Caesar

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  The new year seemed to augur well for Caesar’s enemies. Another Marcellus was consul, after being acquitted on a charge of electoral bribery, with Lucius Aemilius Lepidus Paullus as his colleague. The latter was the son of the Lepidus who had rebelled in 78 BC, only to be suppressed by Pompey. In spite of this, he was not believed to be especially well disposed towards Caesar either, and was anyway currently more concerned with his efforts to rebuild in grander fashion the Basilica Fulvia et Aemilia, a great monument to an earlier member of his family One of the new tribunes was Curio the Younger, who in 59 BC had been one of the few men to criticise the triumvirate publicly Cicero’s lively correspondent Caelius was close to the tribune at this time. Both were prominent members of a generation of young Romans notorious for their wild lifestyle, which, combined with their grand ambitions, often placed them into debt. Mark Antony was another of this group of reckless youths, and Curio is said to have first introduced him to the pleasures of mistresses, drinking and a flamboyantly luxurious lifestyle. The consequence of this was that Antony was soon massively in debt, and Curio’s father banned him from their house lest his own son proved too willing to pay his friend’s way More recently Curio had spent a huge sum on staging spectacular funeral games in honour of the Elder Curio, who died in 53 BC. He even constructed a wooden amphitheatre that revolved and could be divided into two semi-circular theatres for individual theatrical performances. A little later he had married Clodius’ widow, the forthright and forceful Fulvia. These young men-they were still ‘adolescents’ in the Roman understanding of the term-were talented, but did not seem at all stable to the older generation.

  Caelius was convinced that Curio planned an all-out attack on Caesar, but one of his first acts as tribune was to propose a new programme of distributing land to the poor. The hostility of the consuls effectively blocked this and instead he put forward bills for a new grain dole to citizens in Rome, and a five-year programme of road building in Italy. At the same time he began to make it clear at public meetings that he supported Caesar’s cause. Later there was talk of Caesar buying his support by paying off his massive debts with gold from the spoils of Gaul. Velleius Paterculus mentions rumours of a bribe of 2.5 million denarii, while Valerius Maximus talks of the staggering sum of 15 million. Gossip doubtless inflated the figure, but in one sense Caesar was doing for Curio effectively what Crassus had once done for him, covering his staggering debts in order to gain a useful political ally. There was also talk of Paullus benefiting on the scale of 9 million denarii, helping him to complete his building plans. Both men were ambitious Roman aristocrats and looked to their own advantage when they switched to supporting Caesar. For the moment they had been persuaded that it was in their interest to support him. Curio was probably frustrated by the blocking of his bills, which gave him no incentive to aid the leading men in the Senate.10

  The profits of his victories had allowed Caesar to win useful friends amongst the magistrates. When Marcellus duly raised the question of Caesar’s command on 1 March 50 BC his colleague did not support him, but the real counter-attack was led by Curio, who focused most of his attention on Pompey’s position. If Caesar was to be replaced in his Gallic command, then the tribune argued that it would only be fair, as well as safe for the Republic, if Pompey simultaneously gave up his extraordinary command of the Spanish provinces. He had already voiced this proposal at public meetings to the approval of the crowd. Caesar certainly approved of the tactic and may well have suggested it in the first place. The Spanish command had been renewed in 52 BC and still had several years left to run, so there were no legal grounds for this proposal, but it was a reminder of Pompey’s unprecedented position. It placed him and Caesar on the same level, suggesting that either both or neither should enjoy the honours voted to them by the Roman people. More personally, it was clearly intended to show Pompey that it was to his advantage to maintain the alliance with Caesar, since his own position might not in reality be as strong as he thought. Adding this element to the debate raised the stakes, but took back some of the initiative from Caesar’s opponents. They were at first stunned, and for several months there was deadlock, with Curio vetoing any attempt by the Senate to act against Caesar. In April, Caelius wrote again to Cicero:

  As for the situation of the Republic, all contention is focused on a single cause, namely the provinces. At the moment Pompey seems to be backing the Senate in demanding that Caesar leave his province by the Ides [13th] of November. Curio is utterly determined to prevent this – he has abandoned all his other projects. Our ‘friends’ (you know them well!) are afraid of pushing the issue to crisis point. This is the scene-the whole thing – Pompey, just as if he was not attacking Caesar, but making a fair settlement for him, blames Curio for making trouble. At the same time he is absolutely against Caesar becoming consul before giving up his province and army He is getting a rough ride from Curio, and his entire third consulship is attacked. You mark my words, if they try to crush Curio with all their might, Caesar will come to the rescue; if instead, as seems most likely, they are too frightened to risk it, then Caesar will stay as long as he wants.11

