token amount as a symbol of disarmament.18

  Caesar needed to move on while the advantage was still with him and now attacked the Bellovaci. These similarly put up little resistance and swiftly surrendered. This time it was Diviciacus of the Aedui who spoke for them, pleading long-standing friendship between their two tribes. The recent hostility of the Bellovaci was blamed on a few chieftains who saw the Aedui’s alliance with Rome as slavery. These men had now fled to Britain and could no longer influence tribal policy. Caesar happily granted the pleas and accepted the surrender on similarly lenient terms, although he did demand and receive 600 hostages, which was clearly far more than normal. In part this was because he wanted to honour Diviciacus and the Aedui, but it was also important to weaken the coalition facing him by removing as many members as possible. The high total of hostages makes it likely that most of the Suessiones’ aristocratic families sent someone to Caesar’s camp and this was clearly intended to ensure that they did not risk renewing the war. Throughout the Commentaries on the Gallic War there are frequent references to hostages, but never once does Caesar say what happened to any who came from tribes that broke their treaties with him. It would be surprising if most of these were not executed on such occasions. After thus dealing with two powerful tribes individually, Caesar next attacked the smaller Ambiani, who swiftly capitulated. Well over a third of the force that it was claimed the Belgians had mustered earlier in the year had now been defeated and the odds were turning in Caesar’s favour. However, the easy victories of the last days were over and resistance was hardening
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  THE BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE

  Caesar now drove north-west against the Nervii, the largest tribe still willing to fight.

  After three days the Roman column was about 10 miles away from the River Sambre, and captives revealed under interrogation that the tribal army was waiting on the far side. They had been joined by the Atrebates and Viromandui, and another tribe, the Atuatuci, were on their way According to the Remi’s estimates, the Nervii, Atrebates and Viromandui had contributed 75,000 men to the coalition army raised earlier in the summer, and Caesar gives the first tribe 10,000 more men in this battle. As we have seen, the reliability of theses figure is questionable, and their contingents had probably anyway been weakened by the earlier operations and further reduced by warriors who had not yet been able to join the army Caesar’s eight legions probably mustered somewhere in the region of 30 – 40,000 men, backed by several thousand cavalry and as many light troops. It seems likely that the Nervii and their allies had at the very least parity of numbers with Caesar’s men, and probably a significant numerical advantage, although probably not as much as double the Roman numbers. The Belgians were determined to fight, and had evacuated their women, children and other non-combatants to places of sanctuary deep in inaccessible marshland. They also had information sent secretly by some of the Gauls and Belgians marching with Caesar as allies or hostages. These had reported that Caesar’s normal order of march was for each legion to form up separately, guarding its own baggage train. This meant that the fighting troops were split up into eight main sections, with cumbersome lines of servants, carts and pack animals between them, which would have made it difficult to form a battle line.20