  It is not clear why Pompey chose 13 November as the new date for the end of Caesar’s command. It was not much of a concession, since he would still have had the best part of a year to wait before the consular elections in the autumn of 49 BC.It might have been acceptable to Caesar if he wanted to stand for the consulship in the elections at the end of 50 BC, but he does not seem to have made any attempt to secure exemption from law decreeing a ten-year interval between consulships. In any case, given the circumstances he may have decided that this was unlikely to succeed. By June, Caelius was reporting that Marcellus suggested negotiating with the tribunes, but the Senate voted against any such compromise. Curio continued to insist that Caesar’s command should not be discussed independently and that he must be treated in the same way as Pompey. A year before there had been talk of Pompey going out to Spain – now some suggested that either he or Caesar should go to deal with the Parthians. Cicero was very nervous that the latter might launch an all-out invasion of Rome’s eastern provinces before he could give up his own post as governor of Cilicia-knowing that once an attack occurred it would be dishonourable for him to leave. That summer the Senate decided to take one legion from Pompey’s and another from Caesar’s armies and send the troops out to bolster Rome’s forces on the Parthian border. Pompey decided to send the one that he had loaned to Caesar in 54 BC, and which had been campaigning with him ever since. Effectively this meant that Caesar lost two legions, but before he sent the men on their way he gave each soldier a bounty of 250 denarii, a sum amounting to more than one year’s pay. The whole affair seemed even more suspicious when the two units marched back to Italy and then remained there, no one making any effort to send them overseas. A young member of the Claudian family had collected the troops from Gaul and returned claiming that Caesar’s entire army was disaffected. It was just what Pompey wanted to believe.

  Soon afterwards Pompey fell ill, suffering from a recurring fever that may possibly have been malaria. Apparently spontaneously, people throughout Italy began praying and making offerings for the return to health of the man who had performed such great services to the Republic. When he recovered the celebrations were ecstatic, crowds greeting him all along his route as he went from Naples back to the outskirts of Rome. Pompey had always thrived on adoration, whether from his wives, his soldiers or the people, and was deeply moved. More dangerously he interpreted this enthusiasm as a clear sign of widespread devotion to his cause. While still ill he had sent word to the Senate that he was willing to resign his command, assuring them that Caesar would do the same. Curio responded by saying that that would be fine, as long as Pompey laid down his post first. By August Caelius was speaking to Cicero of the prospect of civil war. ‘If neither of the two sets off on a Parthian war, then I can see great discord ahead, which will be decided by cold steel and brute force. They are both well prepared in
spirit and with armies.’12

  Yet there was little enthusiasm for conflict beyond the immediate partisans, as was shown when the Senate debated the issue on 1 December. Curio again proposed that both Caesar and Pompey should give up their commands simultaneously. The consul Marcellus split this into two and presented separate motions to the House. The first, that Caesar should resign, was passed by a big majority, but the second asking Pompey to do the same was defeated by a similarly large margin. When Curio responded by asking the Senate to divide on the motion that both men should resign, the result was highly revealing. Only twenty-two senators voted against this, but no fewer than 370 backed it. The ‘back bench’ pedarii had lived up to their name and voted with their feet, even though most of the great names had been with the twenty-two. Marcellus dismissed the meeting, declaring ‘If that is what you want, be Caesar’s slaves!’, and the votes were ignored. It had not been a victory for Caesar, since a clear majority had wanted him to lay down his provinces and his army, while supporting Pompey’s claim to retain his command. Yet in the end what it had shown was that nearly the entire Senate wanted peace above all else. They were certainly not committed to Caesar’s cause, but nor were they eager to risk civil war on behalf of Pompey, still less of Cato, Domitius and their associates. By this time Cicero had come back to Italy from his province and his view was similar. He felt that Caesar’s demands were outrageously excessive, but even so preferred to grant them rather than allow the Republic to tear itself apart. He, like many others, remembered the dark days of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians and had no wish to see such ghastly strife repeated. In his view there was still the chance for compromise and a peaceful settlement. Perhaps there was, but the mood of the main participants in the dispute had hardened to the point where war was becoming more and more likely.13

  A hard core of distinguished senators loathed Caesar, many of them for personal as well as political reasons. Much of this hatred was not entirely rational. There were memories of his popularis behaviour as aedile and praetor, and even worse his turbulent consulship. To Cato and his associates Caesar was the Catiline who had never quite allowed his villainy to become so open. They saw the effect of his charm on others-on other men’s wives as often as on the crowd in the Forum – but felt that they had seen past it, which only made it all the more frustrating that others had not. It can never have helped that Cato’s half-sister had been one of Caesar’s most ardent lovers. Cato, his son-in-law Bibulus and brother-in-law Domitius Ahenobarbus had stood up to Caesar in the past and had had their moments of success. More often they had simply pushed Caesar into going further, and time after time he had got away with it, riding roughshod over them in 59 BC.They despised Caesar as a man, which made his obviously exceptional talent in public life and as an army commander all the more galling. Appius Claudius, older brother of Clodius, who had co-operated with Caesar much of the time, was obsessed with maintaining the dignity of his ancient patrician heritage. One of his daughters was married to Servilia’s son and Cato’s nephew Brutus, and another to Pompey’s eldest son. Opposition did not just come from Cato’s extended family, for families like the Marcelli and Lentuli did not like to see their current resurgence of electoral success overshadowed. For Metellus Scipio there was concern both to live up to his famous ancestors-both real and adopted – and eagerness to exploit the advantages offered by his marriage tie to Pompey.

  Ultimately, no Roman senator liked to see another man excelling him in glory and influence. It was not so much what Caesar had done that provoked their hostility – most would have happily praised the same deeds, especially his victories in Gaul, if only they had been performed by someone else, or better yet by several other men so that no one individual gained too much glory. Men from established families were raised to believe that they deserved to guide the Republic, but Caesar’s eminence robbed them of much of this role. Now there was a chance to end his career-preferably in court, and a court that shared their view of the accused and the need to be rid of him, but if not, by armed force. Pompey’s aid made this possible and so, for the moment, he was useful enough for his own anomalous position to be ignored. In the future then it might be possible to discard him or at least reduce his dominance. Since he first hinted that he was not firmly committed to backing Caesar’s demands, Pompey had encouraged his opponents. Cato at least does seem to have hoped to avoid civil war, and once it began made some effort to moderate the vehemence with which it was fought. His expectation was that Caesar could be forced to submit. The attitude of his allies was less clear. Some of them clearly hoped to profit from war. Cicero was surprised and rather disgusted by the militancy he saw in many of these men. He could also see no sense in fighting Caesar after years of allowing him to become so powerful.14

  Pompey’s attitude was different. Even at the end he would have been content for Caesar to return to public life so long as it was in a way that made it clear that he was not Pompey’s equal, still less his superior. This desire had hardened as the months had gone by, and Curio had made such efforts to place the two men on the same level. Crassus he had been able to accept as an equal, for he was several years his senior and had fought for Sulla. Perhaps as importantly, Pompey had always been confident that his own charisma and spectacular military exploits-three triumphs compared with Crassus’ mere ovation-gave him a comfortable advantage over his rival. Caesar was younger by just six years, but more importantly he had done nothing when Pompey had formed and led his own armies to victory, and in this respect his career was decades behind. He found it easier to like Caesar than Crassus, but perhaps in part that was because he did not see him as a competitor, at least at first. Even after Caesar’s successes in Gaul, Germany and Britain, Pompey still viewed him as a junior ally After all he had won triumphs on three continents – Asia, Africa and Europe – and defeated many different opponents, some of them Roman, in the process and not just barbarian tribes. ‘What if my son wants to attack me with a stick?’-the comment implied not just the ease of dealing with such a threat, but how absurdly unlikely it was that it would even happen. Pompey did not want civil war, but had little doubt that he could win it if the worst came to the worst and it occurred. Around this time he would begin to boast that he had only to stamp his foot and armies would spring up from the soil of Italy. In the end Caesar must realise that he needed to respect Pompey, accept his terms for coming back, and trust to his friendship for protection in the courts. Curio’s attack on his own position made him all the less inclined to grant too many concessions to the proconsul in Gaul. Caesar would have to see sense, but he could still be very useful to Pompey, who was aware that Cato and his allies had no great love for him either.

  Caesar claimed later that he had to fight a civil war in order to defend his dignitas – his reputation. In his view the laws of his consulship had been necessary and effective, especially the land laws. Since then he had served the Republic well, defending its interests and its allies, and making Roman power respected in regions that had never before seen a legion. For these achievements the Senate had awarded him no less than three public thanksgivings of unprecedented length. Now his command was to be prematurely curtailed – at least in his view-while the law put forward by all ten tribunes in 52 BC as an expression of the will of the Roman people was being set aside both in detail and in spirit. His enemies, ignoring all his successes, were boasting of attacking and condemning him because of his consulship almost a decade ago. The great men of the Republic were not taken to court. Pompey had not been prosecuted since his youth, before he had raised his own legions. No one had ever dared to bring Crassus to trial. Simply having to defend himself would have been a great blow to Caesar’s pride and auctoritas. There was also the very real danger that he might be condemned, especially if the court was controlled by enemies. As consul his behaviour had been controversial at the very least, although innocence or guilt was seldom the decisive factor in Roman trials. Milo’s fate offered a warning, as did that of G
abinius, the man who as tribune in 67 BC had secured Pompey the command against the pirates, and as consul in 58 BC with Caesar’s father-in-law Calpurnius Piso had helped to secure the triumvirate’s position. After that he had gone to govern Syria and, largely on his own initiative, had taken his army into Egypt to restore the deposed Ptolemy XII, a highly profitable enterprise. Yet he was a deeply unpopular man and, in spite of his money and the support of Pompey, he was eventually condemned when he returned to Rome in 53 BC, going into exile.